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Prudential Properties v. Diane Anderson
Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan
Megan K. Cavanagh, Chief Justice Brian K. Zahra Richard H. Bernstein Elizabeth M. Welch Kyra H. Bolden Kimberly A. Thomas Noah P. Hood,
Justices
Order
October 3, 2025
168224
PRUDENTIAL PROPERTIES,
Plaintiff-Appellee, v SC: 168224
COA: 372352
Oakland CC: 2024-206465-AV
DIANE ANDERSON,
Defendant-Appellant. _________________________________________/ On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the January 22, 2025 order of the Court of Appeals is considered and, pursuant to MCR 7.305(I)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we REMAND this case to the Court of Appeals for consideration as on leave granted.
THOMAS, J. (concurring).
Our Legislature has codified statutory protections for the approximately 2.3 million Michiganders who live in rental housing,1including requiring that rental units "are fit for the use intended by the parties" and "in reasonable repair," MCL 554.139(1); requiring disclosures and prohibiting abusive lease terms, MCL 554.631 et seq. (Truth in Renting Act); and prohibiting discrimination on the basis of various characteristics, MCL 37.2505 (part of the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act) and MCL 554.601c (prohibiting discrimination based on source of income). To effectuate tenants' rights under their leases or the law, the Legislature also enacted the retaliatory-eviction statute at issue in this case. See MCL 600.5720. This statute protects tenants against a judgment of possession for exercising enumerated rights as renters. See id.
I join my colleagues in remanding this case to our Court of Appeals. I write separately to highlight the significant issues that necessitate further consideration. This case concerns the eviction of defendant Diane Anderson, who had been living in a townhome for 14 years under a series of one-year leases. Anderson's most recent lease with her landlord, plaintiff Prudential Properties, ran from February 2023 through January
1 United States Census Bureau, American Community Survey—Total Population in Occupied Housing Units by Tenure by Units in Structure
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2024. And it included the following provision under the heading "Required Move-Out Notice":
If neither the Landlord nor the Resident notifies the other party at least thirty (30) days before the Lease termination date that this Lease will terminate on the termination date, then this Lease will continue beyond the termination date on a month-to-month basis until either the Resident or the Landlord gives at least thirty (30) days prior written notice to the other party that this Lease will terminate. Rent or other charges payable by the Resident or any other terms and conditions of this Lease may be changed by the Landlord after the Lease termination date by the Landlord giving Resident at least thirty (30) days prior written notice of the change. A month-to-month fee may be charged for any month-to-month tenancy.
In November 2023, Prudential Properties provided Anderson notice that the lease would terminate at the end of its one-year term and that plaintiff did not intend to enter into a new lease. Anderson contends that Prudential Properties terminated her lease because she helped form a tenant's union to petition Prudential Properties and elected officials concerning various issues tenants faced at the townhome complex.
Upon expiration of the lease, Prudential Properties initiated eviction proceedings. Anderson raised the retaliatory-eviction statute as a defense. She alleged that Prudential Properties sought to evict her "primarily as retribution for . . . membership in a tenant organization" or "a lawful activity of a tenant organization arising out of the tenancy."
MCL 600.5720(1)(c). The district court held that the retaliatory-eviction statute is inapplicable because the parties had a fixed-term lease that expired, citing Frenchtown Villa v Meadors, 117 Mich App 683 (1982). On appeal, the circuit court affirmed the district court's decision.
As an initial matter, I note that Frenchtown Villa is not binding on the Court of Appeals given that it was decided in 1982. See MCR 7.215(J)(1) ("A panel of the Court of Appeals must follow the rule of law established by a prior published decision of the Court of Appeals issued on or after November 1, 1990, that has not been reversed or modified by the Supreme Court, or by a special panel of the Court of Appeals as provided in this rule."). The lack of binding authority on this issue merits examination by our appellate courts. As the Frenchtown Villa Court itself recognized, its holding "effect[ed] a severe limitation upon the retaliatory eviction defense" and was counter to the defense that other jurisdictions developed to insulate tenants from retaliation for protected activity. Frenchtown Villa, 117 Mich App at 688-689; see also id. at 686 & n 1. Even if Frenchtown Villa was correctly decided, the facts of this case do not fit neatly under Frenchtown Villa's umbrella. To be sure, the defendants in that case sought to raise the retaliatory-eviction statute after the expiration of a fixed-term lease. Id. at 685.
