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United States v. Branson
Factual and Procedural Background
Marcus Delars Branson was convicted of bank robbery in 2018 and sentenced to thirty-seven months’ imprisonment followed by supervised release, during which he was prohibited from possessing a firearm. In March 2023, a probation officer found two firearms in his apartment, and Branson was indicted under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). [1]
Branson moved to dismiss the indictment on facial and as-applied Second Amendment grounds. After the district court denied the motion, he pleaded guilty and received a forty-one-month sentence, consecutive to a twenty-four-month revocation sentence. He timely appealed. [2]
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is facially unconstitutional under the Second Amendment. [3]
- Whether § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional as applied to Branson under the Second Amendment. [4][5]
- Whether § 922(g)(1) violates the Commerce Clause. [6]
- Whether § 922(g)(1) violates the equal-protection component of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. [7]
- Whether § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutionally vague under the Fifth Amendment because it fails to provide fair notice. [8]
Arguments of the Parties
Branson’s Arguments
- Section 922(g)(1) is facially unconstitutional under the Second Amendment in light of New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n, Inc. v. Bruen. [9][3]
- Section 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional as applied because the Government offered no evidence that persons convicted of similar Founding-Era crimes were subject to death or forfeiture of estate. [4]
- Section 922(g)(1) violates the Commerce Clause and the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. [10][6][7]
- The statute is vague because an ordinary person allegedly cannot know whether possessing a firearm after conviction is constitutionally protected or a federal felony under the historical test applied after Diaz. [8][11]
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022) | Authority underlying Branson’s Second Amendment challenges. | The court addressed, but rejected, Branson’s facial and as-applied challenges. [9][3][5] |
| United States v. Howard, 766 F.3d 414, 419 (5th Cir. 2014) | Preserved constitutional challenges receive de novo review; unpreserved challenges receive plain-error review. | The court applied the distinction and used plain-error review for Branson’s unpreserved vagueness challenge. [12][13] |
| United States v. Diaz, 116 F.4th 458, 472 (5th Cir. 2024) | Precedent foreclosing the facial Second Amendment challenge. | Branson conceded that Diaz foreclosed his facial challenge. [3] |
| United States v. Schnur, 132 F.4th 863 (5th Cir. 2025) | Diaz forecloses an as-applied challenge based on theft-related felony convictions. | Because bank robbery was treated as a theft-related felony, Diaz and Schnur foreclosed Branson’s as-applied challenge. [5] |
| United States v. Seekins, No. 21-10556, 2022 WL 3644185 (5th Cir. Aug. 24, 2022) | The Fifth Circuit rejected a Commerce Clause challenge to § 922(g)(1). | Branson conceded that this precedent foreclosed his Commerce Clause argument. [6] |
| FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 567 U.S. 239 (2012) | Due process requires fair notice and prohibits statutes that are impermissibly standardless. | The court used this formulation of the vagueness standard. [14] |
| Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926) | Fair-notice principle for vagueness review. | Cited as support for the fair-notice requirement. [14] |
| Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972) | Fair notice and protection against vague criminal laws. | Cited with Fox in stating the governing vagueness principle. [14] |
| United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612 (1954) | A statute must provide fair notice of prohibited conduct. | Cited as additional support for the vagueness standard. [14][11] |
| Beckles v. United States, 580 U.S. 256 (2017) | Vagueness standard concerning fair notice and discriminatory enforcement. | Cited as authority for the governing Due Process rule. [14] |
| Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983) | A penal statute must define prohibited conduct sufficiently clearly and avoid arbitrary enforcement. | The court distinguished Kolender’s facial challenge to a state law from this federal statutory challenge. [14][15] |
| Holder v. Humanitarian L. Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010) | Vagueness requires fair notice; Branson did not challenge excessive enforcement discretion. | The court limited its review to whether § 922(g)(1) provided fair notice. [16] |
| Vill. of Hoffman Ests. v. Flipside, Hoffman Ests., Inc., 455 U.S. 489 (1982) | Non-First Amendment vagueness challenges are examined in light of the facts of the case. | The court required Branson to show that the statute was vague as applied to him. [17] |
| United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544 (1975) | Vagueness review considers the facts of the particular case. | Cited in support of the as-applied threshold for vagueness challenges. [17] |
