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Doe v. Seattle Police Dep't
DWYER, J.
OPINION
DWYER, J.
"There are rights of constitutional stature whose exercise a State may not condition by the exaction of a price." Garrity v. State of New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 500, 87 S.Ct. 616, 17 L.Ed.2d 562 (1967). Among these are the rights guaranteed by the First Amendment to our federal constitution. Garrity, 385 U.S. at 500. Police officers "are not relegated to a watered-down version of [such] rights." Garrity, 385 U.S. at 500.
In this Public Records Act litigation, the trial court failed to heed this pronouncement. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's order requiring disclosure of certain unredacted records. We affirm the ancillary orders of the trial court and remand the matter for further proceedings.
I
Soon after the United States Supreme Court pronounced that police officers are not condemned to a "watered-down version" of core constitutional rights, the voters of our state passed by popular initiative the predecessor to Washington's Public Records Act (PRA). See Progressive Animal Welfare Soc'y v. Univ. of Wash., 125 Wn.2d 243, 250-52, 884 P.2d 592 (1994) (PAWS) (noting approval of the public disclosure act in November 1972). Thus, since the day of the enactment of our state's public records law, police officers in Washington have been entitled to the same federal constitutional protections as are all other Washingtonians. It is by adherence to this principle that we decide this case.
Ch. 42.56 RCW.
We are presented today with the question of whether the Seattle Police Department (SPD) and the City of Seattle (the City) may disclose in investigatory records the identities of current or former Seattle police officers who were investigated regarding potential unlawful or unprofessional conduct during the events of January 6, 2021, in Washington, D.C. John Does 1, 2, 4, and 5 (the Does) sought judicial declaratory and injunctive relief after being informed that SPD, their employer, intended to publicly disclose the unredacted investigatory records in response to several PRA requests. Investigators have determined that allegations against the Does of unlawful or unprofessional conduct were "not sustained." The Does contend that their identities should thus not be disclosed in the requested records, which include transcripts of interviews in which they were compelled to disclose and discuss their political beliefs and affiliations.
The trial court denied the Does' motion for a preliminary injunction, concluding that the exceptions to permitted disclosure set forth in the PRA are inapplicable. The Does appealed from the trial court's order. In addition, Sam Sueoka, a member of the public who filed a records request to obtain copies of the investigatory records, cross appealed, asserting that the trial court erred by permitting the Does to proceed pseudonymously in this litigation.
The United States Supreme Court has recognized a First Amendment right to privacy that protects against state action compelling disclosure of political beliefs and associations. Thus, only if the state actor (here, the City) demonstrates a compelling interest in disclosure, and that interest is sufficiently related to the disclosure, can the state actor lawfully disclose the Does' identities in the investigatory records. Because there is here established no compelling state interest in disclosing the Does' identities, the trial court erred by denying the Does' motion for a preliminary injunction.
The trial court properly concluded, however, that the Does should be permitted to use pseudonyms in litigating this action. Because the Does assert a First Amendment privacy right, it is federal constitutional law-not state law-that controls their request to litigate pseudonymously. Pursuant to federal First Amendment open courts jurisprudence, plaintiffs may litigate using pseudonyms in circumstances wherein the injury sought to be prevented by prevailing in the lawsuit would necessarily be incurred as a result of the compelled disclosure of the plaintiffs' identities, required as a condition of commencing the very lawsuit in which vindication of the constitutional right is sought. Accordingly, the Does may remain anonymous in this action.
II
The Does are current or former SPD officers who attended former President Donald Trump's "Stop the Steal" political rally on January 6, 2021 in Washington, D.C. Upon returning to Washington State, the Does received complaints from SPD's Office of Police Accountability (the OPA) alleging that they might have violated the law or SPD policies during their attendance at the rally.
John Doe 1 resigned from SPD in December 2021 "as a direct result of the pressure" from the investigation and "public backlash arising" therefrom, as well as his concern "over retribution" from the incident.
The Does thereafter submitted to OPA interviews in which they were "ordered to answer all questions asked, truthfully and completely," and informed that "failure to do so may result in discipline up to and including termination." In addition to inquiring regarding the Does' whereabouts and activities on January 6, the OPA also inquired regarding their political beliefs and associations, including whether they attended the rally "to articulate [their] political views," whether they were "affiliated with any political groups," and "[their] impressions of, and reactions to, the content of the Rally." Because the Does were under standing orders to do so, they answered these questions "truthfully and as completely as possible."
