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State v. Biggs
SKLAR, JUDGE
Not for Publication - Rule 111(c), Rules of the Arizona Supreme Court
Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County No. CR2021125398001 The Honorable Jennifer C. Ryan-Touhill, Judge
Kristin K. Mayes, Arizona Attorney General Alice M. Jones, Deputy Solicitor General/Section Chief of Criminal Appeals By Amy Pignatella Cain, Assistant Attorney General, Tucson Counsel for Appellee
Stephen L. Duncan, Scottsdale Counsel for Appellant
Judge Sklar authored the decision of the Court, in which Vice Chief Judge Staring and Judge O'Neil concurred.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
SKLAR, JUDGE
¶ 1 Michael Biggs appeals his conviction for molestation of a child. He argues that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of prior sexual acts he committed against children. We find no abuse of discretion, so we affirm Biggs's conviction.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
¶ 2 We view the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the jury's verdict and resolve all reasonable inferences against Biggs. See State v. Fierro, 254 Ariz. 35, ¶ 2 (2022). In 2020, Biggs was living with A.S., her sister, and their mother. A.S. was eight years old. Although A.S. typically slept downstairs, Biggs called her one night to go upstairs and lay down on the bed. She did so, then Biggs laid down behind her. She felt "his balls" on the back of her legs. She also told a detective that she had "felt [Biggs's] pee pee." A.S.'s mother testified that A.S. had told her that she had "felt something hard."
¶ 3 In July 2021, Biggs was indicted on four counts. The first count, molestation of a child, concerned his conduct in the bedroom with A.S. The remaining three counts alleged child abuse arising from other conduct with A.S. and her sister. Biggs was tried in October 2022. The jury found him guilty of the child-molestation count and not guilty of the remaining counts. The jury also found four aggravating factors. Biggs was sentenced to thirty years in prison. This appeal followed.
OTHER-ACT EVIDENCE
¶ 4 Before trial, the court granted the state's motion to admit other-act evidence under Rule 404(b) and (c). We review the trial court's admission of other-act evidence for an abuse of discretion. See State v. Scott, 243 Ariz. 183, ¶ 14 (App. 2017).
¶ 5 Rule 404(b) allows courts to admit evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts for a permitted purpose. Ariz. R. Evid. 404(b)(2). The rule provides a non-exhaustive list of such purposes, including to show motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. Scott, 243 Ariz. 183, ¶ 14. In evaluating evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts under Rule 404(b), a court must find: (1) clear and convincing proof that the defendant committed the act; (2) the act is offered for a proper purpose; (3) the act is relevant to prove that purpose; and (4) the act has sufficient probative value as not to be substantially outweighed by undue prejudice. State v. Escalante-Orozco, 241 Ariz. 254, ¶ 77 (2017), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Escalante, 245 Ariz. 135, ¶¶ 15, 41 (2018).
¶ 6 In cases involving sexual offenses, Rule 404(c) also allows "evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts [to] be admitted by the court if relevant to show that the defendant had a character trait giving rise to an aberrant sexual propensity to commit the offense charged." Before admitting such evidence, the trial court must find: (1) "clear and convincing evidence supports a finding that the defendant committed the other act," (2) "commission of the other act provides a reasonable basis to infer that the defendant had a character trait giving rise to an aberrant sexual propensity to commit the charged sexual offense," and (3) "the evidentiary value of proof of the other act is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or other factors mentioned in Rule 403." State v. Aguilar, 209 Ariz. 40, ¶ 30 (2004). Unfair prejudice is an "undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, such as emotion, sympathy or horror." State v. Mott, 187 Ariz. 536, 545 (1997). In making an unfair-prejudice determination, the court must make specific findings, including on the factors listed in Rule 404(c)(1)(C). Ariz. R. Evid. 404(c)(1)(D).
¶ 7 In this case, the other-act evidence came through the testimony of two victims. First was L.S., the victim of an incident in May 1991, when she was around three years old. Biggs had been an upstairs neighbor when L.S. lived at an apartment complex in Mesa. At trial, L.S. testified that after she had used the bathroom in Biggs's apartment, Biggs unzipped her clothes, propped her legs over her head, put his mouth on her vagina, and licked her. He engaged in similar conduct one additional time, after L.S. told him not to lick. L.S. told her mother about the incidents, and they moved away. For this conduct, Biggs was convicted of two counts of attempted sexual conduct with a minor and sentenced to thirty years in prison. He was released in 2017 after serving approximately twenty-three years.
