Anthony Paysen v. Commonwealth of Kentucky

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RENDERED: JUNE 25, 2026

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Supreme Court of Kentucky 2024-SC-0176-MR

ANTHONY PAYSEN APPELLANT

V.

ON APPEAL FROM ROWAN CIRCUIT COURT

HONORABLE WILLIAM EVANS LANE, JUDGE

NO. 14-CR-00089

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE

MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT

AFFIRMING

On August 15, 2014, Paysen and four other individuals were indicted for murder, first-degree robbery, first-degree burglary, and tampering with physical evidence. Nearly ten years later, on February 23, 2024, Paysen pled guilty to murder, second-degree robbery, and second-degree burglary. He was sentenced to forty-three years' imprisonment.

Paysen now seeks review on appeal alleging that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Paysen argues that when looking at the totality of the circumstances, his plea was not given knowingly and voluntarily. Paysen asks this Court to reverse the order denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea and to remand this case to the trial court. We decline to do so and affirm the holding of the trial court.

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I. Background

On June 22, 2014, Bo Otis was brutally murdered in his home. On August 15, 2014, Paysen and four other individuals were indicted for murder, first-degree robbery, first-degree burglary, and tampering with physical evidence. On September 9, 2014, the Commonwealth filed its notice of intent to seek the death penalty. Subsequently, each of Paysen's four co-defendants entered guilty pleas. Paysen's trial was delayed as a result of substituting counsel, litigating pre-trial motions, and the COVID-19 pandemic. Paysen's trial was set for February 26, 2024. On January 2, 2024, Paysen moved for hybrid representation to permit Paysen to assist counsel at trial. On January 16, 2024, the trial court conducted a Faretta¹hearing, and it entered an order finding that Paysen's partial waiver of the right to counsel was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. On February 22, 2024, Paysen subsequently moved to withdraw this motion "[d]ue to health concerns." On February 23, 2024, Paysen accepted a plea deal. The same day, Paysen pled guilty to murder, second-degree robbery, and second-degree burglary in exchange for forty-three years' imprisonment. During the plea colloquy, Paysen informed the trial court that he suffers from depression and anxiety. After further questioning regarding Paysen's mental state, the trial court accepted Paysen's guilty plea. Sentencing was set for March 26, 2024.

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However, on March 22, 2024, Paysen moved to withdraw his guilty plea. Paysen listed the following facts to support his motion:

Sentencing was set by the Court to occur on March 26, 2024, and a presentence investigation report (PSI) was ordered to be completed by Probation and Parole. During a meeting with Mr. Paysen to prepare the PSI, staff from probation and parole requested that he sign an acknowledgment form relating to certain custody time credits that could be applied to his sentence. Based on the contents of this form, Mr. Payson [sic] believes that he will not be receiving certain custody time credits promised to him by his attorney during their conversations regarding the offer made in this case. This invalidated the plea entered into by Mr. Paysen since it was not a knowing and voluntary guilty plea. Furthermore, Mr. Payson [sic] did not have sufficient time to discuss the offer with his attorneys prior to the entry of the guilty plea. Mr. Payson [sic] was transported to the Montgomery County Courthouse and had a very limited amount of time to review the plea paperwork and discuss any issues with his attorneys before being brought out into the courtroom to enter his plea. Finally, in the months leading up to the plea, Mr. Paysen was held in solitary confinement at the Fayette County Detention Center. This has caused his mental state to deteriorate and may have impaired his ability to completely understand the terms and conditions of his guilty plea.

On March 26, 2024, the trial court conducted a hearing regarding Paysen's motion. The trial court ruled that Paysen's plea was voluntary and denied his motion. The trial court sentenced Paysen to forty-three years' imprisonment pursuant to the plea agreement. Paysen now appeals as a matter of right. KY. CONST. § 110(2)(b).

II. Analysis

On appeal, Paysen alleges that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to withdraw his guilty plea because, when looking at the totality of the circumstances, his plea was not given knowingly and voluntarily.

