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PEOPLE OF MI V JUAN JOSE DEL CID
Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan
Megan K. Cavanagh, Chief Justice Brian K. Zahra Richard H. Bernstein Elizabeth M. Welch Kyra H. Bolden Kimberly A. Thomas, Justices
Order
May 2, 2025
167877
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v SC: 167877
COA: 370243
Ottawa CC: 16-040357-FC
JUAN JOSE DEL CID,
Defendant-Appellant. _________________________________________/ On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the October 17, 2024 order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court. THOMAS, J. (concurring).
A party seeking to call an expert witness must satisfy the "threshold inquiry" that expert testimony on a particular subject matter "will assist the trier of fact to understand a fact in issue" and demonstrate that the specific expert and their proposed testimony is sufficiently reliable to be admitted at trial. People v Kowalski, 492 Mich 106, 120-121 (2012) (opinion by MARY BETH KELLY, J.); see also MRE 702.1"[T]hese considerations are separate and distinct and must each be satisfied independently . . . ." Id. at 120. The former ensures that expert testimony will be helpful to the jury by providing information that is " 'beyond the ken of common knowledge,' " id. at 122 (citation omitted), while the latter ensures that only expert testimony with sufficient indicia of reliability is presented at trial, Gilbert v DaimlerChrysler Corp, 470 Mich 749, 781 (2004).
Here, defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion in limine to exclude the testimony of prosecution expert Barbara Welke in the areas of delayed disclosure of sexual abuse and the process of disclosure without conducting a Daubert
1 More specifically, MRE 702 requires a proponent of expert testimony to show, in addition to assisting the trier of fact, that the "testimony is based on sufficient facts or data," that it "is the product of reliable principles and methods," and that the "expert's opinion reflects a reliable application of the principles and methods to the facts of the case." MRE 702.
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hearing.2Defendant notes that Welke frequently provides expert testimony to support prosecutions alleging criminal sexual conduct (CSC) against a minor.3He contends that her opinions are derived—if not explicitly, at least in substance—from research on child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome (CSAAS),4which he claims has insufficient scientific support to be admitted under MRE 702.
Defendant's argument implicates People v Peterson, 450 Mich 349 (1995), in which this Court held that (subject to important limitations) an expert may testify regarding typical behaviors of a minor who was subject to sexual abuse.5In particular:
(1) an expert may testify in the prosecution's case in chief regarding typical and relevant symptoms of child sexual abuse for the sole purpose of explaining a victim's specific behavior that might be incorrectly construed by the jury as inconsistent with that of an actual abuse victim, and (2) an expert may testify with regard to the consistencies between the behavior of
2 See Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharm, Inc, 509 US 579 (1993). "A Daubert hearing is a pretrial hearing conducted by a trial court in exercising its role as a gatekeeper to ensure that evidence that is admitted into trial meets reliability characteristics outlined in MRE 702." People v Warner, 514 Mich ___ (July 11, 2024) (Docket No. 163805), slip op at 7 n 3.
3 See, e.g., People v Mejia, unpublished opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued February 14, 2019 (Docket No. 339426); People v Jeltema, unpublished opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued March 23, 2023 (Docket No. 359822).
4 See People v Peterson, 4 50 Mich 34 9, 371 n 11 (1995), citing Summit, The Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome, 7 Child Abuse & Neglect 177 (1983).
5 Peterson did not use the term "CSAAS" or specifically endorse the use of such evidence. However, it discussed the concept when summarizing how other jurisdictions treat expert evidence regarding victim behavior, see Peterson, 450 Mich at 371-373, explaining: Child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome (CSAAS) is a term that has become common place [sic] in other jurisdictions. It is used to describe the different reactions observed in child victims of sexual abuse. The term originated in an article published by Dr. Roland Summit entitled The child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome, 7 Child Abuse & Neglect 177 (1983). The article described five common characteristics observed in child victims of sexual abuse: (1) secrecy, (2) helplessness, (3) entrapment and accommodation, (4) delayed, conflicted, and unconvincing disclosure, and (5) retraction. See Myers, [Expert Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Litigation, 68 Neb L R 1, 66 (1989)]. [Id. at 371 n 11.]
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the particular victim and other victims of child sexual abuse to rebut an attack on the victim's credibility. [Id. at 352-353.][6]
The Court further held that the then-applicable Davis/Frye7 test for admissibility under MRE 702 did not apply to such evidence. Id. at 369. In so holding, the Court relied on People v Beckley, 434 Mich 691 (1990), where five justices agreed that the Davis/Frye test does not apply to expert testimony involving behavioral sciences. See Peterson, 450 Mich at 365-369, citing Beckley, 434 Mich at 721. Since Peterson, expert testimony along these lines has been used in criminal prosecutions alleging CSC against a minor. See People v Muniz, 343 Mich App 437, 443 (2022) ("Michigan courts regularly admit expert testimony concerning typical and relevant symptoms of abuse, such as delayed reporting and secrecy.").
