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SOHO LAND DEVELOPMENT INC V OAKLAND COUNTY TREASURER

Supreme Court of Michigan
May 9, 2025

Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan

Megan K. Cavanagh, Chief Justice Brian K. Zahra Richard H. Bernstein Elizabeth M. Welch Kyra H. Bolden Kimberly A. Thomas, Justices

Order

May 9, 2025

168022

SOHO LAND DEVELOPMENT, INC.,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v SC: 168022

COA: 368567

Oakland CC: 2022-197704-CK

OAKLAND COUNTY TREASURER,

Defendant-Appellant. _________________________________________/ On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the December 16, 2024 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the question presented should be reviewed by this Court. WELCH, J. (concurring).

I concur with the decision to deny leave to appeal. In this case, the plaintiff land developer sued the defendant Oakland County Treasurer for allegedly breaching a 2016 settlement agreement. Relevant here, the agreement required defendant to transfer to plaintiff, Soho Land Development, Inc., several parcels of real property to settle a different lawsuit. Some of the properties included foreclosed vacant lots that were part of a condominium association. Neither party realized that, before the settlement agreement was executed, the lots had automatically reverted by law to the condominium association, MCL 559.167(3), as amended by 2002 PA 283, and defendant therefore never had proper title to convey the property. Defendant argues that plaintiff cannot assert a claim because it received the property "as is, without warrant." The trial court agreed with defendant. The Court of Appeals rejected the "as is, without warranty" argument but still did not grant full relief because plaintiff had not properly requested that the mutual mistake be remedied via rescission of the contract. The panel then remanded the matter to the trial court, and defendant seeks leave to appeal that decision.

I agree with the Court of Appeals that the most reasonable interpretation of the operative legal documents and the parties' conduct is that defendant represented that it possessed legal title to the vacant condominium lots that it could convey, even if defendant did not guarantee the physical condition of the property. See Soho Land Dev, LLC v Oakland Co Treasurer, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued December 16, 2024 (Docket No. 368567), pp 4-7. Therefore, I agree that defendant was

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not entitled to summary disposition as to the vacant lots and that a remand is necessary. Id. at 6-7. I write separately to address potential confusion as to the options available to the parties and the circuit court on remand from the Court of Appeals. This case seemingly presents a classic example of a mutual mistake between contracting parties that could justify a rescission of a contract.1This Court has stated that

"[a] contractual mistake 'is a belief that is not in accord with the facts,' " and this mistaken belief "must relate to a fact in existence at the time the contract is executed." Lenawee Co Bd of Health v Messerly, 417 Mich 17, 24 (1982), quoting 1 Restatement Contracts, 2d, § 151, p 383. "A contract may be rescinded because of a mutual misapprehension of the parties, but this remedy is granted only in the sound discretion of the court." Id. at 26. Whether rescission is justified is to be decided using "a case-by-case analysis" focused on whether the "mistaken belief relates to a basic assumption of the parties upon which the contract is made, and which materially affects the agreed performances of the parties." Id. at 29. "Rescission is not available, however, to relieve a party who has assumed the risk of loss in connection with the mistake." Id. at 30.

Relevant to this matter, when the parties entered into the settlement agreement that plaintiff claims defendant breached, they were both operating under the mistaken belief that, after the foreclosure, defendant possessed title to the vacant condominium lots pursuant to MCL 211.78k(5) and (6). But as everyone now agrees, because the lots had remained undeveloped for more than 10 years after the commencement of construction, the lots automatically reverted to be general common elements of the condominium association by operation of law in effect at the time, MCL 559.167(3), as amended by 2002 PA 283,2 and thus ceased to exist as individual taxable parcels that could be subject to foreclosure.

1 This statement focuses on the concept of rescission premised on a mutual mistake, but I acknowledge that the concept of equitable reformation has also been raised. This Court's precedent has primarily addressed that concept in the context of reformation of a deed or land contract. See, e.g., Dykstra v Huizinga, 362 Mich 420 (1961); Schwaderer v Huron- Clinton Metro Auth, 329 Mich 258 (1951); Scott v Grow, 301 Mich 226 (1942). But in limited circumstances, equitable reformation has been considered in connection with other contractual instruments. See, e.g., Goldman v Century Ins Co, 354 Mich 528 (1958); Urick v Burge, 350 Mich 165 (1957); Modern Displays, Inc v Hennecke, 350 Mich 67 (1957); Heath Delivery Serv v Mich Mut Liability Co, 257 Mich 482 (1932).

2 "If the developer does not withdraw the undeveloped portions of the project from the project before expiration of the [relevant 6- or 10-year] time periods, those undeveloped lands shall remain part of the project as general common elements and all rights to construct units upon that land shall cease." MCL 559.167(3), as amended by 2002 PA 283.

