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People of Michigan v. Allen Michael Sherrill
Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan
Megan K. Cavanagh, Chief Justice Brian K. Zahra Richard H. Bernstein Elizabeth M. Welch Kyra H. Bolden Kimberly A. Thomas, Justices
Order
May 16, 2025
167769
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v SC: 167769
COA: 360133
Wayne CC: 19-002487-FC
ALLEN MICHAEL SHERRILL,
Defendant-Appellant. _________________________________________/ On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the September 12, 2024 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court. BOLDEN, J. (dissenting).
I respectfully dissent from the order denying leave to appeal. In reviewing defendant's claim that he was deprived of his right to a public trial, the Court of Appeals made an error of law by misallocating the burden of proof required to satisfy plain-error review. Because the Court of Appeals applied the incorrect burden of proof, I have questionable confidence in the outcome reached by the panel and, further, I believe that the panel's use of an incorrect standard of review in a published opinion will likely cause confusion for future cases. Therefore, I would either grant leave to appeal or vacate the Court of Appeals' opinion and remand this case to that Court to review defendant's public- trial claim under the proper standard.
Defendant was convicted by a jury of involuntary manslaughter, carrying a concealed weapon, and carrying a firearm during the commission of a felony. People v Sherrill, ___ Mich App ___, ___ (September 12, 2024) (Docket No. 360133); slip op at 1. Defendant raised numerous challenges on appeal, including questioning whether the trial court proceedings violated his right to a public trial, as protected by US Const, Am VI, and Const 1963, art 1, § 20.
A description of defendant's trial helps to understand his argument that his public- trial rights were violated. The trial took place in October 2021. The courtroom was subject to restrictive measures—the jury was physically distanced throughout the courtroom and the physical courtroom was closed to members of the public. Instead, defendant's trial was streamed live on YouTube. An offer of proof submitted to the Court of Appeals by defendant's attorney asserts that although defendant's mother observed the proceeding in person on the morning of the third day of trial, the trial court ordered her to leave when the case was recalled after lunch. The next day, the trial court noted on the record that "we've
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already thrown somebody out the other day so maybe we'd better keep it that way. No spectators." Defendant raised no objections to the courtroom's closure. The right to a public trial is "not unlimited, and circumstances may exist that warrant the closure of a courtroom . . . ." People v Davis, 509 Mich 52, 66 (2022), citing People v Vaughn, 491 Mich 642, 667 (2012). However, a closure " ' "must be no broader than necessary . . . , the trial court must consider reasonable alternatives to closing the proceeding, and it must make findings adequate to support the closure." ' " Vaughn, 491 Mich at 653, quoting Presley v Georgia, 558 US 209, 214 (2010), in turn quoting Waller v Georgia, 467 US 39, 48 (1984). The circumstances under which defendant faced trial may have warranted such a closure. However, given that the Court of Appeals improperly shifted the burden of proof on the public-trial issue, I am unsure whether the Court of Appeals properly affirmed defendant's conviction over this challenge. Three years ago, this Court decided a public-trial case that should have controlled the Court of Appeals' analysis. In Davis, on the second day of the defendant's trial, the trial court responded to an interaction between a courtroom attendant and a juror by instructing that all observers inside the courtroom except for the victim's mother be removed from the courtroom, which was to be closed for the remainder of the trial. Davis,
509 Mich at 59-60. Just like in this case, no objections were raised to the courtroom's closure. Id. at 63. This Court analyzed the error as forfeited, rather than waived, which made it possible to reach the merits of the underlying issue. Id. at 65, 66. Because the issue was a forfeited challenge to the public-trial right, it was an unpreserved structural error. Id. at 67. This Court then noted that "[a]lthough preserved structural errors are subject to automatic reversal, the alleged error here was forfeited,"
which required the defendant to prove that there was a plain error requiring reversal. Id. at
67. Under most circumstances, a reversal for plain error requires the defendant to "prove that (1) error occurred, (2), the error 'was plain, i.e., clear or obvious,' and (3) 'the plain error affected substantial rights"; and, further, that (4) " the plain, forfeited error resulted in the conviction of an actually innocent defendant or [that] an error seriously affected the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings independent of the defendant's innocence.' " Id. at 67-68, quoting People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763 (1999). Importantly, we noted that "there are special considerations relevant to this analysis when a forfeited structural error is at issue." Davis, 509 Mich at 68. Because
"structural errors by definition 'affect[] the framework within which the trial proceeds' rather than a single piece of evidence or aspect of the trial, . . . structural errors are particularly ill-suited to an analysis of whether the error affected the outcome of the trial court proceedings." Id. at 72, quoting Arizona v Fulminante, 499 US 279, 310 (1991) (brackets in original). Accordingly, "[j]ust as the United States Supreme Court jettisoned the prejudice analysis for preserved structural errors [in Fulminante, 499 US at 309], we similarly jettison[ed] the prejudice analysis for forfeited structural errors." Davis, 509 Mich at 73. Because structural errors necessarily affect a defendant's substantial rights,
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"the existence of a forfeited structural error alone satisfies the third prong of the plain-error standard, and a defendant need not also show the occurrence of outcome-determinative prejudice." Id. at 74. Finally, we held that a forfeited structural error creates a formal rebuttable presumption that the fourth prong is also satisfied, which "shift[s] the burden to the prosecutor to demonstrate that the error did not seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceeding." Id. at 76.
