Christina Zink v. Genesee Intermediate School District

Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan

Megan K. Cavanagh, Chief Justice Brian K. Zahra Richard H. Bernstein Elizabeth M. Welch Kyra H. Bolden Kimberly A. Thomas Noah P. Hood,

Justices

Order

July 10, 2026

SC: 167913

COA: 367682

Genesee CC: 21-116109-CD

CHRISTINA ZINK,

Plaintiff-Appellant, v

GENESEE INTERMEDIATE SCHOOL

DISTRICT and JAN COX, Defendants-Appellees. On December 11, 2025, the Court heard oral argument on the application for leave to appeal the November 8, 2024 judgment of the Court of Appeals. On order of the Court, the application is again considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

WELCH, J. (dissenting).

In Jacobson v Parda Fed Credit Union, 457 Mich 318, 321, 328-329 (1998), we held that the limitations period for a constructive discharge claim under the Whistleblowers' Protection Act (WPA), MCL 15.361 et seq., begins to run when an employee resigns. This Court then overruled Jacobson in Joliet v Pitoniak, 475 Mich 30, 41 (2006), holding—without conducting a stare decisis analysis—that a constructive discharge claim accrues at the time of the alleged wrongdoing as opposed to the date the employee felt compelled to quit. In my view, Jacobson was correct and aligns with this Court's longstanding precedent regarding claim accrual. Because this case presents us with the opportunity to correct Joliet's error, I respectfully dissent from the Court's denial of leave to appeal in this case.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

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Plaintiff was employed by defendant Genesee Intermediate School District as a special education teacher from 2016 to 2021.¹In 2020, one of the students in plaintiff's classroom had a violent outburst. According to plaintiff, he attempted to choke himself, threatened to kill staff with a gun, and attempted to take a taser from the school resource officer who responded to the incident. He allegedly pushed, punched, and attempted to bite staff. Plaintiff says that this student put the staff in mortal fear. When the student returned to her classroom, plaintiff communicated her concerns regarding the student to the principal, defendant Jan Cox. Plaintiff complained that the principal's lack of response to the student's outburst violated the school's policies and the law. Plaintiff claims that the principal and other school officials retaliated against her for raising concerns and filing an internal complaint in June 2020. She claims that defendants threatened pre-corrective action, organized to transfer her to a nonteaching position she was not qualified for, continued to ignore her concerns, and violated the parties' mediation agreement. According to plaintiff, she went on physician-approved medical leave beginning May 7, 2021, because of the retaliation she suffered. During this leave of absence, plaintiff heard from a coworker that the same student had again attempted to punch a staff member and steal the resource officer's taser. Plaintiff never returned to work after her medical leave and ultimately quit on June 7, 2021. She claimed that both safety concerns and the retaliatory conduct compelled her to resign.

Eighty days later on August 26, 2021, plaintiff filed suit against defendants. Plaintiff alleged that defendants constructively discharged her in violation of the WPA. Defendants moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7), asserting that plaintiff's claim was barred by the WPA's 90-day statute of limitations. See MCL 15.363(1). Defendants argued that plaintiff's WPA claim was time-barred because plaintiff did not allege any employer action within the 90 days prior to her filing suit that caused her to resign. After a hearing, the trial court granted defendants' motion, dismissing plaintiff's claim. Plaintiff appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, relying on this Court's decision in Joliet.

II. LEGAL BACKGROUND

A. CONSTRUCTIVE DISCHARGE

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Plaintiff alleges that her employer constructively discharged her in retaliation for her internal report. "Constructive discharge may be found where working conditions would have been so difficult or unpleasant that a reasonable person in the employee's shoes would have felt compelled to resign." Jenkins v Southeastern Mich Chapter, American Red Cross, 141 Mich App 785, 796 (1985). "Michigan law recognizes constructive discharge as an adverse employment action." Agnew v BASF Corp, 286 F3d 307, 309 (CA 6, 2002), citing Champion v Nation Wide Security, Inc, 450 Mich 702 (1996), overruled on other grounds by Hamed v Wayne Co, 490 Mich 1, 30 (2011). "It is well established that the law does not differentiate between employees who are actually discharged and those who are constructively discharged." Champion, 450 Mich at 710. In Champion, this Court explained that a constructive discharge is imputed to the employer and is not merely an employee's response to alleged misconduct. In that case, the plaintiff's supervisor raped her after the plaintiff rejected his advances. Id. at 705-706. She immediately left work and reported the rape to police before being rushed by an ambulance to a hospital. Id. at 707. The plaintiff sued her employer, alleging sexual harassment and constructive discharge in violation of the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act, MCL 37.2101 et seq. Id. Although Champion's facts illustrate that establishing intolerable conditions for a constructive discharge claim is a heavy lift for plaintiffs,²Champion made clear that a constructive discharge is not the same thing as a voluntary resignation. If a plaintiff can show that they have suffered intolerable conditions, "the law does not differentiate between employees who are actually discharged and those who are constructively discharged. In other words, once individuals establish their constructive discharge, they are treated as if their employer had actually fired them." Champion, 450 Mich at 710. "The decision to terminate in a constructive discharge case, therefore, is imputed to the employer." Id. To treat the employee as if she had voluntarily quit would inappropriately "attribute[] responsibility for the discharge to [the plaintiff]. This result unjustly blames the victim, especially because a constructive discharge occurs only where an employer['s] . . . conduct is so severe that a reasonable person in the employee's place would feel compelled to resign." Id. at 710.

