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People of Michigan v. Adam Christopher Shendaj

Supreme Court of Michigan
Oct 3, 2025

Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan

Megan K. Cavanagh, Chief Justice Brian K. Zahra Richard H. Bernstein Elizabeth M. Welch Kyra H. Bolden Kimberly A. Thomas Noah P. Hood,

Justices

Order

October 3, 2025

168219

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v SC: 168219

COA: 370866

Macomb CC: 2022-000972-FC

ADAM CHRISTOPHER SHENDAJ,

Defendant-Appellant. _________________________________________/ On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the January 6, 2025 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the question presented should be reviewed by this Court. WELCH, J. (concurring).

Because I see no error in the Court of Appeals' confrontation analysis, I concur in the decision to deny defendant's application for leave to appeal. I write separately to question whether Brandon Williams, a prosecution witness who had received leniency in his own case due to his cooperation, was unavailable within the meaning of MRE 804(a)(5) and the Confrontation Clauses of the United States and Michigan Constitutions.1 While defendant was detained pending trial on a charge of criminal sexual conduct (CSC), he asked two of his fellow jail inmates to kill his accuser. One of the inmates, Williams, reported defendant and cooperated with law enforcement, including wearing a wire to record incriminating conversations. Defendant was charged with solicitation of murder, MCL 750.157b(2), and Williams was released on bail after the prosecution interceded in his case.

Williams testified at defendant's preliminary examination in April 2022. Shortly before defendant's merged trials for CSC and solicitation in November 2023, the prosecution filed a notice stating that Williams was not expected to appear for trial. It asked the trial court to declare him unavailable, see MRE 804(a), and allow his preliminary

1 Though it is "reflected in the Michigan Rules of Evidence," unavailability is an aspect of the constitutional confrontation requirement. People v Bean, 457 Mich 677, 682-684 (1998). See also Ohio v Roberts, 448 US 56, 74 (1980), abrogated on other grounds by Crawford v Washington, 541 US 36 (2004).

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examination testimony to be introduced at trial, see MRE 804(b)(1).2A detective later testified that he had personally served Williams with a trial subpoena, but Williams did not appear.

Defense counsel objected, arguing that using Williams's prior preliminary examination testimony at trial violated defendant's right to confront the witnesses against him, see US Const, Am VI; Const 1963, art 1, § 20, because predecessor counsel's ability to cross-examine Williams at the preliminary examination had been compromised by incomplete discovery. Counsel also stated that he did not believe the prosecution had failed to exercise due diligence in attempting to locate Williams.

As a result, the trial court severed defendant's solicitation trial and adjourned it to May 2024, in order to give the prosecution time to locate its witnesses. Nevertheless, shortly before the May trial date, the prosecution filed another notice indicating that it did not expect Williams to appear and renewed its request to introduce his preliminary examination testimony. Defense counsel again objected to the introduction of this testimony on confrontation grounds and again waived any claim that the prosecution had not exercised due diligence in attempting to locate Williams.

The trial court agreed with defendant and declined to allow the prosecution to introduce Williams's preliminary examination testimony. The prosecution filed an interlocutory application for leave to appeal, which the Court of Appeals granted. The panel reversed, concluding that, despite the discovery issues, defendant had an adequate opportunity to cross-examine Williams at the examination. See People v Farquharson,

274 Mich App 268, 275-279 (2007). The Court of Appeals' decision relied on the—unchallenged—assumption that Williams was unavailable. I am not certain that assumption was correct. As this Court stated in People v Bean, 457 Mich 677 (1998):

The test for whether a witness is "unavailable" as envisioned by MRE 804(a)(5) is that the prosecution must have made a diligent good-faith effort in its attempt to locate a witness for trial. The test is one of reasonableness and depends on the facts and circumstances of each case, i.e., whether diligent good-faith efforts were made to procure the testimony, not whether more stringent efforts would have produced it. [Id. at 684, citing Barber v

2 The prosecution also asked to introduce the testimony of another inmate, Nicholas Pastorelli, who also testified at defendant's preliminary examination and failed to appear at trial; however, his testimony—which appears to be of lesser evidentiary significance— is not at issue in this appeal.

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Page, 390 US 719, 724-725 (1968); People v Dye, 431 Mich 58, 67, 83

(1988).]

