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People of Michigan v. Timothy Joseph Walker

Supreme Court of Michigan
Jan 23, 2026

Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan

Megan K. Cavanagh, Chief Justice Brian K. Zahra Richard H. Bernstein Elizabeth M. Welch Kyra H. Bolden Kimberly A. Thomas Noah P. Hood,

Justices

Order

January 23, 2026

166722

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v SC: 166722

COA: 363199

Isabella CC: 2021-000428-FH

TIMOTHY JOSEPH WALKER,

Defendant-Appellant. _________________________________________/ On December 11, 2025, the Court heard oral argument on the application for leave to appeal the January 18, 2024 judgment of the Court of Appeals. On order of the Court, the application is again considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

BOLDEN, J. (dissenting).

I respectfully dissent from this Court's decision to deny leave to appeal. Defendant in this matter pled guilty to possession of methamphetamine (second offense) in exchange for the dismissal of counts of delivery of methamphetamine. The trial court assigned five points to OV 15, a score that required evidence of either "delivery or possession with intent to deliver . . . any . . . controlled substance" or "possession of controlled substances . . . under such circumstances as to indicate trafficking." MCL 777.45(1)(h); see also People v Jackson, 497 Mich 857, 858 (2014). Because the prosecution conceded in the Court of Appeals that the first category of conduct listed in MCL 777.45(1)(h)— delivery or possession with intent to deliver—did not apply to defendant given that he was convicted of only simple possession, that argument was waived. The remaining issue is whether there was sufficient evidence of "trafficking" to support the scoring decision. In my view, the lower courts committed error requiring reversal by relying on conduct that did not support the sentencing offense for purposes of OV 15 scoring—a result that violates the offense-specific limits established in People v McGraw, 484 Mich 120 (2009), and reaffirmed in People v Gray, 297 Mich App 22 (2012). I would have reversed the Court of Appeals judgment to correct this error.

I. LEGAL BACKGROUND

OV 15 addresses "aggravated controlled substance offenses." MCL 777.45(1). A trial court is directed to assign five points "(1) when the offense involved the delivery or possession with intent to deliver marihuana or any other controlled substance or counterfeit

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controlled substance; and (2) when the offense involved possession of controlled substances or counterfeit controlled substances having a value or under such circumstances as to indicate trafficking." Jackson, 497 Mich at 858. "Trafficking" is defined as "the sale or delivery of controlled substances or counterfeit controlled substances on a continuing basis to 1 or more other individuals for further distribution." MCL 777.45(2)(c). In McGraw, 484 Mich 120, which built on People v Sargent, 481 Mich 346 (2008), the defendant broke into two stores over the course of three separate occasions. Following one of the break-ins, the defendant fled the police but was eventually apprehended. The defendant pled guilty to three counts of breaking and entering in exchange for dismissal of other charges, including a fleeing-and-eluding charge. At sentencing, the trial court considered the conduct giving rise to the dismissed fleeing-and-eluding charge in scoring OV 9. This Court discussed both the offense-specific approach to scoring (favored by the defendant) and the transactional approach (favored by the prosecution). Id. at 124-126. The Court held that the Legislature had chosen the offense-specific approach as the default but had expressly drafted certain offense variables to provide for consideration of the entire transaction, such as OV 14. Id. at 126-127. Continuing, this Court explained:

This does not mean that transactional conduct may never influence a defendant's sentence. Such a result would frustrate the Legislature's intention of having the guidelines promote uniformity in sentencing. Nothing precludes the sentencing court from considering transactional conduct when deciding what sentence to impose within the appropriate guidelines range and whether to depart from the guidelines recommendation. [Id. at 129.]

As for the scoring of OV 9 in that case, the Court held that the Court of Appeals had erred by holding that the defendant's conduct arising from the dismissed fleeing-and- eluding charge could be considered in scoring the variable because it had occurred after the sentencing offense of breaking and entering was completed:

We conclude that the Court of Appeals erred by considering the entire criminal transaction and using defendant's conduct after the crime was completed as the basis for scoring OV 9. Offense variables must be scored giving consideration to the sentencing offense alone, unless otherwise provided in the particular variable. OV 9 does not provide for consideration of conduct after completion of the sentencing offense. Therefore, it must be scored in this case solely on the basis of defendant's conduct during the breaking and entering. If the prosecution had wanted defendant to be punished for fleeing and eluding, it should not have dismissed the fleeing and eluding charge. It would be fundamentally unfair to allow the prosecution to drop the fleeing and eluding charge while brokering a plea bargain, then resurrect it at sentencing in another form. [Id. at 133-134.]

