Eric Adams 2025 v. New York City Campaign Finance Board

partisan city agency, administers the Program pursuant to the New York City Charter (the "Charter"), the New York City Cam- paign Finance Act (the "CFA"), N.Y.C. Admin. Code. §§ 3-701, et seq., and the CFB's rules (the "CFB Rules"). Through rigorous oversight and enforcement, the CFB determines the eligibility of participating candidates for Program matching funds, thereby holding candidates who use public funds to account.² Hoping "to compel" the CFB to grant the 2025 Campaign the public funds to which they believe it is entitled, Plaintiffs claim that by determining that the 2025 Campaign is ineligible to re- ceive Program matching funds, the CFB acted arbitrarily and capriciously in violation of Article 78 of the New York Civil Prac- tice Law and Rules (the "CPLR"), and abridged their rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Con- stitution in violation of 28 U.S.C. § 1983.³Before this court are the parties' opposing motions for summary judgment on all claims.⁴

For the reasons explained below, the court DENIES Plaintiffs' mo- tion for summary judgment and GRANTS the CFB's motion for summary judgment on all claims. The court further DISMISSES Plaintiffs' claim for declaratory judgment and DISMISSES Plain- tiffs' requests for money damages, attorneys' fees, and litigation expenses.

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I. BACKGROUND

The court assumes familiarity with the background facts and pro- cedural history as summarized in its July 11, 2025 Memorandum and Order in the first and related action between the parties, EricAdams 2025 v. N.Y.C. Campaign Fin. Bd., No. 25-CV-3380 (NGG) (LKE), _F. Supp. 3d_, 2025 WL 1920885 (E.D.N.Y. July 11, 2025) (''Adams I"). Accordingly, the court briefly recites the relevant facts and conclusions of law in Adams I. It then sum- marizes the pertinent facts and procedural background leading up to the present action and the parties' opposing motions for summary judgment.

A. Factual Background

1. Adams 1⁵ Adams I arose from the CFB's determination that the 2025 Cam- paign was ineligible for Program matching funds on April 15, 2025 (the "April 15 Determination"). Id. at *10. The CFB pro- vided three independent grounds for that determination:

(1) Mayor Adams' failure to file his annual disclosure report with the New York City Conflicts of Interest Board (the "COIB disclo- sure") in violation of N.Y.C. Admin. Code §§ 12-110 and 3-703(1)(m); (2) the Adams Campaigns' failure to respond to the CFB's requests for information and documents in violation of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 3-703(1)(d) and CFB Rule 3- 0l(d)(i)(A)(2); and (3) the CFB's "reason to believe that, in the course of Program participation, the candidate has engaged in conduct detrimental to the Program that is in violation of any other applicable law" under CFB Rule 3-0l(d)(ii)(B). Id. at *6, *11, *13, *14.

On September 26, 2024, federal prosecutors in the Southern Dis- trict of New York (the "Government") unsealed a five-count

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indictment against Mayor Adams (the ''Adams Indictment").⁶ Id. at *3. The indictment charged Mayor Adams with wire fraud, bribery, campaign finance violations, and conspiracy to commit the aforementioned crimes. Id. Among other things, the indict- ment alleged that Mayor Adams was part of a scheme to use straw donors to hide illegal campaign contributions and to wrongfully obtain Program matching funds. Id. Based on these allegations, and pursuant to the CFB's broad powers to "investi- gate all matters relating to the performance of its functions,"

N.Y.C. Admin. Code§ 3-708(5), the CFB sent a letter to counsel for the Adams Campaigns ("Campaign Counsel") on Novem- ber 15, 2024 (the "November 15 Document Request"). Id. at *4. The November 15 Document Request requested documents re- lating to five fundraisers referenced in the Adams Indictment in order to verify the Adams Campaigns' fundraising activities and to better inform the CFB's eligibility determination in the 2025 election cycle with regard to Mayor Adams (as the "participating candidate") and the 2025 Campaign (as the participating "prin- cipal committee").⁷Id. at * 4, * 13. The Adams Campaigns did not provide the requested documents by the deadline for the first Program payment date, and the CFB issued its first ineligibility determination with regard to the 2025 Campaign. See id. at *3-

5.

Between December 16, 2024 and April 15, 2025, the CFB con- cluded that the 2025 Campaign was ineligible for Program matching funds in five consecutive determinations.⁸Id. at *10.

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On April 2, 2025 (prior to the April 15 Determination), Judge Dale E. Ho of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed the Adams Indictment with prejudice.⁹See id. at *4.

On May 27, 2025, after exhausting its administrative remedies as to the (then-operative) April 15 Determination, the 2025 Cam- paign, together with other plaintiffs, commenced Adams I. ¹⁰ Id. at *7. They alleged that by making the April 15 Determina- tion, the CFB violated various state laws, and the New York State and federal constitutions.¹¹Id. at *1.

On July 11, 2025, this court: (1) denied the plaintiffs' petition for relief pursuant to CPLR Article 78; (2) granted the CFB's motion for judgment on the pleadings; and (3) dismissed the plaintiffs' claim for declaratory judgment and their requests for money damages, attorneys' fees, and litigation expenses because it found that the CFB had "two independent valid grounds" for denying the 2025 Campaign Program matching funds. Id. at *10, *27,12

2025, March 17, 2025, and April 15, 2025. (See Pls.' R. 56.1 Statement ("Pls.' 56.1") (Dkt. 15-2) 'I 15; Deel. of Paul S. Ryan Dated 8/28/2025 ("First Ryan Deel.") (Dkt. 11-1) '1'127-29, 33-37, 39-42, 45-48, 55-58, 86- 89, 102-07, 113.) Ryan is the Executive Director of the CFB. (First Ryan Deel. 'I 1.)

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The court concluded that the CFB "properly denied the matching funds to the [2025] Campaign" because: (1) "Mayor Adams failed to file his COIB disclosure form on time to comply with [N.Y.C.] Admin. Code§ 3-703(1)(m), as well as [N.Y.C.] Admin. Code § 12-110 and CFB Rules 3-0l(d)(ii)(A)(4) and 3-05(b)"; and (2) the 2025 "Campaign plainly did not comply with [N.Y.C.] Admin. Code § 3-703(1)(d) and CFB Rule 3- 01 ( d) (i) (A) (2), which instruct that a candidate seeking matching funds must provide documents and records to the CFB before the deadline set forth by the CFB." Id. at *13. The court concluded that the CFB was entitled to judgment on the pleadings because either reason provided a sufficient and proper basis to uphold the April 15 Determination. See id. at *11, *13.

Although Adams I was decided on these two, independent grounds, the court opted to address the constitutional issues raised by the CFB's so-called "reason to believe" standard in CFB Rule 3-0l(d)(ii)(B). Id. at *14 (highlighting timing considera- tions-namely, "the next payment date of July 15, 2025, and the upcoming mayoral election on November 4, 2025"). As relevant here, the court found that the plaintiffs had plausibly alleged that the CFB's "reason to believe" standard as applied to the 2025 Campaign, violated both the First and Fourteenth Amend- ments. Id. at *14, *21.

The court found that although the CFB had identified a suffi- ciently important government interest-"eliminating corruption or the appearance thereof''-the CFB had not demonstrated that the April 15 Determination was "closely drawn" as applied to the 2025 Campaign. Id. at *15, *16. Accordingly, the court con- cluded that the plaintiffs had adequately alleged a First Amendment claim because the CFB: (1) "did not engage in any independent fact-finding"; and (2) relied solely on the dismissed Adams Indictment for its "reason to believe." Id. at *16, *17. Sig- nificantly, the court distinguished the facts in Adams I from the

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facts of Liu v. N.Y.C. Campaign Fin. Bd., No. 14-CV-1687 (RJS), 2015 WL 1514904 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2015), where the CFB's

"reason to believe" determination rested on the convictions of and trial evidence against agents of the subject campaign and the CFB's own independent investigation. See Adams I, at *17-18. The court also concluded that the plaintiffs had adequately al- leged an as-applied Fourteenth Amendment Due Process claim under the ''void-for-vagueness" doctrine. Id. at *23. The court found that the plaintiffs had satisfied their burden under the doc- trine's two-prong test for constitutional "notice" because:

(1) they "have a liberty interest in their right to free speech, namely, political expression and political association, under the First Amendment"; and (2) they could not "have reasonably been on notice of this outcome [(the CFB's adverse April 15 Determi- nation)] after the criminal charges against Mayor Adams were dismissed." Id. at *22 (emphasis in original).

2. Adams II¹³ Since the court's decision in Adams I, the 2025 Campaign's eligi- bility has come up for review on July 15, 2025, August 6, 2025,

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and August 28, 2025.¹⁴The next opportunity for the 2025 Cam- paign to demonstrate its eligibility for Program matching funds is October 9, 2025.¹⁵

Under the Program, there are 13 payment dates for the 2025 election cycle.¹⁶The CFB reassesses each participant's eligibility on each payment date. ¹⁷Between each date, participants may submit COIB disclosure statements, update documentation, and correct any errors that may lead to an ineligibility determina- tion. ¹⁸

However, as of June 16, 2025, the Adams Campaigns had not produced documents responsive to the CFB's two prior requests for documents verifying campaign activity. ¹⁹Accordingly, on that day, the CFB directed the Adams Campaigns to produce those and additional documents (the "June 16 Document Re- quest") and to provide information with regard to their failure to produce responsive documents (the "June 16 Information Re- quest").²⁰

Rockefeller & Co., Inc., 258 F.3d 62, 73 (2d Cir. 2001) ("[W]here there are no citations or where the cited materials do not support the factual asser- tions in the [Rule 56.1] Statements, the Court is free to disregard the assertion[s] ."), abrogated on other grounds by Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc.,