¶ 8 The second other-act witness, C.G., testified that Biggs had been in a relationship with her mother decades earlier, when C.G. was a young child. C.G. had thought Biggs was her father, though her mother told her later that he was not. When C.G. was very young, Biggs engaged in conduct that she described at trial as including "blowing raspberries on my vagina" and "hovering me above his penis and touching my vagina with his penis." C.G. also recalled frequently waking up in Biggs's bed without her underwear on, despite knowing that she had gone to sleep in her own bed, wearing underwear. Biggs also masturbated onto his arm in front of her. Biggs was arrested for other conduct when C.G. was around seven years old, after which she had no contact with him.
¶ 9 On appeal, Biggs argues that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing L.S. and C.G. to testify about these acts. He focuses solely on undue prejudice and does not challenge the court's conclusion that the evidence satisfied the other requirements of Rule 404(b) and (c). He argues that the evidence suggested that the jury decide the case based on emotion, sympathy, or horror, because the other acts "were significantly more horrendous than the conduct" at issue. He points specifically to: (1) the fact that the other acts occurred decades ago; (2) L.S.'s and C.G.'s young ages when the conduct occurred, compared to A.S.'s age; and (3) the graphic nature of L.S.'s and C.G.'s testimony.
¶ 10 As to the decades that have passed, this fact relates to the "remoteness of the other act," which the trial court must consider under Rule 404(c)(1)(C). In general, "remoteness between the two incidents affects the weight to be given the testimony by the jury," though not the testimony's admissibility. State v. Van Adams, 194 Ariz. 408, ¶ 24 (1999). In addressing remoteness, the trial court recognized that although the acts occurred decades ago, the lengthy lapse in time was due to Biggs's incarceration, including from 1994 to approximately 2017. The court acted within its discretion in disregarding that time period, given that Biggs lacked the ability to offend while he was incarcerated. See State v. Williams, 209 Ariz. 228, ¶ 17 (App. 2004) ("[T]he trial court could properly determine that intervening periods of imprisonment tolled time.").
¶ 11 As to the comparative ages of the victims, this fact relates to the "similarity or dissimilarity of the other act," as well as "other similarities or differences." These are also factors under Rule 404(c)(1)(C). Biggs is correct that A.S. was older than L.S. and C.G. when Biggs committed the acts. But "exact replication" between the acts is not required-they must simply be "similar." State v. Lopez, 170 Ariz. 112, 117 (App. 1991); see also State v. Lehr, 227 Ariz. 140, ¶ 21 (2011) ("Acts need not be perfectly similar in order for evidence of them to be admitted under Rule 404."). Here, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the other acts were similar. In each case, the victims were female and pre-pubescent, and Biggs took advantage of positions of trust with their parents.
¶ 12 Finally, as to the graphic nature of L.S.'s and C.G.'s testimony, the testimony was graphic largely due to the nature of Biggs's conduct. Nothing about that testimony was unnecessarily inflammatory or emotional. Nor did the state improperly exploit that testimony. Its questions during the witnesses' testimony were direct, appropriate, and non-cumulative. Likewise, its references to L.S.'s and C.G.'s testimony in closing argument were measured. They were confined to the proper purposes of demonstrating that Biggs intended to commit the charged acts and had an "aberrant sexual propensity" to do so. See Ariz. R. Evid. 404(c)(1)(B); cf. State v. Salazar, 181 Ariz. 87, 92 (App. 1994) (concluding that Rule 404 evidence should have been excluded where "prosecution's conspicuous purpose with this evidence was to luxuriate in inflammatory detail and create overwhelming prejudice against defendant").
¶ 13 In addition, the jury was properly instructed about the limited purposes of the other-act evidence. Finally, the jury's acquittal of Biggs on three of the four counts suggests that it was not improperly influenced by the testimony. See State v. Stuard, 176 Ariz. 589, 600 (1993) (concluding that acquittal on some charges suggests that jury was not unfairly prejudiced by Rule 404(b) evidence).
DISPOSITION
¶ 14 We affirm Biggs's conviction.
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