Tavoris Simmons v. Warden, Century CI

24-13861 Opinion of the Court 3 Warden J. Kolodziej, Assistant Warden Susan Dove, Captain Set- tlemires, Sergeant R. Hornak, and Officer F. Faust. The second amended complaint included an additional instance of alleged re- taliation in August 2023, based on the removal of Simmons's secure locker where he kept his legal materials and property, and alleged an ongoing "custom and policy" to retaliate against inmates for fil- ing grievances or lawsuits.

The magistrate judge screened the second amended com- plaint sua sponte and recommended dismissing the supervisory lia- bility claims against FDOC Secretary Dixon and the claims for in- junctive relief. The district court adopted the magistrate judge's recommendation without objection. The magistrate judge then ordered Simmons to serve the remaining defendants. After several defendants moved to dismiss in June 2024, Sim- mons asked to supplement his second amended complaint and sub- mitted a proposed pleading. The proposed third amended com- plaint added new claims against Dove and five new defendants— Sergeant Small, Officer Welch, Lieutenant Day, Captain Ellis, Ser- geant Stephens—based on additional alleged acts of retaliation since the initial complaint.

In July 2024, the magistrate judge entered an order granting leave to amend "to the extent that [Simmons's] proposed third amended complaint . . . was accepted by the Court for screening"

under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. The judge found that Simmons was "per- mitted to amend his complaint once on his own accord under Rule

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4 Opinion of the Court 24-13861 15(a)(1)," since he had sought leave "within 21 days after Defend- ants moved to dismiss his complaint under Rule 12(b)(6)," and his prior amended complaints were "filed pursuant to this Court's or- ders and . . . not done under Rule 15(a)(1)."

But the magistrate judge reasoned that the second amended complaint would "remain the operative pleading in this case" be- cause of "improper joinder present in the proposed third amended complaint." The judge found that the allegations in the third amended complaint were not logically related to, and should not be joined together with, the allegations in the second amended complaint. The judge therefore said he would "not order service of the proposed third amended complaint," and that the case would

"proceed on the basis of the remaining claims in the second amended complaint."

Then, in October 2024, the magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation ("R&R"), recommending that the case be dismissed without prejudice as a malicious abuse of the judicial process under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and 1915A(b)(1). The magistrate judge found that Simmons failed to accurately disclose his litigation history on the second amended complaint form, omit- ting six proceedings in state court. The magistrate judge concluded that dismissal for "maliciousness" was warranted and that "[l]esser sanctions would be insufficient."

The district court overruled Simmons's timely objections, adopted the R&R, and dismissed the case without prejudice as to

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24-13861 Opinion of the Court 5 all defendants as a malicious abuse of the judicial process under §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and 1915A(b)(1). Simmons appeals.

II.

We have a threshold obligation to ensure that we have ju- risdiction to hear an appeal. Corley v. Long-Lewis, Inc., 965 F.3d 1222, 1227 (11th Cir. 2020). We review jurisdictional issues de novo. Univ. of S. Ala. v. Am. Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 405, 408 (11th Cir.

1999).

Ordinarily, we have jurisdiction to review only "final deci- sions of the district courts." 28 U.S.C. § 1291. "A final decision is one that ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment." Jenkins v. Prime Ins. Co., 32 F.4th 1343, 1345 (11th Cir. 2022) (quotation marks omitted). Thus,

"the district court's order generally must adjudicate all claims against all parties" to constitute a final decision. Corsello v. Lincare, Inc., 276 F.3d 1229, 1230 (11th Cir. 2001).

Under Rule 15(a)(1)(B), Fed. R. Civ. P., a plaintiff "may amend its pleading once as a matter of course" within 21 days after service of a responsive pleading or a motion to dismiss. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1)(B). When a plaintiff has the right to amend as a matter of course, courts ordinarily lack the discretion to refuse amendment. Williams v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. Of Ga., 477 F.3d 1282, 1292 n.6 (11th Cir. 2007); see Brown v. Johnson, 387 F.3d 1344, 1348-49 (11th Cir. 2004) (stating that, notwithstanding "the screen- ing provisions of the [Prison Litigation Reform Act]," a court abuses its discretion by denying amendment when a pro se plaintiff

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"had the right to amend his complaint under Rule 15(a)"). And when an amended complaint is filed, it "supersedes the initial com- plaint and becomes the operative pleading in the case." Lowery v. Ala. Power Co., 483 F.3d 1184, 1219 (11th Cir. 2007). Here, we must conclude that the district court did not adju- dicate all claims against all parties. See id. The magistrate judge found that Simmons filed the third amended complaint as a matter of course under Rule 15(a)(1)(B). Thus, the third amended com- plaint became the "operative pleading," even assuming it was defi- cient for improper joinder. See Lowery, 483 F.3d at 1219. Because the court accepted Simmons's third amended complaint under Rule 15(a)(1)(B), the court lacked the discretion to nonetheless treat the second amended complaint as the operative pleading. See Williams, 477 F.3d at 1292 n.6.

Nor did the district court make a final ruling on the opera- tive third amended complaint, which added new claims and new defendants. In screening the third amended complaint, the magis- trate judge ruled that Simmons improperly joined new claims that did not share a common set of facts, effectively dismissing those claims from the action going forward. The magistrate judge did so without issuing a report and recommendation or offering Simmons a chance to object.

Absent consent by the parties, which is not present in this case, magistrate judges have "no authority to make a final and bind- ing ruling" on dispositive matters. Williams v. McNeil, 557 F.3d 1287, 1291 (11th Cir. 2009); see 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), (c); Fed. R. Civ.

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24-13861 Opinion of the Court 7 P. 72. We acknowledge that magistrate judges may rule on mo- tions for leave to amend. See Smith v. Marcus & Millichap, Inc., 106 F.4th 1091, 1099-1100 (11th Cir. 2024). But here, the magistrate judge expressly accepted the third amended complaint as filed un- der Rule 15(a)(1)(B). So the court lacked the discretion to refuse leave to amend. See Williams, 477 F.3d at 1292 n.6. Thus, the magistrate judge lacked the authority to dismiss the new defendants from the action on his own, making the judge's order the equivalent of a "nonfinal, nonappealable report and rec- ommendation." Rembert v. Apfel, 213 F.3d 1331, 1335 (11th Cir. 2000). And while the district court ultimately dismissed the case as malicious as to all defendants, its ruling was based on the second amended complaint, and the failure to disclose litigation history in that pleading. The court did not consider or address the third amended complaint.

For these reasons, we conclude that the district court failed to resolve all claims against all defendants raised in the operative third amended complaint. Corsello, 276 F.3d at 1230. Because the judgment under review is not yet final, and no exception to the final-judgment rule appears to apply, we must dismiss the current appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction.

DISMISSED.

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