Golden v. Cox

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

Submitted March 5, 2025 ^[*]

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois. No. 19-cv-00855-RJD Reona J. Daly, Magistrate Judge.

Before MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge, CANDACE JACKSON-AKIWUMI, Circuit Judge, JOSHUA p. KOLAR, Circuit Judge.

ORDER

Eric Golden, a prisoner in the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC), sued three correctional officers for violating his rights under the First Amendment by disciplining him for discussing what he says was his religious group. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. A jury found in favor of the officers, and Golden appeals. We affirm because Golden did not preserve his challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, and the district court did not err in its evidentiary rulings or in the jury selection process.

While Golden was a prisoner at Pinckneyville Correctional Center in Pinckneyville, Illinois, he had several phone calls with a Chicago man named Daryl Abney throughout 2018. Abney was a suspected leader of the Gangster Stones, a criminal gang and faction of the Black P. Stone gang. Sometime in 2019, Ian Cox, an officer with IDOC's Intelligence Unit, flagged one of these phone calls for potential gang ("security threat group") activity. During that call, Golden and Abney discussed elevating someone to Assistant Grand Sheikh within the Moorish Hajars, an Islamic faith group. Cox believed that Golden was a member of the Black P. Stones and was discussing its leadership with Abney, so Cox wrote Golden a disciplinary ticket. Golden appealed, and Officers Charles Heck and Marcus Myers Sr. (members of the committee responsible for adjudicating disciplinary tickets at Pinckneyville) found that Golden engaged in prohibited gang activity. Golden was put in solitary confinement for four months as punishment.

Golden sued Cox, Heck, and Myers for violating his rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, arguing that the Moorish Hajars were a religious group and that the defendants had punished him for discussing his religion. The district court screened his complaint and allowed Golden to proceed with a claim of retaliation for engaging in activity protected by the First Amendment. After the district court denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment, the case proceeded to trial, with a magistrate judge presiding by the parties' consent under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).

During voir dire, the court allowed Golden's counsel to probe the potential jurors for bias against gang members and religious bias. No potential jurors stated that they would be biased because of their religious beliefs. Only one juror stated that he had a negative experience with gangs, and Golden struck that juror for cause. In total, five potential jurors were struck for cause, and each side used its three peremptory challenges. A six-person jury was seated.

At the trial, the jury heard testimony from Golden about his adherence to the Moorish Hajar religion and other Islamic faith groups. Golden testified that during his phone call with Abney, he was simply discussing elevating someone to a higher position within the Moorish Hajars to allow that person to lead religious services in the prison. Golden denied that he was a member of the Black P. Stones and admitted into evidence a charter of the Moorish Hajars to prove that the group was a religious organization and not a gang.

Cox testified next. He stated that he was a "Black P. Stone specialist" and had identified Golden as a member of the Black P. Stones and Abney as a member of the Gangster Stones. Cox believed that Golden and Abney were discussing elevating someone within the Black P. Stones, not a religious group. He also testified that he was unfamiliar with the Moorish Hajars and was unaware of Golden's religion when he wrote the disciplinary ticket. Cox testified that the Intelligence Unit views the Black P. Stones as a gang that uses the trappings and terminology of Islamic faith groups to mask gang activity. Heck and Myers also testified that they believed that Golden and Abney were discussing gang activity and that they were unfamiliar with the Moorish Hajars. Both also said that they did not believe that Golden discussed religion at all on the phone call.

The court instructed the jury that, to succeed, Golden needed to show that the defendants intentionally disciplined him because he discussed his religion on the call with Abney. The jury found for the defendants. Golden did not move for judgment as a matter of law at the close of evidence or after the verdict. He now appeals.

Golden first argues that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence. But he did not file a post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and therefore failed to preserve a sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge for appellate review. See Collins v. Lochard, 792 F.3d 828, 831 (7th Cir. 2015).

Next, Golden challenges the admission of a Moorish Hajar charter he was unfamiliar with, and he alleges that the defense withheld or destroyed two pieces of evidence (an internal affairs interview with Golden after he witnessed excessive force, and a "kite" found inside of Golden's cell). As to the first argument, Golden did not object to the admission of the charter and therefore forfeited any challenge. See Wilson v. City of Chi., 758 F.3d 875, 885 (7th Cir. 2014). And he has not shown that extraordinary circumstances exist for allowing plain-error review under Rule 103(e) of the Federal Rules of Evidence. See Walker v. Groot, 867 F.3d 799, 803 (7th Cir. 2017). In any case, at trial only one charter was presented, and it was identified by Golden and admitted without objection as Plaintiff's Exhibit 12. Golden cannot argue that he was prejudiced by his own evidence, offered to show that the Moorish Hajars were a religious group. See Rainey v. Taylor, 941 F.3d 243, 251 (7th Cir. 2019) (discussing FED. R. EVID. 403).

With respect to the missing evidence, Golden's argument is waived. He did not move to compel production of these items during discovery, seek a discovery sanction, or ask for an adverse-inference jury instruction on the basis of spoliation. We will not review an evidentiary issue that is raised for the first time on appeal. See Bracey v. Grondin, 712 F.3d 1012, 1020 (7th Cir. 2013). Further, Golden provides no support for his assertion that any evidence was withheld or destroyed, let alone intentionally and in bad faith. See Downing v. Abbott Lab'ys, 48 F.4th 793, 812 (7th Cir. 2022).

Golden further contends that the jurors had an inherent bias against "Islamic religions" and possible gang members. But Golden did not raise any concerns of jury bias in the district court or object during voir dire when the district court offered the parties an opportunity to express concerns or identify problems. He has thus waived his jury-bias argument. Ammons-Lewis v. Metro. Water Reclamation Dist. of Greater Chi., 488 F.3d 739, 744 (7th Cir. 2007). Regardless, during voir dire, the district court allowed Golden's counsel to probe the potential jurors for bias against gang members or bias based on the jurors' religious beliefs. No jurors expressed that they would be biased because of their religious beliefs. One juror stated that he had a negative experience with gangs, and the court struck that juror for cause. Thus Golden lacks evidence that the verdict for the defendants was a product of inherent bias.

Lastly, Golden argues that the jury composed of "all white Christians" was not a jury of his peers. Golden, however, never previously raised any issue about the jury's composition. To preserve this argument, he had to object before the jury was sworn and the venire was dismissed, see Lisle v. Welborn, 933 F.3d 705, 714-715 (7th Cir. 2019), and he did not. Regardless, a litigant does not have a right to a petit jury of his peers, only a right to a jury venire that represents a cross-section of the community. Marshall v. City of Chi., 762 F.3d 573, 578 (7th Cir. 2014). Golden did not timely object to the makeup of the venire, see 28 U.S.C. § 1867(c), (e), and on appeal he does not point to anything in the record to suggest that the jury pool was tainted.

AFFIRMED

[*] We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not significantly aid the court. FED. R. APP. p. 34(a)(2)(C).