People v. Hall

People v Hall

2025 NY Slip Op 06366 Decided on November 20, 2025 Appellate Division, Third Department Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports. Decided and Entered:November 20, 2025

CR-24-1456

[*1] The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v

Mckyle Hall, Appellant.

Calendar Date:September 2, 2025 Before:Garry, P.J., Pritzker, McShan, Powers and Mackey, JJ. Thomas Eddy, New Rochelle, for appellant.

Lee C. Kindlon, District Attorney, Albany (Emily Schultz of counsel), for respondent. Powers, J.

Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Roger McDonough, J.), rendered May 30, 2024 in Albany County, upon a verdict convicting defendant of the crime of attempted assault in the first degree.

Following an altercation on the campus of the State University of New York at Albany in September 2022, during which the victim suffered stab and slash wounds to her abdomen and arm, defendant was charged by indictment with attempted murder in the second degree, assault in the first degree, attempted assault in the first degree and assault in the second degree. Defendant was convicted, after a jury trial, of the sole count of attempted assault in the first degree ( see Penal Law §§ 110.00, 120.10 [1]) and acquitted of the remaining counts charged in the indictment. He then moved to set aside the verdict pursuant to CPL 330.30 on the grounds of, as is relevant here, repugnancy and juror confusion as evidenced by affidavits from some of the sworn jurors. Supreme Court denied the motion and sentenced defendant to a five-year prison term, to be followed by five years of postrelease supervision. In so sentencing defendant, the court denied his request to be adjudicated as a youthful offender and heard a victim impact statement from the victim's father. Defendant appeals.

Initially, by failing to object to the verdict before the jury was discharged, defendant has not preserved his claim that the verdict was repugnant in view of his acquittal on the remaining counts ( see People v Carter , 7 NY3d 875 , 876 [2006]; People v Colvin , 218 AD3d 1016 , 1021 [3d Dept 2023], lv denied 40 NY3d 1038 [2023]; People v Leigh , 208 AD3d 1463 , 1465 [3d Dept 2022]). We decline defendant's request that this Court take corrective action in the interest of justice ( see CPL

1

470.15 [3] [c]; People v Dale , 115 AD3d 1002 , 1006-1007 [3d Dept 2014]; see generally People v Muhammad , 17 NY3d 532 , 539-540 [2011]).

Turning to defendant's assertion that the conviction is not supported by the weight of the evidence, when undertaking such review, "this Court must view the evidence in a neutral light and determine first whether a different verdict would have been unreasonable and, if not, weigh the relative probative force of conflicting testimony and the relative strength of conflicting inferences that may be drawn from the testimony to determine if the verdict is supported by the weight of the evidence" ( People v Robbins , 236 AD3d 1097 , 1098-1099 [3d Dept 2025] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]). "A person is guilty of assault in the first degree when . . . [w]ith intent to cause serious physical injury to another person, he [or she] causes such injury to such person or to a third person by means of a deadly weapon or a dangerous instrument" (Penal Law § 120.10 [1]). Relatedly, "[a] person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime when, with intent to commit a crime, he [or she] engages in conduct which tends to effect the commission of such crime" (Penal Law § 110.00). Thus, there [*2] must be proof that the defendant "intended and came dangerously close to engaging in" the prohibited act ( People v Butkiewicz , 175 AD3d 792 , 793 [3d Dept 2019] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted], lv denied 34 NY3d 1076 [2019]). Defendant only presently raises issue with respect to the element of intent, claiming that the evidence did not establish that he intended to cause serious physical injury to the victim. Although a different verdict would not have been unreasonable had the jury credited defendant's testimony that he did not intend to injure the victim ( see People v Contompasis , 236 AD3d 138 , 143 [3d Dept 2025], lv denied 43 NY3d 1007 [2025]; People v LaDuke , 204 AD3d 1083 , 1087 [3d Dept 2022], lv denied 38 NY3d 1072 [2022]), we do not find the verdict to be against the weight of the evidence. The evidence adduced at trial, viewed in a neutral light, established that defendant brought a knife to an ongoing verbal disagreement between his friend and his friend's girlfriend. After he made a derogatory remark directed toward the victim, a physical altercation arose between defendant and the victim. During the course of this physical altercation, defendant removed the knife from his pocket and the victim was stabbed and/or slashed with that knife. Defendant then fled the scene in a vehicle with two friends, including his friend who had been involved in the initial verbal disagreement.