After Peterson was decided, this Court adopted the Daubert standard articulated by the United States Supreme Court and amended MRE 702 to effectively reject the Davis/Frye test. See Gilbert, 470 Mich at 781. Under the current standard, a trial judge must act as a gatekeeper to ensure that "any and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable." Daubert, 509 US at 589; see also Kumho Tire Co, Ltd v Carmichael, 526 US 137, 141 (1999) (emphasizing that "Daubert's general holding—setting forth the trial judge's general 'gatekeeping' obligation—applies not only to testimony based on 'scientific' knowledge, but also to testimony based on 'technical' and 'other specialized' knowledge."). This Court has not squarely addressed Peterson or expert testimony regarding common victim behaviors since this significant shift.8 However, two recent published Court of Appeals decisions relied on Peterson to reject arguments that defense counsel who failed to challenge the admissibility of expert testimony regarding typical victim behavior rendered constitutionally deficient performance. People v Spaulding, 332 Mich App 638, 658-661 (2020) (addressing expert testimony regarding adult victims of domestic violence); Muniz, 343 Mich App at 441-445 (addressing expert testimony regarding minor victims of CSC). In rejecting these
6 The Court added that, when providing such testimony, "(1) an expert may not testify that the sexual abuse occurred, (2) an expert may not vouch for the veracity of a victim, and (3) an expert may not testify whether the defendant is guilty." Id. at 352.
7 People v Davis, 343 Mich 348 (1955); Frye v United States, 54 App DC 46 (1923).
8 Of note, this Court's grant order in People v Tomasik, 497 Mich 977 (2015), directed the parties to address, among other things, whether the trial court erred by admitting CSAAS testimony at trial. After hearing argument, the Court entered an order granting defendant a new trial on a different basis. People v Tomasik, 498 Mich 953 (2015). The order further stated, "On retrial, if the parties seek to admit expert testimony, the trial court shall conduct a Daubert hearing to ensure that the proposed testimony is both relevant and reliable as is required under MRE 702." Id.
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challenges, both panels stated that " 'expert testimony is admissible and appropriate to explain [the behavior of trauma victims] with no need to engage in an analysis of scientific reliability.' " Muniz, 343 Mich App at 445, quoting Spaulding, 332 Mich App at 659 (emphasis added).
To the extent that lower courts might read Peterson, Spaulding, and Muniz as establishing that this type of expert testimony is per se admissible without reliability testing under the current version of MRE 702 and Daubert, I question that conclusion. In People v Kowalski, this Court addressed the admissibility of expert testimony regarding false confessions under the version of MRE 702 incorporating the Daubert standard. The Court held that such testimony satisfied the threshold requirement that expert testimony "assist the trier of fact to understand a fact in issue," because a false confession is "behavior contrary to common sense" that is "not within the average person's understanding of human behavior." Kowalski, 492 Mich at 120, 124 (opinion by MARY BETH KELLY, J.).9 The Court explained that "because the claim of a false confession is beyond the common knowledge of the ordinary person, expert testimony about this phenomenon is admissible under MRE 702 when it meets the other requirements of MRE 702." Id. at 129 (emphasis added). The Court then assessed whether the specific expert testimony proffered in that case was sufficiently reliable to be admitted at trial and affirmed the trial court's conclusion that it was not. Id. at 131-135.
Like testimony regarding false confessions, the type of testimony addressed in Peterson may, as a threshold matter, explain "human behavior that is contrary to the average person's commonsense assumptions." Kowalski, 492 Mich at 123-124 (opinion by MARY BETH KELLY, J.), citing Peterson, 450 Mich at 363. But it does not inexorably follow that the specific expert or testimony offered is sufficiently reliable to be presented to a jury in a particular case. As other members of this Court have noted, the scientific community and courts in other states have questioned the validity, reliability, and admissibility of at least some aspects of expert testimony premised upon CSAAS. See People v Jackson, ___ Mich ___, ___; 11 NW3d 515, 519 (2024) (WELCH, J., dissenting); People v Mejia, 505 Mich 963, 963-964 (2020) (MCCORMACK, C.J., dissenting). If not addressed by this Court, the existing caselaw could inhibit the development of the factual record necessary to assess the reliability of such testimony, thereby precluding Michigan from "join[ing] the CSAAS conversation." People v Muniz, 513 Mich 893, 893 (2023) (CAVANAGH, J., concurring) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
9 While only two other justices joined in full Justice MARY BETH KELLY's lead opinion, a majority of the Court agreed with the substance of that opinion. See Kowalski, 492 Mich at 144-146 (CAVANAGH, J., concurring).
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I, Larry S. Royster, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. May 2, 2025
p0429
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Clerk I concur in the Court's denial order because this case does not squarely present these important issues.10But like my colleagues who have written on this previously, I believe there are unresolved questions regarding Peterson and CSAAS testimony that this Court should consider in an appropriate case.
10 The record presented to us provides limited information regarding the scope and underlying basis for Welke's proposed testimony. The trial court's order denying defendant's motion in limine states that Welke's testimony is limited to "delayed disclosure and the process of disclosure . . . ." It therefore appears that her testimony at defendant's upcoming trial will be limited to behavior related to disclosure and will not include other purportedly common behaviors of child victims that are sometimes offered in CSAAS testimony. See Peterson, 450 Mich at 371 n 11. Moreover, it does not appear that defendant's motion in limine requested that the trial court hold a Daubert hearing to assess Welke's proposed testimony.
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