State of Arizona v. Donald Ray Palmer

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION TWO

THE STATE OF ARIZONA,

Respondent,

v.

DONALD RAY PALMER,

Petitioner.

No. 2 CA-CR 2026-0039-PR Filed July 1, 2026

THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND

MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

See Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 111(c)(1); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.19(e). Petition for Review from the Superior Court in Pima County No. CR20050892001

The Honorable Danielle J.K. Constant, Judge

REVIEW GRANTED; RELIEF DENIED

COUNSEL

Laura Conover, Pima County Attorney By J. William Brammer Jr. and James W. Rappaport, Deputy County Attorneys, Tucson

Counsel for Respondent

Donald R. Palmer, Eloy

In Propria Persona

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MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Eckerstrom authored the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Gard and Chief Judge Staring concurred.

E C K E R S T R O M, Judge:

¶1 Petitioner Donald Palmer seeks review of the trial court's order summarily dismissing his successive petition for post-conviction relief, filed under Rule 32, Ariz. R. Crim. P. We will not disturb that order unless the court abused its discretion, which Palmer has failed to establish here. See State v. Martinez, 226 Ariz. 464, ¶ 6 (App. 2011).

¶2 After a 2007 jury trial, Palmer was convicted of attempted first-degree murder, drive-by shooting, and aggravated assault. The trial court sentenced him to concurrent life prison terms, with the minute entry indicating that he was eligible for release after twenty-five years, while the court orally explained that he was eligible for parole after twenty-five years. We affirmed his convictions and sentences on appeal. State v. Palmer, No.

2 CA-CR 2007-0118 (Ariz. App. Sep. 18, 2008) (mem. decision). Thereafter, Palmer sought and was denied post-conviction relief multiple times. State

v. Palmer, No. 2 CA-CR 2024-0022-PR (Ariz. App. May 21, 2024) (mem. decision); State v. Palmer, No. 2 CA-CR 2018-0218-PR (Ariz. App. Jan. 10, 2019) (mem. decision); State v. Palmer, No. 2 CA-CR 2017-0189-PR (Ariz. App. Oct. 25, 2017) (mem. decision); State v. Palmer, No. 2 CA-CR 2010-0100-PR (Ariz. App. June 25, 2010) (mem. decision). However, as part of his July 2021 proceeding, pursuant to the supreme court's order, the trial court clarified that Palmer's sentence was "life in prison with the possibility of parole after twenty-five calendar years, concurrently, on each count."¹ State v. Palmer, No. CR-21-0328-PR (Ariz. Aug. 25, 2022) (order).

¶3 In June 2025, Palmer initiated the current Rule 32 proceeding. In his petition, he argued that when the legislature eliminated parole in 1994, they created "confusion" and "ambiguity," resulting in ineffective assistance of trial counsel in his case. He maintained that he "should be

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reoffer[ed]" a plea agreement that he had rejected because at the time he rejected it he apparently did not understand that parole had been eliminated. Palmer relied on State v. Anderson, 257 Ariz. 226 (2024), to argue that his claim was exempted from the rules of preclusion and timeliness.

¶4 In January 2026, the trial court summarily dismissed Palmer's petition. First, the court noted that the state's response to Palmer's petition had been "untimely," but because Palmer's claims were "precluded," it considered the state's response and Palmer's replies. Next, the court pointed out that, despite Palmer's argument that "he would have accepted a plea had he known he was ineligible for parole at trial," he in fact received parole eligibility. Thus, the court observed, "the rejection of his plea agreement—assuming there was even a plea—based on ineffective assistance of counsel because of parole eligibility is a logical fallacy." In addition, the court found that the claim was precluded because Palmer had also raised it in his prior Rule 32 proceeding and was untimely. The court found Anderson inapplicable because Palmer had waited more than a year after it was decided to file his current petition and he previously raised the same claim. Palmer filed a motion for rehearing, which the court denied. This petition for review followed.

¶5 On review, Palmer first contends the trial court erred by considering the state's untimely response.²He maintains that there was no good cause or extraordinary circumstances warranting consideration of the response, in violation of Rule 32.9(a)(1).

¶6 Pursuant to Rule 32.9(a)(1), the state must file its response no later than forty-five days after the defendant files a petition. However, the court for "good cause" may grant a thirty-day extension and may grant additional extensions "only on a showing of extraordinary circumstances and after considering the rights of the victim to a prompt and final conclusion of the case." Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.9(a)(1).

¶7 Palmer filed his Rule 32 petition on June 24, 2025. However, by order dated August 7, 2025, the trial court observed that it was not clear

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whether the state had received a copy of Palmer's petition and therefore gave the state until September 21, 2025, to file a response. On September 22, 2025, the state filed a motion seeking, as relevant here, a thirty-day extension. On September 24, 2025, the court granted that request, giving the state "until October 24, 2025, in which to file a response." The state then filed its response on October 24, 2025.

¶8 Although the trial court suggested that the state's response had been untimely filed, based on the record before us, it does not appear that was the case. Even assuming the response was untimely, nothing in the rules precluded the court from considering it—particularly in light of the court's conclusion that Palmer's claim was precluded—and Palmer has pointed to us no such authority. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b), 32.9(a)(1). Accordingly, Palmer has not established that the court abused its discretion.

¶9 Palmer next contends that the trial court erred in finding his claim precluded "in direct conflict with the new binding precedent in"

Anderson and State v. Traverso, 260 Ariz. 409 (2025).³He reasons that the court relied on "a now disavowed concept of automatic preclusion."

¶10 Anderson and Traverso are readily distinguishable from the case before us. In both those cases, the defendants sought post-conviction relief based on ineffective assistance of counsel related to misinformation regarding plea offers. Traverso, 260 Ariz. 409, ¶ 12; Anderson, 257 Ariz. 226, ¶ 6. Our supreme court determined that neither of their claims were precluded under Rule 32.2(a)(3), despite the defendants raising prior, unrelated claims of ineffective assistance. Traverso, 260 Ariz. 409, ¶¶ 11, 30, 41; Anderson, 257 Ariz. 226, ¶¶ 5, 25, 36.

¶11 Here, however, this case involves preclusion under Rule 32.2(a)(2) because Palmer previously alleged claims of ineffective assistance of counsel with regard to his parole eligibility. As our supreme court reiterated in Traverso, "'[o]ur preclusion rules require a defendant to raise all known claims for relief in a single petition to prevent endless trial-court reviews of the same case,' especially involving [ineffective assistance of counsel] claims." 260 Ariz. 409, ¶ 42 (alteration in Traverso) (quoting Anderson, 257 Ariz. 226, ¶ 21). Because Palmer previously raised this claim, he is precluded from doing so again. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a)(2).

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¶12 Even assuming Palmer's current claim was neither precluded nor untimely, he is not entitled to relief. "To state a colorable claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show both that counsel's performance fell below objectively reasonable standards and that this deficiency prejudiced the defendant." State v. Bennett, 213 Ariz. 562, ¶ 21 (2006) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)). "Failure to satisfy either prong of the Strickland test is fatal to an ineffective assistance of counsel claim." Id.

¶13 Palmer has received a parole-eligible sentence and therefore cannot establish prejudice. The trial court therefore did not abuse its discretion in summarily dismissing Palmer's petition.

¶14 Accordingly, we grant review but deny relief.