Mason v. State

Sarah I. Wheelock, Judge

Hennepin County District Court File No. 27-CR-17-18221

Considered and decided by Larkin, Presiding Judge; Segal, Chief Judge; and Wheelock, Judge.

ORDER OPINION

Sarah I. Wheelock, Judge

BASED ON THE FILE, RECORD, AND PROCEEDINGS, AND BECAUSE:

1. In July 2017, police officers stopped appellant Paul Casey Mason for riding a bicycle on the sidewalk. After discovering an active warrant for Mason's arrest, the officers arrested and searched him, finding a syringe filled with a mixture containing methamphetamine. Respondent State of Minnesota charged Mason with felony fifth-degree controlled-substance possession.

2. Mason pleaded guilty as charged. He submitted a "Petition to Enter Plea of Guilty in Felony Case Pursuant to Rule 15." On the third page of the form, paragraph 20.a., which contains standardized text and blank lines to fill in any terms of the state's agreement in exchange for the plea, was crossed out. Beneath the blank lines was handwritten text stating, "straight plea to court." At a hearing in August 2017, the district court asked Mason if he intended to offer a straight plea, and he said, "Yes." Thereafter, the district court engaged Mason in a discussion on the record about a possible agreement. The district court then accepted Mason's guilty plea to the charge of felony fifth-degree controlled-substance possession and sentenced him to 13 months stayed for three years with a furlough to Park Avenue. Mason never appealed his conviction or sentence and was discharged from his sentence in May 2018.

3. More than four years later, in February 2023, Mason filed a motion to correct his sentence. Mason argued that, although he pleaded guilty to a felony-level charge, he had committed only a gross-misdemeanor-level offense because he had no previous similar offenses and he possessed a single syringe that constituted a single dosage unit within the meaning of Minn. Stat. § 152.025, subd. 4(a)(1) (2016), which sets forth circumstances under which fifth-degree controlled-substance possession constitutes a gross misdemeanor. The state responded that Mason's motion was an untimely request for postconviction relief because it challenged the validity of his plea and thus was not a proper motion to correct his sentence. The district court agreed with the state and construed the motion as a petition for postconviction relief. It then denied the request as untimely and did not reach the merits of Mason's arguments. Mason appeals.

4. Mason contends that the district court erred by denying his motion to correct his sentence. He asserts that because his motion to correct his sentence did not implicate his conviction, the district court erred in construing it as a time-barred petition for postconviction relief. We agree.

5. An individual can collaterally attack a sentence in two ways: (1) by filing a motion to correct a sentence under the Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure or (2) by filing a petition for postconviction relief under Minnesota Statutes chapter 590. Washington v. State, 845 N.W.2d 205, 210 (Minn.App. 2014). Under the Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure, "[t]he court may at any time correct a sentence not authorized by law." Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 9. We interpret rule 27.03, subdivision 9, narrowly so that it is used only to modify a sentence. State v. Coles, 862 N.W.2d 477, 480 (Minn. 2015). Any request for relief that impacts the underlying conviction or a plea agreement regarding the sentence to be imposed must be brought in a petition for postconviction relief under chapter 590. Id. at 480-82; see Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 1 (2022) (providing that "a person convicted of a crime who claims that[] the conviction obtained or the sentence or other disposition made violated the person's rights" may file a postconviction petition).

We cite the version of section 590.01 in effect at the time of Mason's postconviction proceedings because it sets forth the procedure to be followed in those proceedings.

6. To determine whether a request for relief is a motion to correct an unlawful sentence or a petition for postconviction relief, the district court must "look to the pleadings and the relief sought in order to determine the nature of a claim." Coles, 862 N.W.2d at 480. The substance of the request controls rather than the label a filing is given: "A motion to correct a sentence that in fact challenges the underlying conviction cannot circumvent the procedural requirements of the postconviction statute simply because a defendant labeled it differently." Bolstad v. State, 966 N.W.2d 239, 243 (Minn. 2021) (quotation omitted). And as the supreme court stated explicitly in Coles, "where the sentence at issue is imposed as part of a plea agreement, a motion to change that sentence impacts more than simply the sentence, and Rule 27.03 does not apply." 862 N.W.2d at 481.

7. In concluding that Mason's motion implicated more than his sentence, the district court first found that Mason's "felony conviction and sentence are the result of a plea agreement." Questions regarding the existence and terms of a plea agreement are questions of fact to be resolved by the district court. State v. Brown, 606 N.W.2d 670, 674 (Minn. 2000); cf. Morrisette v. Harrison Int'l Corp., 486 N.W.2d 424, 427 (Minn. 1992) (stating that the existence of a contract is a question of fact). We review a postconviction court's decision on a question of fact for clear error and will not reverse unless such findings "are not factually supported by the record." Riley v. State, 819 N.W.2d 162, 167 (Minn. 2012). "Findings of fact are clearly erroneous if, on the entire evidence, we are left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake occurred." State v. Andersen, 784 N.W.2d 320, 334 (Minn. 2010).