Sueoka and other members of the public submitted records requests pursuant to the PRA, chapter 42.56 RCW, seeking disclosure of the investigatory records pertaining to police officers who participated in the events of January 6, 2021, in our nation's capital. In response to the records requests, SPD informed the Does that it intended to disclose both records regarding its ongoing investigation and the Does' personnel files.
On February 23, 2021, the Does filed a complaint for declaratory relief and preliminary and permanent injunction in the trial court. They concurrently filed a motion for permission to proceed pseudonymously and a motion for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and order to show cause why the preliminary injunction should not issue.
The complaint was filed by Jane and John Does, 1 through 6. Jane Doe 1 and John Doe 3 are not parties in this appeal. While litigation was ongoing in the trial court, the OPA determined that Jane Doe 1 and John Doe 3 had violated both the law and SPD policies on January 6, 2021, and their employment by SPD was terminated.
On February 24, 2021, the trial court granted the Does' motion for a TRO, enjoining production of the requested records until a show cause hearing was held. On March 9, 2021, the trial court granted the Does' motion to proceed pseudonymously, ruling that the order would "remain in effect at least until the merits of Plaintiffs' PRA claims are resolved."
Following the show cause hearing, held on March 10, 2021, the trial court denied the Does' motion for a preliminary injunction. The Does sought review of the trial court's ruling in this court, and review was granted. Sueoka thereafter moved to transfer the cause to our Supreme Court. Then, on June 28, 2021, the OPA concluded its investigation. The OPA determined that allegations that the presently-litigating Does had violated the law or SPD policies or had engaged in unprofessional conduct were "not sustained."
On August 4, 2021, our Supreme Court granted Sueoka's motion to transfer the cause to that court. However, following oral argument on November 9, 2021, the court determined that, "in light of changed circumstances," review of the preliminary injunction was moot. The court dismissed review of the matter and remanded the cause to the trial court for further proceedings.
The trial court proceedings at issue herein then commenced. On January 5, 2022, Sueoka filed a "motion to change the case title and bar the use of pseudonyms." On January 12, 2022, the Does filed an additional motion for a preliminary injunction, again requesting that the trial court redact their identities in any disclosed records.
Jane Doe 1 and John Doe 3 were no longer parties at that point in the litigation. Accordingly, the motion was filed by the "Represented Doe Plaintiffs," who are the same individuals as the Does in this appeal.
Following a January 28, 2022 hearing, the trial court again denied the Does' motion for a preliminary injunction, ruling that the Does had not "met their burden of proof that they have a privacy right that falls within an exemption under the [PRA]." The court additionally concluded that the record contains "insufficient evidence" that disclosure will cause the Does to "experience a level of harassment that will result in a chilling effect on their First Amendment rights." The trial court also denied Sueoka's motion to preclude the Does from proceeding in pseudonym.
The Does appeal from the trial court's order denying their motion for a preliminary injunction. Sueoka cross appeals, asserting that the trial court erred by denying his "motion to change the case title and bar the use of pseudonyms." Sueoka also requests that we change the case title and bar the use of pseudonyms in this appeal.
III
The Does assert that the trial court erred by determining that they were unlikely to succeed on the merits of their claim that their identities are exempt from disclosure in the requested records and, accordingly, denying their motion for a preliminary injunction precluding such disclosure. We agree. The First Amendment, made applicable to the states though the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 45 S.Ct. 625, 69 L.Ed. 1138 (1925), confers a right to privacy in one's political beliefs and associations that may be impinged only on the basis of a subordinating state interest that is compelling.
Our Supreme Court's decisional authority, the profusion of legislatively enacted exceptions to disclosure, and the policy underlying the PRA indicate that there is no compelling state interest in disclosing to the public the identities of public employees against whom unsustained allegations of wrongdoing have been made. Therefore, we hold that the trial court erred by denying the Does' request for a preliminary injunction precluding disclosure of their names and other identifying information in the requested records.
