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MacOmb County Prosecutor v. MacOmb County Executive

Supreme Court of Michigan
Jun 16, 2025

Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan

Megan K. Cavanagh, Chief Justice Brian K. Zahra Richard H. Bernstein Elizabeth M. Welch Kyra H. Bolden Kimberly A. Thomas Noah P. Hood,

Justices

Order

June 16, 2025

167415

MACOMB COUNTY PROSECUTOR,

Plaintiff-Appellee, v SC: 167415

COA: 370065

MACOMB COUNTY EXECUTIVE and

COUNTY OF MACOMB,

Defendants-Appellants. _________________________________________/ On April 9, 2025, the Court heard oral argument on the application for leave to appeal the June 27, 2024 judgment of the Court of Appeals. On order of the Court, the application is again considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

WELCH, J. (concurring).

I agree with the outcome reached by the Court of Appeals and most of its analysis. I write separately to note a couple of points where my views differ from the Court of Appeals. Specifically, I believe a different accrual date should have been used for measuring plaintiff's claim and I question the Court of Appeals' conclusion that § 6.6.5 of the Home Rule Charter of Macomb County does not impose any limits on the purpose for which independent legal counsel can be retained using public funds. As the first issue does not impact the outcome and the second issue was not appealed to us, I concur with the Court's decision to deny the application for leave to appeal.

The dispute at issue concerns whether the Macomb County Board of Commissioners (the Commission) had legal authority to appropriate $42,500 to plaintiff, Macomb County Prosecutor, which the Prosecutor intended to use to retain independent legal counsel. On November 27, 2023, the Commission appropriated the funds as a line item for "contract services" for fiscal year 2024 in Ordinance 2023-04. Defendant Macomb County Executive Mark Hackel exercised his line-item veto power over that appropriation on December 8, 2023, stating his belief that the appropriation was unlawful under Charter, § 6.6.5 ("The Countywide Elected Officials provided for in this Article shall not cause the expenditure of taxpayer funds or public monies for legal counsel unless permitted by law,

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but may seek advice and counsel from Corporation Counsel upon request."). The Commission overrode the veto on December 14, 2023, by enacting Resolution 2023-

11699.

The Prosecutor's Office later submitted engagement agreements with five law firms to the Commission. On January 25, 2024, the Commission enacted Resolution 2024- 11938, which approved those contracts. The Prosecutor then submitted the contracts to the County Executive for his signature. In a January 29, 2024 memorandum, the County Executive reiterated his view that the appropriation was unlawful and invited the Commission to identify the law that permitted this use of public funds. The County Executive never signed the contracts.

The Prosecutor initiated this action against the County Executive and Macomb County by filing a complaint for mandamus, declaratory, and injunctive relief in the Court of Appeals on March 13, 2024. The parties filed competing motions for summary disposition. Relevant here, defendants argued that the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction, that the claim was time-barred under the 60-day limitations period in MCL 141.438(7), and that the appropriation was unlawful.

The Court of Appeals rejected these arguments and ruled in favor of the Prosecutor in a published opinion. Macomb Co Prosecutor v Macomb Co Executive, ___ Mich App ___, ___ (June 27, 2024) (Docket No. 370065); slip op at 15. The Court noted that

"contract services" was a line item in the annual budget enacted by Ordinance 2023-04, which was an act involving a general appropriation. Id. at ___; slip op at 5-6. The panel observed that the Prosecutor sought enforcement of that line item, and therefore, the claim was within the Court's jurisdiction under MCR 7.203(C)(5) and MCL 141.438(6), (7), and (10). Id. at ___; slip op at 4-6.