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"A guilty plea is valid only when it is entered intelligently and voluntarily." Bronk v. Commonwealth, 58 S.W.3d 482, 486 (Ky. 2001) (citing Centers v. Commonwealth, 799 S.W.2d 51, 54 (Ky. App. 1990)). Before accepting a criminal defendant's guilty plea to a criminal charge, the trial court, at the time of the guilty plea, must first ascertain "that the plea is made voluntarily with understanding of the nature of the charge." Id. (quoting RCr²8.08). "Due process requires a trial court to make an affirmative showing, on the record, that a guilty plea is voluntary and intelligent before it may be accepted." Edmonds v. Commonwealth, 189 S.W.3d 558, 565 (Ky. 2006) (citing Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 241-42 (1969)). Here, the trial court conducted a facially satisfactory Boykin colloquy. See id. Paysen subsequently pled guilty; however, after the trial court accepted the plea, but prior to the sentencing and final judgment, Paysen moved to withdraw his guilty plea.

"At any time before judgment the court may permit the plea of guilty or guilty but mentally ill, to be withdrawn and a plea of not guilty substituted." RCr 8.10. "If a guilty plea is found to have been entered involuntarily, considering the totality of the circumstances, a trial court must grant a defendant's motion to withdraw the plea." Edmonds, 189 S.W.3d at 566. "However, if it was voluntary, the trial court may, within

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its discretion, either grant or deny the motion." Sturgill v. Commonwealth, 533 S.W.3d 204, 208 (Ky. 2017). "The test for determining the validity of a guilty plea is whether the plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant." Id. (citing Sparks v. Commonwealth, 721 S.W.2d 726, 727 (Ky. App. 1986)). A trial court's denial of a defendant's motion to withdraw a guilty plea is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Id. "A trial court abuses its discretion when it renders a decision that is arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by legal principles." Id. Paysen asks this Court to consider his statements made to the trial court during the plea colloquy:

Trial Court: Suffered any mental problems in the past and now suffer from it?

Paysen: Yeah, I've got depression and anxiety.

Trial Court: But that doesn't affect your understanding of reality at this time?

Paysen: Yes, sir.

Trial Court: Okay. But it doesn't affect, you don't see any animals floating through the air or anything of that nature.

Paysen: No, sir.

Trial Court: So, it doesn't affect your concept of reality at this point. I would say it affects your well-being some but not your concepts of reality.

Paysen: Yes, sir.

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Paysen contends that this testimony demonstrates that he informed the trial court that his depression and anxiety did affect his understanding of reality at the time. Next, Paysen argues that the Commonwealth erroneously relies on the fact that Paysen was found to be competent during the Faretta hearing but has failed to address the fact that Paysen withdrew his motion for hybrid representation due to health concerns. Paysen further alleges that the Commonwealth improperly used the fact that he was receiving treatment for depression and anxiety against him. He maintains that his treating therapist should have been called to testify in order to provide relevant context regarding his mental health during plea discussions.

"Evaluating the totality of the circumstances surrounding the guilty plea is an inherently factual inquiry which requires consideration of 'the accused's demeanor, background and experience, and whether the record reveals that the plea was voluntarily made.'" Bronk, 58 S.W.3d at 487 (quoing Centers, 799 S.W.2d at 54). Here, the trial court did not accept Paysen's claim at face value and instead conducted a thorough inquiry into Paysen's mental state. The court acknowledged that depression and anxiety may impact Paysen's functioning; however, it determined that such conditions, without more, do not render him incapable of entering a guilty plea. The court determined that Paysen does not experience a distorted perception of reality. By doing so, the trial court satisfied its obligation to ensure that the plea was entered

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knowingly and voluntarily. Furthermore, "[s]olemn declarations in open court carry a strong presumption of verity." Edmonds, 189 S.W.3d at 569 (quoting Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74 (1977)). Paysen affirmed that he understood his rights, and he affirmed he was making his plea willingly, freely, and voluntarily. Therefore, we presume that his statements were true. Accordingly, "[w]e review a trial court's findings regarding voluntariness for clear error, i.e., whether the determination was supported by substantial evidence. . . ." Porter v. Commonwealth,

394 S.W.3d 382, 386 (Ky. 2011). While there is evidence to demonstrate that Paysen had depression and anxiety, there is substantial evidence in the record that supports the trial court's finding that his plea was made voluntarily. Edmonds, 189 S.W.3d at 569 (holding that "the record contain[ed] substantial evidence to support the trial court's ruling on the plea's voluntariness[,]" despite Edmonds' claim that "his medications were so pervasive that he was unable to enter a voluntary guilty plea"). The record demonstrates that Paysen was in contact with his attorneys regularly. Paysen was being treated by a psychiatrist, and he was medicated for his depression and anxiety. Paysen actively participated in his case and even filed pro se motions on his own behalf. The record does not demonstrate that there were any significant changes in his mental state on the day he entered his guilty plea.