| United States v. Clark, 582 F.3d 607 (5th Cir. 2009) | A defendant must show that the statute is vague in his case. | The court held that Branson failed to meet this threshold. [17][15] |
| United States v. Nat'l Dairy Prods. Corp., 372 U.S. 29 (1963) | Criminal responsibility should not attach when a person could not reasonably understand that conduct was prohibited. | The court held that Branson could reasonably understand that firearm possession was prohibited. [11] |
| United States v. Gray, 96 F.3d 769 (5th Cir. 1999) | The void-for-vagueness doctrine requires definiteness sufficient for ordinary people to understand prohibited conduct. | The court found that § 922(g)(1) clearly defined possession of a firearm by a felon as prohibited conduct. [18][19] |
| Columbia Nat. Ress., Inc. v. Tatum, 58 F.3d 1101 (6th Cir. 1995) | No precedent supported attacking a Supreme Court decision as void for vagueness. | The court rejected Branson’s attempt to base vagueness on a judicial interpretation of the statute. [20] |
| United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363 (1971) | Courts may consider limiting constructions in certain facial vagueness challenges. | The court explained that the precedent involved a different posture from Branson’s case. [15] |
| Wainwright v. Stone, 414 U.S. 21 (1973) | Authority cited regarding consideration of statutory construction in vagueness review. | The court stated that the case involved a posture materially different from Branson’s. [15] |
| High Ol' Times, Inc. v. Busbee, 673 F.2d 1225 (11th Cir. 1982) | Authority cited regarding the effect of statutory construction in vagueness analysis. | The court identified it as another case involving a different posture. [15] |
| Copeland v. Vance, 893 F.3d 101 (2d Cir. 2018) | Authority cited concerning consideration of statutory construction in vagueness review. | The court included it among cases distinguishable from Branson’s federal statutory challenge. [15] |
| Posters 'N' Things, Ltd. v. United States, 511 U.S. 513 (1994) | A criminal law must define the offense with sufficient definiteness for ordinary people to understand what is prohibited. | The court relied on this principle in concluding that § 922(g)(1) survived vagueness review. [19] |
| United States v. Conlan, 786 F.3d 380 (5th Cir. 2015) | Unpreserved constitutional claims are reviewed for plain error. | The court applied plain-error review because Branson had not raised vagueness below. [13] |
| United States v. Garcia-Carrillo, 749 F.3d 376 (5th Cir. 2014) | Plain-error review requires error, obviousness, effect on substantial rights, and an effect on judicial proceedings’ fairness or integrity. | The court recited this test in evaluating Branson’s unpreserved claim. [13][21] |
| United States v. Sanches, 86 F.4th 680 (5th Cir. 2023) | An error must be plainly dictated by relevant law and decisions to satisfy plain-error review. | Branson identified no precedent requiring a different result; therefore, any error was not plain. [21][22] |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court reviewed preserved constitutional challenges de novo and unpreserved challenges for plain error. [12]
Branson conceded that United States v. Diaz foreclosed his facial Second Amendment challenge. His as-applied challenge likewise failed because United States v. Schnur treated Diaz as foreclosing challenges involving theft-related felony convictions, and the court classified bank robbery as theft-related. [3][5]
Branson also conceded that Fifth Circuit precedent rejected his Commerce Clause argument and that United States v. Howard rejected a similar equal-protection argument under the Fifth Amendment. [6][7]
Regarding vagueness, the court applied the requirement that a statute provide fair notice and examined the challenge in light of Branson’s specific circumstances. Section 922(g)(1) prohibits firearm possession by a person convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year of imprisonment. Branson had been convicted of bank robbery and sentenced to thirty-seven months, so the statute plainly covered his conduct. [14][17][11]
The court rejected Branson’s argument that Diaz made the statute vague. A judicial interpretation cannot circumvent the clear text of an otherwise definite statute, and Branson had fair notice when he possessed the firearms in 2023. [11][20][15]
Because Branson raised the vagueness challenge for the first time on appeal, plain-error review applied. He identified no authority plainly requiring a different result; consequently, even assuming error, it was not plain. [13][22]
Holding and Implications
AFFIRMED. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s sentence and rejected all five constitutional challenges to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). [23][24]
The direct effect was that Branson’s conviction and sentence remained in place. The opinion discusses no broader implications beyond applying existing precedent to his claims and does not establish a new precedent. [24]
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ____________
No. 24-60417
____________
United States of America, Plaintiff—Appellee,
versus
Marcus Delars Branson, Defendant—Appellant.