The panel was unpersuaded by the argument that Resolution 2024-11938 was not an "appropriations action" subject to enforcement. Id. at ___; slip op at 5. That resolution was dependent on funds in the general appropriations ordinance that the Prosecutor sought to enforce, and thus, the action was to enforce a general appropriation. Id. at ___; slip op at 5-6. The Court also held that this action was timely under MCL 141.438(7)(b) because the Prosecutor filed suit within 60 days of both the Commission's approval of the disputed contracts and the County Executive's subsequent memo. Id. at ___; slip op at 6-7. Finally, the panel held that Charter, § 6.6.5 provided authority for the Prosecutor to obtain public funds for independent legal representation so long as the funds were lawfully appropriated and approved by the Commission. Id. at ___; slip op at 9-12.

I agree with the Court of Appeals that it had jurisdiction and that the Prosecutor's lawsuit was timely. I am not convinced, however, that the correct accrual date was used. The Uniform Budgeting and Accounting Act (UBAA), MCL 141.421 et seq., grants standing to "[a]n elected official who heads a branch of county government" to file an

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action "relating to the enforcement of a general appropriations act for that branch of county government[.]"1MCL 141.438(6). See also MCL 141.438(7). Subject to subsection (8), which is not applicable here, such an action must be filed in the Court of Appeals within 60 days of either "[t]he adoption of a general appropriations act" or "[a]n amendment to a general appropriations act or an action relating to the enforcement of that general appropriations act, if the amendment or action constitutes a basis for the suit." MCL 141.438(7). The Court of Appeals' jurisdiction is exclusive, MCL 141.438(10), and for a suit under subsection (7)(b), jurisdiction "is limited to that portion of the general appropriations act that is directly affected by the amendment or action," MCL 141.438(9). The UBAA defines a "[g]eneral appropriations act" as "the budget as adopted by the legislative body or as otherwise given legal effect pursuant to a charter provision in effect on the effective date of this section." MCL 141.422c(2).

There is no dispute that Ordinance 2023-04 was a general appropriations act under MCL 141.422c(2). That ordinance provided for the County's budget for fiscal year 2024 and appropriated2public funds for specific purposes. The UBAA allows for a suit to be filed "within 60 days after" either "[t]he adoption of a general appropriations act" or "[a]n amendment to a general appropriations act or an action relating to the enforcement of that general appropriations act, if the amendment or action constitutes a basis for the suit."

MCL 141.438(7) (emphasis added). The County Executive's refusal to approve or otherwise release the previously appropriated funds for the contracts that the Commission approved in Resolution 2024-11938 was "an action relating to the enforcement of" a general appropriations act. MCL 141.438(7)(b). Specifically, the resolution authorized contracts that were to be paid for using funds previously appropriated to the department of the Prosecutor for "contract services." Ordinance 2023-04.

Although the Prosecutor did not file his action within 60 days of the adoption of Ordinance 2023-04 or the resolution overriding the line-item veto, he filed within 60 days of the County Executive's January 29, 2024 memo, which made clear that the County Executive would not sign the contracts or release the appropriated funds. The County Executive's statements in the memo impounded the funds that had been appropriated for the contracts that the Commission approved on January 25, 2024. It was not until that date that it was clear the County Executive would not sign the law firm contracts or release the impounded funds to the Prosecutor. The memo was "an action relating to the enforcement of" the line-item appropriation for "contract services" in Ordinance 2023-04, and that

1 The UBAA also provides the chief judge of a court funded by a county standing to file such an action, but no court is involved in the present appropriations dispute. See MCL

1 41 .438(6) to (8).

2 The UBAA defines an "[a]ppropriation" as "an authorization granted by a legislative body to incur obligations and to expend public funds for a stated purpose." MCL 141.422a(3).

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action "constitutes a basis for the suit."3MCL 141.438(7)(b). Therefore, the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction under MCL 141.438 and the lawsuit was timely filed, but the claim accrued on January 29, 2024. Although the distinction is academic in this case, it might not be in the future.