B. THE WHISTLEBLOWERS' PROTECTION ACT

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The WPA prohibits an employer from taking an adverse employment action against an employee who reports or is about to report to a public body a violation of law or a suspected violation of law. Green v Pontiac Pub Library, ___ Mich App ___ (March 7, 2024) (Docket No. 363459); slip op at 7. Section 2 of the WPA, MCL 15.362, provides:

An employer shall not discharge, threaten, or otherwise discriminate against an employee regarding the employee's compensation, terms, conditions, location, or privileges of employment because the employee, or a person acting on behalf of the employee, reports or is about to report, verbally or in writing, a violation or a suspected violation of a law or regulation or rule promulgated pursuant to law of this state, a political subdivision of this state, or the United States to a public body, unless the employee knows that the report is false, or because an employee is requested by a public body to participate in an investigation, hearing, or inquiry held by that public body, or a court action.

To establish a prima facie case of violation of the WPA, plaintiffs must demonstrate that (1) they were engaged in protected activity as defined by the act, (2) they were discharged or discriminated against, and (3) there is a causal connection between their protected activity and the discharge or adverse employment action. Pace v Edel- Harrelson, 499 Mich 1, 6 (2016). The WPA sets out a 90-day limitations period. "A person who alleges a violation of this act may bring a civil action for appropriate injunctive relief, or actual damages, or both within 90 days after the occurrence of the alleged violation of this act." MCL 15.363(1).

In Jacobson, this Court held that a constructive discharge claim accrues under the WPA on the date an employee resigns. Jacobson, 457 Mich at 321. There, the plaintiff was the executive vice president and chief operating officer of the defendant employer, a credit union, and she believed that she was generally regarded as the expected successor to the president and CEO. Id. at 321-322. The plaintiff reported suspicious activity to the Federal Bureau of Investigation because she thought that the defendant had filed a fraudulent bond. Id. at 322. After the board of directors learned of the plaintiff's report, her relationship with the board dramatically declined. Id. The defendant passed her over for her expected promotion, reassigned her staff to the new interim president, and significantly reduced the plaintiff's job duties. Id. at 322-323. The plaintiff resigned, and exactly 90 days later, she filed her WPA action. Id. at 323. Each of the employer actions that prompted the plaintiff to resign occurred more than 90 days before her resignation. Id. The defendant in Jacobson argued that the plaintiff's claim was untimely because she did not allege any wrongful employer action within the 90-day limitations period. Id. at 326-328. We rejected this argument:

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While an employer's action may lead to a constructive discharge, such a discharge itself generally cannot become evident until the employee has, in fact, left the employment. It seems, therefore, that to say that a discharge occurred whenever an employer's action that resulted in the discharge occurred would be to set a date of occurrence in retrospect. Until the employee resigns, the employer's action has yet to prove to be one of discharge. A discharge, be it constructive or otherwise, must have in place all the events necessary to determine its existence. [Id. at 327.] The Jacobson Court thus "decline[d] the defendant's invitation to depart from our longstanding rule that a discharge occurs when a reasonable person in the employee's place would feel compelled to resign." Id. at 328. As a result, the Court determined that the plaintiff timely filed her lawsuit because she resigned within the WPA's 90-day limitations period. Id. at 321, 329.

