White v. TitleMax of Va., Inc.

PER CURIAM:

UNPUBLISHED

Submitted: April 25, 2024

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Loretta C. Biggs, District Judge. (1:19-cv-00489-LCB-JLW)

ON BRIEF:

Anthony J. Durone, Lauren Tallent, BERKOWITZ OLIVER LLP, Kansas City, Missouri, for Appellants.

Andrew H. Brown, James R. Faucher, BROWN, FAUCHER, PERALDO &BENSON, PLLC, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellees.

Before KING, THACKER, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.

Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Appellants TitleMax of Virginia, Inc., and TitleMax of South Carolina, Inc. ("TitleMax"), appeal the district court's orders granting Appellees' applications under Section 9 of the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (FAA), to confirm arbitration awards. On appeal, TitleMax argues the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter the judgments confirming Appellees' arbitration awards because Appellees' Section 9 applications did not identify an independent basis for the court's jurisdiction. We agree.

In Badgerow v. Walters, 596 U.S. 1 (2022), the Supreme Court held that, in contrast to the method for determining a district court's jurisdiction over a motion to compel arbitration under Section 4 of the FAA, there must be "an independent jurisdictional basis" for a district court to confirm or vacate an arbitration award under Section 9 or 10, id. at 4 (internal quotation marks omitted), that is apparent from "the application actually submitted to" the court, id. at 5. As we recently explained, this is true regardless of whether the relevant application was a "freestanding application[]" or was "filed after arbitration in a previously stayed action." SmartSky Networks, LLC v. DAG Wireless, LTD., 93 F.4th 175, 184 (4th Cir. 2024). Rather, "all Section 9 and 10 applications must have an independent jurisdictional basis clear on the face of the application." Id.

The Section 9 applications at issue in this case did not identify a basis for the district court's jurisdiction. The applications did not identify a non-FAA basis for federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. They did not suggest that the amount in controversy was above the $75,000 threshold necessary for the district court to have diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. And they did not invoke the district court's supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 or identify any other basis for the court's jurisdiction. Because "a court may look only to the application actually submitted to it in assessing its jurisdiction," Badgerow, 596 U.S. at 5 (emphasis added), the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to grant Appellees' Section 9 applications.

Accordingly, we vacate the district court's judgments and remand to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

VACATED AND REMANDED