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PEOPLE OF MI V JOHN MACAULEY BURKMAN
Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan
Megan K. Cavanagh, Chief Justice Brian K. Zahra Richard H. Bernstein Elizabeth M. Welch Kyra H. Bolden Kimberly A. Thomas Noah P. Hood,
Justices
Order
June 27, 2025 168137-8
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v SC: 168137
COA: 356600
Wayne CC: 20-004636-FH
JOHN MACAULEY BURKMAN,
Defendant-Appellant. _____________________________________/
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v SC: 168138
COA: 356602
Wayne CC: 20-004637-FH
JACOB ALEXANDER WOHL,
Defendant-Appellant. _____________________________________/ On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the December 13, 2024 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court. ZAHRA, J. (dissenting).
Before the 2020 general election, defendants disseminated the following robocall in areas around the country with predominantly African American populations, including in Michigan:
"Hi, this is Tamika Taylor from Project 1599, a civil rights organization founded by Jack Burkman and Jacob Wohl. Mail-in voting sounds great, but did you know that if you vote by mail your personal information will be part of a public database that will be used by police departments to track down old warrants and be used by credit card companies to collect outstanding debts? The CDC [Centers for Disease Control and
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Prevention] is even pushing to use records from mail-in voting to track people for mandatory vaccines. Don't be finessed into giving your private information to the man. Stay safe and beware of vote by mail."[1] The prosecution charged defendants with violating MCL 168.932(a) by attempting through "menace, or other corrupt means or device, either directly or indirectly, . . . to deter [an] elector from . . . giving his or her vote at any election held in this state." The district court bound defendants over for trial. Defendants filed interlocutory applications for leave to appeal their bindovers, arguing that there was no probable cause to believe that they had committed the charged offenses. After the Court of Appeals affirmed the bindovers,2this Court granted defendants' joint application for leave to appeal.3 Last term, the Court issued an opinion reversing the Court of Appeals' judgment in part and remanding.4The Court disagreed with the Court of Appeals that there was probable cause to believe that defendants had engaged in "menace."5As for attempting to deter a vote by "other corrupt means or device," the Court agreed with the Court of Appeals that the charged actions fell within the meaning of the phrase.6But that was not the end of the matter. The Court held that the "other corrupt means or device" language of MCL 168.932(a), as interpreted, was unconstitutionally overbroad because it threatened to infringe constitutionally protected speech.7Rather than invalidate the statutory language, the Court offered a "limiting construction" to save MCL 168.932(a)'s "other corrupt means or device" catchall.8The Court explained that the catchall henceforth "operates to proscribe that speech only if it is intentionally false speech that is related to voting requirements or procedures and is made in an attempt to deter or influence an elector's
1 People v Burkman, 513 Mich 300, 342-343 (2024) (ZAHRA, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (alteration in original).
2 People v Burkman, 341 Mich App 734, 739 (2 02 2 ), rev'd in part 513 Mich 300 (2 02 4).
3 People v Burkman, 510 Mich 968 (2022).
4 Burkman, 513 Mich at 34 1-34 2.
5 Id. at 316-320. Joined by Justice VIVIANO, I concurred in this ruling but dissented in all other respects. Id. at 343-344 (ZAHRA, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
6 Id. at 326 (opinion of the Court).
7 Id. at 338.
8 Id. at 340.
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vote."9The Court then remanded for the Court of Appeals to apply this construction of the statute.10
On remand, the Court of Appeals panel split on how to follow this Court's version of MCL 168.932(a), specifically regarding what it means to be "related to voting requirements or procedures." Noting that this Court had not given guidance on what constitutes a "voting . . . procedure[]," the Court of Appeals majority reasoned that "voting by mail is a voting procedure."11Accordingly, the robocall's discussion of the purported negative consequences of voting by mail made the robocall "related to the procedure" of voting by mail.12Dissenting in part, Judge REDFORD took a narrower view of this Court's construction of MCL 168.932(a). He argued that voting "procedures" are the "manner and means" or "mechanics" of voting and that the robocall related only to having one's information entered in a database as a supposed secondary consequence of voting by mail.13 And he expressed concern that the Court of Appeals majority's approach would overregulate constitutionally protected political speech, which is what this Court sought to avoid when limiting the statute.14
The different approaches taken by the Court of Appeals panel demonstrate that the Court's "limiting construction" has brought little clarity or limitation to what constitutes
"other means or devices." There is no obvious endpoint to what "related to voting requirements or procedures" could mean in this context. All voting involves requirements or procedures, so any speech related to voting could conceivably be "related to voting requirements or procedures." How attenuated must the speech's content be before it is no longer "related to voting requirements or procedures"? It seems simply to be an exercise of judicial intuition about how far is too far. I share Judge REDFORD's concerns about the potential for criminalizing or chilling constitutionally protected political speech. This Court's terse explanation of how it crafted its version of MCL 168.932(a)'s catchall does little to alleviate these concerns. The "voting requirements and procedures"
9 Id.
10 Id. at 341-342.
11 People v Burkman (On Remand), ___ Mich App ___, ___ (December 13, 2024) (Docket No. 356600); slip op at 13.
12 Id. at ___; slip op at 13-14.
13 Id. at ___ (REDFORD, J., dissenting); slip op at 4-5.
14 Id. at ___; slip op at 5-6.
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I, Larry S. Royster, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. June 27, 2025
a0624
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Clerk language apparently came from a footnote in the United States Supreme Court's opinion in Minnesota Voters Alliance v Mansky.15That case involved a dispute about whether Minnesota's ban on wearing a political badge, button, or other insignia in a polling place on Election Day violated the First Amendment.16The "voting requirements and procedures" language was used in reference to "Please I. D. Me" buttons worn in polling places that were allegedly "designed to confuse other voters about whether they needed photo identification to vote."17Thus, the disputed conduct there was more closely tied to the mechanics of voting than the conduct was in this case. If this Court intended the "voting requirements and procedures" language to go no further than the Minnesota Voters Alliance statement, that could support the Court of Appeals dissent's contention that "related to"
should be read narrowly to mean false information about voting requirements and procedures themselves and not any subsequent consequences of engaging in a certain voting procedure.
I believe that this Court should take the case and clarify what it intended when it construed "other corrupt means or devices" to mean "intentionally false speech that is related to voting requirements or procedures and is made in an attempt to deter or influence an elector's vote."18Despite its efforts to avoid the unconstitutional application of the statute, this Court's prior opinion produced new constitutional uncertainty regarding MCL 168.932(a). This Court grafted the operative language into the statute. Accordingly, we should take responsibility for explaining how that language should be applied so as not to violate the constitutional right to free speech. If we do not, the United States Supreme Court might someday decide the question for us. For these reasons, I dissent from the order denying leave to appeal.
15 Burkman, 513 Mich at 341, quoting Minnesota Voters Alliance v Mansky, 585 US 1, 19 n 4 (2018).
16 Minnesota Voters Alliance, 585 US at 5.
17 Id. at 18 n 4.
18 Burkman, 513 Mich at 340.
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