______________________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi USDC No. 3:23-CR-61-1
______________________________
Before Smith, Graves, and Duncan, Circuit Judges. James E. Graves, Jr., Circuit Judge:
Marcus Delars Branson appeals his conviction for possession of a firearm after a felony conviction in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He argues that § 922(g)(1) violates the Second Amendment both on its face and as applied to him in light of New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n, Inc. v. Bruen,
597 U.S. 1 (2022). He also argues that § 922(g)(1) violates the Commerce Clause and Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. We AFFIRM. United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
June 4, 2025 Lyle W. Cayce Clerk
1
2
I.
In 2018, Marcus Delars Branson was convicted of bank robbery in Texas and sentenced to a thirty-seven-month term of imprisonment to be followed by a three-year term of supervised release. Branson was released in 2020, and a condition of his supervised release was that he not possess a gun. In March 2023—months before his supervised release term was up—a United States Probation Officer visited Branson's apartment and found two firearms. Branson was indicted on one count of possession of a firearm by a person who has previously been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year—a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
Branson moved to dismiss the indictment, lodging facial and as- applied challenges under the Second Amendment in light of Bruen. The district court denied the motion to dismiss, and Branson thereafter pled guilty and was sentenced to a forty-one-month term of imprisonment, to run consecutively to his revocation sentence of twenty-four-months' imprisonment, followed by a three-year term of supervised release that would run concurrently with the revocation term of supervised release. This timely appeal followed, wherein Branson presents his preserved Second Amendment challenges and three unpreserved challenges.
II.
"We review preserved challenges to the constitutionality of a criminal statute de novo. But if the constitutional challenge was not presented to the district court, we review for plain error." United States v. Howard, 766 F.3d 414, 419 (5th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted).
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III.
Branson seeks reversal on five grounds, four of which are foreclosed. The fifth, his void-for-vagueness challenge, lacks merit.
A.
First, Branson contends that § 922(g)(1) is facially unconstitutional under the Second Amendment. Branson concedes, however, that this argument is foreclosed by our precedent. See United States v. Diaz, 116 F.4th 458, 472 (5th Cir. 2024), petition for cert. filed (U.S. Feb. 24, 2025) (No. 24-
6625)).
B.
Second, Branson maintains that § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional as applied to him, because "[t]he Government has put forth no evidence demonstrating that in the Founding Era, defendants convicted for similar crimes [to bank robbery] were subject to the death penalty or forfeiture of estate."
However, we recently reviewed a similar challenge in United States v. Schnur, 132 F.4th 863 (5th Cir. 2025), and held that "[b]ased on Schnur's two theft-related felony convictions, Diaz forecloses Schnur's as-applied challenge." Id. at 871 (collecting authority). Branson's conviction for bank robbery falls within the category of theft-related felony convictions. Thus, Branson's as-applied challenge is also foreclosed.
C.
Third, Branson asserts that § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause. However, he concedes that "[t]his court has previously rejected this Commerce Clause-based argument." See United States v. Seekins, No. 21-10556, 2022 WL 3644185, at *2 (5th Cir. Aug. 24, 2022) (unpublished) (summarizing precedent)).
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D.
Fourth, Branson argues that § 922(g)(1) violates the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. However, once again, Branson concedes that "this Court recently rejected a similar argument raised on plain error review in United States v. Howard, No. 24- 40033, 2024 WL 4449866, at *2 (5th Cir. Oct. 9, 2024) . . . ."
E.
Branson's fifth challenge is not foreclosed. He claims that § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutionally vague in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment "because it fails to provide a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what conduct is prohibited."
"A fundamental principle in our legal system is that laws which regulate persons or entities must give fair notice of conduct that is forbidden or required." FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 567 U.S. 239, 253 (2012) (citing Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926); Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972)); accord United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954). "A conviction or punishment fails to comply with due process if the statute or regulation under which it is obtained 'fails to provide a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited, or is so standardless that it authorizes or encourages seriously discriminatory enforcement.'"1Fox, 567 U.S. at 253 (quoting Williams, 553 U.S. at 304); accord Beckles v. United States, 580 U.S. 256, 262 (2017) (quoting Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983)).
_____________________
1 Branson does not argue that § 922(g)(1 ) "grants too much enforcement discretion to the Government. We therefore only address whether the statute 'provides a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited.'" Holder v. Humanitarian L. Project, 561 U.S. 1, 20 (2010) (cleaned up) (quoting Williams, 553 U.S. at 304).
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"Vagueness challenges to statutes which do not involve First Amendment freedoms must be examined in the light of the facts of the case at hand." Vill. of Hoffman Ests. v. Flipside, Hoffman Ests., Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 495 n.7 (1982) (modification accepted) (quoting United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 550 (1975)); accord United States v. Clark, 582 F.3d 607, 614 (5th Cir. 2009). "As a threshold matter, [Branson] must show that the statute is vague in his case . . . ." Clark, 582 F.3d at 614.
