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In re: Geddes

Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
Dec 1, 2025

FILED

United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit

December 1, 2025

Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

_________________________________ In re: DERALD WILFORD GEDDES, Movant.

No. 25-4139

(D.C. Nos. 1:23-CV-00091-TC & 1:15-CR-00093-TC-1)

(D. Utah)

_________________________________

ORDER

_________________________________ Before McHUGH, MORITZ, and ROSSMAN, Circuit Judges. _________________________________

Derald Wilford Geddes, proceeding pro se, seeks authorization to file a second or successive 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion. For the reasons stated below, we deny the motion for authorization.

In 2022, Mr. Geddes was convicted of tax obstruction, tax evasion, and three counts of willfully filing false tax returns and sentenced to 60 months in prison followed by three years of supervised release.1On direct appeal, he successfully challenged certain aspects of his sentence relating to restitution and conditions of supervised release, but he did not challenge the conviction. United States v. Geddes, 71 F.4th 1206, 1217 (10th Cir. 2023). On remand, the district court entered an amended judgment that

1 Mr. Geddes has finished serving his prison sentence. But because he remains on supervised release, the motion for authorization is not moot. See United States v. Condit, 621 F.2d 1096, 1098 (10th Cir. 1980) (noting that a released prisoner who is still subject to a term of supervised release is "in custody" for purposes of § 2255). Appellate Case: 25-4139 Document: 2 Date Filed: 12/01/2025 Page: 1

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conformed with our decision. Mr. Geddes then filed a § 2255 motion asserting 41 claims. That motion was denied, and Mr. Geddes did not appeal.

Mr. Geddes now seeks authorization to file a second or successive § 2255 motion. Such a motion cannot proceed in the district court without first being authorized by this court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h); § 2244(b)(3)(A). We may authorize a claim only if the prisoner makes a prima facie showing, see § 2244(b)(3)(C), that the motion contains:

(1) "newly discovered evidence that, if proven and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable factfinder would have found [him] guilty of the offense," § 2255(h)(1); or

(2) "a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable," § 2255(h)(2). Mr. Geddes proposes eight claims he wishes to pursue in a second or successive § 2255 motion, all of which rely solely upon § 2255(h)(1). We address each in turn.

For his first claim, Mr. Geddes contends his due process rights were violated based on his discovery of "[s]ubstantial evidence," Mot. for Auth. at 10, concerning the underlying 2015 indictment. The alleged documents2include a case history report containing the 2017 notes of an IRS examiner who recorded having stamped grand jury documents, and several internal IRS memos from 2017 and 2019 from which he says it can be inferred the grand jury proceedings were still ongoing. These documents, Mr. Geddes claims, suggest that there was in fact no grand jury proceeding in 2015, or

2 Mr. Geddes has not attached or otherwise provided any of the alleged newly discovered documents in support of his motion. Appellate Case: 25-4139 Document: 2 Date Filed: 12/01/2025 Page: 2

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that if there had been, it did not result in an indictment. Even accepting his characterization of these documents, they bear on his legal innocence, not his factual innocence. Claims of legal innocence do not satisfy the requirement of § 2255(h)(1). See United States v. Maravilla, 566 F. App'x 704, 707-08 (10th Cir. 2014) (noting that courts interpret § 2255(h)(1) "to require new evidence of actual factual innocence," and collecting supporting published authority from other circuits). We therefore deny authorization on this claim.

Mr. Geddes's second and third claims assert his due process rights were violated when he was detained pretrial as a flight risk. He points to certain documents, including his passport application, which he says establish that he should not have been detained. He also claims an alleged transcribed statement by a Department of Justice attorney suggests the government wanted him detained not because he was a flight risk but instead to hinder his ability prepare a defense. These claims are relevant to his pretrial detention, not to whether any "reasonable factfinder would have found [him] guilty of the offense[s]," § 2255(h)(1). Because these claims do not relate to his guilt or innocence, we deny authorization.

In his fourth and fifth claims, Mr. Geddes complains he was denied the right to conduct his own defense and received constitutionally ineffective assistance of standby trial counsel and appellate counsel. He does not allege, however, that but for these alleged violations, no reasonable factfinder would have found him guilty. These claims therefore do not satisfy the requirements of § 2255(h)(1), and we therefore deny authorization.

Appellate Case: 25-4139 Document: 2 Date Filed: 12/01/2025 Page: 3

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Mr. Geddes's sixth claim is difficult to discern, but the gist of the claim appears to be his allegation that newly discovered documents reveal that "many" of the claims alleged in the indictment are "invalidate[d]." Mot. for Auth. at 15. This claim is supported only by assertions that are by turns conclusory and perplexing. For example, Mr. Geddes contends that he has newly discovered IRS records "revealing fraudulent Business Master Files . . . of the entities for which [he] practiced dentistry." Id. at 16. He says these files show the IRS assigned these entities a code relating to "527 Political Organization," id. (italics omitted), but that his entity was solely related to dentistry. It is unclear how these assertions relate to the underlying criminal convictions. In addition, some of his evidence consists of what he would have testified to but for the interference of the court and his standby counsel, who, he claims, "ensure[d] no such defenses would be made." Id. To the extent this claim repeats claims four and five, we reject it for the same reasons. We otherwise deny authorization as to Mr. Geddes's sixth claim because he has not established that no reasonable juror would find him guilty in light of these documents.

For his seventh claim, Mr. Geddes asserts he has newly discovered evidence that

"is not physical evidence per say [sic] by rather implied evidence which has been fostered by the [Department of Justice] in the related civil action necessary to substantiate the criminal restitutions allegation." Id. at 17. He seems to assert that this new evidence substantiates his assertion that his criminal convictions were the result of a vast conspiracy among "criminal and civil prosecutors, courts, jail and [Bureau of Prison] officials." Id. We find that Mr. Geddes has not established that in view of this "implied Appellate Case: 25-4139 Document: 2 Date Filed: 12/01/2025 Page: 4

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evidence," no reasonable juror would have found him guilty of the charged offenses. We therefore deny authorization as to this claim.

Finally, for his eighth claim, Mr. Geddes alleges that newly discovered evidence proves that the Tax Court committed "administrative fraud." Id. at 18. He alleges this supposed fraud resulted in the jury receiving evidence that his tax debt was much higher than it actually was. Mr. Geddes does not allege, however, that no reasonable jury would have convicted him of the charged offenses in light of this alleged new evidence. Accordingly, we deny authorization as to this claim.

This denial of authorization "shall not be appealable and shall not be the subject of a petition for rehearing or for a writ of certiorari." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(E). Entered for the Court

Per Curiam

Appellate Case: 25-4139 Document: 2 Date Filed: 12/01/2025 Page: 5

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