Turning to the legality of the appropriated funds, I agree with the Court of Appeals that Charter, § 6.6.5 authorized the Commission to appropriate to the Prosecutor's Office public funds for independent legal representation. Macomb Co Prosecutor, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 9. Relevant here, Charter, § 6.6.5 states that:

The Countywide Elected Officials provided for in this Article[4]shall not cause the expenditure of taxpayer funds or public monies for legal counsel unless permitted by law, but may seek advice and counsel from Corporation Counsel upon request. If a Countywide Elected Official provided for in this Article desires to protect or seek authority to implement the rights, powers, and duties of the office, the Executive may authorize the use of Corporation Counsel, or the Commission may authorize the use of independent legal counsel, to seek injunctive, mandamus, or declaratory relief from a court of competent jurisdiction to clarify or enforce the rights, powers, and duties of the office. [Emphasis added.]

The first sentence of Charter, § 6.6.5 prohibits the use of public funds for legal counsel "unless permitted by law." As observed in Hackel v Macomb Co Bd of Comm'rs, ___ Mich ___, ___ (June 16, 2025) (Docket No. 166363); slip op at 16-17, "[a]lthough the use of 'law' in a specific context or in conjunction with a specific modifier can narrow the scope of the term, the starting point must be a broad and inclusive meaning," and the use of "by . . . law" in Charter, § 3.5(a) to authorize the imposition of some limitations on the County Executive's authority was broad enough to include a validly enacted ordinance. Id. at 17-19. Relevant here, all actions of the Commission must be executed through ordinances or resolutions, Charter, § 4.6, and the County's budget must be effectuated through an "appropriations ordinance," Charter, § 8.7. Ordinance 2023-04 was enacted by the Commission and it authorized the expenditure of public funds for "contract services"

for the department of the Prosecutor, with the intent that the funds would be used by the

3 The UBAA states that the power to enforce and effectuate a general appropriations act is vested in the county's chief administrative officer, MCL 141.438(5), here, the County Executive. 4 The department of the prosecuting attorney, which is headed by the Macomb County Prosecutor, was created by Charter, § 6.2.

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I, Larry S. Royster, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. June 16, 2025

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Clerk Prosecutor to retain outside legal services. That ordinance became binding law within the County once it became effective.5See Hackel, ___ Mich at ___; slip op at 18. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals did not err by holding that the Charter allowed the Commission to authorize the use of public funds by the Prosecutor for outside legal counsel.

I do question the Court of Appeals' holding that the second sentence of Charter, § 6.6.5 does not limit the purposes or circumstances for which the Commission can lawfully authorize the use of independent counsel. Macomb Co Prosecutor, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 10-11. Charter, § 6.6.5 says that the Executive may authorize the use of corporation counsel, "or the Commission may authorize the use of independent legal counsel, to seek injunctive, mandamus, or declaratory relief from a court of competent jurisdiction to clarify or enforce the rights, powers, and duties of the office." (Emphasis added.) The most natural reading of that sentence is that the Commission has discretion to authorize independent counsel, but only for the purpose of commencing litigation to seek relief. Thus, while the appropriation to fund independent legal counsel was certainly lawful, I question whether the resolution that authorized legal contracts solely for

"prelitigation services" is lawful if the Prosecutor does not intend to proactively commence litigation.

However, to the extent the Court of Appeals held differently, that holding was not presented for review by this Court. And while defendants' brief suggests that the second sentence of Charter, § 6.6.5 limits the purposes for which independent counsel can be utilized, it does so only in the context of support for the argument that "by law" in the first sentence of that charter section does not encompass a validly enacted ordinance. Defendants have not argued that the second sentence of Charter, § 6.6.5 provides an independent basis for reversing the judgment of the Court of Appeals. Under these unique circumstances, I agree with the Court's decision not to address this issue sua sponte. HOOD, J., did not participate in the decision to enter this order.

5 Under the facts of this case, but for Resolution 2023-11699 overriding the County Executive's veto, the line-item appropriation for "contract services" that is at issue would not have become a legally effective part of the County's budget. See Wood v State Admin Bd, 255 Mich 220, 224-229 (1931) (explaining how the Governor's use of the veto power prevents proposed legislation from becoming law unless the veto is overridden).

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