The dissent in Jacobson agreed with the defendant and would have started the limitations period from the date that the employer's adverse action occurred. Id. at 330- 331 (TAYLOR, J., dissenting). Specifically, "[b]ecause plaintiff allege[d] no adverse actions by defendant that occurred within ninety days of the filing of her complaint," the dissent would have held that the WPA's 90-day statute of limitations barred her claim. Id. at 331. Eight years later, this Court overruled Jacobson in Joliet, another constructive discharge case. The plaintiff in Joliet was a municipal worker who alleged her employer constructively discharged her through Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act violations, breach of contract, and misrepresentation. Joliet, 475 Mich at 31-34, 37. All the alleged claims were subject to a three-year statute of limitations. Id. at 32, citing MCL 600.5805. The plaintiff filed suit against her employer within three years after she resigned. Id. at 33-34. However, because the plaintiff took a leave of absence before resigning, her last interaction with her employer was more than three years before the plaintiff filed her claims. Id. at 33, 42-43. The Joliet Court adopted the accrual reasoning from the dissent in Jacobson. Id. at 41 ("We agree with the Jacobson dissent that in the context of a constructive discharge it is the employer's wrongful act that starts the period of limitations by causing the employee to feel compelled to resign, not the employee's response."). For this reason, the Joliet Court remanded the case for entry of an order granting the defendants' motion for summary disposition based on the three-year limitations period. Id. at 45. Justice KELLY dissented. Id. at 45-48 (M. J. KELLY, J., dissenting). While Joliet did not involve a WPA claim, it purported to overrule Jacobson's holding that a constructive discharge claim accrues under the WPA when a plaintiff resigns. Id. at 41 (opinion of the Court). In my view, the Joliet Court made a series of errors in overruling Jacobson.

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III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Whether a cause of action is barred by the statute of limitations is a question of law that this Court reviews de novo if there is no factual dispute. See Moll v Abbott Laboratories, 444 Mich 1, 26 (1993); Frank v Linkner, 500 Mich 133, 140 (2017). This Court similarly reviews statutory interpretation on a de novo basis. Pace, 499 Mich at 5. We review de novo the trial court's decision to grant or deny summary disposition. Ottgen v Katranji, 511 Mich 223, 230 (2023). When reviewing a trial court's decision on a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7), this Court considers all documentary evidence and accepts the complaint as factually accurate unless it is specifically contradicted by affidavits or other appropriate documents. Frank, 500 Mich at 140.

IV. DISCUSSION

A. THE JOLIET COURT OVERRULED JACOBSON TO RESOLVE AN IMAGINARY

CONFLICT

The Joliet Court reasoned that Jacobson's analysis of claim accrual as applied to a constructive discharge conflicted with another opinion from this Court, Magee v DaimlerChrysler Corp, 472 Mich 108 (2005). But this conflict was the Joliet Court's invention. The Joliet majority—which was the same majority that decided Magee— resolved the contrived conflict in favor of its own recent analysis. It thus effectively overruled Jacobson without considering the principles of stare decisis. The error in Joliet is further compounded by the fact that Magee does not actually conflict with Jacobson. The plaintiff in Magee alleged that she suffered sexual harassment, sex and age discrimination, and retaliation by her employer in violation of the Elliott- Larsen Civil Rights Act. Magee, 472 Mich at 109. She went on a medical leave of absence for six months before resigning, and she sued her employer nearly three years after her resignation. Id. at 110. Her civil rights claims were subject to a three-year statute of limitations. Id.; see MCL 600.5805. The plaintiff argued that her claims were timely because she filed suit within three years of resigning. Id. at 111-112. The Magee Court rejected that argument because the plaintiff's lawsuit did not include a discharge claim. Id. at 112. Significantly, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's dismissal of Magee's constructive discharge claim, and Magee did not appeal that issue to this Court. Id. at 110 n 2.

The Magee plaintiff instead "base[d] her Civil Rights Act claims on alleged discriminatory conduct that occurred before her leave of absence." Id. at 112. It was this controlling fact that led the Court to distinguish Magee from a typical discharge case. Id. at 112, citing Collins v Comerica Bank, 468 Mich 628, 633 (2003) (holding that "a claim for discriminatory discharge cannot arise until a claimant has been discharged"). Because the plaintiff in Magee did not appeal her discharge claim—whether discriminatory or

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constructive—the date of the plaintiff's resignation was irrelevant to the Court's decision regarding the three-year limitations period.

In summary, Magee and Jacobson did not conflict with each other. Jacobson involved a constructive discharge whereas Magee, on appeal to this Court, did not involve a discharge claim of any sort. The cases were resolved based upon wholly different legal reasoning. The Joliet Court invented a conflict between Magee and Jacobson by incorrectly treating Magee as a constructive discharge case.

B. JOLIET WAS WRONGLY DECIDED

In addition to improperly resolving an imaginary conflict between Magee and Jacobson, the Joliet Court erred in overruling Jacobson for several other reasons. First, the Joliet Court failed to meaningfully engage with the constructive discharge caselaw that underlies Jacobson. Champion clarified in no uncertain terms that "the law does not differentiate between employees who are actually discharged and those who are constructively discharged. In other words, once individuals establish their constructive discharge, they are treated as if their employer had actually fired them." Champion, 450 Mich at 710. "The decision to terminate in a constructive discharge case, therefore, is imputed to the employer." Id. Jacobson relied on Champion when it "decline[d] the defendant's invitation to depart from our longstanding rule that a discharge occurs when a reasonable person in the employee's place would feel compelled to resign." Jacobson, 457 Mich at 328.