557 U.S. 167 (2009).

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First, the June 16 Document Request specifically directed the Ad- ams Campaigns to produce responsive documents from Mayor Adams.²¹Second, based on Campaign Counsel's disclosures in response to the CFB's outstanding document requests that it had contacted individuals who "all advised Counsel that they were in possession of no records which have not been provided to the CFB by the Committees," the June 16 Information Request di- rected the Adams Campaigns to identify these individuals. ²² At 9:45 P.M. on July 11, 2025-the date of the deadline to re- spond to the CFB's June 16 Requests-the Adams Campaigns submitted a response (the "July 11 Response") .²³The July 11 Re- sponse requested an extension of the deadline to respond to the June 16 Document Request and identified 11 "past and current employees, consultants, and agents of the Committees [con- tacted by Campaign Counsel] to obtain any responsive documentation."²⁴The list included Mayor Adams, Sharon Ad- ams, and Brianna Suggs, among others.²⁵However, it did not include "certain agents" of the Adams Campaigns who were ex- plicitly identified in the CFB's earlier document requests dated November 15, 2024 and April 11, 2025-including, for example, 21 (CFB's 56.1 'I 52; June 16 Request at ECF pp.59-60.) The CFB's prior document requests were addressed to the "2021 and 2025 campaigns of Eric Adams," and not to Mayor Adams personally. (CFB's Letter to the Ad- ams Campaigns Requesting Docs. Dated 11/15/2024 ("November 15 Request") (Dkt. 11-2) at ECF p.344; CFB's Letter to the Adams Campaigns Requesting Docs. Dated 4/11/2025 (Dkt. 11-2) at ECF p.392.) 22 (CFB's 56.1 '!'I 34, 45, 53; June 16 Request at ECF p.58.) 23 (CFB's 56.1 'I 58; Adams Campaigns' Response Letter to the June 16 Request Dated 7/11/2025 ("July 11 Resp.") (Dkt. 11-3) at ECF pp. 77-78; CFB's Reply Letter to the Adams Campaigns' July 11 Resp. Dated 7/14/2025 ("July 14 Info. Request") (Dkt. 11-3) at ECF p.80.) 24 (July 11 Resp. at ECF pp.77-78.)

2s (Id.)

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Rana Abbasova, Mohamed Bahi, Ahsan Chugtai, and Winnie Greco.²⁶

On July 14, 2025, the CFB replied to the July 11 Response.²⁷The CFB granted the Adams Campaigns' extension request and made three additional requests for information (the "July 14 Infor- mation Request'').²⁸The July 14 Information Request directed the Adams Campaigns to provide information regarding:

(1) Mayor Adams' search for responsive documents; (2) the Ad- ams Campaigns' change in position regarding the existence of responsive documents in their possession or control; and (3) a more comprehensive list of"past and current employees, consult- ants, and agents [contacted by Campaign Counsel] to obtain any responsive documentation."²⁹As the CFB explained, this infor- mation was necessary to clarify three "inconsistencies"³⁰in the Adams Campaigns' previous representations to the CFB, which

"raise questions regarding the adequacy and reliability of the

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Campaigns' past responses and their current efforts to comply with [the CFB's document] requests."³¹

On July 25, 2025, the Adams Campaigns produced their first set of responsive documents and a revised list of 31 individuals con- tacted by Campaign Counsel ( the "July 25 Response").³²The July 25 Response represented that the revised list "is comprehen- sive."³³The response also disclosed that a protective order in the dismissed criminal action against Mayor Adams ( the "Protec- tive Order") prohibited Mayor Adams from producing certain materials to the CFB without the Government's authorization.³⁴ On August 1, 2025, the Adams Campaigns produced a second set of responsive documents and provided a supplemental response to the July 14 Information Request (the "August 1 Response").³⁵ The Adams Campaigns produced no further documents and pro- vided no additional information to the CFB.³⁶However, on August 5, the Adams Campaigns joined in the CFB's July 29, 2025 request to the Government for authorization to produce to the CFB responsive materials subject to the Protective Order.³⁷ The CFB then determined that the 2025 Campaign is not eligible for Program matching funds-first, on August 6 and again on

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August 28, 2025 (respectively, the "August 6 Determination" and the "August 28 Determination").³⁸Each determination was based on: (1) the Adams Campaigns' failure to provide timely and complete responses to the CFB's requests for documents and information verifying campaign activity as required for Program eligibility under CFB Rule 3-0l(d) (i) (A) (2) and N.Y.C. Admin. Code§ 3-703 (1) (d); and (2) the CFB's "reason to believe that the Candidate has, in the course of program participation, engaged in conduct detrimental to the Program that was in violation of law," pursuant to CFB Rule 3-0l(d)(ii)(B).³⁹

The 2025 Campaign did not file a CFB Rule 7-09 petition for re- consideration of either determination.⁴⁰Instead, the 2025 Campaign, along with other plaintiffs, filed this lawsuit.⁴¹

B. Procedural Background

On August 15, 2025, Plaintiffs commenced this action challeng- ing the then-operative August 6 Determination.⁴²On August 29, the CFB answered the Complaint.⁴³In light of the urgency of this matter, the case proceeded on an expedited briefing schedule.⁴⁴ On September 4, Plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment on all claims. However, Plaintiffs' motion did not address the

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now-operative August 28 Determination.⁴⁵On September 9, the court directed the parties to address the August 28 Determina- tion in supplemental briefing.⁴⁶Plaintiffs submitted their supplemental briefing related to the August 28 Determination on September 12.

On September 16, the CFB filed its opposition to Plaintiffs' mo- tion and its own motion for summary judgment on all claims. Plaintiffs filed their reply two days later. On September 19, the court directed the CFB to file, from the CFB-subpoenaed docu- ment production of Erden Arkan (the "Arkan Production"), the documents upon which it relied in making its ineligibility deter- minations.⁴⁷On September 22, the CFB filed the Arkan Production under seal.⁴⁸Also on September 22, Plaintiffs filed an unauthorized reply to the Arkan Production.⁴⁹On September 23, the court accepted this reply and additional briefing requested by the parties. so

On Sunday, September 28, 2025, the New York Times reported that Mayor Adams would "abandon" the 2025 Campaign.⁵¹In a

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video posted to social media, Mayor Adams stated: "I cannot con- tinue my re-election campaign."⁵²Mayor Adams said further that

"the [CFB's] decision to withhold millions of dollars has under- mined my ability to raise the funds needed for a serious campaign."⁵³Later that day, the court directed Plaintiffs to state whether, "in view of Mayor Adams' statement, they are with- drawing this action challenging [the CFB's] determination that the [2025 Campaign] is currently not eligible for public matching funds. ⁵⁴On September 29, Plaintiffs' counsel advised the court that they are not.⁵⁵

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

Plaintiffs seek various forms of relief: (1) "annulling the CFB's denial of campaign matching funds to the Adams Campaign and directing the CFB to grant them" pursuant to CPLR Article 78;

(2) "declaring that the CFB's denial of campaign matching funds to the Adams Campaign violated the free speech and due process protections as guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution" pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 2201; and (3) "awarding the [2025] Campaign money damages[,] ... attorneys' fees[,] and litigation expenses"

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, and 1988, respectively.⁵⁶Before

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the court are the parties' respective motions for summary judg- ment on all claims.

A. Summary Judgment

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 authorizes summary judg- ment where "'the movant shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."' Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 656-57 (2014) (per curiam) (quoting Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 56(a)). "The mere ex- istence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact."' Scottv. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby) Inc. (Liberty Lobby), 477 U.S. 242, 247- 48 (1986)) (emphases in original). "An issue of fact is genuine if 'the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party."' Roe v. City of Waterbury, 542 F.3d 31, 35 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 248) (em- phasis added). "A fact is material if it 'might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law."' Id. at 35 (quoting Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 248) (emphasis added). Therefore, "where there is an absence of sufficient proof as to one essential element of a claim, any factual disputes with respect to other elements of the claim are immaterial." Bellotto v. Cnty. of Orange, 248 F. App'x 232, 234 (2d Cir. 2007).

"The movant bears the initial burden of showing that there is no genuine dispute as to a material fact." McKinney v. City of Mid- dletown, 49 F.4th 730, 738 (2d Cir. 2022). When "the burden of proof at trial would fall on the nonmoving party, the moving party can shift the initial burden by pointing to a lack of evidence to go to the trier of fact on an essential element of the non- movant's claim." Id. "If the moving party carries its burden, the nonmoving party must come forward with evidence that would be sufficient to support a jury verdict in its favor." Id. (adding that

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the nonmovant must "'do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts"' and "'a scin- tilla of evidence"' in support of its position) (first quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, (1986); and then quoting Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 252). In sum, "[n]o genuine dispute of material fact exists when the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party." Id. at 737.

"The role of the district court on summary judgment is not to resolve disputed issues of fact but to assess whether there are any factual issues to be tried." Id. at 738. On summary judgment, the court does not determine the truth and it "[does] not weigh evi- dence." Roberts v. Genting New YorkLLC, 68 F.4th 81, 88 (2d Cir. 2023). Neither does the court "ask whether the evidence unmis- takably favors one side or the other"; instead, the court asks ''whether a fair-minded fact-finder could return a verdict for the non-moving party on the evidence presented." Id.

"In determining whether there are genuine disputes of material fact, [the court is] required to resolve all ambiguities and draw all permissible factual inferences in favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought." Union Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Ace Caribbean Mkt., 64 F.4th 441, 445 (2d Cir. 2023). Accord- ingly, a court may grant a motion for summary judgment "only if' the court "conclude[s] that on the record presented, consid- ered in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, no reasonable fact-finder could find in its favor." Roberts, 68 F.4th at 88.

"The same standard[s] appl[y] where, as here, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment." Morales v. Quintel Ent., Inc., 249 F.3d 115, 121 (2d Cir. 2001). The court is simply asked to "determine whether either of the parties deserves judgment as a matter of law on facts that are not in dispute." AFSIIBEX v. AE- GIS Managing Agency Ltd., 517 F. Supp. 3d 120, 123 (E.D.N.Y.

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2021). The court must "evaluate[] each party's motion on its own merits, taking care in each instance to draw all reasonable infer- ences against the party whose motion is under consideration."

Coutard v. Mun. Credit Union, 848 F.3d 102, 114 (2d Cir. 2017). However, "[w]hen opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no rea- sonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for sum- mary judgment." Scott, 550 U.S. at 380.