A
1
The party seeking an injunction pursuant to the PRA has the burden of proof. Lyft, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 190 Wn.2d 769, 791, 418 P.3d 102 (2018). When a party seeks a preliminary injunction or a TRO, "the trial court need not resolve the merits of the issues." Seattle Children's Hosp. v. King County, 16 Wn.App. 2d 365, 373, 483 P.3d 785 (2020). "Instead, the trial court considers only the likelihood that the moving party ultimately will prevail at a trial on the merits." SEIU Healthcare 775NW v. Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs., 193 Wn.App. 377, 392-93, 377 P.3d 214 (2016).
We stand in the same position as the trial court when, as here, "the record consists of only affidavits, memoranda of law, and other documentary evidence, and where the trial court has not seen or heard testimony requiring it to assess the witnesses' credibility or competency." Bainbridge Island Police Guild v. City of Puyallup, 172 Wn.2d 398, 407, 259 P.3d 190 (2011). "Whether requested records are exempt from disclosure presents a legal question that is reviewed de novo." Wash. Pub. Emps. Ass'n v. Wash. State Ctr. for Childhood Deafness & Hearing Loss, 194 Wn.2d 484, 493, 450 P.3d 601 (2019).
2
"The PRA ensures the sovereignty of the people and the accountability of the governmental agencies that serve them by providing full access to information concerning the conduct of government." Predisik v. Spokane Sch. Dist. No. 81, 182 Wn.2d 896, 903, 346 P.3d 737 (2015). Its basic purpose "is to provide a mechanism by which the public can be assured that its public officials are honest and impartial in the conduct of their public offices." Cowles Publ'g Co. v. State Patrol, 109 Wn.2d 712, 719, 748 P.2d 597 (1988). To that end, the act requires state and local agencies to "make available for public inspection and copying all public records," unless the record falls within a specific exemption in the PRA or an "other statute which exempts or prohibits disclosure of specific information or records." RCW 42.56.070(1).
We have interpreted the "other statute" provision to incorporate exemptions set forth not only in other legislative enactments, but also those deriving from the state or federal constitutions. Wash. Fed'n of State Emps., Council 28 v. State, 22 Wn.App. 2d 392, 511 P.3d 119 (2022), review granted, 200 Wn.2d 1012, 519 P.3d 585 (2022); see also White v. Clark County, 188 Wn.App. 622, 354 P.3d 38 (2015). Although our Supreme Court has not directly held that RCW 42.56.070(1)'s "other statute" provision incorporates constitutional protections against disclosure, the court has acknowledged that such an argument "has force." Yakima County v. Yakima Herald-Republic, 170 Wn.2d 775, 808, 246 P.3d 768 (2011) (addressing the argument that provisions of the United States Constitution qualify as "other statutes").
Moreover, the high court has recognized that, even absent legislative incorporation of constitutional guarantees in the PRA, Washington courts must nevertheless protect such rights. Seattle Times Co. v. Serko, 170 Wn.2d 581, 594-96, 243 P.3d 919 (2010). In the context of fair trial rights, the court explained that while "[t]here is no specific exemption under the PRA that mentions the protection of an individual's constitutional fair trial rights, . . . courts have an independent obligation to secure such rights." Seattle Times Co., 170 Wn.2d at 595. Indeed, because "the constitution supersedes contrary statutory laws, even those enacted by initiative," "the PRA must give way to constitutional mandates." Freedom Found. v. Gregoire, 178 Wn.2d 686, 695, 310 P.3d 1252 (2013).
In addition to setting forth exemptions to the mandate for disclosure of public records, the PRA includes an injunction provision stating that disclosure may be enjoined only when "examination would clearly not be in the public interest and would substantially and irreparably damage any person, or would substantially and irreparably damage vital governmental functions." RCW 42.56.540. Based on this statutory provision, our Supreme Court has held that "finding an exemption applies under the PRA does not ipso facto support issuing an injunction." Lyft, 190 Wn.2d at 786. Rather, for the disclosure of records to be precluded due to a statutory exemption, the court has held that the PRA's standard for injunctive relief must also be met. Morgan v. City of Federal Way, 166 Wn.2d 747, 756-57, 213 P.3d 596 (2009); see also Soter v. Cowles Publ'g Co., 162 Wn.2d 716, 757, 174 P.3d 60 (2007) (plurality opinion) ("[T]o impose the injunction contemplated by RCW 42.56.540, the trial court must find that a specific exemption applies and that disclosure would not be in the public interest and would substantially and irreparably damage a person or a vital government interest.").