The Joliet Court reasoned that "Jacobson erroneously treated an employee's resignation as a violation of the WPA. Where the resignation is not itself an unlawful act perpetrated by the employer, it simply is not a 'violation' of the WPA under the plain language of MCL 15.362 . . . ." Joliet, 475 Mich at 41. But the Joliet Court failed to recognize that, under Champion, the employer bears the responsibility for an employee's involuntary resignation. And this concept was not novel in Jacobson; it goes to the very heart of the law governing constructive discharge.³Joliet ignored the strong foundation upon which Jacobson was built. In doing so, it committed an error that the Champion

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Court forbade: Joliet "unjustly blames the victim" for the employer's misconduct. Champion, 450 Mich at 710.

Second, the Joliet Court diverged from ordinary accrual principles by focusing on the employer's act rather than the injury to the plaintiff. Joliet measured the three-year limitations period from " 'the time the wrong upon which the claim is based was done regardless of the time when damage results.' " Joliet, 475 Mich at 36, quoting MCL 600.5827 (emphasis omitted). But this Court has consistently held that a "wrong" is the combination of the defendant's wrongful act and the injury to the plaintiff. See Boyle v Gen Motors Corp, 468 Mich 226, 231 n 5 (2003) ("The wrong is done when the plaintiff is harmed rather than when the defendant acted."); Stephens v Dixon, 449 Mich 531, 534- 535 (1995) ("We have held that the term 'wrong,' as used in the accrual provision, refers to the date on which the plaintiff was harmed by the defendant's negligent act, not the date on which the defendant acted negligently. Otherwise, a plaintiff's cause of action could be barred before the injury took place.") (citation omitted). The Joliet Court improperly focused on the defendant's act rather than the plaintiff's injury when it reasoned that "it is the employer's wrongful act that starts the period of limitations by causing the employee to feel compelled to resign, not the employee's response," Joliet, 475 Mich at 41. Third, the Joliet Court failed to appreciate that the plaintiff's alleged injury was an involuntary discharge. An employee simply cannot suffer a discharge while still working for the defendant who allegedly discharged them.⁴As the Jacobson Court correctly explained, "[u]ntil the employee resigns, the employer's action has yet to prove to be one of discharge. A discharge, be it constructive or otherwise, must have in place all the events necessary to determine its existence." Jacobson, 457 Mich at 327. Thus, the Joliet Court erred when it reasoned that a claim for constructive discharge may accrue before the plaintiff suffers an actionable injury.

Fourth, the Joliet Court overstepped in purporting to overrule caselaw that interprets a completely different statute. Magee and Joliet were both cases filed under the Elliott- Larsen Civil Rights Act. Jacobson, in contrast, was a WPA case. The two statutes of limitations vary dramatically.⁵Jacobson and Magee do not irreconcilably conflict. The

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dissent in Joliet was right that the majority's overruling of Jacobson was "gratuitous" and

"unnecessary" because Jacobson involved claims brought under the WPA rather than the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act. Joliet, 475 Mich at 46 (M. J. KELLY, J., dissenting).⁶ Finally, the Joliet Court eschewed principles of stare decisis. "[S]tare decisis is a principle of policy and not a mechanical formula of adherence to the latest decision, however recent and questionable, when such adherence involves collision with a prior doctrine more embracing in its scope, intrinsically sounder, and verified by experience."

Helvering v Hallock, 309 US 106, 119 (1940) (italics omitted). "Stare decisis is generally 'the preferred course because it promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process.' " Robinson v Detroit, 462 Mich 439, 463 (2000), quoting Hohn v United States, 524 US 236, 251 (1998). Courts that are considering overruling a decision must not merely determine that the decision was wrong. They must also consider factors such as practical workability, reliance interests, and changes in law or facts.⁷Robinson, 462 Mich at 464. But the Joliet Court did not consider any of these factors. It instead avoided a stare decisis analysis by imagining a conflict between Jacobson and Magee.

C. JOLIET SHOULD BE OVERRULED

In my view, the stare decisis factors weigh in favor of overruling Joliet. When considering whether to overrule a wrongly decided opinion, "courts should review whether the decision defies practical workability, whether reliance interests would work an undue The statute of limitations for Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act violations is three years. MCL

600.5805(2).

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hardship were the decision to be overruled, and whether changes in the law or facts no longer justify the decision." City of Coldwater v Consumers Energy Co, 500 Mich 158,

173 (2017).