B. Article 78, Agency Determination, and Supplemental Jurisdiction

In general, "Article 78 is a special proceeding under the New York CPLR that is intended to provide a speedy correction of improper state administrative action." DiMartile v. Hochul, 80 F.4th 443, 446 n.1 (2d Cir. 2023). Article 78 authorizes a party to challenge a final agency determination when that "determination was made in violation of lawful procedure, was affected by an error of law[,] or was arbitrary and capricious or an abuse of discre- tion." CPLR § 7803 (3). However, judicial review of a final agency determination is limited.

A court "may not disturb an administrative action unless it finds no rational basis for the agency's action, or that the challenged action was arbitrary and capricious." In re Stevens v. N. Y. State Div. of Crim. Just. Servs., 40 N.Y.3d 505, 525 (N.Y. 2023). "An action is arbitrary and capricious when it is taken without sound basis in reason or regard to the facts." In re Peckham v. Calogero,

12 N.Y.3d 424, 431 (N.Y. 2009). The court's review is further limited to the "facts and record adduced before the agency." Mat- ter of Kelly v. Safir, 96 N.Y.2d 32, 39 (N.Y. 2001). An agency's decision "must be accorded great weight and judicial deference,"

where "the judgment of the agency involves factual evaluations in the area of the agency's expertise and is supported by the rec- ord." Placke v. Onondaga Landfill Sys., Inc., 69 N.Y.2d 355, 363

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(N.Y. 1987). A court "must sustain" a determination "supported by a rational basis" even if the court "would have reached a dif- ferent result than the one reached by the agency." In re Peckham,

12 N.Y.3d at 431.

"Supreme Court precedent suggests ... that federal courts ... have jurisdiction over Article 78 claims." Residents & Fams. United to Save Our Adult Homes v. Zucker, No. 16-CV-1683 (NGG) (RER), 2017 WL 5496277, at *12-13 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 2017). The Court's precedent suggests that Article 78 does not "deprive a federal court of jurisdiction over claims brought under that pro- vision ... as long as those claims would otherwise fall within the court's pendent jurisdiction." See Carver v. Nassau Cnty. Interim Fin. Auth., 730 F.3d 150, 155 (2d Cir. 2013). As relevant here,

"in any civil action of which the district courts have original ju- risdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action ..

. that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution." 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).

C. Declaratory Judgment

The Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, authorizes a court's discretionary exercise of jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a). The court's discretion to exercise that jurisdiction is broad.Admirallns. Co. v. Niagara Transformer Corp., 57 F.4th 85, 96 (2d Cir. 2023) ("We have consistently interpreted this permis- sive language [of 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a)] as a broad grant of discretion to district courts to refuse to exercise jurisdiction over a declaratory action that they would otherwise be empowered to hear.").

Reaffirming the district courts' ''broad discretion to decline juris- diction under the [Declaratory Judgment Act]," the Second Circuit has enumerated six factors that a district court should consider in deciding whether to exercise jurisdiction under the Declaratory Judgment Act (the ''Admiral Ins. Co. factors").

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Id. at 99. However, the factors are "non-exhaustive," and "no one factor is sufficient, by itself, to mandate that a district court exer- cise-or decline to exercise-its jurisdiction to issue a declaratory judgment." Id. at 100. A district court has "broad discretion to weigh the factors." Id.

So long as a district court considers "a relevant factor that should ... [be] given significant weight," and does not consider and give

"significant weight" to "an irrelevant or improper factor" or "com- mit[] a clear error of judgment'' in weighing the relevant factors, its decision with regard to exercising this discretionary jurisdic- tion will be upheld. See id.

D. Sections 1983 & 1988

Section 1983 creates a cause of action for the deprivation of "any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws." 42 U.S.C. § 1983. However, "Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights[;] [i] t merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred." Patterson v. Cnty. of Oneida, N.Y., 375 F.3d 206, 225 (2d Cir. 2004); accord Kampfer v. Argotsinger, 856 F. App'x 331, 333 (2d Cir. 2021) (summary order). Accordingly, "[t]he first step" in any Section 1983 claim "is to identify the specific constitutional right alleg- edly infringed." Kampfer, 856 F. App'x at 333. To succeed, a plaintiff must then meet the burden of proof on two essential el- ements. The plaintiff must show: (1) that the conduct at issue was "committed by a person acting under color of state law"; and

(2) that the action "deprived [the plaintiff] of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States." Cornejo v. Bell, 592 F.3d 121, 127 (2d Cir. 2010). Section 1988 authorizes the court to award attorney's fees and litigation expenses to the prevailing party in a Section 1983 pro- ceeding. 42 U.S.C. § 1988.

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III. DISCUSSION

Plaintiffs challenge the CFB's determinations that the 2025 Cam- paign was ineligible for Program matching funds on August 6 and August 28, 2025.⁵⁷However, the August 28 Determination is the operative decision and the only determination ripe for re- view. See Adams I, at *10 (concluding that of the challenged determinations between December 2024 and April 2025, the April 15 Determination "is the operative decision"). For that de- termination, the CFB provided two reasons.⁵⁸Each reason constitutes an independent basis for the CFB's determination of ineligibility. Plaintiffs challenge each basis.⁵⁹ For the following reasons the court denies Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and grants the CFB's motion for summary judgment on all claims. The court's grant of the CFB's motions for summary judgment and denial of Plaintiffs' requests for in- junctive relief and monetary damages necessarily settles the issues for which declaratory judgment is sought. Accordingly, and because consideration of the Admiral Ins. Co. factors sup- ports the court's decision to decline jurisdiction under the Declaratory Judgment Act, Plaintiffs' declaratory judgment claim is also dismissed.

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A. Article 78

Plaintiffs bring an Article 78 claim to annul the August 28 Deter- mination. They allege that the determination was "arbitrary and capricious" because the CFB "had no evidence" upon which to base the determination.⁶⁰

Because the undisputed facts show that the CFB provided two, independent and valid grounds for the August 28 Determina- tion-Cl) the Adams Campaigns' failure to provide timely and complete responses to the CFB's requests for documents and in- formation verifying campaign activity as required for Program eligibility under CFB Rule 3-0l(d)(i)(A)(2) and N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 3-703(1)(d) (the "Failure to Provide Determination"); and (2) the CFB's reason to believe that Mayor Adams, his agents, and other agents of the Adams Campaigns engaged in conduct detrimental to the Program and in violation of law pursuant to CFB Rule 3-01 (d) (ii) (B) (the "Reason to Believe Determina- tion")-the court denies Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and request for relief pursuant to Article 78 and grants the CFB's motion for summary judgment on this claim.

1. Plaintiffs Were Not Required to Exhaust Administrative Remedies

The CFB argues that the court cannot hear this case because Plaintiffs failed to exhaust their administrative remedies such that the CFB's determination is not "final and binding."⁶¹Plain- tiffs respond that they were not required to bring a CFB Rule 7- 09 petition prior to bringing this action because: (1) filing the

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petition ''would have been futile"; and independently, (2) pursu- ing the petition would cause "irreparable injury."⁶² Article 78 authorizes an affected party to challenge an adminis- trative determination that is "final." CPLR § 7801(1). "An administrative determination becomes 'final and binding' when the petitioner seeking review has been aggrieved by it." Yar- borough v. Franco, 95 N.Y.2d 342, 346 (N.Y. 2000). However, the fact that a determination is "final" for the purpose of its pre- sent execution does not mean it is "final" for the purpose of judicial review. Id. at 346-47.

An administrative determination becomes "final and binding" for judicial review purposes only ''when two requirements are met'':

(1) the agency's "completeness (finality) of the determination"; and (2) the petitioner's "exhaustion of administrative remedies."

Walton v. N.Y. StateDep'tofCorr. Servs., 8 N.Y.3d 186,194 (N.Y. 2007). To satisfy the "finality'' requirement, "the agency must have reached a definitive position on the issue that inflicts actual, concrete injury." Id. To satisfy the "exhaustion" requirement, "the injury inflicted may not be significantly ameliorated by further administrative action or by steps available to the complaining party." Id. However, the exhaustion requirement is "subject to important qualifications." Watergate II Apts. v. Buffalo Sewer Auth. (Watergate II), 46 N.Y.2d 52, 57 (N.Y. 1978). As relevant here, an aggrieved party need not exhaust its admin- istrative remedies where "resort to an administrative remedy would be futile or when its pursuit would cause irreparable in- jury." Id. Importantly, "[i]n deciding the point at which petitioner's administrative remedies are exhausted, courts must take a pragmatic approach." Walton, 8 N.Y.3d at 196. For exam- ple, ''when it is plain that 'resort to an administrative remedy

22

would be futile,' an [A]rticle 78 proceeding should be held ripe"

for judicial review. Id. (quoting Watergate II, 46 N.Y.2d at 57). The court finds that both exceptions to the exhaustion require- ment are present here. The CFB has determined that the 2025 Campaign is ineligible for Program matching funds on all pay- ment dates to date.⁶³In addition, the CFB also denied the 2025 Campaign's CFB Rule 7-09 petition for reconsideration of the April 15 Determination.⁶⁴Further, the date of the New York City mayoral election is November 4, 2025.⁶⁵As the parties have re- peatedly told this court-and as the court itself has acknowledged-in this action, "[t]ime is of the essence."⁶⁶Each day the election grows nearer, Plaintiffs' claimed injury-the in- ability to make use of Program matching funds-grows. Cf Parkway Hosp. v. Axelrod, 578 N.Y.S.2d 219 (2d Dep't 1991) (" [T] he resulting economic strain suffered by the petitioner ade- quately demonstrates that this case comes within the irreparable

23

injury exception to the exhaustion doctrine."). Despite Mayor Ad- ams' decision to suspend the 2025 Campaign, his name remains on the ballot.⁶⁷Therefore, Plaintiffs' claimed injury continues. After eight successive denials (and one denial of a petition for reconsideration) over the course of nine months, the court is re- luctant to permit the exhaustion requirement to block judicial review of Plaintiffs' alleged injuries-particularly, this late in the 2025 election cycle. To find otherwise would prejudice Plaintiffs' ability to have their day in court and their constitutional claims heard before the election. The court "must take a pragmatic ap- proach" in deciding the point at which administrative remedies are exhausted. Walton, 8 N.Y.3d at 196. Because "it is plain that 'resort to an administrative remedy would be futile,"' the court finds that Plaintiffs' Article 78 claim is "final" for judicial review. Id. (quoting Watergate II, 46 N.Y.2d at 57).

a. The August 28 Known Documents List is Part of the Administrative Record

The court acknowledges that technically, the CFB should have attached an updated list of alleged, "responsive" documents that the CFB has determined exist but that were not produced the Ad- ams Campaigns (the "August 28 Known Documents List'') to the

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August 28 Notice.⁶⁸However, both the 2025 Campaign's failure to file a CFB Rule 7-09 petition and the CFB's failure to attach this list, amount to technicalities of procedural process that do not prejudice the parties now.

Plaintiffs acknowledge that the August 28 Known Documents List was provided to the Adams Campaigns with the CFB's Opposition on September 16, 2025.⁶⁹The CFB has therefore produced the list. Furthermore, the CFB produced a similar list to the Adams Campaigns with the August 7 Notice (the "August 7 Known Doc- uments List'').⁷⁰Plaintiffs addressed each of the nine items on the August 7 Known Documents List in their Motion for Summary Judgment, and they addressed the additional eight items on the August 28 Known Documents List in their Reply.⁷¹

25

Plaintiffs argue that the August 28 Known Documents List should not be part of the administrative record for review because "it is unclear whether this list was ... drafted prior to the [August 28 Determination]" and "[i]nformation the CFB has gathered or dis- closed during this litigation cannot was, by definition, not as basis for its decision and, therefore, cannot, as a matter of law, be used as a defense to justify its arbitrary and capricious de- nial. "⁷²This argument is unavailing because in Scanlon the New York Court of Appeals applied the long-standing rule that ':iudi- cial review of an administrative determination is limited to the grounds presented by the agency at the time of its determina- tion." Scanlan v. Buffalo Pub. Sch. Sys., 90 N.Y.2d 662, 678 (N.Y. 1997). Here, the record is clear that the CFB relied on the August

28 Known Documents List at the time it made the August 28 De- termination.⁷³

Furthermore, the CFB's inadvertent failure to attach the August

28 Known Documents List ''would have been corrected" (and Plaintiffs would have had the list sooner), had the 2025 Cam- paign utilized the CFB's administrative remedy process by filing a CFB Rule 7-09 petition.⁷⁴Plaintiffs cannot eat their cake and have it too: they cannot request that the court review their Article 78 claim, and have this court not consider the full administrative record before the CFB at the time the CFB made the challenged determination. In any event, and as previously noted, time is of the essence to resolve the parties' motions for summary judgment

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before an election that takes place five weeks from today. Accord- ingly, the court proceeds to the merits of Plaintiffs' Article 78 claim and the parties' respective motions.

2. CFB Determination 1: Failure to Provide In their motion for summary judgment, Plaintiffs argue that "the CFB's allegation that the Adams Campaign[s] withheld infor- mation is false" because "[e]very document requested ... that is in the possession or control of the [Adams] Campaign[s] was produced, with the one exception of materials that the cam- paign[s] [ were] prohibited by a federal court order from disclosing to the CFB."⁷⁵Regarding the materials that have not been produced, Plaintiffs state that the Adams Campaigns "con- sented to the CFB seeking judicial relief from the [P]rotective [O]rder so that the campaign[s] might lawfully provide any re- quested materials covered by the injunction."⁷⁶To succeed on their motion, Plaintiffs must show that the Adams Campaigns' document production was complete and accurate as to each of the CFB's document requests and that their written responses were complete and accurate as to each of the CFB's information requests by the deadline for the August 28 Determination. See CFB Rule 3-01 (d) (i) (A) (2). They have not. In its motion for summary judgment, the CFB argues that "[t]he undisputed facts demonstrate that [it] examined the record and rationally determined that the Adams Campaign[s] repeatedly failed to respond in a timely and forthright manner to the [CFB]'s requests for documents and other information necessary for eval- uating eligibility," and that "[t]his conduct violates the [CFA] and the ... [CFB] Rules ... and mandates the denial of matching funds."⁷⁷To succeed on its motion for summary judgment, the

27

CFB must show either that the Adams Campaigns' document pro- duction was incomplete or that the Adams Campaigns failed to provide accurate and complete information in response to the CFB's requests for information. See CFB Rule 3-0l(d)(i)(A)(2). In fact, the CFB has shown both.

Because the undisputed facts show that the Adams Campaigns' document production is incomplete and that the Adams Cam- paigns failed to provide accurate and complete information in response to the CFB's requests, the court grants the CFB's motion for summary judgment for these two independent bases. a. The CFB's Requests for Documents and Information Are Proper

The CFA states that "[t]o be eligible for optional public financ- ing," a participating candidate must "obtain and furnish to the [CFB], and his or her principal committee or authorized commit- tees must obtain and furnish to the [CFB], any information [the CFB] may request relating to his or her campaign expenditures or contributions and furnish such documentation and other proof of compliance." N.Y.C. Admin. Code§ 3-703(1)(d). Similarly, the CFB Rules state that "public funds will not be paid to a candidate"

if "the candidate fails to provide to the [CFB], upon its request and by the deadline set forth by the [CFB], documents or records required by Chapter 4 of these rules, or other information that verifies campaign activity." CFB Rule 3-0l(d) (i) (A) (2). On September 26, 2024, the Government unsealed the Adams Indictment.⁷⁸The indictment alleged that Mayor Adams was part of a scheme to use straw donors to hide illegal contributions and improperly obtain Program matching funds for the 2021 and 2025 Campaigns.⁷⁹The charged conduct implicated not only

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Mayor Adams and conduct relating to his participation in the Pro- gram, but also that of several current and former fundraisers for, and employees and agents of, the 2021 and 2025 Campaigns, including: (1) Rana Abbasova, a former Mayor Adams aide and staffer and admitted agent of the Adams Campaigns;⁸⁰(2) Erden Arkan, a former Mayor Adams associate who fundraised for the 2021 Campaign;⁸¹(3) Mohamad Bahi, a former member of Mayor Adams' administration and admitted agent of the Adams Campaigns;⁸²(4) Ahsan Chugtai, a former member of Mayor Ad- ams' administration and admitted agent of the Adams

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Campaigns;⁸³and (5) Brianna Suggs, a 2021 Campaign fund- raiser, a 2025 Campaign fundraiser, and an admitted agent of the Adams Campaigns.⁸⁴

The court concludes that these individuals are "agents" of Mayor Adams and/or the Adams Campaigns because the undisputed facts and permissible, rational inferences drawn therefrom^85- including those in the Arkan Production and the documents pro- duced by the Adams Campaigns to the CFB-demonstrate that each person was "authorized by" Mayor Adams, the 2021 Cam- paign, or the 2025 Campaign, and that each person "act[ed] on behalf of or at the direction of'' Mayor Adams or his relevant cam- paign. 86 N.Y. Elec. L. § 14-107; see also CFB Rule 1-02 (defining

"fundraising agent" as an "individual[] ... that ha[s] accepted or may accept contributions on behalf of the candidate" as a "paid or volunteer full-time campaign worker[]").

On January 10, 2025, Arkan pleaded guilty to committing wire fraud conspiracy in conjunction with an alleged straw donation scheme for the 2021 Campaign.⁸⁷

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On August 12, 2025, Bahi pleaded guilty to committing wire fraud conspiracy "from approximately 2020 through 2024, in conjunction with straw donation schemes for the 2021 Campaign and 2025 Campaign."⁸⁸

Further, on May 8, 2023, the Manhattan District Attorney charged seven defendants with various state crimes in connec- tion with a straw donor scheme "to fraudulently obtain tens of thousands of dollars in matching funds for [the 2021 Campaign] by submitting falsified campaign contribution forms to the [CFB] ."⁸⁹The charged conduct implicated unnamed "Campaign Representatives" of the 2021 Campaign and Mayor Adams.⁹⁰On February 5, 2024, Dwayne Montgomery-a Mayor Adams asso- ciate-pleaded guilty to Count 1 of the Montgomery et al. Indictment, admitting to conspiracy in the fifth degree with the 09; Plea Transcript at 22:24-23:06, 24:24-25:25, United States v. ErdenAr- kan, No. 25-CR-013 (DEH) (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 10, 2025) ("Arkan Plea Tr.") (Dkt. 11-2) at ECF pp.410-39. See al.so First Ryan Deel. '!'I 53(d)-(e) ("Mayor Adams's associate Erden Arkan committed wire fraud, in connec- tion with an alleged straw donation scheme for Mayor Adams's 2021 mayoral campaign."); Govt.'s February 7 Letter at ECF p.405 ("The con- duct for which Arkan pled guilty forms a part of the conduct charged in Counts One and Two of the Adams Indictment'').)

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intent of "offering a false instrument for filing'' with the CFB.⁹¹ The undisputed facts and permissible, rational inferences drawn therefrom also demonstrate that Montgomery was an "agent'' as defined in the New York Election law and CFB Rules because he was "authorized by'' Mayor Adams to and did accept contribu- tions for the 2021 Campaign on his behalf.⁹²

On August 20, 2025, the New York Times reported that a 2025 Campaign spokesman said that the campaign had "suspended"

Winnie Greco-at the time, a 2025 Campaign volunteer and ad- mitted agent of the Adams Campaigns⁹³-after she handed a cash-filled bag of potato chips to a reporter following a 2025 Campaign fundraising event.⁹⁴The undisputed facts-including text messages produced by the Adams Campaigns between Suggs and Greco, and Suggs, Greco, and Mayor Adams-demonstrate that Greco was an "agent" of the 2025 Campaign as defined in the New York Election Law and CFB Rules.⁹⁵ The CFB is charged with "rigorous oversight" of the Program to serve its mission to "reduce the corrupting influence of money in politics."⁹⁶Before a Program participant can receive public

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matching funds, the CFB must determine that the candidate has

"met all eligibility requirements set forth in the [CFA] and the [CFB Rules]." CFB Rule 3-0l(a). The aforementioned charges and convictions related to campaign corruption during Mayor Adams' participation in the Program for office of mayor from Sep- tember 2019-when he first certified to the CFB that he was a 2021 mayoral candidate-through the present, compelled the CFB to investigate the conduct of Mayor Adams and the Adams Campaigns and to request documents and information to verify campaign activity.⁹⁷The CFB is obligated to verify conduct relat- ing to the 2021 Campaign in addition to verifying conduct relating to the 2025 Campaign.⁹⁸See CFB Rule 3-0l(d)(ii)(B). As Plaintiffs concede, the CFB has "considerable investigative powers."⁹⁹The CFA and CFB Rules provide the CFB with broad authority to "investigate all matters relating to the performance of its functions."¹⁰⁰See N.Y.C. Admin. Code§ 3-708(5); see also N.Y.C. Charter Ch. 46, § 1052(a)(5); N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 3- 710(1). The CFB's document and information requests were proper because each request falls squarely within the CFB's in- vestigatory powers in all aspects of campaign activity including, but not limited to, campaign contributions, fundraising, and fundraising activities.

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Because the CFB's requests for documents and information are proper, the Adams Campaigns' failures to produce the requested responsive documents, and to provide complete and accurate re- quested information, compelled the CFB to find that the 2025 Campaign is ineligible for Program matching funds. See CFB Rules 3-0l(a), 3-0l(d)(i)(A)(2).

b. The Adams Campaigns' Document Production Is Incomplete

The undisputed facts demonstrate two independent reasons as to why the Adams Campaigns' document production is incomplete. First, it does not include the responsive documents in the cam- paigns' possession and control that are covered by the Protective Order. Second, the document production does not include all re- sponsive documents, which the CFB rationally determined exist, and are (or should be) in the Adams Campaigns' possession or control. The CFB Rules, therefore, mandate the CFB's ineligibility determination. See CFB Rule 3-0l(d)(i)(A)(2).

First, it is undisputed that the document production does not in- clude responsive documents covered by the Protective Order.¹⁰¹ This fact is sufficient to deny Plaintiffs' motion for summary judg- ment. The CFB had no obligation to excuse the campaigns' failure to produce these documents. See CFB Rule 3-01 (d) (i) (A) (2). The CFB made its first document request on November 15, 2024, after Judge Ho entered the Protective Order on October 3, 2024.¹⁰²The Protective Order defines "Disclosure Material" as

"documents, objects[,] and information" disclosed to "the de- fendant"-meaning, Mayor Adams and his defense counsel-by

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the Government.¹⁰³The Protective Order states that these mate- rials produced by the Government to Mayor Adams, "shall not be disclosed by the defendant or defense counsel, ... other than as set forth herein, and shall be used by the defense solely for pur- poses of defending this action."¹⁰⁴The Protective Order further states that "[t]he Government may authorize, in writing, disclo- sure of Disclosure Material beyond that otherwise permitted by this Order without further Order of this Court."¹⁰⁵ On December 5, 2024-three weeks after the CFB's first docu- ment request-Campaign Counsel responded to the November

15 Document Request, stating that "this is not something that we can respond to at this time" ( the "December 5 Response").¹⁰⁶The response neither disclosed the existence of, nor explained whether the Adams Campaigns were in possession or control of responsive documents subject to, the Protective Order.¹⁰⁷The Adams Campaigns waited over nine months to disclose this in- formation. ¹⁰⁸The Adams Campaigns were required to provide this information to the CFB earlier. Cf Adams I, at *13 (''The Ad- ams Campaign had no excuse to wait until less than 12 hours before the CFB meeting on April 15, 2025 to respond to the [CFB's] proper request.").

Plaintiffs' argument that the Protective Order "is a public docu- ment, not a record that the Adams Campaign[s] held secretly until it was 'revealed,"' does not convince the court otherwise.¹⁰⁹ Plaintiffs argue that the CFB should have "followed the docket 103 (Protective Order '11.)

104 (Id. 'I 5.) 10s (Id. '! lO.)

106 (CFB's 56.1 'I 29.)

107 (See id. 'I 39.)

108 (See id. '166; July 25 Resp. at ECF pp.108 -10.)

109 (Pls.' 56.1 Resp. 'I 39 .)

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entries" in Mayor Adams' now-dismissed criminal case "like a hawk" so that it could have "become aware of the [Protective Order] as soon as it was listed on the public docket."¹¹⁰Plaintiffs argue further that the CFB then should have "conferred with the United States Attorney's Office and asked the Government for in- formation relevant to [the CFB's] investigation into the Adams Campaign[s] ."¹¹¹To argue that the CFB was under such obliga- tions misconstrues the fundamental nature of the voluntary Program by shifting the participant's burden onto the CFB. The CFB Rules mandate that to receive Program matching funds,

"candidates must demonstrate eligibility." CFB Rule 3-01 · (em- phasis added). The rules further prescribe that "public funds will not be paid to a candidate if ... the candidate fails to provide to the [CFB]" documents or information that verify campaign activ- ity. CFB Rule 3-0l(d)(i)(A)(2) (emphases added). In addition to its obligation to protect the public trust, the CFB also has the important obligation to protect the public fisc. Par- ticipating candidates who qualify for matching funds receive eight dollars in public funds for every one dollar a New York City resident contributes to the candidate's campaign ( up to $250) .¹¹² This ratio places a significant fiscal burden on the City of New York. The CFB's administration of the Program and concomitant duty to "hold[] candidates accountable for using public funds re- sponsibly,"¹¹³includes the obligation to determine the eligibility of over 90 participating candidates in the current election cycle, including several other offices besides mayor. ¹¹⁴If the court were 110 (Pls.' Mot. at 11.)

m (Id.)

112 (First Ryan Deel. '116.)

m (Id.)

114 (See Press Release, NYC Campaign Finance Board Approves Pre-General Matching Funds Payments to 2025 Candidates, N.Y.C. Campaign Fin. Bd. (Aug. 28, 2025) (Dkt. 18-10).)

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to accept Plaintiffs' rewriting of the CFB Rules, the administrative burden on the CFB to seek out every document that could theo- retically be publicly accessible would make the Program unworkable. Even if it were theoretically possible for the CFB to seek out public information for a single participant, this burden, compounded over 90 Program participants, would place an un- manageable burden on the CFB's ability to adhere to its statutory obligations of promptly providing Program matching funds to el- igible candidates running for city office. The court rejects Plaintiffs' reading of the CFB Rules.

Finally, the court is troubled by Plaintiffs' arguments regarding the reach and scope of the Protective Order. Plaintiffs argue, for example, that certain text messages between Abbasova and Rey- han Ozgiir, a Turkish official implicated in the Adams Indictment,¹¹⁵regarding a ''list of contributions collected during"

a campaign event in May 2021, are "communication[s] ... with a third party and therefore cannot be produced under the terms of the [P]rotective [O]rder."¹¹⁶The Protective Order does not cover "communication[s] ... with a third party''; it covers mate- rials disclosed by the Government to Mayor Adams and his defense counsel. ¹¹⁷Further, the Protective Order also states that

"[n]othing in this Order limits the defense's use of [Electronically Stored Information ("ESI")] obtained from the defendant's own devices or accounts or documents produced by the defendant to the Government in his individual capacity."¹¹⁸Plaintiffs' argu- ment contradicts the clear language of the Protective Order. It

115 The Adams Indictment refers to Ozgiir as "the Turkish Official."

(See June 16 Request at ECF pp.59-60.) The Adams Indictment alleges that Ozgiir "facilitated many straw donations to [Mayor Adams]." (Adams In- dictment at ECF p.288.)

116 (See Pls.' Mot. at 15.)

117 (Protective Order '11.)

11s (Id. 'I 5.)

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also calls into doubt the completeness of the Adams Campaigns' production of responsive documents not subject to the Protective Order.

Second, the undisputed facts also show that the CFB rationally determined that the Adams Campaigns' document production does not include several responsive documents that should have been produced. ¹¹⁹For example, the CFB rationally determined that certain communications related to a fundraising event for the 2021 Campaign should have been produced.¹²⁰The undis- puted material facts show that a May 20, 2021 email from Elif Ok to Abbasova, copying Arkan and attaching "catering receipts and invoices" from this fundraising event: (i) does, in fact, exist;

(ii) that the Adams Campaigns were required to maintain the email and its attachments pursuant to the CFA and CFB Rules; and (iii) that the email and its attachments were not produced to

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the CFB by the Adams Campaigns.¹²¹See CFB Rule 4- 01 (b) (ii) (E) ("[f]or each in-kind contribution, candidates must maintain a written record that provides" certain, enumerated in- formation about the contribution and the contributor), (b)(iii) (requiring "Candidates" to maintain "a photocopy of each check or other monetary instrument, other than cash, representing a contribution or other monetary receipt."), ( e) ("Candidates must maintain records for all fundraising events, which must contain [certain, enumerated information].").) Further, these documents are material because: (1) the provision of food and beverages at campaign fundraising events is considered an "in kind contribu- tion" that campaigns must maintain records for, and report to, the CFB; and (2) the CFB's records show that no in-kind donation was reported for this fundraising event.¹²²See CFB Rules 4- 0l(b) (ii) (E), (b)(iii), 4-0S(c)(i).