Davis provides the framework for analyzing unpreserved challenges to a defendant's right to a public trial. The Court of Appeals did not apply the proper framework. When articulating the standard of review, the Court of Appeals explained:
Because Sherrill did not timely assert his right to a public trial, this issue is forfeited. See [Davis, 509 Mich at 64-65.] Accordingly, to prevail, Sherrill must show that (1) error occurred, (2) the error was plain, i.e., clear or obvious, (3) his substantial rights were affected, and (4) the error resulted in the conviction of an actually innocent defendant or the error seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings independent of the defendant's innocence. See id. at 67-68. [Sherrill, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 4].
Although the panel was correct that the issue is forfeited, they erroneously required defendant to show all four plain-error prongs "to prevail" in his forfeited public trial challenge. This conflicts with Davis, in which we held that the third prong is automatically satisfied and that the prosecution bears the burden of rebutting a presumption that the forfeited structural error seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the trial. Compare Davis, 509 Mich at 76, with Sherrill, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at
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The misapplication of Davis's instructions for how to review a challenge alleging a forfeited structural error, such as this one, undermines the Court of Appeals' holding
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I, Larry S. Royster, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. May 16, 2025
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Clerk affirming defendant's convictions over this challenge.0F1 Although the Court of Appeals' conclusion may ultimately be correct, Davis does not place the entire burden of plain-error review on the defendant, as the panel did here. In light of this error, it is impossible to determine whether the Court of Appeals reached the correct conclusion. Therefore, I would either grant leave to appeal or vacate Part III of the Court of Appeals' opinion and remand this case back to that Court with instructions to apply Davis properly.
1 The Court of Appeals also held that the courtroom's closure to in-person spectators addressed an overriding interest that was likely to be prejudiced if the courtroom was open to the public because the decision was based on a local court order that was intended to make the courtroom safer for the jury and other participants during the COVID-19 pandemic. People v Sherrill, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 6. The panel further noted that although the trial court did not consider reasonable alternatives to closing the courtroom, the local court order already considered reasonable alternatives by encouraging YouTube as a live-streaming option, which was consistent with an administrative order from our Court instructing that proceedings were to be conducted virtually to the maximum extent possible. Id., citing Administrative Order No. 2020-6, 505 Mich cxxxi (2020). I have doubts that the Court of Appeals' analysis on these points was complete, given that in Davis, we found plain error where the trial court's closure was broader than necessary to protect the impartiality of the jury, the trial court failed to consider reasonable alternatives to closing the proceeding, and the trial court did not make adequate factual findings to justify the closure. Davis, 509 Mich at 71. Davis focused on the jury's impartiality and how the trial court justifies a closure for a trial rather than on external measures and decisions made external to the courtroom. I further doubt the Court of Appeals' reliance on AO 2020-6, which was rescinded several months before the trial began. See Rescission of Pandemic-Related Administrative Orders, 507 Mich cxcvii (2021) (rescinding AO 2020-6 on July 26, 2021). Nonetheless, the reason I would vacate the opinion and remand for further analysis is primarily driven by the application of the incorrect standard of review.
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