State of New Hampshire v. John Doyle

THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

SUPREME COURT

In Case No. 2024-0518, State of New Hampshire v. John Doyle, the court on May 14, 2026, issued the following order:

The court has reviewed the written arguments and the record submitted on appeal, has considered the oral arguments of the parties, and has determined to resolve the case by way of this order. See Sup. Ct. R. 20(3). The defendant, John Doyle, appeals an order of the Superior Court (St. Hilaire, J.) issued following our remand of this case. See State v. Doyle, 176 N.H. 594 (2024), 2024 N.H. 25 (Doyle I). The order granted the State's motion to authorize the Office of the Forensic Examiner (OFE) to release the defendant's medical and mental health records to a physician designated by the State for the purpose of evaluating the appropriateness of the defendant's involuntary admission and completing the certificate for involuntary admission. See RSA 135:17-a, V (2021); RSA 135-C:34 (2021); RSA 135-C:36, I(c) (Supp. 2025). We reverse and remand.

The trial court recited, or the record reflects, the following facts. In 2019, the defendant was charged with crimes arising out of a domestic dispute occurring in March 2019. The Superior Court (Tucker, J.) found the defendant not competent to stand trial in September 2019, and subsequently concluded that his competency could not be restored. In February 2022, following an evidentiary hearing, the court concluded that the defendant posed a danger to others and ordered, pursuant to RSA 135:17-a, V, that he be evaluated for the appropriateness of involuntary treatment. See RSA 135:17-a, V. In March 2022, the trial court granted the State's request to order the OFE to disclose to the State-designated evaluator all reports prepared by the OFE in conjunction with the defendant's case, which included the OFE's initial competency evaluation and a subsequent re-evaluation. Soon thereafter, the State requested that the trial court order the OFE to also release to the evaluator "all records relied upon" by the OFE to form the opinions reflected in the OFE reports so that the evaluator could "do an accurate assessment and evaluation" of whether the defendant satisfies the standard for involuntary treatment. See RSA 135-C:34; RSA 135-C:36, I(c).¹The trial court granted the

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State's request, reasoning that the medical and mental health records were exempt from the statutory physician-patient and therapist-patient privileges. See RSA 329:26 (2025) (physician); RSA 330-A:32 (2025) (therapist). On appeal, we concluded that the trial court erred because records sought for the purpose of an evaluation under RSA 135:17-a, V are not statutorily exempt from the privileges. Doyle I, 176 N.H. at 598, 2024 N.H. 25, ¶13. We vacated the trial court's order and remanded for it to determine whether the records could be disclosed on either of the two grounds upon which privileged information may generally be disclosed: "(1) the court finds a waiver of the privilege; or (2) the court orders a piercing of the privilege because disclosure of the information concerned is considered 'essential.'" Id. at 599, 2024 N.H. 25, ¶14.

On remand, the Trial Court (St. Hilaire, J.) held an evidentiary hearing at which it heard testimony from the State-designated evaluator. The court then determined that the State had established an "essential need" for the records and granted the State's motion. It is undisputed that the trial court did not conduct an in camera review of the medical and mental health records prior to ordering their disclosure to the evaluator. Because the court concluded that the records should be released to the evaluator based on essential need, it did not address whether the defendant waived his statutory privileges. The trial court stayed the effect of its order pending appeal. This appeal followed. The appellate record does not include the contested records.

We review a trial court's decisions on the management of discovery for an unsustainable exercise of discretion. See State v. Stewart, 178 N.H. ___, ___ (2026), 2026 N.H. 14, ¶11. The defendant bears the burden of demonstrating that the trial court's ruling was clearly untenable or unreasonable to the prejudice of his case. Id. We consider whether the record establishes a sufficient objective basis for the discretionary decision made. Id. The parties agree that the statutory physician-patient and therapist- patient privileges apply to the records at issue, see RSA 329:26; RSA 330-A:32, and that the records contain "private or personal information" protected by Part I, Article 2-b of the New Hampshire Constitution, N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 2-b. We observe that the trial court did not address whether the defendant waived these protections and that its consideration of waiver in the first instance could have obviated the need for it, and for this court, to address whether the defendant's statutory privileges should be pierced. See Doyle I,

176 N.H. at 599, 2024 N.H. 25, ¶14. In the absence of a waiver ruling, the only defendant's expert in drafting her report on competency and restoration. On remand, the State should clarify the scope of its request. For the purposes of this appeal, we refer to the records at issue as "medical and mental health records."

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issue on appeal is whether the trial court sustainably pierced these protections and ordered the records to be disclosed.