The jury rejected defendant's explanation of the events in question, namely, that he did not intend to harm the victim and that the victim's injuries were the result of an accident after he removed the knife from his pocket for his own safety in the face of an allegedly advancing crowd. Instead, the jury credited the evidence proffered by the People, including a text message exchange wherein defendant was asked to bring the knife to the ongoing verbal disagreement, witness testimony describing that defendant was seen swinging his arms at the victim during the altercation, was observed to be in possession of said knife and that no other members of the crowd were involved in the altercation. The jury found that defendant possessed the requisite intent based upon these surrounding circumstances and we defer to that credibility determination ( see People v Baque , 43 NY3d 26 , 30 [2024]; People v LaDuke , 204 AD3d at 1087; cf. People v Fisher , 221 AD3d 1355 , 1358-1359 [3d Dept 2023], lv denied 40 NY3d 1092 [2024]). Accordingly, the verdict finding defendant guilty of attempted assault in the first degree is not against the weight of the evidence ( see People v Contompasis , 236 AD3d at 144; People v Lewis , 224 AD3d 1143 , 1148 [3d Dept 2024], lv denied 42 NY3d 939 [2024]; People v Stines , 212 AD3d 883 , 887 [3d Dept 2023], lv denied 39 NY3d 1113 [2023]). This is not nullified by the fact that the jury seemingly could have convicted defendant of either assault in the first degree or assault in the second degree as it is uncontested that the victim sustained serious [*3] physical injuries â€" which included major abdominal surgery and the removal of parts of her intestines and stomach â€" considering that "[a]n intermediate appellate court conducting a weight of the evidence review of a mixed jury verdict may take into

2

account the possibility that the jury has not necessarily acted irrationally, but instead has exercised mercy" ( People v Joseph , 235 AD3d 898 , 899 [2d Dept 2025] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted], lv denied 43 NY3d 964 [2025]; see People v Muhammad , 17 NY3d at 540; People v Johnson , 197 AD3d 725 , 726 [2d Dept 2021], lv denied 37 NY3d 1097 [2021]). Defendant next challenges the denial of his request to be adjudicated as a youthful offender. Defendant was presumptively eligible for youthful offender adjudication, [FN1] therefore, Supreme Court was required to consider whether, among other things, "the interest of justice would be served by relieving [him] from the onus of a criminal record" and capping his sentence at an indeterminate four-year prison term (CPL 720.20 [1] [a]). "Longstanding authority holds that the factors to be considered include the gravity of the crime and manner in which it was committed, mitigating circumstances, defendant's prior criminal record, prior acts of violence, recommendations in the presentence reports, defendant's reputation, the level of cooperation with authorities, defendant's attitude toward society and respect for the law, and the prospects for rehabilitation and hope for a future constructive life" ( People v Terry , 238 AD3d 1387 , 1389 [3d Dept 2025] [internal quotation marks, brackets and citations omitted], lv denied 44 NY3d 984 [2025]). "The decision to grant or deny youthful offender status rests within the sound exercise of the sentencing court's discretion" ( People v Vanderhorst , 235 AD3d 1089 , 1090 [3d Dept 2025]). Accordingly, this Court may "review youthful offender adjudications for abuse of discretion, or under its broad interest-of-justice jurisdiction" ( People v Anthony C. , 25 NY3d 937 , 938 [2015], citing CPL 470.15 [6] [b]; 720.20 [1] [a]).

In support of the request, defendant's trial counsel noted that multiple jurors had provided letters in relation to defendant's CPL 330.30 motion in which these jurors indicated that they believed the conviction was unjust. In response, Supreme Court stated that it would not consider these letters in the context of the sentence to be imposed as the jury is not involved in sentencing. Nevertheless, trial counsel went on at length as to how defendant's conviction was unjust and that defendant "should not be sentenced" in the first instance. Trial counsel then set forth that, if the court does wish to sentence defendant, it should sentence him to the minimum and grant youthful offender status, without further extrapolation on this point. Defendant stated on his own behalf that he was sorry for the events that transpired but that he was trying to protect himself and did not intend to harm the victim. He noted [*4] that this was his first involvement with the criminal justice system, that he was in college when the incident occurred, he continued to attend college and attained a job during these proceedings. Based upon these factors, defendant requested the imposition of a 4½-year term of incarceration. In opposition, the People asked that the maximum permissible prison term of 15 years be imposed.