Branson does not cross the threshold. Branson was clearly put on notice that his offense comes within § 922(g)(1). As a reminder, § 922(g)(1) makes it unlawful for any person "who has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year" to possess any firearm. Branson neatly fits the statutory text. He was convicted of bank robbery and sentenced to thirty-seven-months' imprisonment, which, of course, exceeded one year. Under these facts and the express language of § 922(g)(1), an ordinary person had fair notice that it is unlawful for them to possess a gun. See United States v. Nat'l Dairy Prods. Corp., 372 U.S. 29, 32- 33 (1963) ("Void for vagueness simply means that criminal responsibility should not attach where one could not reasonably understand that his contemplated conduct is proscribed." (citing Harriss, 347 U.S. at 617)). Branson's vagueness challenge, however, goes beyond the contours of the statute; he says that Diaz spawned vagueness. In his view, "[u]nder the current test permitting disarmament only if the Government demonstrates that the Nation has a longstanding tradition of disarming someone with an analogous criminal history, an ordinary person cannot know in advance of a court's retroactive declaration whether possessing a firearm post-conviction is a constitutional entitlement or a federal felony."
Branson seems to misunderstand the concept of vagueness. See United States v. Gray, 96 F.3d 769, 776 (5th Cir. 1999) ("The 'void-for-vagueness'
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doctrine requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement." (emphasis added)). The statute, § 922 (g)(1), clearly defines the prohibited conduct—possessing a firearm as a felon. We are aware of no precedent that permits a vagueness challenge to circumvent the text because a court's interpretation has rendered vague an otherwise pellucid statutory provision.2See Columbia Nat. Ress., Inc. v. Tatum, 58 F.3d 1101, 1106 (6th Cir. 1995) ("No precedent supports the proposition that a party may attack a Supreme Court decision as void for vagueness."). Section 922(g)(1) survives vagueness review because "it define[s] the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what _____________________
2 Branson cites to caselaw that in his view supports the conclusion that a court's statutory construction should be considered when reviewing whether a statute is unconstitutionally vague. Branson avers that "Kolender recognizes that a statute can be unconstitutionally vague based on how it has been construed." But the postures underlying Kolender and this case are markedly different. There, the Court was evaluating a facial challenge to a state law and followed the long-standing practice of considering "any limiting construction" proffered by the state. See id. at 355 & n.4; see also United States v. Thirty- Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 369 (1971). The same is true of the other cases Branson cites. See Wainwright v. Stone, 414 U.S. 21, 23 (1973) High Ol' Times, Inc. v. Busbee, 673 F.2d 1225, 1229 (11th Cir. 1982); Copeland v. Vance, 893 F.3d 101, 120 (2d Cir. 2018). The quoted language in Kolender, thus, indicates an exercise in federalism that is not relevant in this case where a federal court is tasked with reviewing a federal statute. But even if Kolender stands for the principle that a court must consider whether a statute is vague in light of how courts have interpreted it, Branson's claim still falls short. Branson offers our September 2024 Diaz decision as the catalyst that made § 922(g)(1) vague. The corollary is that pre-Diaz § 922(g)(1) was not vague. Thus, when Branson was arrested in June 2023—over a year before Diaz issued—he had fair notice that pursuant to § 922(g)(1) it was illegal for him to possess a firearm. Because Branson must show that "the statute is vague in his case," his challenge necessarily fails. Clark, 582 F.3d at 614.
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conduct is prohibited . . . ." Gray, 96 F.3d at 776 (citing Posters 'N' Things, Ltd. v. United States, 511 U.S. 513, 525 (1994)).
Because Branson failed to raise this constitutional challenge before the district court, we review for plain error only. United States v. Conlan, 786 F.3d 380, 385-86 (5th Cir. 2015). "Plain error exists if '(1) there is an error, (2) the error is plain, (3) the error affects substantial rights, and (4) the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.'" Howard, 766 F.3d at 419 (cleaned up) (quoting United States
v. Garcia-Carrillo, 749 F.3d 376, 378 (5th Cir. 2014) (per curiam). Branson points us to no precedent that makes us think that a different
"result was 'plainly dictated by relevant laws and decisions.'" United States
v. Sanches, 86 F.4th 680, 686 (5th Cir. 2023). Absent that, if there was any error—and we are not convinced there was—the error was not plain. See id. So Branson's unpreserved vagueness challenge fails.
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court's sentence.
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