On that issue, the parties agree that the applicable threshold standard is the essential need test as stated in State v. Zarella, 177 N.H. 328, 341-42 (2025), 2025 N.H. 20, ¶36. Because the parties agree on the applicable standard, we assume without deciding that the essential need test applies here — where the State is requesting that a State entity disclose records in its possession to a State-designated evaluator. Cf. Zarella, 177 N.H. at 334-38, 2025 N.H. 20, ¶¶10-25 (distinguishing standard applicable in cases involving defendant's request for privileged records in the government's possession from standard applicable when defendant seeks such records held by a private entity); In re Kathleen M., 126 N.H. 379, 380-81, 385 (1985) (applying essential need test to determine whether State could introduce at involuntary admission hearings privileged testimony from respondents' treating psychiatrists at New Hampshire Hospital; decided under prior version of statutory privilege). We held in Zarella that, to obtain in camera review and subsequent disclosure of privileged records, the party seeking disclosure must establish an essential need for the records sought. See Zarella, 177 N.H. at 331, 341, 2025 N.H. 20, ¶¶1-2, 36. To show essential need, a party must "prove both that there is a compelling justification for the disclosure of the records, and that the targeted information is unavailable from another source." Id. at 341, 2025 N.H. 20, ¶36.

We turn first to the compelling justification prong of the essential need test because it is dispositive. The trial court reasoned that "[a]bsent a review of Defendant's medical records, the evaluation preceding the State's attempt to involuntarily admit [the defendant] will not be as accurate." It determined that this "inaccuracy potentially jeopardizes the safety of Defendant and the public,"

giving rise to a compelling justification for piercing the statutory privileges. The court's reasoning was informed by the evaluator's testimony at the hearing that, generally, a review of "reasonably available records" is the "standard of care" when performing a forensic psychiatric assessment and that, although it is possible to do an evaluation without reviewing the records, "[t]he accuracy of that evaluation would be less than if we had access to those records."

We agree with the defendant that, if accepted, the trial court's reasoning would amount to a per se rule that there is a compelling justification to pierce a defendant's statutory privileges whenever the State seeks the defendant's records to facilitate an evaluation for the appropriateness of involuntary admission pursuant to RSA 135:17-a, V. We have previously declined to adopt such per se rules regarding compelling justifications for piercing statutory privileges. See Stewart, 178 N.H. at ___, 2026 N.H. 14, ¶21 (observing that "the prosecution of felonies is not, standing alone, a per se compelling justification,"

thereby recognizing our prior limitation of the holding in In re Grand Jury

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Subpoena (Medical Records of Payne), 150 N.H. 436, 442 (2004)); Kathleen M.,

126 N.H. at 383, 385 (declining to adopt per se exception to psychiatrist- patient privilege for purposes of involuntary admission hearings). Instead, we have explained that a compelling justification exists when a sufficiently important public interest is at stake and the court finds that this interest

"countervails the societal benefit that the privilege advances." Stewart, 178 N.H. at ___, 2026 N.H. 14, ¶18. Whether the public interest at stake countervails the societal benefit promoted by the privilege — and whether a compelling justification therefore exists — depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. See id. at ___, 2026 N.H. 14, ¶¶18-19, 21-23; see also Desclos v. S. N.H. Med. Ctr., 153 N.H. 607, 617-19 (2006); Kathleen M.,

126 N.H. at 385. Here, the trial court did not discuss or rely upon any circumstances specific to this case as a basis for finding a compelling justification; rather, it relied upon the "standard of care" applicable to all forensic psychiatric evaluations. Moreover, upon our review of the record, the evaluator did not testify to any case-specific reasons for his need to review the records. Additionally, we are not persuaded by the State's argument that, because the same records were "needed" by prior evaluators who assessed the defendant's competency and restorability, "so too are they essential" for the present evaluator's assessment, thereby providing a compelling justification. The trial court ordered the defendant to provide the OFE certain medical and mental health records when it ordered a competency evaluation. The fact that the court ordered the release of records to the OFE for the purposes of assessing the defendant's competency to stand trial does not — without more case-specific explanation — lead inexorably to the conclusion that there is a compelling justification for releasing the same records to another medical professional to facilitate an assessment ordered under a different statute for a distinct purpose. Compare RSA 135:17 (2021) (amended 2024) (granting courts authority to order competency evaluations and setting forth competency standard), with RSA 135:17-a, V (providing that, once court has found defendant has not regained competency and poses a danger, court shall order evaluation of defendant for appropriateness of involuntary admission), and RSA 135-C:34 (involuntary admission standard).

We conclude that there is no objective basis in the record upon which to sustain the trial court's ruling that a compelling justification exists for piercing the defendant's statutory privileges. See Stewart, 178 N.H. at ___, 2026 N.H. 14, ¶11. We therefore conclude that the defendant has carried his burden of showing that the court's ruling was untenable or unreasonable to the prejudice of his case. Id. Because the State must establish both prongs of the essential need test before a court can pierce the defendant's privilege, see Zarella, 177 N.H. at 341, 2025 N.H. 20, ¶36, we reverse the trial court's ruling. We remand to the trial court for the limited purpose of considering whether the defendant

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has waived the statutory privileges with respect to the records at issue. See Doyle I, 176 N.H. at 599, 2024 N.H. 25, ¶14.

Reversed and remanded.

MACDONALD, C.J., and DONOVAN, COUNTWAY, and GOULD, JJ., concurred.

Timothy A. Gudas, Clerk