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Perez, Manuel Javier
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
OF TEXAS
NO. WR-84,267-02 EX PARTE MANUEL JAVIER PEREZ, Applicant
ON APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
CAUSE NO. CR37715-B IN THE 385TH DISTRICT COURT
FROM MIDLAND COUNTY
Per curiam.
O R D E R
A jury found Applicant guilty of two counts of aggravated sexual assault of a child and one count of indecency with a child by contact. It assessed prison terms. The Eleventh Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions in an unpublished decision. See Perez v. State, No. 11-11-00247-CR (Tex. App.—Eastland del. Sep. 30, 2013). Applicant, through counsel, filed this subsequent application for a writ of habeas corpus in the county of conviction, and the district clerk forwarded it to this Court. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 11.07.
Applicant raises two grounds for relief based on prosecutorial misconduct involving Ralph Petty's dual employment as both an assistant district attorney and a law clerk for the trial court judge.
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The claims are newly available to Applicant since the date this Court denied Applicant's initial habeas application. Applicant argues that Petty's dual role during the initial habeas corpus proceeding violated his due process rights. See Ex parte Young, No. WR-65,137-05 (Tex. Crim. App. del. Sep. 22, 2021) (not designated for publication). This Court has independently reviewed the claims Applicant raised in his initial habeas application. See, e.g., Ex parte Benavides, No. WR-81,593-01 (Tex. Crim. App. del. Sep. 21, 2022) (not designated for publication). They lack merit and do not demonstrate entitlement to habeas relief. Applicant also argues prosecutorial misconduct during his trial, claiming Petty assisted prosecutors with legal issues while simultaneously advising the trial court on those same matters. The trial court concluded that Applicant failed to meet his burden to prove that Petty actively participated as a prosecutor during the trial while also working for the judge. This Court agrees.
Applicant raises one ground claiming that the State violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), by failing to disclose material evidence regarding third-party DNA profiles. Suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused violates due process where evidence is material either to guilt or punishment, irrespective of the prosecution's good or bad faith. Applicant alleges that suppressed evidence reveals that DNA from at least three contributors was present on the victim. He further argues that this evidence contradicted the prosecution's narrative and supported Applicant's defense that the victim fabricated the allegations against him. The trial court found that this evidence was favorable and material. We disagree because, among other things, the exculpatory value of an unidentified third party's non-sperm DNA is insignificant compared with the inculpatory value of Applicant's sperm DNA recovered from the victim's thigh
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and anus. Relief is denied. Delivered: March 12, 2025 Do not publish
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