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Accordingly, we reject Paysen's argument that the trial court should have provided counsel with time to interview the psychiatrist and review medical records. The record includes multiple written reports from the psychiatrist, none of which suggest that Paysen's mental condition had deteriorated to the point that he was incapable of voluntarily entering the plea.

Moreover, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when considering the previous Faretta hearing. In its order denying Paysen's motion to withdraw, the trial court stated that Paysen acknowledged that he filed a pro se motion for hybrid counsel, and that a Faretta hearing was held where Paysen was found to be competent and capable. The trial court does not make the assertion that Paysen made a voluntary plea merely because he was found competent and capable after the Faretta hearing. This would be improper because this hearing was conducted on January 16, 2024, and Paysen did not plead guilty until February 23, 2024. "RCr 8.08 requires a trial court, at the time of the guilty plea, 'to determine that the plea is made voluntarily with understanding of the nature of the charge.'" Bronk, 58 S.W.3d at 486 (quoting RCr 8.08) (emphasis added). However, there was an independent finding of voluntariness on the day Paysen made his guilty plea.

Accordingly, the trial court properly considered the significance of the Faretta hearing. Although Paysen struggled with anxiety and

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depression throughout the proceedings, he nevertheless remained fully competent to participate in the prior proceedings. Paysen's recollection of prior proceedings at the March 26, 2024, hearing further supports a finding that he understood matters before the court. Moreover, the record reflects that he received extensive psychiatric treatment for anxiety and depression and was properly medicated. At the time of Paysen's guilty plea, the record reflects no significant changes documented by either defense counsel or his treating psychiatrist indicating that he was no longer capable of voluntarily and knowingly entering the plea.

We recognize that Paysen being placed in isolation may have caused adverse mental health effects. However, the record reflects that Paysen's placement in isolation was the result of multiple physical altercations requiring institutional intervention to maintain safety and security within the facility. Jail officials have an obligation to protect inmates and staff, and they retain broad discretion to determine the appropriate measures necessary to ensure institutional safety. Furthermore, we acknowledge the significant passage of time between the commission of the offense and the entry of the guilty plea. While we recognize that a lengthy period of pretrial incarceration—here approximately ten years—may contribute to mental health decline, this factor alone is insufficient to render a guilty plea involuntary.

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Paysen further contends that the Commonwealth mischaracterized his understanding of the plea agreement. His testimony reflects that he discussed this plea agreement with counsel for only approximately three to five minutes, as the remainder of the meeting on February 23, 2024, was devoted primarily to trial strategy. Paysen contends that his trial counsel's testimony corroborates his account because trial counsel testified that trial strategy was the principal focus of their discussion and that the time spent reviewing plea paperwork was brief. We reject Paysen's argument that he lacked an understanding of the plea agreement. The trial court correctly found that Paysen had knowledge of the plea agreement before February 23, 2024, because trial counsel testified that the terms of this plea agreement were discussed with Paysen on the days prior. Furthermore, plea negotiations had been ongoing the month prior, all of which were discussed with Paysen. Paysen met with his attorneys on February 23, 2024, for at least an hour. Trial counsel testified that Paysen was able to view the plea agreement paperwork for ten minutes, but that the terms of the agreement had been well-established. Trial counsel further testified that he did not believe Paysen's mental health affected his ability to enter a guilty plea. We conclude that the record supports a finding that Paysen possessed sufficient knowledge of the plea agreement. Finally, Paysen's concerns that he was not receiving the credit he believed he had been

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promised were addressed and resolved during the March 26, 2024, hearing and were not raised on appeal.

Considering the totality of the circumstances and affording a strong presumption of verity to Paysen's sworn expression of guilt, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying relief.

III. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. Therefore, we affirm.

All sitting. Lambert, C.J.; Bisig, Conley, Goodwine, Keller, and Nickell, JJ., concur. Thompson, J., concurs in result only.

COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:

Roy A. Durham

Assistant Public Advocate

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:

Russell M. Coleman Attorney General of Kentucky Courtney J. Hightower Assistant Attorney General