First, Joliet's constructive discharge claim accrual holding is unworkable in any practical sense. Joliet reasoned that "it is the employer's wrongful act that starts the period of limitations by causing the employee to feel compelled to resign, not the employee's response." Joliet, 475 Mich at 41. This rule ignores the practical reality that an employer's wrongful lack of action may reasonably compel an employee to resign. In this case, for example, plaintiff alleges that her employer twice failed to appropriately respond to a serious threat to staff's physical safety. She alleges that she was met with retaliation for reporting her employer's mishandling of the dangerous situation and that she was forced to resign after she lost hope that her employer would stop retaliating against her, stop ignoring her concerns, and start ensuring her safety. Even if a reasonable employee in her position would feel compelled to resign, the Joliet rule precludes her constructive discharge claim based precisely on the alleged cause of her involuntary resignation: her employer's retaliatory lack of action.

Further, the Joliet rule creates a perverse incentive for employees to quit at the first sign of retaliation. An employee may weather horrible conduct beyond the point where a reasonable employee would resign. Perhaps an employee cannot afford to quit. Or perhaps they believe assurances that the adverse conduct will be remedied. Each day such an employee waits to quit in hopes that the employer will remedy the situation is one less day to file suit within an extremely short 90-day limitations period. Joliet punishes these employees for seeking reconciliation.

Jacobson's bright-line rule is far more logical. The statute of limitations would begin to run when an employee finally loses hope and resigns. Although an objection to this rule is that plaintiffs can manipulate the limitations period, the Jacobson Court aptly responded:

The longer the employee delays his or her resignation, the more difficult it may be to prove that the allegedly intolerable conditions of employment actually were intolerable on an objective basis . . . , or that it was these conditions that caused the employee's resignation. Further, the employer, who has created or permitted the persistence of known intolerable conditions, should not be able to complain of delay when the employee retains employment in the hope that conditions will improve or that informal conciliation may succeed. [Jacobson, 457 Mich at 329 n 22, quoting Mullins v Rockwell Int'l Corp, 15 Cal 4th 731, 740 (1997) (quotation marks omitted; ellipsis in Jacobson).]

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In other words, starting the accrual period at the plaintiff's resignation does not allow plaintiffs to indefinitely delay bringing a constructive discharge claim under the WPA.

"The hypothetical tardy plaintiff . . . is more likely to harm, rather than help, her cause by delaying action" because "a person claiming 'intolerable' working conditions for some number of years will be hard pressed to convince a trier of fact, or even raise a question of fact, that such conditions were reasonably 'intolerable.' " Jacobson, 457 Mich at 330 n 24.⁸Defendants are free to seek summary disposition where they believe that no jury could believe that a reasonable person in the plaintiff's position would feel compelled to resign. See MCR 2.116(C)(10).⁹

Second, there are no reliance interests upon Joliet that would be upset by overruling that case. Reliance interests are upset when "the previous decision has become so embedded, so accepted, so fundamental, to everyone's expectations that to change it would produce not just readjustments, but practical real-world dislocations." Robinson, 462 Mich at 466. Although Joliet punishes plaintiffs who delay their resignations, most plaintiffs will likely learn of the Joliet rule only after resigning from an intolerable workplace and while considering a constructive discharge claim. And employers are not likely to schedule their retaliation based on Joliet. Overruling Joliet will merely cause judges and lawyers to adjust their accrual calculations in future cases; it will not affect the conduct underlying the lawsuit.

Third, while the law has not changed, Joliet itself abruptly changed the law. See McCormick v Carrier, 487 Mich 180, 211 (2010). And since Joliet was decided, the United States Supreme Court has resolved a circuit split in favor of starting the accrual of constructive discharge claims under Title VII of the federal Civil Rights Act, 42 USC 2000e et seq., on the date that the employee resigns. Green v Brennan, 578 US 547, 550, 552 (2016). Although we are not bound to apply that holding to Michigan's analogous Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act or to the WPA, the reasoning in that decision remains persuasive.

V. CONCLUSION

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Joliet was wrong when it overruled Jacobson. It concocted a conflict between Jacobson and Magee that does not exist. It then resolved that supposed conflict incorrectly, departing from this Court's caselaw on both constructive discharge and claim accrual. And it overruled established caselaw without conducting a stare decisis analysis. The Joliet Court's holding is detached from the statutory text of the WPA, the injuries the Legislature enacted it to remedy, our caselaw, and common sense. Because the WPA's limitations period is only 90 days, Joliet's error creates a high risk of barring meritorious suits— especially among employees facing deeply challenging circumstances who delay resigning because they either need a job or hope the problem will be remedied. I would correct this Court's error by overruling Joliet and reinstating Jacobson's logical accrual rule for constructive discharge claims under the WPA. I respectfully dissent. CAVANAGH, C.J., joins the statement of WELCH, J.

THOMAS, J. (dissenting).