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The automatic reversion occurred approximately a year before the parties executed the settlement at issue. Under the law at that time, a reversion occurred without any vote, public notice, or mandated recording with the register of deeds.3Both lower courts seem to agree that there was a mutual mistake in this case that "relates to a basic assumption of the parties upon which the contract is made, and which materially affects the agreed performances of the parties." Messerly, 417 Mich at 29. In Messerly, there was a mutual mistaken belief that "that the property transferred by the vendors to the vendees was suitable for human habitation and could be utilized to generate rental income," which was core to the agreed upon value of the property and its intended use after the transfer. Id. at 30-31. The Court reasoned that, because "[n]othing short of rescission [could] remedy the mistake . . . , the parties' mistake as to a basic assumption materially affect[ed] the agreed performances of the parties." Id. at 31. Here, both parties believed that defendant held title to the vacant condominium lots, and neither party was aware of the automatic reversion that had already occurred before the settlement agreement was signed. This was illustrated by the parties' communications in negotiating the settlement and the language of the settlement agreement and incorporated documents, as well as through defendant's action of foreclosing on tax parcels that it could not foreclose on as a matter of law. Despite the mistaken understanding underlying the transaction in Messerly, the Court found that rescission was not an appropriate remedy. The Court looked to § 154 of the Second Restatement of Contracts, which addressed which party in a contract bears the risk of the mistake. Messerly, 417 Mich at 32. The Court in Messerly found it significant that the contract allocated risks as to the physical conditions of the property to the vendee through an "as is" clause. Id. at 32. That clause was a "persuasive indication that the parties considered that, as between them, such risk as related to the 'present condition' of the property should lie with the purchaser." Id. The Court held that "[i]f the 'as is' clause is to have any meaning at all, it must be interpreted to refer to those defects which were unknown at the time that the contract was executed." Id. Importantly, the mistake and the contractual clause in Messerly both concerned the physical condition of the property—not the underlying right to title in the property itself.

Returning to this case, the trial court found that a mutual mistake as to title existed, but it also held that plaintiff bore the risk of the mistake because, by agreeing to an "as is, without warranty" clause, "Soho assumed the risk of loss." The trial court also

3 The statute was later amended to provide that such reversions could only take effect if the condominium association co-owners voted to declare a reversion, provided written notice to the developer of the decision to declare a reversion, and recorded the declaration with the register of deeds. See MCL 559.167(4), as amended by 2016 PA 233, effective September 21, 2016. However, that amendment was held not to operate retroactively to reversions that became effective before the effective date of the amendment. See Cove Creek Condo Ass'n v Vistal Land & Home Dev, LLC, 330 Mich App 679, 698-699 (2019).

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acknowledged that plaintiff had not sought rescission and cited assumption of risk as a reason why rescission would not be warranted. In disposing of defendant's arguments related to the vacant lots, the Court of Appeals agreed that there was a mutual mistake and disagreed that plaintiff assumed the risk because the "as is, without warranty" clause was limited to the physical condition of the properties. Soho Land Dev, LLC, unpub op at 4-7. But the panel also declined to order rescission on the current record, stating:

We hold that the trial court erred by granting defendant's motion for summary disposition regarding the vacant lots. . . . Although the trial court also found a mutual mistake of fact, it noted that neither party had sought rescission of the contract in this matter, and found that plaintiff had assumed the risk of loss in connection with the mistake. See Messerly, 417 Mich at

32. Although we do not agree that plaintiff assumed the risk that defendant was not the legal owner of the vacant lots, or that the lots did not legally exist, we agree that neither party appears to have sought rescission in this matter; the trial court accordingly did not abuse its discretion by declining to order rescission despite finding a mutual mistake of fact. Id. [Soho Land Dev, LLC, unpub op at 6-7 (emphasis added).]

The quoted holding suggests that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by declining to order rescission sua sponte upon finding a mutual mistake given the lack of a motion or a properly pleaded claim or defense seeking rescission. I see no clear error in this holding because there is no evidence in the record of either party making a request for rescission in any pleading, motion, or brief that was filed in circuit court.4However, it is notable that the Court of Appeals reversed the circuit court as to what would have been the presumptive justification for denying rescission if it had been properly requested, rejecting the argument that plaintiff accepted the property "as is." Footnote 2 of the Court of Appeals' opinion arguably leaves open various avenues for the plaintiff on remand. The panel stated:

Plaintiff also argues in the alternative that the trial court erred by not allowing plaintiff to amend its complaint to add claims for reformation or rescission based on mutual mistake. See Ormsby v Capital Welding, Inc, 471 Mich 45, 52-53; 684 NW2[d] 320 (2004), citing MCR 2.116(I)(5) ("When a trial court grants summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8), or (C)(10), the opportunity for the nonprevailing party to amend its pleadings pursuant to MCR 2.118 should be freely granted, unless the amendment would not be justified."). To the extent that plaintiff argues that the trial

4 I note that while the circuit court did deny a request from plaintiff for leave to file an amended complaint, that request did not articulate an interest in adding a claim for or requested remedy of equitable reformation or rescission.

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I, Larry S. Royster, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. May 9, 2025

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Clerk court should have permitted amendment with regard to the vacant lots, because we reverse the trial court's grant of summary disposition, we need not address the argument in the alternative. With regard to the Hazel Park property, any amendment would be futile in light of the clear contractual language at issue. Id. at 53. [Soho Land Dev, LLC, unpub op at 7 n 2 (emphasis added).]

Of course, even if a request for leave to amend is filed under MCR 2.118(A)(2), the circuit court would have discretion to consider whether MCR 2.118(A)(3), related to inexcusable delay, also affects the case.

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