In the Matter of Lici Deng-Vish and Frank Vish

THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

SUPREME COURT

In Case No. 2025-0041, In the Matter of Lici Deng-Vish and Frank Vish, the court on February 24, 2026, issued the following order:

The court has reviewed the written arguments and the record submitted on appeal, and has determined to resolve the case by way of this order. See Sup. Ct. R. 20(3). The petitioner, Lici Deng-Vish (Wife), appeals a final decree of divorce issued by the Circuit Court (Rauseo, J.). On appeal, Wife challenges the trial court's order that she pay child support to the respondent, Frank Vish (Husband). We affirm.

I. Background The following facts were found by the trial court or are supported by the record. The parties were married in 2004. They have two minor children. Throughout the marriage, Wife was the primary wage earner. She holds a master's degree in industrial engineering. Husband holds a bachelor's degree in mechanical engineering technology. Husband was last employed in 2018. In 2021, Wife quit her job as an industrial engineer. She later returned to work as a real estate agent. The parties separated in January 2024. In July 2024, the parties submitted a parenting plan in which they agreed to share parenting equally.

Following a hearing in October 2024, the trial court issued a final order on the petition for divorce, and approved the parenting plan submitted by the parties. Regarding child support, the court found that both Wife and Husband

"are voluntarily underemployed/unemployed." Accordingly, the court exercised its discretion to "consider as gross income the difference between the amount a parent is earning and the amount a parent has earned." See RSA 458-C:2, IV(a) (Supp. 2024).

To determine Husband's gross income, the court considered what Husband earned as a "quality engineer" in 2016, as that position was

"consistent with his education and the vast majority of his work experience."

The court "attribute[d] yearly income to [Husband] at $47,810.00 or $3,998.17 per month, which was his income as a quality engineer." The court attributed yearly income to Wife of $83,927.00, which was her 2020 income "the last year she worked almost full time at approximately 30 hours per week," which converted to "monthly income of $6,941.42." The court found "guidelines child

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support to be appropriate," and ordered Wife to pay monthly child support in the amount of $1,457.00.

The trial court noted that Wife "proposes that she not pay guidelines child support as the eldest son . . . is not exercising the parenting time the parties agreed to in the Parenting Plan." The court stated, however, that the parties had submitted an agreed-upon parenting plan in July 2024 and represented to the court "that parenting issues were resolved." Based on that representation, the court declined to allow Wife to discuss issues regarding parenting at the hearing, explaining that Husband "is entitled to enforce the Parenting Plan" and if Husband "continues to fail to exercise his parenting time, then the Court would entertain a Motion to Modify the Parenting Plan and Child Support." Until such time, the court found "guidelines child support to be in the children's best interest." Wife unsuccessfully moved for reconsideration. This appeal followed.

II. Analysis On appeal, Wife argues that the trial court erred in ordering her to pay child support and in calculating the amount of child support she should pay. Specifically, she asserts that the court's order is based on an incorrect interpretation of the parties' parenting plan and that the trial court erred in calculating Husband's imputed income.

The trial court has broad discretion in fashioning a final divorce decree. In the Matter of Braunstein & Braunstein, 173 N.H. 38, 46 (2020). The trial court's discretion necessarily encompasses decisions concerning property distribution, child support, and parenting rights and responsibilities. Id. We will not overturn the trial court's rulings on such matters absent an unsustainable exercise of discretion. Id. at 47. This standard of review means that we review only whether the record establishes an objective basis sufficient to sustain the discretionary judgment made, and we will not disturb the trial court's determination if it could reasonably have been made. Id. We defer to the trial court's judgment in matters of conflicting testimony and evaluating the credibility of witnesses. Id. As the trier of fact, the trial court could accept or reject, in whole or in part, the testimony of any witness or party, and was not required to believe even uncontroverted evidence. Id. If the trial court's findings could reasonably have been made on the evidence presented at trial, they will stand. Id.