This case concerns the alleged constructive discharge of plaintiff, Christina Zink, by defendant Genesee Intermediate School District. Plaintiff alleges that she reported a violation of law and, as a result, was made miserable in her job by the district and its staff. She subsequently went on medical leave for a period of time before eventually resigning from her position. And, after resigning, she filed the instant suit alleging violations of the Whistleblowers' Protection Act (WPA), MCL 15.361 et seq.

At issue is whether the statutory limitations period runs from the last retaliatory act, as this Court held in Joliet v Pitoniak, 475 Mich 30 (2006), or from the date of plaintiff's resignation, which was previously the rule under Jacobson v Parda Fed Credit Union, 457 Mich 318 (1998). Our Court of Appeals and the trial court applied the rule from Joliet in holding that defendants were entitled to summary disposition. However, given that the claim in this case is under the WPA, like in Jacobson, and not under the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act (ELCRA), MCL 37.2101 et seq., as in Joliet, I would apply the rule from Jacobson. Accordingly, I would reverse the judgments of our Court of Appeals and the trial court and apply the rule that the WPA claim of constructive discharge accrues on the date of resignation. For this reason, I respectfully dissent.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE

Plaintiff was a special education teacher employed by defendant Genesee Intermediate School District from 2016 to 2021. In 2020, a student in her classroom had a violent outburst that resulted in the intervention of the school resource officer. Plaintiff alleges that the staff was in fear after this incident. Plaintiff was not satisfied with the response of the defendant principal to these concerns, and plaintiff complained about defendants' alleged failure to take corrective action in violation of both school policies and the law. She claims that, because of her complaint, the principal and other school officials

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retaliated against her beginning in February 2020. On May 7, 2021, plaintiff went on physician-approved medical leave allegedly due to stress from the retaliation she suffered. Plaintiff never returned to work after going on medical leave, ultimately resigning on June 7, 2021. She alleges that both safety concerns and the retaliatory conduct compelled her to resign.

Plaintiff filed this suit 80 days after her resignation, on August 26, 2021. She alleged that defendants constructively discharged her in violation of the WPA. Defendants moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7) based on the WPA's 90-day statute of limitations. See MCL 15.363(1). Defendants assert that the last date any retaliatory act could have occurred, triggering the statute of limitations, was May 21, 2021 (when plaintiff received her last employee evaluation). After a hearing, the trial court granted defendants' motion and dismissed the WPA claim. Plaintiff appealed to our Court of Appeals, which affirmed. Zink v Genesee Intermediate Sch Dist, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued November 8, 2024 (Docket No. 367682). Plaintiff then sought leave to appeal in this Court. In lieu of granting leave to appeal, we ordered oral argument on the application, see MCR 7.305(I)(1), and asked:

(1) whether constructive discharge constitutes adverse employment action under the Whistleblowers' Protection Act, MCL 15.361 et seq.; (2) whether Joliet v Pitoniak, 475 Mich 30 (2006), and Magee v DaimlerChrysler [Corp],

472 Mich 108 (2005), were correctly decided, see Jacobson v Parda Federal Credit Union, 457 Mich 318 (1998); (3) whether they were properly applied in this case; and (4) if they were not correctly decided, whether this Court should overrule them. [Zink v Genesee Intermediate Sch Dist, ___ Mich ___;

21 NW3d 587 (2025).]

II. LEGAL BACKGROUND

This case concerns the accrual of a cause of action under the WPA in the context of constructive discharge. As a general rule, "[a] claim accrues when all of the elements of the cause of action have occurred and can be alleged in a proper complaint." Kesti v Williams, 513 Mich 1060, 1060 (2024) (quotation marks and citation omitted). In the context of the WPA, this means that a claim does not accrue until an employer's retaliatory

"intent was effectuated." Millar v Constr Code Auth, 501 Mich 233, 239-240 (2018).

"The WPA . . . protects whistleblowing employees from retaliation." Janetsky v Saginaw Co, ___ Mich ___, ___ (July 25, 2025) (Docket Nos. 166477 and 166478); slip op at 9. It states:

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An employer shall not discharge, threaten, or otherwise discriminate against an employee . . . because the employee, or a person acting on behalf of the employee, reports or is about to report, verbally or in writing, a violation or a suspected violation of a law or regulation or rule promulgated pursuant to law of this state, a political subdivision of this state, or the United States to a public body, unless the employee knows that the report is false . . . . [MCL 15.362.¹]

The WPA further provides that "[a] person who alleges a violation of this act may bring a civil action for appropriate injunctive relief, or actual damages, or both within 90 days after the occurrence of the alleged violation of [the WPA]." MCL 15.363(1) (emphasis added).