Initially, Supreme Court noted that it had received multiple letters in support of defendant which indicated that he was of "upstanding character." The court agreed with defendant's assertion that this was his first involvement with the criminal justice system and that he had avoided circumstances like this in the past. The court considered these facts in imposing the sentence, but also that there was no evidence that any other individual had been involved in the physical altercation between defendant and the victim. The court expressly disbelieved defendant's explanation that he carried the knife at all times because he feared for his safety, in view of the fact that defendant's presence with the knife was explicitly requested. The court noted that if defendant was truly afraid for his safety the appropriate response would be to call campus police, not show up to the fight with knife in tow. The court also paid importance to defendant's failure to take accountability or acknowledge that his actions caused the victim's injury, despite having expressed generalized sympathy for the victim. The court found that, although eligible for youthful offender status, the circumstances of the crime did not warrant granting the request and imposed a five-year term of incarceration.

3

"[T]he purpose of according youthful offender treatment is to avoid stigmatizing youths between the ages of 16 and 19 with criminal records triggered by hasty or thoughtless acts which, although crimes, may not have been the serious deeds of hardened criminals" ( People v Cha-Narion D. , 232 AD3d 1131 , 1133 [3d Dept 2024] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]). That purpose would not be served by granting defendant's request here. To begin, trial counsel's argument that the conviction was unjust and defendant's related assertion that he did not intend to injure the victim both go to defendant's guilt, a matter resolved by the guilty verdict reached by the jury after trial and not, as defendant seemed to advance, a sentencing consideration. It is true that this was defendant's first involvement with the criminal justice system and he is not a "hardened criminal,"

however we must note that the facts presented demonstrate that the crime at issue was not the result of a "hasty or thoughtless act[ ]" on the part of defendant as intended by the Legislature. Rather, defendant's presence with the knife was specifically requested at the location of the ongoing verbal disagreement and, upon arrival, defendant inserted himself into that disagreement and elevated it to a physical altercation, during [*5] which he ultimately utilized that knife to cause injuries to the victim. This level of forethought is not consistent with actions that can be classified as

"hasty or thoughtless." Interestingly, the trial proof also evidences that defendant harbored some level of indifference when it comes to violence against women â€" going so far as telling a friend that a different woman deserved to be punched in the face because her breath smelled badly. Even crediting that this was a joke, defendant's actions here are concerningly similar to this prior statement. Specifically, defendant told the victim here that he "slap[s] b***hes like [her]," and then when she stood up for herself â€" albeit through violence â€" he escalated the situation from fisticuffs to a potentially deadly altercation. If the victim was the instigator, as defendant claims, this does not excuse his actions. Moreover, as Supreme Court noted at sentencing, defendant did not take accountability for his role in the underlying altercation and has consistently advanced that the victim was in some way responsible for her own injuries.

Based upon these facts, we discern no basis upon which to disturb Supreme Court's discretionary denial of defendant's request for youthful offender treatment ( see People v Quarterman , 238 AD3d 1385 , 1387 [3d Dept 2025]; People v Wimberly , 228 AD3d 1177 , 1179 [3d Dept 2024], lv denied 42 NY3d 1022 [2024]; People v Moon , 176 AD3d 1265 , 1266 [3d Dept 2019], lv denied 34 NY3d 1080 [2019]). Most notably, the facts defendant points to that weigh in favor of his request were plainly considered by the court in imposing a sentence at the bottom end of the legally permissible term for defendant's conviction ( see Penal Law § 70.02 [3] [b]; see also Penal Law §§ 70.02 [1] [a]-[b]; 110.00, 120.10 [1]). Likewise, considering defendant's age ( compare People v Lyman HH. , 215 AD2d 847, 848 [3d Dept 1995]), [FN2] the severe injuries sustained by the victim ( compare People v Cha-Narion D. , 232 AD3d at 1134), the manner in which the crime was committed and defendant's refusal to take accountability for his actions ( compare People v Thomas R.O. , 136 AD3d 1400 , 1403 [4th Dept 2016]; People v Jeffrey VV. , 88 AD3d 1159 , 1160 [3d Dept 2011]), we do not believe that this is a case where the invocation of our interest of justice jurisdiction is warranted ( compare People v Cruickshank , 105 AD2d 325, 335 [3d Dept 1985], affd sub nom. People v Dawn Maria C. , 67 NY2d 625 [1986]). In brief, "we are unpersuaded that the factors identified by defendant warrant a substitution of our own discretion to grant defendant youthful offender status" ( People v Terry , 238 AD3d at 1389 [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]). [FN3]

