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PEOPLE OF MI V JASON LEE FEDEWA
Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan
Megan K. Cavanagh, Chief Justice Brian K. Zahra Richard H. Bernstein Elizabeth M. Welch Kyra H. Bolden Kimberly A. Thomas, Justices
Order
May 9, 2025
167211
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v SC: 167211
COA: 362396
Cass CC: 2021-010011-FC
JASON LEE FEDEWA,
Defendant-Appellant. _________________________________________/ On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the April 18, 2024 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court. CAVANAGH, C.J. (dissenting).
I respectfully dissent from the Court's order denying defendant's application for leave to appeal. I would have granted oral argument on the application to consider whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying defendant's motion to compel the complainant to undergo a psychological examination.
Defendant was charged with three counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct, MCL 750.520b(1)(a), and three counts of second-degree criminal sexual conduct, MCL 750.520c(1)(a), after his 13-year-old child, AF, accused him of multiple instances of sexual abuse. After the abuse came to light, AF received psychiatric treatment. Before trial, defendant filed a motion to compel AF to submit to a psychological evaluation, specifically an MMPI test.1In support, defendant provided a note from a doctor who had evaluated AF approximately eleven months earlier, indicating that the doctor
1 An "MMPI" test refers to the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory used to "help identify personal, social, and behavioral problems." American Psychological Association, APA Dictionary of Psychology—Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI)
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[w]ould highly recommend MMPI be administered to this child, especially if [AF's] testimony is to be used in court. There appears to be a strong deficit in [AF's] personality and it would be good for the courts to arrange for a full battery of psychological and neuropsychological tests before any testimony is heard.
Defendant argued that he should be able to explore whether AF "suffers from a personality issue that calls into question [their] testimony . . . ." Following a hearing on the motion, the trial court concluded that the doctor's note did not provide a compelling reason to order a psychological evaluation. The court reasoned that cross-examination was sufficient to test the complainant's credibility.
Defendant did not seek an interlocutory appeal of the trial court's order but did raise this issue in his appeal of right. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling. People v Fedewa, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued April 18, 2024 (Docket No. 362396). Defendant then filed an application for leave to appeal in this Court, which the majority now denies.
We review a trial court's decision on whether to grant a request for a psychiatric examination for an abuse of discretion. People v Shahideh, 277 Mich App 111, 113 (2007), rev'd on other grounds 482 Mich 1156 (2008). In People v Freeman (After Remand), 406 Mich 514, 516 (1979), this Court stated that a defendant who seeks to compel a complaining witness to submit to a psychological exam must "adequately demonstrate the need for the discovery he seeks" and that "amorphous contentions" are insufficient. In Freeman, unsupported allegations that the complaining witness was, for example, a
" 'highly nervous person' " and intellectually disabled were deemed insufficient. Id. Although those reasons were inadequate, this Court declined to "speculate as to what factors" would suffice. Id. Later, in People v Graham, 173 Mich App 473, 478 (1988), the Court of Appeals held that a psychological examination may be ordered if there is a
"compelling reason to do so." There, the defendant accused the victim's mother of being an alcoholic, which the defendant posited could have a bearing on the mother's motives and veracity in reporting the charged acts. Id. at 476. But the Court of Appeals rejected the notion that such "unsupported arguments" constituted a compelling reason. Id. at 478. Moreover, the Court of Appeals concluded that concerns about the mother's veracity and motives could be adequately explored on cross-examination. Id. The panel in the present case concluded that the trial court properly considered Freeman and Graham before determining that there was no compelling reason to order a psychological examination and that defendant's right to a fair trial could be adequately protected through cross-examination. Fedewa, unpub op at 12. The panel reasoned that defendant "acknowledged that he did not know what the MMPI test would uncover" and that he simply wanted to explore whether the complainant suffered from any personality issues that could call AF's testimony into question. Id. According to the panel, this is the
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same purpose that was found insufficiently compelling in Graham. Id. The panel then, however, recognized that the doctor's note in this case was actually "more compelling"
than the allegations and concerns in Freeman and Graham, but concluded that granting the motion to compel would have sanctioned an "impermissible fishing expedition absent any statement from [defendant] that MMPI testing was linked to determining an examinee's credibility." Id. Finally, it held that opportunities to attack AF's credibility were sufficient to protect defendants' right to fair trial. Id.
I question the conclusions drawn by the Court of Appeals. As the panel acknowledged, the doctor's note in this case was certainly more compelling than the unsubstantiated allegations in Freeman or Graham. In this case, defendant's request was accompanied by a note from a doctor who had psychologically evaluated AF indicating suspected "strong deficits" in their personality that the doctor believed should be explored by further psychological testing if AF's testimony was presented in court. This is enough, in my view, to link the proposed testing with the complainant's credibility. If the doctor's note here is not sufficiently compelling to warrant further discovery, it is unclear under what, if any, circumstance a motion to compel a psychological examination would ever be granted under our current standards. I also disagree with the Court of Appeals that defendant's motion should be labeled an improper fishing expedition.2Defendant was not seeking unfettered psychological testing of the complainant based on pure speculation; but instead sought a specific psychological test on the basis of a doctor's recommendation. Moreover, if the complainant did have a personality disorder that affected their testimony, it is not clear how that could be adequately explored on cross-examination where no such test was ever, as far as the record demonstrates, performed.
2 Moreover, not all "fishing expeditions" are improper. Creen v Mich Central R Co, 168 Mich 104, 108 (1911) (reasoning that "[f]ishing is sometimes legitimate"). As one judge has explained,
Some go fishing to catch whatever is biting, not quite sure what they'll get. Others pursue a more targeted approach, seeking to catch a certain type of fish, using specific bait and tackle. [Walsh v Top Notch Home Designs Corp, unpublished opinion of the Eastern District of New York, issued August 11,
2 02 2 (Case No. CV 2 0-05087).] In other words, while roving inspections for unspecified information are impermissible "fishing expeditions," targeted requests based on more than mere speculation are not. Courts should be careful to delineate between the two. But see Thornburg, Just Say "No Fishing": The Lure of Metaphor, 40 Univ of Mich J L Reform 1 (2006) (arguing that courts should abandon the "fishing expedition" metaphor altogether as unhelpful).
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I, Larry S. Royster, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. May 9, 2025
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Clerk At minimum, I believe that further consideration of this case would present this Court an opportunity to provide further guidance on the contours of what constitutes a
"compelling reason" for such a motion to be granted, Graham, 173 Mich App at 478, and how a defendant can "adequately demonstrate the need for the discovery," Freeman, 406 Mich at 516. Additional guidance could help trial courts exercise their discretion in a manner that weighs a defendant's right to mount a defense with other important considerations including the complainant's right to privacy. Because the Court instead denies defendant's application for leave to appeal, I respectfully dissent.
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