In the Matter of Laurie Bondaz and Jean-Pierre Bondaz

THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

SUPREME COURT

In Case No. 2024-0327, In the Matter of Laurie Bondaz and Jean-Pierre Bondaz, the court on November 21, 2025, issued the following order:

The court has reviewed the written arguments and the record submitted on appeal, and has determined to resolve the case by way of this order. See Sup. Ct. R. 20(3). The petitioner, Laurie Bondaz (the wife), appeals from a final divorce decree issued by the Circuit Court (Garner, J.). The wife argues that the trial court ordered insufficient alimony and child support to be paid by the respondent, Jean-Pierre Bondaz (the husband), and erred in dividing the marital property. We affirm.

The trial court found, or the record otherwise supports, the following facts. The parties met in 1990 and married in 1993. They have three children; one of the children is still a minor and will turn 18 in 2027. The husband works as a commercial airline pilot. Prior to having children, the wife obtained her master's degree and subsequently worked for a publishing company. She also has her pilot's license, but has never piloted commercially. When the parties' first child was born in 2003, they agreed that the wife would stay home to care for the children, which she did for the next sixteen years. The wife returned to work in 2019 as a paraprofessional and, as of early 2024, she worked as an administrative assistant at a school. The parties filed a joint petition for divorce in 2020. They continued to live together until they sold the marital home in October 2022 and equally divided the proceeds. The trial court held a hearing in May 2023, after which it entered temporary orders on alimony and child support.

The trial court held a two-day final hearing in November 2023 and issued final orders. To calculate alimony, the trial court attributed $22,313 in monthly income to the husband and $2,220 in monthly income to the wife. It then awarded alimony to the wife in the amount of $2,769 per month until June 2024, when the parties' second child graduated from high school and child support was reduced, then $3,268 per month until June 2031, when the husband will turn 65, and then $1,500 per month until 2036. The trial court reasoned that the wife would be financially dependent on the husband "for at least a few years," though after that she "may be expected to regain full time employment at an income consistent with her education and experience." It also found that, as a result of the property distribution, both parties will

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possess significant retirement assets and each will be able to maintain "a comfortable standard of living" with those assets. In addition to alimony, the trial court awarded full guidelines child support to the wife in the amount of $4,026 per month until June 2024, and then $2,942 per month until the youngest child no longer qualifies as a minor. The trial court also ordered an equal division of the parties' property.

Both parties filed motions to reconsider or clarify along with corresponding objections. In her pleadings, the wife challenged the trial court's child support and alimony awards, as well as its division of the parties' assets. The trial court declined to amend its alimony and child support orders but adjusted the property distribution slightly to account for certain assets it had inadvertently overlooked. This appeal followed.

The trial court has broad discretion in fashioning a final decree of divorce. In the Matter of Spenard & Spenard, 167 N.H. 1, 3 (2014). Its discretion necessarily encompasses decisions concerning child support, alimony, and property distribution. Id. We will not overturn the trial court's rulings absent an unsustainable exercise of discretion, id., and we will uphold its factual findings unless they are unsupported by the evidence, see In the Matter of Routhier & Routhier, 175 N.H. 6, 15 (2022). Under this standard, we review only whether the record establishes an objective basis sufficient to sustain the discretionary judgment made, and we will not disturb the trial court's determination if it could reasonably have been made. In the Matter of Braunstein & Braunstein, 173 N.H. 38, 47 (2020).

We first address the wife's arguments regarding the alimony award. RSA 458:19-a (Supp. 2024) governs term alimony. Paragraph II provides that "[t]he amount of a term alimony order shall be the lesser of the payee's reasonable need, or a formula based on 23 percent of the difference between the parties' gross incomes at the time the order is created, unless the court finds that justice requires an adjustment." RSA 458:19-a, II(a). Alimony determinations are based primarily upon the parties' income and need. Routhier, 175 N.H. at

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The wife argues that the trial court improperly calculated the amount of alimony awarded from June 2027 through June 2031 when it failed to increase her alimony award after child support terminates in 2027, following the third child's graduation from high school. She argues that the trial court properly applied the statutory formula — 23 percent of the difference between the parties' incomes, adjusted for child support — to increase alimony upon the termination of child support for the parties' second child, and that its failure to apply the statutory formula following the third child's graduation without providing its reasoning for doing so was an unsustainable exercise of discretion. We disagree.

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In calculating the alimony award, the trial court considered the wife's qualifications and her prospects of achieving more gainful employment in the future. The trial court found that the wife has a pilot's license and a master's degree and has worked for a publishing company, as a paraprofessional, administrative assistant, and French teacher. The trial court described the wife as "undoubtedly a well organized and competent person whose experience and level of education might well enable her to achieve a greater level of income" than she earns as a school administrative assistant. Although the trial court determined that the wife has justifiably limited her efforts to secure more lucrative employment in order to care for the children, it also found that this need is diminishing as the children get older. The trial court thus concluded that she may be expected to regain full-time employment "at an income consistent with her education and experience" in a matter of years. These findings are supported by the record.

Additionally, the trial court found that, in light of the property division, both parties will be able to maintain a comfortable standard of living post- divorce. Each party received roughly $400,000 from the sale of the marital home, and the record shows that the parties' other assets, amounting to

"significant value," were split equally. Furthermore, in fashioning the alimony award, the trial court considered that the wife will receive child support until

2027.