Our cases provide guidance about the level of diligence required to meet this standard. In both Bean and Dye, we concluded that the prosecution did not demonstrate due diligence because it did not actively pursue leads to locate witnesses who had left the state. Bean,

457 Mich at 689-690; Dye, 431 Mich at 67-78. In contrast to Bean and Dye, the prosecution here was able to personally serve Williams with a subpoena shortly before defendant's first trial date. Even so, it claimed to be unable to secure his attendance at trial. The record is unclear about what, if any, additional measures the prosecution took to locate Williams after the trial court adjourned defendant's solicitation trial, specifically to allow the prosecution to track down its witnesses. See Dye, 431 Mich at 76-78 (faulting the prosecution for not beginning its search for known hesitant witnesses immediately upon learning of trial date and for not

"increas[ing] its efforts" after initial attempts to locate them failed). Because the full extent of the prosecution's efforts to locate Williams is not clear from the record, I cannot say conclusively that the prosecutor did not act with due diligence. Further, defense counsel expressly conceded this point. Accordingly, the issue is waived. See People v Carter, 462 Mich 206, 215 (2000). It is possible that defense counsel was aware of good reasons for Williams's unavailability; however, those reasons are not in the record.

Bean and Dye make clear that the prosecution must take proactive measures to locate witnesses who seem unlikely to appear at trial. Neither case concerned a witness who received lenient treatment in return for their assistance to the prosecution. But the fact that a witness has received a benefit from the prosecution seems like a significant "fact[] or circumstance[]" of the case bearing on the prosecution's ability and responsibility to produce that witness. Bean, 457 Mich at 684. Although defense counsel waived the claim that the prosecution failed to demonstrate due diligence here, this case raises an important question regarding the scope of "unavailability" that I believe this Court should explore in a future case.

BOLDEN, J. (concurring in result).

I agree with the decision to deny leave because I am not persuaded that interlocutory review is warranted. However, I write separately to address the Court of Appeals' analysis of defendant's Confrontation Clause claim. In my view, the panel misunderstood the nature of the constitutional inquiry.

This case arises from a prosecution in which defendant, Adam Shendaj, was charged with solicitation to commit murder, MCL 750.157b(2), while he was in jail awaiting trial

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for one count of third-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC-III). During defendant's preliminary examination on the solicitation charge, two inmates, Brandon Williams and Nicholas Pastorelli, testified that defendant solicited them to murder the complainant in defendant's CSC-III case. Before defendant was tried for solicitation, Williams was released from jail and stopped communicating with the prosecution, so the prosecution sought to use the transcript of Williams's preliminary-examination testimony at defendant's solicitation trial. At the time of the preliminary examination, the defense had access to a total of five pages of discovery, which included a limited set of text messages and phone calls. Shortly after the preliminary examination, the prosecution disclosed an additional 1,200 text messages and 58 phone calls—a dramatic increase in potentially relevant impeachment evidence.

The trial court denied the prosecution's motion to admit the preliminary- examination testimony at trial, concluding that the defense had been deprived of the opportunity for effective cross-examination as a result of incomplete discovery. The prosecution filed an interlocutory application seeking leave to appeal in the Court of Appeals, which granted the application. The Court of Appeals ultimately reversed, holding that the Confrontation Clause was satisfied because the defense had a "similar motive and opportunity" to cross-examine Williams at the preliminary examination. People v Shendaj, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued January 6, 2025 (Docket No. 370866). Defendant then filed this interlocutory application seeking leave to appeal in our Court.

The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him[.]" US Const, Am VI. In Crawford v Washington, 541 US 36, 61 (2004), the United States Supreme Court held that prior testimonial statements may only be admitted at trial when the witness is unavailable and the defendant has had a prior adequate opportunity for cross-examination. Id. at 57. See also Davis v Washington, 547

US 813, 821 (2006).

The key issue in this case is whether the trial court erred by denying the prosecution's motion to admit Williams's testimony. The Court of Appeals held that it did, concluding that defendant had "a similar motive and opportunity to develop Williams' testimony at the preliminary examination" and that the prior testimony was admissible because it fell within a "hearsay exception." Shendaj, unpub op at 4, 7. However, the panel's reasoning suffers from a material issue: it treated evidentiary admissibility under MRE 804(b)(1) as though it resolved the separate constitutional inquiry under the