" 'The underlying purpose of the [WPA] is protection of the public." Stefanski v Saginaw Co 911 Communications Ctr Auth, ___ Mich ___, ___ (April 14, 2025) (Docket No. 166663); slip op at 8, quoting Dolan v Continental Airlines/Continental Express, 454 Mich 373, 378-379 (1997). It was initially adopted in response to the accidental contamination of livestock feed. Dolan, 454 Mich at 378. The WPA "encourages employees to assist in law enforcement and protects those employees . . . with an eye toward promoting public health and safety." Id. (quotation marks, citation, and alterations omitted).²It does so by "removing barriers that may interdict employee efforts to report violations or suspected violations of the law." Id. at 378-379. We have taken a broad view of the WPA's application given its text. See, e.g., Brown v Mayor of Detroit, 478 Mich 589, 594-596 (2007) (declining to read into the WPA requirements that reporting be (1) to

"an outside agency or higher authority" and (2) "outside the employee's job duties").³

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A constructive discharge is "the culmination of [an employer's] alleged wrongful actions," which cause the employee targeted by those actions to quit. Joliet, 475 Mich at 41. However, not all wrongful acts by an employer amount to constructive discharge. Rather, " 'a constructive discharge occurs only where an employer or its agent's conduct is so severe that a reasonable person in the employee's place would feel compelled to resign[.]' " Jacobson, 457 Mich at 325-326, quoting Champion v Nation Wide Security, Inc, 450 Mich 702, 710 (1996).⁴"[O]nce individuals establish their constructive discharge, they are treated as if their employer had actually fired them." Champion, 450 Mich at 710.

III. ANALYSIS

In essence, the parties here ask us to resolve the conflict between Jacobson and Joliet. In Jacobson, 457 Mich at 320-321, this Court held that the WPA's statute of limitations for a constructive discharge claim begins to run on the date of the employee's resignation.⁵In contrast, the Joliet Court held that the ELCRA statute of limitations, former MCL 600.5805(9) (now MCL 600.5805(2), as amended by 2018 PA 183), begins to run for a constructive discharge claim when the alleged conduct occurred that caused the plaintiff's resignation. Joliet, 475 Mich at 36, 41-42.⁶Our Court of Appeals, and the trial court, applied the rule from Joliet in this case. Zink, unpub op at 3-4. The Joliet Court strayed beyond the law and case before it. In Joliet, the plaintiff brought claims of discriminatory discharge under the ELCRA, breach of contract, and misrepresentation. Joliet, 475 Mich at 31-32. The relevant issue before the Joliet Court, as noted above, was accrual of the plaintiff's discriminatory discharge claim under the

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three-year statute of limitations applicable to ELCRA claims. Id. at 34-35; see MCL 600.5805(2). The Court cited and discussed this statute of limitations in considering whether the claim accrued on the date of resignation rather than the date of the alleged harassment.⁷Joliet, 475 Mich at 36. But the Court went further than the ELCRA statute of limitations, creating a conflict between Joliet and Jacobson by discussing the WPA's own statutory limitations period and purporting to overrule our decision in Jacobson. Joliet, 475 Mich at 38-42.⁸

I do not opine on the wisdom of the Joliet Court's decision with respect to accrual under the ELCRA's statute of limitations. The WPA and ELCRA are subject to distinct statutes of limitations of different lengths. Compare MCL 15.363(1) with MCL 600.5805(2). But this distinction is also deleterious to both Joliet's application to WPA claims and its ability to overrule Jacobson completely.⁹See Mich Bell Tel Co v Pub Serv Comm, 332 Mich 7, 18 (1952); Rector v Ragnar-Benson, Inc, 313 Mich 277, 281-282 (1946). As the case before us involves an alleged discharge in violation of the WPA, I would find that Joliet's overruling of Jacobson as it pertains to the WPA is nonbinding dicta.

We have said that a " '[d]ictum is a judicial comment that is not necessary to the decision in the case.' " Rayford v American House Roseville I, LLC, ___ Mich ___, ___ (July 31, 2025) (Docket No. 163989); slip op at 23, quoting Pew v Mich State Univ, 307 Mich App 328, 334 (2014). "It is a well-settled rule that obiter dicta lacks the force of an adjudication and is not binding under the principle of stare decisis." People v Borchard- Ruhland, 460 Mich 278, 286 n 4 (1999); see also Quinton v Gen Motors Corp, 453 Mich

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63, 74 (1996) (opinion by LEVIN, J.) ("[I]ssues neither briefed nor argued cannot be definitively decided, and . . . the Court's pronouncements, especially dicta, without briefing and argument, are not stare decisis."). As we have described, " 'any statements and comments in an opinion concerning some rule of law or debated legal proposition not necessarily involved nor essential to determination of the case in hand are, however illuminating, but obiter dicta and lack the force of an adjudication.' " McNally v Bd of Canvassers of Wayne Co, 316 Mich 551, 558 (1947), quoting People v Case, 220 Mich 379, 382-383 (1922); see also Attorney General ex rel O'Hara v Montgomery, 275 Mich