3
Our analysis of the issues presented relies on the holdings of our nation's highest court establishing that the First Amendment to the United States Constitution confers a privacy right in an individual's political beliefs and associations. Accordingly, we must explore the decisional authority establishing the contours of that right.
The United States Supreme Court has recognized "political freedom of the individual" to be "a fundamental principle of a democratic society." Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250, 77 S.Ct. 1203, 1 L.Ed.2d 1311 (1957). "Our form of government," the Court explained, "is built on the premise that every citizen shall have the right to engage in political expression and association," a right "enshrined in the First Amendment." Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 250. Indeed, "[i]n the political realm . . . thought and action are presumptively immune from inquisition by political authority." Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 266. Thus, the federal constitution protects not only the right of individuals to engage in political expression and association, but also to maintain their privacy in so doing.
See also Gibson v. Florida Legis. Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 570, 83 S.Ct. 889, 9 L.Ed.2d 929 (1963) (Douglas, J., concurring) ("'The First Amendment in its respect for the conscience of the individual honors the sanctity of thought and belief. To think as one chooses, to believe what one wishes are important aspects of the constitutional right to be let alone.'" (quoting Pub. Utils. Comm'n of Dist. of Columbia v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 468, 72 S.Ct. 813, 96 L.Ed. 1068 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting))).
Indeed, the Court has "repeatedly found that compelled disclosure, in itself, can seriously infringe on privacy of association and belief guaranteed by the First Amendment." Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64, 96 S.Ct. 612, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976) (citing Gibson v. Florida Legis. Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 83 S.Ct. 889, 9 L.Ed.2d 929 (1963); Nat'l Ass'n for Advancement of Colored People v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 83 S.Ct. 328, 9 L.Ed.2d 405 (1963); Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 80 S.Ct. 412, 4 L.Ed.2d 480 (1960); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 81 S.Ct. 247, 5 L.Ed.2d 231 (1960); Nat'l Ass'n for Advancement of Colored People v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 78 S.Ct. 1163, 2 L.Ed.2d 1488 (1958) (NAACP)); see also Doe v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 232, 130 S.Ct. 2811, 177 L.Ed.2d 493 (2010) (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("This Court has long recognized the 'vital relationship between' political association 'and privacy in one's associations,' and held that '[t]he Constitution protects against the compelled disclosure of political associations and beliefs.'" (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting NAACP, 357 U.S. at 462; Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Comm. (Ohio), 459 U.S. 87, 91, 103 S.Ct. 416, 74 L.Ed.2d 250 (1982))). Thus, the Court has recognized a "pervasive right of privacy against government intrusion" that is "implicit in the First Amendment." Gibson, 372 U.S. at 569-70 (Douglas, J., concurring). This "tradition of anonymity in the advocacy of political causes . . . is perhaps best exemplified by the secret ballot, the hard-won right to vote one's conscience without fear of retaliation." McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 343, 115 S.Ct. 1511, 131 L.Ed.2d 426 (1995); see also Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 266 ("It cannot require argument that inquiry would be barred to ascertain whether a citizen had voted for one or the other of the two major parties either in a state or national election.").