Wife first argues that in ordering and calculating the amount of child support, the trial court erroneously interpreted the parties' parenting plan "as essentially creating a shared arrangement" when in fact Husband has "zero ordered parenting time" for their eldest son. She asserts that because the court's decision to award child support and its calculation of the amount of

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child support were based upon this erroneous interpretation, we must reverse. We disagree.

In interpreting the meaning of a divorce decree, we review the decree de novo. In the Matter of Georgakilas & Georgakilas, 157 N.H. 662, 664 (2008). We consider the intent of the parties as expressed in the language of their agreed-upon parenting plan. See id.

The parties' agreed-upon parenting plan, adopted by the trial court in its final order, provides:

The children shall have parenting time with their mother, Lici Deng, from Monday after school (or 3pm if no school) to Wednesday drop off at school (or 3pm if no school). The children shall have parenting time with their father, Frank Vish, from Wednesday after school (or 3pm if no school) to Friday drop off at school . . . (or 3pm if no school).

The parties shall alternate weekends from Friday after school (or 3pm if no school) to Monday drop off at school (or 3pm if no school).

The parties acknowledge and agree that [the eldest son] is not required to follow this parenting schedule due to his age and maturity, and that he shall arrange any parenting time he has with his father directly with both parents.

We agree with Wife that the language above supports that "the intent of the parenting plan was to allow [the eldest son] and his father to see each other based upon a mutual agreement, and not a compelled schedule." However, Wife testified at the final hearing that the parties "have a final parenting plan that is agreed upon by [Wife and Husband] for 50-50" parenting time. The fact that the eldest son is not required to follow the parenting schedule does not extinguish Husband's right under the plan to equal parenting time with him. Rather, it affects only when Husband spends that time with his son. Accordingly, the trial court did not err when it determined that Husband "is entitled to enforce the Parenting Plan."

Wife next argues that the trial court erred when it imputed income to Husband by dividing his 2016 income by twelve months when he "only worked six months in 2016." Wife states that Husband's "total 2016 income should have been divided by 6 months instead of 12."

To calculate child support, the trial court must first determine each parent's "present income." In the Matter of Crowe & Crowe, 148 N.H. 218, 222 (2002). It is up to the trial court to decide "what income figures should be used

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. . . based upon the facts presented at the hearing." Id. Pursuant to the child support guidelines, whether to impute income is discretionary. In the Matter of Lynn & Lynn, 158 N.H. 615, 618 (2009).

The undisputed evidence in the record is that Husband's income in 2016 was $47,810. The only evidence that supports Wife's assertion that Husband's 2016 income was earned in six months is Wife's testimony that in 2016 Husband worked "[p]robably around six months or so." The trier of fact is in the best position to measure the persuasiveness and credibility of evidence and is not compelled to believe even uncontroverted evidence. DeLucca v. DeLucca,

152 N.H. 100, 102 (2005).

Based on the facts presented at the hearing, the trial court exercised its discretion to compare Husband's total 2016 income — the last year Husband earned a salary "consistent with his education and the vast majority of his work experience" — to Wife's total 2020 income — the last year Wife worked

"almost full time" — in calculating the amount of child support to be paid. Because the record establishes an objective basis sufficient to sustain the trial court's conclusion, we affirm its calculation of Husband's 2016 income. See In the Matter of Silva & Silva, 171 N.H. 1, 4 (2018).

"There shall be a rebuttable presumption in any proceeding for the award of child support that the amount of the award which would result from the application of guidelines provided under this chapter is the correct amount of child support." RSA 458-C:4, II (2016). Upon our review of Wife's remaining arguments, we conclude that she has failed to demonstrate that the trial court erred in awarding child support and has not overcome the statutory presumption that the guidelines award was the correct amount of child support in this case. See id.; see also Vogel v. Vogel, 137 N.H. 321, 322 (1993); Sup. Ct. R. 25(8).

Affirmed.

MACDONALD, C.J., and DONOVAN, COUNTWAY, and GOULD, JJ., concurred.

Timothy A. Gudas, Clerk