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As a result, this Court reversed and remanded for resentencing. Id. at 135. In Gray, 297 Mich App 22, the defendant was pulled over for a traffic violation and the police discovered 0.6 grams of cocaine in his possession. Later, the police discovered 64 grams of cocaine in the defendant's motel room. The defendant was charged as a third- offense habitual offender with possession with intent to deliver (PWID) 50 to 449 grams of cocaine, PWID less than 50 grams of cocaine, possession of 50 to 449 grams of cocaine, possession of less than 50 grams of cocaine, operating a vehicle with a controlled substance present, operating a vehicle with no license, and witness intimidation. He pled guilty to PWID less than 50 grams of cocaine (relating to the cocaine found during the traffic stop), operating a vehicle with a controlled substance present, and witness intimidation in exchange for dismissal of the remaining charges. At sentencing, the trial court scored 50 points for OV 15 by taking into account the drugs found in both locations. The defendant filed a motion to vacate an invalid sentence, which the trial court denied, and the Court of Appeals denied the defendant's delayed application for leave to appeal. This Court vacated the defendant's sentence and remanded to the trial court for resentencing and to reconsider the scoring of OV 15 in light of McGraw.

On remand for resentencing, the trial court again imposed a score of 50 points for OV 15. In doing so, the court held that McGraw was distinguishable because it rejected consideration of events that transpired after the sentencing offense was completed, whereas the defendant's possession of the cocaine in the vehicle and the possession of the cocaine in the motel room occurred at the same time. The Court of Appeals granted leave and, in a published opinion, agreed with the defendant that, in light of McGraw, OV 15 must be scored for possessing only the amount of cocaine found in the vehicle, i.e., the sentencing offense, and could not be scored on the basis of other drug offenses committed during a similar period but dismissed as part of the plea agreement. Id. at 28. The Gray panel reversed and remanded for resentencing, explaining:

In this case, the sentencing offense solely involved the cocaine in the vehicle driven by defendant; therefore, "[t]he offense involved the . . . possession with intent to . . . deliver" less than 50 grams of cocaine, MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(iv), which is not an amount that allows 50 points to be assessed for OV 15, MCL 777.45(1)(c). The sentencing offense did not involve the cocaine found in the motel room; therefore, contrary to the trial court's ruling, the offense did not involve the "possession with intent to . . . deliver . . . 50 or more grams but less than 450 grams" of cocaine. Id. Indeed, a review of MCL 777.45(1) reveals, in conjunction with a consideration of the record, that none of subdivisions (a) through (g) [now (h)] (points ranging from 5 to 100) applies, triggering the application of subdivision (h) [now (i)], which requires a score of "0 points" when "[t]he

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offense was not an offense described in subdivisions (a) through (g)." [Gray,

297 Mich App at 31-32.]1

II. ANALYSIS

In this case, defendant pled guilty to possession of methamphetamine as a second offense. In exchange, the prosecution dismissed all counts of PWID. On appeal, the prosecution affirmatively informed the Court of Appeals that OV 15 could not be scored on the basis of delivery or intent to deliver because the conviction offense was simple possession. The remaining question was whether this conviction offense occurred under circumstances that "indicate trafficking." Jackson, 497 Mich at 898. The statutory definition of "trafficking" requires "the sale or delivery of controlled substances . . . on a continuing basis to 1 or more other individuals for further distribution." MCL 777.45(2)(c). This definition makes the sale or delivery a prerequisite to any finding of trafficking.

This Court's holding in McGraw establishes that offense variables must be scored by reference to the sentencing offense unless the Legislature expressly provides otherwise. McGraw, 484 Mich at 124-127. OV 15 contains no such provision. This Court's holding in McGraw built on a prior decision issued by this Court, in Sargent, 481 Mich 346. In that case, this Court addressed what conduct the sentencing court should consider, and we explained that "the offense variables are generally offense specific. The sentencing offense determines which offense variables are to be scored in the first place, and then the appropriate offense variables are generally to be scored on the basis of the sentencing offense." Id. at 348. Further, we explained that, "generally, only conduct 'relating to the offense' may be taken into consideration when scoring the offense variables." Id. at 349. As this Court reiterated in McGraw:

1 Several other Court of Appeals panels have expressly applied Gray's holding that OV 1 5 must be scored solely on the basis of the defendant's conduct related to the sentencing offense. See, e.g., People v Jones, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued May 7, 2020 (Docket No. 346743), p 3; People v Calloway, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued February 25, 2020 (Docket No. 349870), p 4; People v Arnold, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued October 11, 2018 (Docket No. 336817), p 3; People v Gutierrez, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued September 15, 2016 (Docket No. 328634), pp 2-3; People v Thomas, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued December 12, 2013 (Docket No. 311569), p 3; People v Boughner, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued October 22, 2013 (Docket No. 312849), p 3.

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Our determination about how offense variables should be scored was based on a reading of the sentencing guidelines statutes as a whole. We relied on the Legislature's use of the terms "the offense" and "each offense" in

MCL 777.21:

MCL 777.21 instructs us on how to score the sentencing guidelines. MCL 777.21(1)(a) instructs us to "[f]ind the offense category for the offense . . . [and] determine the offense variables to be scored for that offense category . . . ."