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Confrontation Clause.1MRE 804(b)(1) permits admission of prior testimony if the declarant is unavailable and the testimony is offered against a party who had a prior opportunity and similar motive to cross-examine the declarant. However, satisfaction of the procedural predicates under MRE 804(b)(1) does not necessarily establish that a defendant's right to confront the witnesses against him has been satisfied. The panel's reliance on People v Farquharson, 274 Mich App 268 (2007), illustrates the problem. Farquharson considered whether prior testimony was admissible under MRE 804(b)(1) and specifically stated that the Confrontation Clause was "not at issue" in that case because the defendant waived that right at the investigative-subpoena hearing. Id. at 277 n 3. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals here cited Farquharson as though it supplied the test for violations of the constitutional right to confront a witness. By doing so, the panel blurred the boundary between evidentiary rules and constitutional requirements, effectively substituting the "similar motive" factors of MRE 804(b)(1) for the independent constitutional guarantee of meaningful confrontation.

It is also necessary at this point to address the waiver of due diligence reflected in the record. Defense counsel did not dispute that the prosecution and the police had exercised due diligence in attempting to secure Williams's in-person testimony at trial. Accordingly, there is no dispute that Williams was properly deemed to be "unavailable"

for trial under MRE 804(a)(5). See Shendaj, unpub op at 4. While that concession forecloses defendant from contesting whether the witness was "unavailable" under MRE 804(a)(5), the admissibility of this testimony presents a separate question of whether defendant was afforded a meaningful opportunity to cross-examine the witness at the preliminary examination under the Confrontation Clause. The two inquiries are related but distinct: unavailability is a constitutional prerequisite under the Confrontation Clause, but it is only part of the test; the Clause also demands that the defendant had an adequate opportunity to cross-examine the witness, and the failure to satisfy either requirement is fatal to the admission of testimonial hearsay. Crawford, 541 US at 57. The record here demonstrates why that distinction matters. At the time of the preliminary examination, the defense had access to only five pages of discovery, which included a mere 523 text messages and 3 phone calls. After the preliminary examination, the prosecution produced an additional 1,200 text messages and 58 phone calls involving Williams. As recounted by the Court of Appeals, the trial court acknowledged the significance of the missing discovery, explaining:

1 The panel did not explicitly state that MRE 804(b)(1 ) was the applicable exception to the rule against admitting hearsay; however, that can be inferred from the panel's reliance on People v Farquharson, 274 Mich App 268 (2007), as explained later.

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[W]hile the trial court did not clearly make a finding with respect to its materiality, the court at one point stated that the missing discovery was not

"necessary" but "[i]t gives context." The trial court also acknowledged that the additional evidence was "something that can be utilized by defense counsel in the exploration of the credibility of the witness" and that Williams was "deceptive and that is something that clearly . . . can be utilized by defense counsel." [Shendaj, unpub op at 3 (emphasis added).] Despite acknowledging the volume and potential relevance of the missing discovery, the Court of Appeals ultimately concluded that the defense's meager opportunity to ask questions at the preliminary examination was sufficient to satisfy the Confrontation Clause, stating that in order "to avoid a confrontation clause violation, defense counsel need only actually undertake cross-examination," id. at 5, citing Farquharson, 274 Mich App at 278. In my view, this reasoning reduces a defendant's right to confrontation to a shallow formality. As Crawford makes clear, "[w]here testimonial statements are involved, we do not think the Framers meant to leave the Sixth Amendment's protection to the vagaries of the rules of evidence" and that "[the Clause] commands . . . that reliability be assessed in a particular manner: by testing in the crucible of cross-examination." Crawford, 541 US at 61. I have my doubts whether, given the access to discovery at the time of the preliminary examination, defendant was able to adequately challenge the reliability of Williams's testimony during his cross-examination.

For these reasons, I believe the Court of Appeals misunderstood the nature of the Confrontation Clause. It conflated evidentiary rules with constitutional protections and overlooked the significance of enabling the defense to conduct an effective cross- examination without the full benefit of discovery. Although defense counsel waived the prosecution's due-diligence obligation, that waiver affected only the evidentiary question of unavailability—it did not waive the independent constitutional right to meaningful confrontation.

Nevertheless, I agree with this Court's decision to deny leave in this case. Interlocutory review is not warranted at this stage because, if defendant is convicted, these issues can be more fully addressed on direct appeal after a complete trial record has been developed. The errors in the Court of Appeals' reasoning are important, but they do not compel intervention at this juncture.

BERNSTEIN, J., joins the statement of BOLDEN, J.

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I, Elizabeth Kingston-Miller, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. October 3, 2025

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Clerk HOOD, J., did not participate because he was on the Court of Appeals panel.

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