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The Court of Appeals in that case held that "the retaliatory eviction defense does not extend to summary proceedings instituted at the expiration of a fixed-term lease." Id. at 689. In doing so, it reasoned:
[A] tenancy for a fixed term of years pursuant to a lease is ordinarily terminated on the expiration of the term of the tenancy as fixed by the lease. Thus, a tenant's right to possession of leased premises expires or terminates pursuant to the lease absent the securing of an extension. As a result, a landlord seeking repossession of premises upon the expiration of the term of a fixed lease does not terminate the tenancy, but merely seeks repossession pursuant to the termination that has otherwise taken place. Because the landlord has not independently caused the termination, his motivation in seeking repossession or declining to renew the lease agreement is irrelevant to the operation of MCL 600.5720[.] [Id. at 689 (citation omitted).] It contrasted the expiration of a fixed-term lease with a month-to-month tenancy, which continues until either party provides notice. Id. at 688-689. The Court of Appeals in Frenchtown Villa reasoned that a tenant may raise the statutory defense of retaliatory eviction if the landlord terminates a month-to-month lease, but a tenant may not raise the same defense if the landlord chooses not to renew a fixed-term lease. Id. In this case, it appears that Anderson's lease does not self-terminate by operation of its terms. Rather, the "Landlord . . . notifies the [Tenant] at least thirty (30) days before the Lease termination date that th[e] Lease will terminate on the termination date . . . ."
Absent such notice, the lease apparently continues month-to-month. This factual distinction raises a question of whether Frenchtown Villa applies to the present case. Moreover, this distinction may have additional legal implications. A tenancy is generally understood as being either fixed-term or periodic (often month-to-month). But the Second Restatement of Property suggests that a lease can provide for a combination of the two where, by its terms, it is to "endure for a fixed . . . period of time [and] is to continue after such period as a periodic tenancy."2Our courts have not addressed whether this creates distinct term and periodic tenancies—the former ending at the end of the term and
2 1 Restatement Property, 2 d, Landlord & Tenant, § 1.5, comment i, p 2 6; cf. In re Smith Trust, 480 Mich 19, 24 (2008) (explaining that a lease is a contract, that courts must "determine the intent of the parties by examining [its] language," and that if the "language is unambiguous, courts must interpret and enforce the contract as written").
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I, Elizabeth Kingston-Miller, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. October 3, 2025
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Clerk the latter ending when a party provides notice—or one combination tenancy that may only end by notice of the parties. But see Rice v Atkinson, Deacon, Elliott Co, 215 Mich 371, 375 (1921) (explaining that a periodic lease "constitutes as a whole one continuing tenancy" rather than a series of tenancies) (quotation marks and citation omitted).3 Frenchtown Villa does not answer this question. Instead, it relies on Ellsworth v Taylor, a case in which the lease provided an option to renew " 'on terms and conditions to be agreed upon at the expiration of the [initial] term.' " Ellsworth v Taylor, 233 Mich 163, 164 (1925); see also Frenchtown Villa, 117 Mich App at 689 (citing Ellsworth for the proposition that "a tenant's right to possession . . . expires or terminates pursuant to the lease absent the securing of an extension").
This case presents complex issues of landlord-tenant law that are significant to a clear understanding of the protections afforded to Michiganders and have no obvious answer in our current caselaw. It is for these reasons that I support the decision to remand this case to our Court of Appeals as on leave granted for further consideration. WELCH, J., joins the statement of THOMAS, J.
3 Even if the fixed-term portion of the lease constitutes a single tenancy on its own, the question further arises whether a month-to-month portion such as that present here serves as an extension that would prolong the tenancy rather than a renewal that creates a new tenancy. Cf. Rice, 215 Mich at 376 (considering whether holding over at the end of a lease creates a new tenancy or extends the original tenancy); see also 52 CJS, Landlord & Tenant, §§ 70 and 75; Andrews v Marshall Creamery Co, 118 Iowa 595 (1902); Orton v Noonan, 27 Wis 272, 282-283 (1870).
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