(Emphasis added.) MCL 777.21(2) instructs us to "score each offense" if "the defendant was convicted of multiple offenses . . . ." (Emphasis added.) MCL 777.21(3), which pertains to habitual offenders, instructs us to "determine the . . . offense variable level . . . based on the underlying offense" and then to increase the upper limit of the recommended minimum sentence range as indicated. (Emphasis added.) This language indicates that the offense variables are generally offense specific.

[McGraw, 484 Mich at 124-125, quoting Sargent, 481 Mich at 348.] Under McGraw, the plea agreement defines the sentencing offense, unless the respective OV expressly indicates otherwise. Conduct underlying dismissed charges cannot be imported into the case under the guise of offense-variable scoring. As McGraw explained:

When providing rules for guidelines scoring, the Legislature took pains to set forth step-by-step instructions, pointing with particularity to where one must look to make the necessary calculations. Given the Legislature's attention to detail, we do not believe that it intended to deviate from what otherwise appears to be an offense-specific orientation. If assessing points for conduct beyond the sentencing offense were to be the norm, the Legislature would have delineated the scope of that conduct, as it did with several specific offense variables. [McGraw, 484 Mich at 127.]

OV 15 specifically states that—under either of the categories of conduct presented in MCL 777.45(1)(h)—in order to score a defendant at five points, the court must determine that "the offense involved" (1) delivery or possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance or (2) possession of a controlled substance under circumstances that indicate trafficking. Id. (emphasis added). It does not permit consideration of all conduct

"related" to the offense, but rather requires that the offense itself involve delivery, intent to deliver, or circumstances establishing trafficking.

Logically, it is impossible to maintain that the sentencing offense involved no delivery or intent to deliver with regard to Category One, yet simultaneously argue that the

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sentencing offense involved ongoing delivery to others for further distribution, as required for Category Two. Additionally, the presence of drug paraphernalia, the alleged plan to sell the methamphetamine, and defendant's broader involvement in drug activity were all tied to counts that the prosecutor dismissed. Under McGraw, those facts are off-limits for scoring OV 15. And under Jackson, they cannot be used to recharacterize a simple possession conviction as trafficking. This is precisely the "fundamental unfairness"

McGraw forbids. See McGraw, 484 Mich at 134.

Gray held that simultaneous conduct forming the basis of dismissed charges cannot be used to score OV 15, even when temporally close to the sentencing offense. Gray, 297 Mich App at 31-32. That is because "[t]he sentencing offense is the crime of which the defendant has been convicted and for which he or she is being sentenced." McGraw, 484 Mich at 122 n 3. This instant matter fits comfortably within that rule. The sentencing offense here is possession of less than 25 grams of methamphetamine, and the factual basis supporting the conviction is limited to that possession. The plea contained no admission of delivery, intent to deliver, or trafficking; instead, the plea affirmatively eliminated those allegations. The trial court nevertheless relied on defendant's alleged plan to sell drugs, the presence of scales and baggies, and other facts supporting the dismissed PWID charges, which constitute a factual basis outside the scope of the sentencing offense. As in Gray, the sentencing offense cannot be expanded to reintroduce dismissed conduct for purposes of scoring OV 15.

Lastly, there is an argument to be made that once the prosecution conceded in the Court of Appeals that OV 15 could not be scored under the first category because the sentencing offense was simple possession, that concession necessarily carried consequences for the second category as well. By affirmatively informing the Court of Appeals through its brief that the "first category [did] not apply to [defendant]," the prosecution relinquished any argument that the sentencing offense contained distributive conduct of any kind. However, that issue is not before us today, and we may be inclined to address it another case.

III. CONCLUSION

OV 15 cannot be scored on the basis of conduct that does not belong to the sentencing offense. The lower courts' approach to the contrary is incompatible with the offense-specific framework mandated by McGraw and reaffirmed in Gray. Because the scoring error altered defendant's guidelines range, he would have been entitled to resentencing. See People v Francisco, 474 Mich 82, 92 (2006); see People v Roberson,

500 Mich 929 (2017). I would have reversed the Court of Appeals judgment to correct this error. I respectfully dissent.

I take no stance on whether People v Hines, ___ Mich App ___ (January 16, 2025) (Docket No. 363151), was correctly decided because we declined to hear specific

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I, Elizabeth Kingston-Miller, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. January 23, 2026

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Clerk arguments in this case. However, I believe our denial order should be without prejudice to defendant's filing a motion under MCR 6.500 to argue entitlement to resentencing under Hines in light of its holding that the existence of previous drug-related convictions, without more, is an insufficient basis to double the authorized sentencing guidelines under MCL 333.7413(1). See id. at ___; slip op at 14.

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