In declining to adjust the alimony award following the third child's graduation, it appears that the trial court concluded that, by 2027, the wife's

"reasonable need" would be less than the amount under the statutory formula. RSA 458:19-a, II(a). Based on the record before it, the trial court could reasonably conclude that the wife's share of the property division — combined with her likely increase in earnings — will lessen her need for alimony by 2027, thus obviating the need to apply the statutory formula. See id. Although the trial court did not explicitly state that the wife's reasonable need would be less than the formula alimony amount starting in 2027, the statute does not require such an express finding. See RSA 458:19-a, II, VI; In the Matter of Valerie Bois and Alan Bois, No. 2024-0252 (non-precedential order at 2-3), 2025 WL 2237314 (N.H. Aug. 6, 2025) (affirming alimony award less than statutory formula amount where "it appear[ed] that the court determined that Wife's reasonable need was less than the formula alimony amount"). Based upon our review of the record, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence to support the trial court's conclusion that an increase in alimony was not warranted. See In the Matter of Peirano & Larsen, 155 N.H. 738, 745-47

(2007).

The wife also argues that the trial court improperly calculated the amount of the alimony award from 2031 to 2036. We agree with the husband that this issue was not properly preserved, as the wife has failed to demonstrate that she raised this issue before the trial court. We therefore

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decline to review it. See Bean v. Red Oak Prop. Mgmt., 151 N.H. 248, 250

(2004).

The wife next argues that the trial court erred when it did not award retroactive alimony and child support for the period of October 2022, when the parties sold the marital home, through July 2023, when the court's temporary support orders took effect. After they sold the home, the husband paid the wife voluntary child support each month until the trial court's temporary orders on child support and alimony took effect. The wife contends that the trial court should have retroactively awarded her the difference between the husband's voluntary child support monthly payments and the monthly child support and alimony payments that the trial court subsequently ordered. She also argues that the trial court's failure to order retroactive support was unfair because it

"forced her to liquidate assets" and "front" the payment of expenses from her own funds that should have been reimbursed through a retroactive award. As the record shows, each party received approximately $400,000 from the sale of their home, and the husband began providing voluntary monthly child support to the wife shortly thereafter. As previously discussed, the wife received an equal share of the parties' significant property value, and her salary has the potential to increase in the future. Based on this evidence, and the record as a whole, we cannot conclude that the trial court unsustainably exercised its discretion when it determined that retroactive support was not warranted. See Walker v. Walker, 133 N.H. 413, 418 (1990) ("[T]he date from which alimony is payable is peculiarly within the discretion of the trial court."

(quotation omitted)); see also West v. Turchioe, 144 N.H. 509, 512-13 (1999) (upholding court's exercise of discretion in awarding retroactive child support below full guidelines amount).

The wife's remaining arguments challenge the trial court's methods in distributing the parties' property. She argues that the trial court: (1) unjustifiably failed to account for the parties' joint checking and brokerage accounts in dividing the property; (2) failed to account for the husband's use of those accounts to pay personal expenses; and (3) erred in calculating the parties' individual checking account balances. We address the first two of these arguments together.

Marital property is not to be divided by some mechanical formula, but in a manner deemed "just" based upon the evidence presented and the equities of the case. In the Matter of Kempton & Kempton, 167 N.H. 785, 799 (2015) (quotation omitted). We will not reweigh the equities to divide assets as we deem appropriate. See In the Matter of Heinrich & Heinrich, 164 N.H. 357, 365 (2012). The record shows that the husband used or transferred funds from both joint accounts to his own account to pay certain expenses, such as spousal support and a $5,000 down payment on his new condominium. Since the trial court stated that it was only considering the parties' divisible assets

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for equitable distribution, we read the trial court orders as excluding those transactions from the marital estate. The wife does not argue that the husband wasted marital funds in order to avoid their equitable distribution, but rather that his use of the joint accounts to pay his own expenses, as well as marital expenses, reduced the overall equity to be distributed in the final divorce decree. Because the record shows that these transfers were made to pay reasonable and necessary living expenses, we cannot conclude that the trial court erred when it declined to include the joint accounts in the property distribution. Cf. RSA 458:16-b, I(b) (2018) (providing exception to anti- hypothecation order for party's use of property "[f]or reasonable and necessary expenses of living"); In the Matter of Brownell & Brownell, 163 N.H. 593, 600- 01 (2012) (describing marital property that is "intentionally dissipated to avoid its inclusion in the property to be equitably distributed" as a "fraud on marital rights," and explaining that courts will constructively consider dissipated property part of the marital estate (quotation omitted)). Concerning the checking account balances, the wife contends that the trial court included her share of the sale proceeds of a mutual asset — a Kubota tractor — in her checking account balance while failing to include the husband's share in his checking account balance. We find no error. The trial court adjusted the parties' respective checking account balances to deduct the amount of the net proceeds each received from the sale of the marital home. The record shows that there were some discrepancies and omissions in the wife's financial affidavit, and she acknowledged during her trial testimony that the affidavit needed to be corrected for accuracy. In determining the remaining balance of the wife's account, the trial court could reasonably have not credited the wife's representations about the amount or source of the remaining funds. Considering the broad discretion afforded to the trial court, we cannot conclude that its findings were unsupported by the evidence. See In the Matter of Letendre & Letendre, 149 N.H. 31, 36 (2002) ("If the court's findings [regarding property distribution] can reasonably be made on the evidence presented, they will stand."); Routhier, 175 N.H. at 18 (explaining that circuit court has discretion in assessing the weight of the evidence and the credibility and demeanor of witnesses).

Affirmed.

MACDONALD, C.J., and DONOVAN, COUNTWAY, and GOULD, JJ.,

concurred.

Timothy A. Gudas, Clerk