For example, the CFB also rationally determined that the docu- ment production should, but does not include, certain communications related to a fundraising event for the 2025 Cam- paign.¹²³The undisputed facts show that the document production does not include the complete July 2023 text conver- sation between Mayor Adams and Arda Sayiner, a Turkish national implicated in the Adams Indictment,¹²⁴discussing this

39

fundraising event and its attendees.¹²⁵The undisputed facts show that the August 1 Response produced a screenshot of that text conversation, which is not complete because part of a text message in the screenshot is truncated.¹²⁶The truncated mes- sage shows a link to "Read More," but the produced documents do not include the additional information at that link. Plaintiffs' argument that "it [is] clear from the context of the text messages ... that this truncated message was a separate, non- responsive communication unrelated to the [2025] [C]am- paign," does not convince the court otherwise.¹²⁷The CFB rationally concluded that the truncated message was responsive because it only begins to identify a group of individuals, which the next text message-the only message from the text conversa- tion that Plaintiffs claim is responsive-appears to reference. That next message, addressed to Mayor Adams, states: "If you are interested in these people I will invite them to meet you in NYC before or after the dinner I'm organizing for you in Septem- ber."¹²⁸The CFB's determination that the truncated message is related to the last message and therefore responsive was rational because it is reasonable that "these people" refers to the individ- uals identified and discussed in the previous, truncated message. Furthermore, the CFB explained its reasonable conclusion to the Adams Campaigns in the August 7 Notice. ¹²⁹However, the Ad- ams Campaign produced no additional documents and provided money for the 2025 Campaign if [Mayor Adams] visited Turkey and met with Turkish businesspeople." (See id. at ECF p.64; see also Adams Indict- ment at ECF p.327 (further alleging that Mayor Adams told Sayiner "to coordinate with [Abbasova] to arrange the contributions").) 125 (August 1 Resp. at ECF p.17.)

126 (See id.)

127 (See Pls.' Mot. at 13.)

12 s (Id. (emphasis added).)

129 (August 7 Notice at 4; see August 1 Resp. at ECF p.17.)

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no additional information-including as to why the truncated message should not be produced to the CFB prior to the August

28 Determination. Accordingly, the CFB had a rational basis to determine that the Adams Campaigns' response to the CFB's re- quest for documents verifying the campaign's fundraising activities is incomplete.

As a final example, the undisputed facts show that the Adams Campaigns failed to produce any text messages between Mayor Adams and Suggs, a fundraiser for both the 2021 Campaign and the 2025 Campaign.¹³⁰The failure to produce any text messages between the participating candidate and a top fundraiser for his campaigns-or otherwise explain why these texts were not pro- duced-provides another independent and rational basis for the CFB's determination that the document production is incom- plete.

The examples above are requested, responsive documents that are (or otherwise should be) in the control of the Adams Cam- paigns, which were not produced to the CFB in response to its document requests. Consequently, the Adams Campaigns' failure to provide these documents renders the document production in- complete and compels the CFB's ineligibility determination. See CFB Rule 3-0l(d) (i) (A) (2).

The CFB's Failure to Provide Determination is based on its con- clusion that that the Adams Campaigns failed to timely and completely produce responsive documents to the CFB's docu- ment requests. The CFB is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs' Article 78 claim because the undisputed facts show that the document production is incomplete.

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c. The Adams Campaigns Did Not Provide Requested Information

The CFB is also entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs' Arti- cle 78 claim for the independent and sufficient reason that the undisputed facts show that the Adams Campaigns failed to com- pletely respond to the July 14 Information Request. ¹³¹ First, the CFB directed the Adams Campaigns to provide certain information about Mayor Adams' search for responsive docu- ments.¹³²The campaigns' response is incomplete because it fails to provide requested information regarding: (1) ''when [Mayor Adams] completed his search"; and (2) whether Mayor Adams'

"search for responsive documents included documents provided to him by the [G]overnment as part of discovery in [his criminal case] ."¹³³In addition, it is unclear from the campaigns' response when Campaign Counsel first asked Mayor Adams to provide re- sponsive documents. ¹³⁴

Second, the CFB directed the Adams Campaigns to identify indi- viduals contacted by Campaign Counsel for responsive documents. ¹³⁵The July 25 Response included a list of 31 indi- viduals and stated that "[t]he list is comprehensive in scope."¹³⁶ However, the response did not explain: (i) why the prior list of individuals (submitted on July 11, 2025) contained only 11 indi- viduals; (ii) when the additional 20 individuals on the list had been contacted; or (iii) whether these individuals had provided

42

responsive documents. ¹³⁷The Adams Campaigns' supplemental response on August 1 did not provide this information. Rather, the August 1 Response stated that "some" of the individuals pro- vided documents, "others" indicated that they had no responsive documents, "others" did not respond, and "one" declined to pro- vide materials on advice of counsel. ¹³⁸The August 1 Response did not identify these individuals, and it did not explain how many individuals responded.¹³⁹

Plaintiffs argue that the Adams Campaigns' obligation to respond to the July 14 Information Request did not include providing this information because the "CFB did not request this information, nor had it in any time in the past."¹⁴⁰This argument is unavailing for two principal reasons. First, prior to submitting the August 1 Response, Campaign Counsel requested confirmation from the CFB's General Counsel that "no additional information is being requested other than what was identified in the document re- quest. "¹⁴¹The CFB's General Counsel responded that "CFB staff will review the ... response after submission and will notify the [Adams Campaigns] at that time if additional documentation or information is requested."¹⁴²Therefore the CFB did not foreclose any additional requests, and explicitly told Campaign Counsel that additional information may be necessary. Second, the Adams Campaigns should have known that the failure to identify these individuals would result in the CFB's finding that the August 1

43

Response was incomplete. The July 14 Information Request ex- plained that "[a] more comprehensive identification" of current and past employees, consultants, and agents" contacted by Cam- paign Counsel was necessary in order to allow the CFB "to ensure the completeness of any document production."¹⁴³Thus, the CFB specifically told the Adams Campaigns that a full accounting of these individuals was necessary, and that the CFB's evaluation of the document production would not be possible without know- ing which of the individuals did or did not provide responsive documents. ¹⁴⁴

Furthermore, the August 7 Information Request directed the Ad- ams Campaigns to disclose the identities of the individuals described in the August 1 Response, explaining that "[a]bsent [this] information[,] ... the CFB cannot conduct a complete in- dependent investigation."¹⁴⁵It is undisputed that after receiving the August 7 Notice, the Adams Campaigns took no action to remedy the inadequacies of its responses to the CFB's infor- mation requests. Therefore, the Adams Campaigns' failure to provide this information before the August 28 Determination renders the campaigns' response to the July 14 Information Re- quest incomplete.

The two aforementioned deficiencies in the Adams Campaigns' responses to the July 14 Information Request each provide an independent basis for finding that the Adams Campaigns failed

44

to provide requested information to the CFB. Because the undis- puted facts show that the Adams Campaigns' responses to the CFB's requests for information are incomplete, the court grants the CFB's motion for summary judgment on the Article 78 claim for this independent reason and denies Plaintiffs' motion for sum- mary judgment.

The undisputed facts show that the Adams Campaigns failed to timely, forthrightly, and completely respond to the CFB's docu- ment and information requests as required under N.Y.C. Admin. Code§ 3-703(1)(d) and CFB Rule 3-0l(d)(i)(A)(2).¹⁴⁶This con- duct violates the CFA, it violates the CFB Rules, and it results in the 2025 Campaign's Program ineligibility. See id. Therefore, Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment is denied and the CFB's motion for summary judgment is granted.

3. CFB Determination 2: Reason to Believe The CFB is also entitled to summary judgment for the independ- ent and sufficient reason that the undisputed facts show that the CFB had a rational basis for determining that there is "reason to believe" that Mayor Adams, his agents, and agents of the Adams Campaigns engaged in conduct detrimental to the Program and in violation of law. While this finding does not compel the CFB to find that the 2025 Campaign is ineligible for Program matching funds, it allows a discretionary finding of ineligibility. Here, the CFB's discretionary determination was rational and in accord- ance with state and federal law and must be upheld. a. The CFB's "Reason to Believe" Standard

The CFB Rules authorize the CFB to determine that a participant is ineligible for Program matching funds where there is "reason

45

to believe" that in the course of Program participation, "the can- didate" engaged in conduct detrimental to the Program and in violation oflaw. CFB Rule 3-0l(d)(ii)(B).

At first blush, the "reason to believe" standard may seem amor- phous. However, the standard exists in federal law and throughout New York state law.¹⁴⁷

In the Fourth Amendment context, the Second Circuit has de- fined a "reason to believe" standard as requiring "more than a hunch ... but less than a probability." United States v. Bohannon,

824 F.3d 242, 255 (2d Cir. 2016) (interpreting the "reason to believe" standard for law enforcement officers to execute a con- stitutional arrest warrant in a dwelling other than the subject's so long as there is "reason to believe that [the subject] was then in the premises entered"). The Second Circuit held that this "reason to believe is a lesser standard" than "probable cause." Id. at 253; see also id. at 254 (holding that the "reason-to-believe review ... does not demand probable cause" in this context). While ac- knowledging that the "reason to believe is not a particularly high standard," the Second Circuit explained that "it does require spe- cific and articulable facts that, taken together with rational inferences drawn therefrom, provide a particularized and objec- tive basis for [ the determination]." Id. at 255 ( emphasis added).

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If this "reason to believe" standard is sufficient to guarantee the Fourth Amendment's privacy rights and the constitutional guar- antee to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures, it is sufficient to protect a person's First Amendment free speech rights-certainly in this context, where an ineligibility determi- nation "does not prevent the underlying contribution from reaching the campaign" and therefore is subject to a "less strin- gent standard of review" than strict scrutiny. See Adams I, at *15. In addition, while the Adams I decision is not binding on this court, it is instructive. The general rule from Adams I is that alt- hough the CFB cannot rely solely on the dismissed Adams Indictment to prove a fact, it can take that indictment into ac- count to the extent that the alleged facts or conduct therein are corroborated in other sources and through the CFB's independ- ent fact-finding. See id. at *16.

In sum, under the CFB's "reason to believe" standard, the CFB must show that the Reason to Believe Determination was grounded in "specific and articulable facts" drawn from sources other than the dismissed Adams Indictment, that "taken together with rational inferences drawn therefrom, provide a particular- ized and objective basis for" determining that "in the course of Program participation, the candidate has engaged in conduct detrimental to the Program that is in violation of any other appli- cable law." Bohannon, 824 F.3d at 255; CFB Rule 3-0l(d)(ii)(B). b. The CFB's Decision to Deny Funds Based on its

"Reason to Believe" Was Neither Arbitrary nor Capricious

The undisputed facts provide multiple, independent reasons to support each of the CFB's theories supporting its "reason to be- lieve" that "the candidate" engaged in conduct detrimental to the Program and in violation of law during Mayor Adams' participa- tion in the Program. Significantly, the CFB had "reason to believe" that "the candidate" as that term is defined in the CFB

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Rules violated the law in the course of Program participation, in part, due to their agents' convictions. See Liu, 2015 WL 1514904, at *9; supra Part III.A.2.a.

