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Shannon Blackman v. Tyler David Millward
Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan
Megan K. Cavanagh, Chief Justice Brian K. Zahra Richard H. Bernstein Elizabeth M. Welch Kyra H. Bolden Kimberly A. Thomas Noah P. Hood,
Justices
Order
March 6, 2026
167867
SHANNON BLACKMAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee/ Cross-Appellant, v SC: 167867
COA: 367240
Calhoun CC: 2019-002623-DS
TYLER DAVID MILLWARD,
Defendant-Appellant/ Cross-Appellee. _________________________________________/ On January 21, 2026, the Court heard oral argument on the application for leave to appeal the October 29, 2024 judgment of the Court of Appeals and the application for leave to appeal as cross-appellant. On order of the Court, the applications are again considered, and they are DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.
THOMAS, J. (dissenting).
I respectfully dissent from the Court's denial of leave to appeal in this matter. I would have granted leave in order to examine and clarify whether there is a time limitation for filing for a revocation of an acknowledgment of parentage (AOP) under MCL 722.1445 and, if so, what steps are necessary to extend the limitations period. I would have affirmed, on other grounds, the Court of Appeals' decision that plaintiff is not barred from filing for a revocation of the AOP in this case. In my view, the Calhoun Circuit Court correctly determined that an action for revocation of an AOP is subject to the limitations period in MCL 722.1437(1), but can be extended by a request for extension accompanied by an explanatory affidavit under MCL 722.1443.
Plaintiff was the victim of criminal sexual conduct by defendant beginning in 2017, when plaintiff was 16 years old and while defendant was her teacher. This relationship continued for approximately a year and a half. Defendant left his teaching position in February 2018. Defendant was later arrested and pled guilty to criminal sexual conduct in the third degree, CSC-III, in violation of MCL 750.520d(1)(e), in Calhoun, Branch, and St. Joseph Counties, and using a computer to commit a crime in violation of MCL 750.145d(2)(f). This conduct occurred in June 2017 and July 2017. He received a sentence
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of seven to fifteen years' imprisonment.1Defendant also pled guilty to a charge of felony witness bribery/intimidation in violation of MCL 750.122(7)(b) for allegations that he compelled plaintiff to recant statements about the conduct to the police. This conduct occurred between February 20, 2018, and November 1, 2018.2The birth of a child resulted from the sexual conduct. The child was born in December 2018, when defendant was incarcerated on these convictions.3An AOP was executed three days after the child's birth. In March 2023, while still incarcerated, defendant filed a pro se motion to compel parenting time via video call. Plaintiff opposed that motion and shortly after filed the
"Motion and Affidavit to Revoke Acknowledgment of Parentage and Other Relief" that is before this Court. The Calhoun Circuit Court granted the motion, defendant moved for reconsideration, and the circuit court affirmed its decision. Defendant then appealed in the Court of Appeals, which issued a published opinion holding that the limitations period in MCL 722.1437(1) did not apply to actions brought under MCL 722.1445(2). It is necessary to first examine the act under which plaintiff seeks relief in this matter. When plaintiff filed her motion, the Revocation of Paternity Act (ROPA), MCL 722.1431 et seq.—now known as the Revocation of Parentage Act, see 2024 PA 29— allowed "acknowledgments, determinations, and judgments relating to paternity to be set aside in certain circumstances," among other things. 2012 PA 159, title. Relevant here, the act provides remedies to a mother who "proves by clear and convincing evidence that the child was conceived as a result of nonconsensual sexual penetration . . . ." MCL 722.1445(2). If that burden is carried after a fact-finding hearing, a court shall do one of the following: (1) "[r]evoke an acknowledgment of parentage for an acknowledged father," (2) "[d]etermine that a genetic father is not the child's father," (3)
"[s]et aside an order of filiation for an affiliated father," or (4) "[m]ake a determination of paternity regarding an alleged father and enter an order of revocation of parentage for that alleged father." MCL 722.1445(2)(a) through (d). In other words, this subsection provides that a court must take one of four possible actions available under ROPA if specific
1 This sentence resulted from the CSC-III conviction in Calhoun County. The conviction in St. Joseph County resulted in a sentence of six years and five months to fifteen years in prison. The conviction in Branch County resulted in a sentence of five years and six months to fifteen years in prison. These sentences ran concurrently with each other.
2 This conviction resulted in a sentence of three years and one month to ten years in prison, which ran concurrently with the other sentences.
3 The parties dispute the exact date of the child's conception, but it is not relevant to the question of the limitations period I address here; any date within the putative window of conception would be more than three years before the present motion was filed.
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conditions are met—specifically, that a mother has shown by clear and convincing evidence that the child was conceived as a result of nonconsensual sexual penetration.4In this matter, plaintiff filed under this subsection seeking relief in the form of a revocation of an AOP under MCL 722.1445(2)(a).
Four sections of ROPA respectively address each of the four actions available under the act, while other sections are definitions and other generally applicable provisions. While ROPA was first passed in 2012, the subsection requiring courts to take an action revoking paternity if proven that the child was conceived as a result of nonconsensual sexual penetration was added in 2016,5following passage of the federal Rape Survivor Child Custody Act (RSCCA), 34 USC 21301 et seq.