504, 517 (1936).¹⁰

To be sure, our Court of Appeals' decision in Joliet relied upon our Jacobson decision; the Court of Appeals analyzed the ELCRA case before it by analogy to a constructive discharge case under the WPA. Joliet, 475 Mich at 36. And the Joliet Court's majority discussed Jacobson and the WPA at length. See id. at 38-42. However, Jacobson was discussed regarding its application to ELCRA claims. To wit, the order scheduling argument in Joliet mentioned neither the WPA nor Jacobson. See id. at 34-35, citing Joliet v Pitoniak, 472 Mich 908 (2005). It cited only Magee, Joliet, 472 Mich at 908, which was an ELCRA case that did not include a claim of constructive discharge, Magee, 472 Mich at 110 & n 2.

This failure is important here. The WPA includes a short 90-day statute of limitations that runs from "the occurrence of the alleged violation of this act." MCL 15.363(1). In Shallal v Catholic Social Servs of Wayne Co, 455 Mich 604, 612-613 (1997), we recognized that the Legislature enacted a narrow statute of limitations to compensate for the WPA's broad statutory language and to protect employers from "unscrupulous"

claims. (Quotation marks and citation omitted.) Striking the proper balance between protecting employees and employers is a particularly delicate matter under the WPA given the statute's purpose to protect the public health and safety. See Stefanski, ___ Mich at ___; slip op at 8. ELCRA claims are subject to a longer three-year statute of limitations that runs from "the time of the . . . injury." MCL 600.5805(2). And the Legislature has been content to apply the general tort statute of limitations to ELCRA claims. MCL

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600.5805(2); McLain v Roman Catholic Diocese of Lansing, 514 Mich 1, 12 n 6 (2024) ("MCL 600.5805 addresses limitations periods for tort actions."). Joliet's statements purporting to overrule Jacobson in the context of a WPA claim and to create an accrual rule for WPA claims are nonbinding dicta.¹¹Joliet did speak broadly about its ruling, and it purported to overrule Jacobson in every context, not just rejecting the analogy to the ELCRA case before it. Yet Joliet's pronouncements about an issue not before that Court are textbook dicta: a WPA claim was not before the Court, and neither Jacobson nor the WPA accrual rule was included in the questions posed by this Court. See Quinton, 453 Mich at 74 (opinion by LEVIN, J.). Moreover, its statements on the application of the Joliet rule to a possible future case under a different statute were not integral to the Joliet Court's decision. See Rayford, ___ Mich at ___; slip op at 23-24. Accordingly, I would apply the accrual rule adopted in Jacobson with respect to the WPA claims in this case. Moreover, this rule is consistent with the WPA's history and rationale in light of the shortened period provided for plaintiffs to bring a claim. For these reasons, I would hold that plaintiff's claim accrued on the date she resigned since she alleges a constructive discharge. See Jacobson, 457 Mich at 328-329.

IV. CONCLUSION

While Joliet purported to apply a uniform accrual rule to constructive discharges under both the ELCRA and the WPA, its statements as to the latter statute are nonbinding dicta. Rather, I believe our Court of Appeals and the trial court should have applied the date-of-resignation rule adopted for WPA claims in Jacobson.

I recognize that my resolution is unsatisfying with respect to constructive discharge law generally; it does not resolve the tension between the reasoning of Jacobson and that of Joliet or address accrual of other causes of action in the constructive discharge context. Justice WELCH would resolve that tension in this case by setting forth a framework that, when consistently applied to constructive discharge claims, would lead to the overruling of Joliet in both the WPA and ELCRA contexts. I would leave that question for another day given the case before us.

I also offer no comment as to the merits of plaintiff's claim. Summary disposition was granted in this case under MCR 2.116(C)(7), meaning that the only issue before us here is accrual of the claim under the statute of limitations given the facts alleged. The parties had not yet tested the merits of plaintiff's claims under MCR 2.116(C)(8) ("The

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I, Elizabeth Kingston-Miller, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. July 10, 2026

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Clerk opposing party has failed to state a claim on which relief can be granted.") or MCR 2.116(C)(10) ("Except as to the amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment or partial judgment as a matter of law."). This would require plaintiff to " 'show that (1) [s]he was engaged in protected activity as defined by the act, (2) the defendant retaliated against [her], and (3) a causal connection exists between the protected activity and the discharge.' " Janetsky, ___ Mich at ___ n 5; slip op at 11 n 5, quoting Chandler v Dowell Schlumberger Inc, 456 Mich 395, 399 (1998) (brackets omitted). Plaintiff's claims may very well have failed for any number of reasons.¹²However, I do not agree that they should fail on statute of limitations grounds. Consequently, I would reverse the judgments of our Court of Appeals and the trial court and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings.

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