Pursuant to CFB Rule 3-0l(d)(ii)(B), the CFB may find a partici- pant ineligible for Program matching funds on a discretionary basis "if there is reason to believe that, in the course of Program participation, the candidate has engaged in conduct detrimental to the Program that is in violation of any other applicable law."

The CFB Rules define "the candidate" to include not only the in- dividual running for office, N.Y. Elec. L. § 14-100(7), but also

"every authorized committee of the candidate, the treasurer of each such committee, and any other agent of the candidate." CFB Rule 1-02. In tum, the New York State Election Law defines an

"agent" as "a person authorized by the candidate or the candi- date's authorized committee, who acts on behalf of or at the direction of a candidate or the candidate's authorized commit- tee." N.Y. Elec. L. § 14-107. Furthermore, the CFB Rules define

"fundraising agent[s]" as including "paid or volunteer full-time campaign workers" who "have accepted or may accept contribu- tions on behalf of the candidate." CFB Rule 1-02. As already explained, "agents" of Mayor Adams and the Adams Campaigns have already been convicted by federal and state prosecutors in conjunction with straw donor schemes for the 2021 Campaign. The conduct of these agents was "detrimental to the Program" because each criminal conspiracy for which they were convicted involved the fraudulent obtainment of tens of thousands of dollars in Program matching funds. The conduct was also in violation of law. ¹⁴⁸See supra Part III.A.2.a.

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Furthermore, and as explained infra Part III.B.1, the CFB's inde- pendent fact-finding provided ample additional support for the CFB's "reason to believe" that from September 2019 through the present, "the candidate" (including Mayor Adams and his agents) engaged in additional conduct detrimental to the Program and in violation of state and federal law.

B. Plaintiffs' Constitutional Challenges

Plaintiffs bring two Section 1983 claims based on the alleged in- fringement of their free speech rights under the New York State and U.S. Constitutions, alleging that the CFB's ineligibility deter- mination: (1) violates the First Amendment's free speech protections as applied to the 2025 Campaign because the CFB's Failure to Provide and Reason to Believe Determinations "lack any factual basis," "result from a misapplication of law," and were "not narrowly tailored to achieve any legitimate govern- mental objective"; and (2) violates the Fourteenth Amendment's substantive due process protections as applied to the 2025 Cam- paign because "there is no evidence to support the [CFB's] findings that the Adams Campaign[s] failed to provide requested information that was within [their] possession or control."¹⁴⁹ Because the undisputed facts show that the CFB has met its bur- den of proving the constitutionality of its actions, the court denies Rules 2-01 (b) ("[T]he requirements of the [CFA] and these rules apply to financial transactions that take place before a candidate registers [with the Program]."), 4-02 (''The candidate must retain all records and documents required to be kept under section 4-01 for five years from the filing of a final statement."), 4-10 (''The financial records of any committees of a can- didate are subject to [CFB] review for purposes of monitoring the candidate's compliance with the requirements of the [CFA] and these rules and must be made available to the [CFB] upon request.").

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Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and requests for relief pursuant to Sections 1983 and 1988, and grants the CFB's mo- tion for summary judgment on these claims. First, the CFB has met its burden of identifying a sufficiently important government interest justifying the "reason to believe" standard because

"[CFB] Rule 3-01 (d) (ii) (B) serves the goal of eliminating corrup- tion or the appearance thereof which is a sufficiently important governmental interest." Adams I, at *15 (internal quotes omit- ted). Second, as applied to the 2025 Campaign, the rule is "closely drawn" to serve this sufficiently important government interest. See F.E.C. v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 161 (2003); Ognibene v. Parkes, 671 F.3d 174, 183 (2d Cir. 2011). See also Adams I, at *15 (determining that the court "must apply the less stringent stand- ard of review of whether [CFB Rule 3-0l(d)(ii)(B)] is closely drawn" because "the rule does not prevent the underlying con- tribution from reaching the campaign").

1. The CFB's Ineligibility Determination Is "Closely Drawn"

Plaintiffs claim that the CFB's Reason to Believe Determination is

"as fatally flawed as it was in Adams I. "¹⁵⁰In Adams I, this court concluded that the plaintiffs had plausibly alleged an as-applied First Amendment claim challenging the CFB's "reason to believe"

standard because the CFB engaged in no independent factfinding and relied solely on the dismissed Adams Indictment. See Ad- ams I, at * 14-17. Here, the CFB has met both requirements. As detailed below, the CFB engaged in an independent investiga- tion to corroborate the allegations brought against Mayor Adams, as well as allegations brought by federal and state pros- ecutors against his current and former campaign fundraisers and 1so (Id. 'I 6.)

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agents. ¹⁵¹Significantly, the charged conduct relates to the Ad- ams Campaigns' fundraising activities, including their efforts to obtain Program matching funds, and directly implicates Mayor Adams, his agents, and other agents of the Adams Campaigns during Mayor Adams' participation in the Program.¹⁵²Conse- quently, the CFB is entitled to summary judgment because its determination that the 2025 Campaign is ineligible for Program matching funds is "closely drawn" to the sufficiently important government interest of preventing quid pro quo corruption. See Adams I, at *15.

First, the CFB's independent factfinding included a review of doc- uments produced by the Adams Campaigns to the CFB, as well as Mayor Adams' 2019 and 2021 corn disclosure statements.¹⁵³ Relying on this review, the CFB rationally determined that Mayor Adams' corn disclosures violated various provisions of New York State Election law and the CFB Rules by failing "to disclose gifts to the NYC Conflicts of Interest Board" while Mayor Adams was a Program participant.¹⁵⁴Moreover, the CFB's review of the Ad- ams Campaigns' document production also demonstrates that the CFB had a rational basis for its "reason to believe" that "the candidate" violated additional state and federal laws through the failure to provide complete and accurate information to the CFB. ¹⁵⁵For example, the Adams Campaigns produced a conver- sation in the Signal application between Mayor Adams, Suggs, and Greco discussing a then-upcoming fundraising event for the

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2025 Campaign and Greco's list of event attendees and contrib- utors.¹⁵⁶The last message in that conversation is a

"System Message" notifying the group that ((Eric Adams set dis- appearing message time."¹⁵⁷While the 2025 Campaign cannot fail to produce documents that do not exist, this last text message provides additional support for the CFB's ((reason to believe,"

based on sworn FBI Agent affidavits and the initial, federal com- plaint filed against Bahi, that Mayor Adams, while fundraising for the 2025 Campaign, engaged in conduct detrimental to the Program and in violation of law.¹⁵⁸

As previously explained, by opting into the Program, Mayor Ad- ams and the 2025 Campaign voluntarily took on certain obligations under the CFA and CFB Rules to save and maintain certain records, relating to campaign fundraising events, contri- butions, and contributors.¹⁵⁹See CFB Rules 4-01, 4-02. By setting this Signal chat to ((disappearing messages," Mayor Adams failed

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to maintain records verifying the 2025 Campaigns' activities with regard to the fundraising event discussed in this chat. ¹⁶⁰ The last message also serves as corroborative evidence of conduct described in other materials reviewed by the CFB and upon which the CFB based its "reason to believe" that "the candidate"

(Mayor Adams and his agents) "[o]bstructedjustice and engaged in a conspiracy to obstruct justice" in violation of federal laws.¹⁶¹ For example, the CFB reviewed "sworn FBI Agent Affidavits de- scrib [ing] how Mayor Adams may have engaged in obstruction behavior ... such as by deleting incriminating text messages."¹⁶² Finally, this example further demonstrates how the CFB's inde- pendent factfinding-not the dismissed Adams Indictment- supports the Reason to Believe Determination. Second, the CFB's independent factfinding also included the CFB's review of, inter alia, "other documents" that the CFB "ob- tained in the course of its independent investigation."¹⁶³These

"other documents" include documents produced in response to 17 subpoenas issued by the CFB to third parties, including the Arkan Production.¹⁶⁴The CFB "independently considered the credibility of the facts alleged in these documents and the sources of those allegations" and then applied "the credibly alleged facts 16 ° CFB Rule 4-01 requires candidates to, among other things, "keep rec- ords that enable the [CFB] to verify the accuracy of disclosure statements."

See CFB Rule 4-01 (a) (i). CFB Rule 4-02 states: ''The candidate must retain all records and documents required to be kept under section 4-01 for five years from the filing of a final statement."

161 The court makes no conclusion as to whether Mayor Adams or his agents did, in fact, "obstruct[] justice" or "engage[] in a conspiracy to ob- struct justice." (August 28 Notice at 7.)

162 (August 28 Notice at 7. See e.g., Agent Affidavit in Support of Applica- tion for Search and Seizure Warrant (Dkt. 11-6 at ECF pp.288-89) tJ 11.)

163 (August 7 Notice at ECF p.54; August 28 Notice at 5; see also CFB's 56.1

-i-i 72-73, 75, 84, 93.)

164 (CFB's 56.1 tJtJ 72-73.)