8. The district court found that, although characterized as a straight plea, "the record indicates that the parties reached a plea agreement as to the sentencing order." Specifically, the court found "that the parties had reached an agreement to thirteen months stayed for three years to the Commissioner of Corrections and that [Mason] would be furloughed to Park Avenue from the jail for 365 days." The record does not support these findings.

9. As noted above, Mason pleaded guilty to the sole charged offense and the guilty-plea petition he submitted did not indicate that the parties had reached any agreement as to the sentence and stated that it was a "straight plea to court." Moreover, the district court had asked Mason if his was a "straight plea," and Mason indicated that it was. Thereafter, the following exchange occurred:

THE COURT: All right. My understanding of the offer was 210 days to the workhouse, furlough, after Mr. Mason was to complete Telesis. Through some discussions with the Court, I've indicated that I would-Mr. Mason pled guilty, but I would stay all sentences.

The parties had agreed 13 months stays for three years to the Commissioner of Corrections. I would furlough him to Park Avenue from the jail and that there would be 365-day furlough, meaning Mr. Mason, if you didn't complete Park Avenue, there'd be something significantly-a significant-where you reached a level of significant violation that I could revoke the 365 days and send you to the workhouse.

MASON: Yes, sir.

There was no further discussion regarding any agreement with the state. After Mason entered his plea, the district court imposed a stayed 13-month sentence, ordered Mason to serve 365 days in the workhouse, and furloughed him to chemical dependency treatment at Park Avenue.

10. This record demonstrates that Mason and the state did not reach any agreement with regard to either his conviction or his sentence. Although it appears that the state had made an offer-for a stayed 13-month sentence, 210 days of workhouse time, and participation in a different chemical-dependency program-Mason elected to enter a "straight plea" only after "some discussions with the Court" during which it indicated that it "would stay all sentences." The record contains no indication that the state was involved in the discussion about the plea that occurred on the record between the district court and Mason, but a plea agreement must be made between the parties and cannot be made between a party and the court. And the district court stayed the workhouse time, which is different from the state's offer as described in the transcript. The district court thus departed from the state's offer, thereby making it a straight plea. Furthermore, the record shows that the sentence the district court imposed was not part of any plea agreement because it did not match what the record shows as the state's offer, and notwithstanding the change in terms, the district court did not ask the state if it had accurately recited the state's offer, and the state does not argue on appeal that it provided any consideration in exchange for Mason's plea by way of dismissed charges, a mitigated sentence, or forbearance on other prosecution. We therefore conclude that the district court clearly erred in finding that Mason's conviction and sentence were entered pursuant to a plea agreement.

11. The district court also construed Mason's request as a petition for postconviction relief because his argument regarding the definition of "dosage unit" "implicates [Mason's] plea agreement and the eventual felony conviction of a fifth-degree drug possession." We disagree.

12. First, as discussed above, because the district court did not convict and sentence Mason pursuant to any plea agreement with the state, the imposition of a gross-misdemeanor sentence in this case would not deprive the state of the benefit of any bargain to which it was a party. Second, in Coles, the supreme court indicated in a footnote that if the district court imposed an illegal sentence following a trial, rule 27 relief would remain available because "the conviction and sentence would not be interrelated in the way they are in Coles' case." 862 N.W.2d at 481 n.5. Mason's case presents the exact circumstance that the supreme court referenced. A defendant who enters a "straight plea" of guilty to the offense as charged with no agreement as to the sentence is identically situated to a defendant who is found guilty following a trial. Both the defendant and the state, in each case, will proceed to sentencing without entitlement to any particular sentence other than a legal one. And in each case, no alteration to the sentence will have any bearing on the validity of the conviction or the means by which it was procured. Accordingly, just as for a defendant found guilty following a trial, Mason's conviction for the offense in this matter is entirely independent of his sentence, and he is entitled to challenge its legality in a motion under rule 27.03, subdivision 9.

14. We conclude that the district court erred in construing appellant's motion for correction of his sentence as an untimely petition for postconviction relief. We therefore reverse the district court's order denying relief and remand for consideration of Mason's motion for correction of his sentence on its merits.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

1. The district court's order is reversed, and this matter is remanded to the district court with instructions to consider Mason's motion for correction of his sentence under Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 9, on its merits.

2. Pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c), this order opinion is nonprecedential, except as law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel.