V.C. v. W.C.

THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

SUPREME COURT

In Case No. 2024-0676, V.C. v. W.C., the court on June 2, 2025, issued the following order:

The defendant's motion for late entry of his brief, and his motion to seal, are granted. The defendant's motion for late entry will be made confidential. The plaintiff's motion to seal is denied.

The court has reviewed the written arguments and the record submitted on appeal, and has determined to resolve the case by way of this order. See Sup. Ct. R. 20(2). The defendant, W.C., appeals the civil stalking and domestic violence final orders of protection entered by the Circuit Court (Paine, J.), following a hearing, in favor of the plaintiff, V.C. See RSA 173-B:5 (2022); RSA 633:3-a, III-a (2016). The defendant argues that the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over him, and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm.

The parties have been engaged in divorce proceedings in New Hampshire, resulting in restraining orders being issued against the defendant, a Massachusetts resident, pursuant to RSA 458:16 (2018). The plaintiff, a New Hampshire resident, testified that on May 17, 2024, the defendant violated the restraining orders when he drove by her home. The plaintiff further testified that on July 1, 2024, the defendant went to the New Hampshire school of one of their children, knowing that the plaintiff would be there, and that he was ordered to have no contact with the plaintiff. The trial court found that the defendant stalked the plaintiff as defined in RSA 633-3:a when, after having been served with an order pursuant to RSA 458:16 that prohibited contact with the plaintiff, he knowingly engaged in a single act of conduct that violated the provisions of the order. See RSA 633:3-a, I(c) (2016). The court found that the defendant's conduct constituted "abuse," as defined in RSA 173-B:5, I. The defendant first argues that the trial court erred in exercising personal jurisdiction over him. It is the burden of the appealing party, here the defendant, to provide this court with a record sufficient to decide his issues on appeal, and to demonstrate that he raised his issues in the trial court. Bean v. Red Oak Prop. Mgmt., 151 N.H. 248, 250 (2004); see also In the Matter of Birmingham & Birmingham, 154 N.H. 51, 56 (2006) (self-represented litigants are bound by the same procedural rules that govern parties represented by counsel). The defendant has failed to provide a record to demonstrate that he raised this issue in the trial court. Asserting that he "clearly disclosed his non-

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resident address in all filings with the court," the defendant seeks review under our plain error rule.

Under the plain error rule, we may consider errors not raised in the trial court. State v. Hodges, 176 N.H. 751, 754 (2024); see Sup. Ct. R. 16-A. However, the rule should be used sparingly, its use limited to those circumstances in which a miscarriage of justice would otherwise result. Hodges, 176 N.H. at 754. To find plain error: (1) there must be an error; (2) the error must be plain; (3) the error must affect substantial rights; and (4) the error must seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Id.

We have held that New Hampshire courts have personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant who has minimum contacts with the State "such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." Hemenway v. Hemenway, 159 N.H. 680, 685 (2010) (quotation omitted). We have also held that a protective order that prohibits a defendant from abusing the plaintiff, and orders him to have no contact with her, but that does not impose any personal obligations on the defendant, is valid even without personal jurisdiction over the defendant. Id. at 688. Based upon our case law in this area and the record on appeal, we conclude that the defendant has not shown plain error.

The defendant next argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Assuming, without deciding, that the defendant has a right to the effective assistance of counsel in this context, but see In re Kotey M., 158 N.H. 358, 361 (2009) (declining juvenile's request to find constitutional right to counsel in CHINS proceedings), the defendant has failed to show that he raised this issue in the trial court. Accordingly, we conclude that the issue is not preserved for review. See Bean, 151 N.H. at 250.

To the extent that the defendant's brief may be construed to raise additional issues, we conclude that they are not sufficiently developed, see State v. Blackmer, 149 N.H. 47, 48 (2003), or otherwise do not warrant further discussion, see Vogel v. Vogel, 137 N.H. 321, 322 (1993).

Affirmed.

MacDonald, C.J., and Bassett and Donovan, JJ., concurred.

Timothy A. Gudas, Clerk