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to the law" to make the Reason to Believe Determination.¹⁶⁵The CFB also adequately explained how these "other documents"

gave the CFB "reason to believe" that "the candidate" (including Mayor Adams and his agents), while participating in the Pro- gram, engaged in conduct detrimental to the Program and in violation of various other federal and state laws.¹⁶⁶ For example, the CFB adequately explained how its review of Bahi's plea allocution, and the underlying Information to which he pleaded guilty, supports its "reason to believe" that Mayor Ad- ams and agents of the Adams Campaigns engaged in conduct detrimental to the Program and in violation of federal and state law while "engag[ing] in multiple straw donations schemes for [Mayor Adams'] 2021 and 2025 mayoral campaigns while a Pro- gram participant."¹⁶⁷Bahi pleaded guilty to a one-count Information charging him with conspiracy to commit wire fraud relating to his involvement in various campaign finance viola- tions for the Adams Campaigns from at least 2020 through 2024.¹⁶⁸Bahi allocated as follows:

In December 2020, I helped to organize a fundraising event in New York City in which employees of the construction company owner hosting the event were reimbursed by the

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owner for their campaign contributions. I knew that this was occurring because I had been instructed by a volunteer of the campaign to tell the owner of the construction company that the donations could be made this way. I understood that the Adams campaign would then seek matching funds for those donations [.]1⁶⁹

Bahi' s plea allocution, including the underlying Information to which he pleaded guilty, together with the other evidence re- viewed by the CFB demonstrates that the CFB rationally determined that Bahi was an "agent" of the Adams Campaigns as defined in the New York Election Law and CFB Rules. ¹⁷° Conse- quently, the CFB rationally determined that there is "reason to believe" that during Program participation, "the candidate" (in- cluding agents of the Adams Campaigns) engaged in conduct detrimental to the Program and in violation of law.¹⁷¹ Third, the CFB's independent investigation also includes the ef- forts of a third-party investigating firm, DeLuca Advisory Services, "to conduct witness interviews with individuals who may have acted as straw donors and provide recommendations regarding the [CFB's] staffs independent investigation and its conclusions."¹⁷²The CFB also adequately explained how this in- vestigation provided additional bases for the Reason to Believe Determination.¹⁷³

169 (Bahi Plea Tr. 21 :20-22:6; CFB's 56.1 'I 93.)

17 0 (See, e.g., Bahi Plea Tr. 21:20-22:6; Bahi Information '1'11-2; Affidavit in Support of Application for Warrant to Search and Seize (Dkt. 11-6 at ECF pp. 198-199) '1'112-19; Bahi Compl. at ECF p.397; Govt.'s February 7 Letter at ECF p.405; July 25 Resp. at ECF pp.108, 119; Adams Indictment at ECF p.333-34.)

171 (See, e.g., August 28 Notice at 6 (wire fraud), 8-9 (failure to disclose), 10 (election conspiracy).)

172 (First Ryan Deel. '198; CFB's 56.1 '173.)

173 (See August 7 Notice at ECF p.54; August 28 Notice at 5-6.)

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The extent of the CFB's independent investigation after the con- victions of various fundraisers and agents of the Adams Campaigns brings this case more in line with Liu than with Ad- ams I. There, then-District Judge Richard Sullivan upheld the CFB's ineligibility determination as to then-candidate for New York City Mayor John Liu because "there was ample basis for the [CFB] to believe" that "the candidate" violated the CFA and CFB Rules where the CFB considered "the prosecution and conviction of [the campaign treasurer] and [the candidate's fundraiser], the evidence introduced at their trial, and the separate investigation conducted by the [CFB] and its investigator, Thacher Associ- ates."¹⁷⁴Liu, 2015 WL 1514904, at *9; see also Adams I, at¹'18 ("[H]ad the CFB engaged in independent fact-finding and inves- tigation after such convictions, as it did in Liu, Plaintiffs' as- applied [First Amendment] challenge would have likely failed[,]

[b] ecause under those circumstances the rule's application would have been reasonable."). A fortiori, there is an even stronger basis for the CFB's "reason to believe" in this case where the CFB considered the prosecution and conviction of various campaign agents and fundraisers, the evidence introduced at their guilty plea allocutions, and the separate investigation con- ducted by the CFB and its investigator, DeLuca Services.

1 74 Plaintiffs' argument that Liu is materially distinct from the present case because in Liu the subject campaign's treasurer was convicted of campaign finance violations is unavailing. (Pls.' Reply at 10, 15-16.) A campaign's

"treasurer" is just one among many people whose conduct the CFB consid- ers under the "reason to believe" standard. See supra Part III.A.3. Under this standard, participating campaigns are equally liable for the actions of their treasurers as they are for the actions of their agents. Here, the actions and convictions of the Adams Campaigns' agents have provided the CFB with a "reason to believe" that "the candidate" engaged in conduct detri- mental to the Program and in violation of law. See supra Part III.A.2.a, B. l.

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The CFB is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs' as-applied First Amendment claim because the CFB's independent factfind- ing was adequate and its limited reliance on the dismissed Adams Indictment was proper.

2. The CFB's "Reason to Believe" is not "Void for Vagueness" As-applied to the 2025 Campaign Plaintiffs allege that "as applied to the [2025] Campaign," the CFB's "reason to believe" standard is "unconstitutionally vague"

because "in the absence of . . . evidence" that "the candidate"

violated the law, the CFB's "denial of matching funds to the [2025] Campaign ... violates the due process clause."¹⁷⁵ A void for vagueness claim challenging the notice requirement of procedural due process is subject to a two-step inquiry. The gov- ernment bears the burden to show that the challenged law:

(1) "give[s] the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable op- portunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly''; and (2) "provide [s] explicit standards for those who apply them." Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108.

Plaintiffs challenge the notice requirement. ¹⁷⁶They argue that the 2025 Campaign "could not have been on notice" that the dis- missed Adams Indictment and criminal cases against alleged

"third parties" "could be the basis for the CFB's complete denial

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of matching campaign funds."¹⁷⁷Plaintiffs' argument is unavail- ing.

The purpose of the notice prong is to ensure that individuals can

"steer between lawful and unlawful conduct." See id. at 108. The relevant inquiry is ''whether the language conveys sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practices." Cunney v. Bd. of Trs. of Vill. of Grand View, N.Y., 660 F.3d 612, 621 (2d Cir. 2011); ac- cord Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108 ("[W]e insist that laws give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly"). Therefore, the relevant question is not whether Plaintiffs had notice as to what materials the CFB might use to reach an eligibility determi- nation but whether Mayor Adams, his agents, and agents of the Adams Campaigns were on notice that their own conduct could be found to be a basis for ineligibility. Here, the proscribed conduct is the act of engaging in "conduct detrimental to the Program that is in violation of any other appli- cable law." See CFB Rule 3-0l(d)(ii)(B). Plaintiffs had adequate notice that soliciting, accepting, and concealing straw donations, as well as donations from foreign nationals and corporations do- ing business in New York State-including the filing of false COIB disclosures-would give the CFB "reason to believe" that

"the candidate" engaged in conduct detrimental to the Program and in violation oflaw. See Adams I, at *15 ("Clearly, corruption, or even the appearance of it, would be 'detrimental to the Pro- gram."').

Even if Plaintiffs' framing of the notice requirement were correct, a person of ordinary intelligence would reasonably expect the

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CFB to rely on facts about Mayor Adams, his agents, and agents of the Adams Campaigns ascertained from criminal cases involv- ing the Adams Campaigns and its agents. See Liu, 2015 WL 1514904, at *3. The CFB Rules are clear that the conduct of Mayor Adams' agents and the agents of the Adams Campaigns may impact eligibility for Program matching funds. See CFB Rule 3-01 (d) (ii) (B); see also CFB Rule 1-02 (defining "the candidate"). The CFB did not rely on the criminal proceedings of independent, third-party "supporters" of Mayor Adams as Plaintiffs claim. Ra- ther, the CFB relied on the criminal convictions of authorized campaign fundraisers who admitted to their participation in straw donor schemes involving the Adams Campaigns, which the CFB found to be detrimental to the Program.¹⁷⁸See supra Part III.A.2.a.

C. Declaratory Judgment

Plaintiffs' claim for declaratory judgment is dismissed because the court declines to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction under the Declaratory Judgment Act.

The Second Circuit has said that a district court should consider six factors in deciding whether to exercise jurisdiction under the Declaratory JudgmentAct.Admiralins. Co., 57 F.4th at 99. Those factors are: (1) ''whether the declaratory judgment sought will serve a useful purpose in clarifying or settling the legal issues in- volved"; (2) ''whether such a judgment would finalize the controversy and offer relief from uncertainty''; (3) "whether the proposed remedy is being used merely for procedural fencing or a race to res judicata"; ( 4) ''whether the use of a declaratory judg- ment would increase friction between sovereign legal systems or improperly encroach on the domain of a state or foreign court";

(5) ''whether there is a better or more effective remedy''; and (6) ''whether concerns for judicial efficiency and judicial economy

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favor declining to exercise jurisdiction." Id. at 99-100; accord Lib- erty Ins. Corp. v. Hudson .Excess Ins. Co., 147 F.4th 249, 262 (2d Cir. 2025) (upholding these factors).

Under the Admiral Ins. Co. framework '"courts will dismiss a de- claratory judgment claim if it is the mirror image of a claim asserted in the complaint' ... because 'the fact that a lawsuit has been filed that will necessarily settle the issues for which the de- claratory judgment is sought suggests that the declaratory judgment will serve no useful purpose."' Peleus Ins. Co. v. Hallet, LLC, No. 24-CV-4630 (HG) (PK), 2025 WL 1736868, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. June 23, 2025) (quoting Josie Maran Cosms., LLC v. Shefa Grp. LLC, 624 F. Supp. 3d 281, 286 (E.D.N.Y. 2022)). In other words, a declaratory judgment claim may be dismissed as

"duplicative" when it seeks no relief that is not implicitly sought in other causes of action. See J&A Concrete Corp. v. Dobco Inc., No. 21-CV-11097 (JGK), 2025 WL 605252, at *15 (S.D.N.Y. Feb.

24, 2025).

Because the court has already decided the primary claims resolv- ing the controversy between the parties, it declines to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' declaratory judgment claim. See Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. McGrath, No. 19-CV-7477 (l.JL), 2025 WL 2509190, at *20 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 2, 2025). ***

IV. CONCLUSION

Because the undisputed facts show that the CFB's ineligibility de-

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s/Nicholas G. Garaufis DISMISSES Plaintiffs' claim for declaratory judgment and DISMISSES Plaintiffs' requests for money damages, attorneys' fees, and litigation expenses.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: Brooklyn, New York October L, 2025

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ICHOLAS G. GARAUF

United States District Ju

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