Under the plain language of ROPA, different sections of the act govern each action available. Specific to this case involving an AOP, "Section 7 governs an action to set aside an acknowledgement of parentage." MCL 722.1435(1). ROPA also states that the next three statutory sections address the other three actions available.6This framework predates the 2016 ROPA amendments and was not changed by those amendments. See, e.g., Walen v Dep't of Corrections, 443 Mich 240, 248 (1993) (stating that "the Legislature is presumed to be aware of, and thus to have considered the effect on, all existing statutes when enacting new laws").
4 Other provisions of law, in separate acts, bar custody awards for parents convicted of criminal sexual conduct that result in the birth of a child, but do not terminate paternity. See Child Custody Act, MCL 722.21 et seq.
5 The RSCCA provided increased formula grants for states that have a law in place allowing the mother of a child conceived through sexual assault to seek through the courts the termination of parental rights with respect to that child. While Congress made a series of findings on the subject and codified them in the RSCCA, these do not address the timing or time limitations of the filing of petitions seeking termination of parental rights. See 34 USC 21302.
6 ROPA also provides that: (2) Section 8 governs an action to determine that a genetic father is not a child's father. (3) Section 9 governs an action to set aside an order of filiation. (4) Section 11 governs an action to determine that a presumed parent is not a child's parent. [MCL 722.1435.]
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Section 7 specifies who may file a revocation of an AOP and also provides a time limitation on a filing under the section. When plaintiff brought this action, this section stated that "the mother, the acknowledged father, an alleged father, or a prosecuting attorney" must file an action for revocation of an AOP "within 3 years after the child's birth or within 1 year after the date that the [AOP] was signed, whichever is later." MCL 722.1437(1), as amended by 2014 PA 368. The other types of action in this act also contain similar time requirements.7
After the four sections specifically addressing each of these four possible actions, ROPA then has a section that provides court requirements that are not specific to any of these particular actions. See MCL 722.1443. Under this section, a plaintiff may file a request for extension of the limitations period supported by a signed affidavit. See former MCL 722.1443(12).8To extend the limitations period, the court must find that a party could have filed an action under ROPA but did not within the time allowed as the result of a mistake of fact, newly discovered evidence that could not have been found earlier, fraud, misrepresentation or misconduct, or duress. Former MCL 722.1443(12)(a) through (e). This section applies to "an action or motion under [ROPA]" and neither limits its application to particular sections or subsections of the act nor limits its application to particular types of actions under ROPA. Former MCL 722.1443(12). Therefore, mothers seeking one of the four remedies available under MCL 722.1445(2) must either comply with the applicable limitations period or file an affidavit seeking extension of the limitations period under former MCL 722.1443(12), now MCL 722.1443(14). In this case, the plaintiff filed such an affidavit and the trial court accepted it as evidence of duress and misconduct.
When interpreting a statute, courts must read the statute as a whole in the light of its intended purpose. Bush v Shabahang, 484 Mich 156, 166-167 (2009). The Court of Appeals erred by not reading ROPA as an integrated whole and by focusing narrowly on the lack of a limitations period in MCL 722.1445(2). Instead of harmonizing the existing ROPA with the 2016 amendment at issue here, the Court of Appeals read the amended provision to be independent of the rest of ROPA and inconsistent with the existing statutory framework. Blackman v Millward, ___ Mich App ___ (October 29, 2024) (Docket No. 367240); slip op at 8 n 2 (stating that because the amendment is more recent and specific,
7 See MCL 7 22.1438(1) (action for an order determining that the genetic father is not the child's father); MCL 722.1439(2) (motion to set aside a determination regarding an affiliated father); MCL 722.1441(1)(a)(iii), (2), and (3)(a)(iii) (regarding a determination that a child was born out of wedlock).
8 This subsection is now codified as MCL 722.1443(14). See 2024 PA 29, effective April 2, 2025.
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I, Elizabeth Kingston-Miller, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. March 6, 2026
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Clerk it displaces the general provision). However, there is no conflict between the amended provision and the existing framework. The provision at issue here, MCL 722.1445, does not contain a limitations period or any reference to timing; the preexisting framework already sets a limitations period and allows for extensions in specified circumstances. See MCL 722.1437 (limitations period for revocation of AOPs); MCL 722.1443(14) (circumstances under which an extension can be requested and may be granted). "If statutes lend themselves to a construction that avoids conflict, then that construction should control." People v Webb, 458 Mich 265, 274 (1998). Additionally, the subsection at issue here provides for four distinct remedies, one of which is revocation of an AOP, as sought in this case. Instead of reading this subsection as distinct from the rest of ROPA and providing no limitations guidance, I believe the better approach is the one taken by the trial court in this case: to read this subsection consistently with all the other provisions of ROPA. As noted earlier, courts must give effect to every word, phrase, or clause of a statute, as far as possible, and interpret the words of the statute in the context of the entire legislative scheme. Bush, 484 Mich at 167; Webb, 458 Mich at 274.
Therefore, I respectfully dissent from this Court's denial of leave and would have granted leave in order to clarify ROPA's applicable limitations periods and that litigants seeking to revoke an acknowledgment of parentage under MCL 722.1445(2)(a) should, if not within the statutory time period, accompany their request for relief with an affidavit under MCL 722.1443(14). In this case, I believe the trial court appropriately extended the limitations period according to MCL 722.1443 and therefore would have affirmed on alternative grounds.
WELCH, J., joins the statement of THOMAS, J.
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