Defendant finally maintains that Supreme Court violated CPL 380.50 (2) (a) (2) by allowing the victim's father to provide a victim impact statement without elucidation on the record that the victim was unwilling or unable to provide a statement on her own behalf. Despite having prior [*6] notice thereof, defendant failed to raise any objection to the father's statement at a time when it could have been easily remedied. As a result, this claim is unpreserved for our review, and we decline to reach it in the interest of justice ( see People v Russell , 203 AD3d 1081 , 1081 [2d Dept 2022], lv denied 38

4

NY3d 1035 [2022]; see also People v Morales-Lopez , 110 AD3d 1248 , 1249 [3d Dept 2013], lvs denied 22 NY3d 1140 [2014]; People v Cianfarani , 81 AD3d 998 , 999 [3d Dept 2011]; see generally People v Hemmings , 2 NY3d 1, 6 [2004] ["Nothing in the . . . language or legislative history (of CPL

380.50 [2]) suggests . . . that the provision was intended to otherwise restrict a sentencing court's discretionary authority to allow others close to the victim to address the court at sentencing and we therefore decline to read such a limitation into the statute."]).

Garry, P.J., Pritzker and Mackey, JJ., concur.

McShan, J. (dissenting).

I respectfully dissent only with respect to the discrete issue of my colleagues' affirmance of Supreme Court's denial of youthful offender status. In doing so, I am cognizant that we generally defer to the discretionary determinations of the sentencing court. In this instance, although Supreme Court chose not to grant youthful offender status, it imposed a sentence that exceeds the permissible period of incarceration for youthful offenders by one year. I am generally in accord with the length of the sentence imposed; however, it is my view that declining to adjudicate defendant as a youthful offender was an improvident exercise of discretion, as it will unnecessarily burden this defendant with the heavy weight of a criminal record, a consequence that could have a profound effect on his ability to become a productive member of society. Based upon the facts and circumstances of this particular case, I believe that denying defendant such status does not serve the ends of justice. The relevant factors to be considered upon an application for youthful offender status are well established, and include "the gravity of the crime and manner in which it was committed, mitigating circumstances, defendant's prior criminal record, prior acts of violence, recommendations in the presentence reports, defendant's reputation, the level of cooperation with authorities, defendant's attitude toward society and respect for the law, and the prospects for rehabilitation and hope for a future constructive life" ( People v Cruickshank , 105 AD2d 325, 334 [3d Dept 1985], affd sub nom. People v Dawn Maria C. , 67 NY2d 625 [1986]). In denying defendant youthful offender status, Supreme Court noted its familiarity with the case and ultimately found that "youthful offender status [was not] an appropriate response or sentence in a case of this nature, of this violence." Leaving no doubt, defendant's criminal conduct constituted an egregious lack of judgment, and I am in no way diminishing its severity. Defendant willingly chose to bring a knife to an [*7] altercation without good reason and, crediting the trial testimony describing that encounter, chose to utilize the knife in the absence of any justification. The victim now has to live with both the mental and physical scars from that encounter. Those facts cannot and should not be minimized, and, on that, I believe that a significant term of imprisonment is wholly appropriate. However, acknowledging that the conduct at issue is indeed severe, I note that the Legislature allows for criminal conduct, such as the crime at issue, to be eligible for youthful offender status, "manifest[ing] its intent that this factor alone does not mandate denial of such treatment" ( People v Strong , 152 AD3d 1076 , 1079 [3d Dept 2017, Garry, J., dissenting]; see People v Cha-Narion D. , 232 AD3d 1131 , 1134 [3d Dept 2024]). Although Supreme Court's focus on the severity of the crime is understandable, it is my view that weighing all of the appropriate factors for consideration on a youthful offender status, on balance, tips the scales in favor of granting defendant such relief.

The presentence report [FN4] indicates that defendant was generally cooperative in the interview process, only declining to discuss the present offense on the advice of counsel in light of his pending appeal. Prominent in the report's findings is the fact that defendant's criminal conduct was aberrational and "out of character," as it constituted his first and only contact with the criminal justice system as of that time. [FN5] Defendant's blemish-free history also extended to his time in school, reflected by the absence of any disciplinary records. On his educational endeavors, defendant had demonstrated his commitment to bettering himself academically during his enrollment in college

5