The Supreme Court's jurisprudence regarding this constitutional right to privacy evolved in response to legislative investigations seeking to compel the disclosure of individuals' political beliefs. In the 1950s, the Court considered the constitutional limits of legislatures' authority to inquire into belief and activity deemed to be subversive to federal or state governments. Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72, 79 S.Ct. 1040, 3 L.Ed.2d 1090 (1959); Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 77 S.Ct. 1173, 1 L.Ed.2d 1273 (1957); Sweezy, 354 U.S. 234; Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 73 S.Ct. 215, 97 L.Ed. 216 (1952). This "new kind of [legislative] inquiry unknown in prior periods of American history . . . involved a broad-scale intrusion into the lives and affairs of private citizens," Watkins, 354 U.S. at 195, thus requiring the Court to ensure that such inquiry did not "unjustifiably encroach upon an individual's right to privacy." Watkins, 354 U.S. at 198-99. In considering this "collision of the investigatory function with constitutionally protected rights of speech and assembly," Uphaus, 360 U.S. at 83 (Brennan, J., dissenting), the Court recognized the state interest in "self- preservation, 'the ultimate value of any society.'" Uphaus, 360 U.S. at 80 (quoting Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 509, 71 S.Ct. 857, 95 L.Ed. 1137 (1951)). However, the Court rejected any notion that exposure itself was a valid state interest:
We have no doubt that there is no congressional power to expose for the sake of exposure. The public is, of course, entitled to be informed concerning the workings of its government. That cannot be inflated into a general power to expose where the predominant result can only be an invasion of the private rights of individuals.Watkins, 354 U.S. at 200 (footnote omitted); see also Uphaus, 360 U.S. at 82 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (recognizing the "investigatory objective" therein to be "the impermissible one of exposure for exposure's sake"). The Watkins Court recognized the governmental intrusion resulting from such legislative inquiry, as well as the "disastrous" consequences that may ensue as a result of compelled disclosure of the individual's political beliefs.
The mere summoning of a witness and compelling him to testify, against his will, about his beliefs, expressions or associations is a measure of governmental interference. And when those forced revelations concern matters that are unorthodox, unpopular, or even hateful to the general public, the reaction in the life of the witness may be disastrous.354 U.S. at 197; see also Uphaus, 360 U.S. at 84 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[I]n an era of mass communications and mass opinion, and of international tensions and domestic anxiety, exposure and group identification by the state of those holding unpopular and dissident views are fraught with such serious consequences for the individual as inevitably to inhibit seriously the expression of views which the Constitution intended to make free.").
However, it is not only those individuals compelled to disclose their beliefs who may be impacted. To the contrary, the Court recognized an additional "more subtle and immeasurable effect upon those who tend to adhere to the most orthodox and uncontroversial views and associations in order to avoid a similar fate at some future time." Watkins, 354 U.S. at 197-98. Moreover, that the injury was not inflicted solely by government actors did not nullify the constitutional infirmity; rather, that the "impact [was] partly the result of non-governmental activity by private persons [could not] relieve the investigators of their responsibility for initiating the reaction." Watkins, 354 U.S. at 198.
The Supreme Court further defined this constitutional privacy interest in response to legislative action seeking to compel the disclosure of organizational membership. NAACP, 357 U.S. 449; Bates, 361 U.S. 516; Shelton, 364 U.S. 479; Gibson, 372 U.S. 539. In 1958, the Court considered whether Alabama could, consistent with our federal constitution, compel the NAACP to disclose its membership list to the Alabama Attorney General. NAACP, 357 U.S. at 451. "It is beyond debate," the Court held, "that freedom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the 'liberty' assured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which embraces freedom of speech." NAACP, 357 U.S. at 460. Although the state itself had "taken no direct action" in the challenged contempt judgment, the Court recognized that "abridgement of [First Amendment] rights, even though unintended, may inevitably follow from varied forms of governmental action." NAACP, 357 U.S. at 461. Indeed, "[t]he governmental action challenged may appear to be totally unrelated to protected liberties." NAACP, 357 U.S. at 461. Nevertheless, the Court held, the State could require disclosure of the membership lists only if there existed a "'subordinating interest of the State [that is] compelling.'" NAACP, 357 U.S. at 463 (quoting Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 265); see also Bates, 361 U.S. at 524 ("Where there is a significant encroachment upon personal liberty, the State may prevail only upon showing a subordinating interest which is compelling."). The Court concluded that it discerned no such state interest. NAACP, 357 U.S. at 464.
The Court again considered whether the First Amendment, incorporated through the due process clause, precluded the compelled disclosure of NAACP membership lists in Bates, 361 U.S. 516. There, the organization asserted the rights of its "'members and contributors to participate in the activities of the NAACP, anonymously, a right which has been recognized as the basic right of every American citizen since the founding of this country.'" Bates, 361 U.S. at 521. Again, the Court recognized that it was not simply a "heavy-handed frontal attack" against which First Amendment freedoms are protected, but "also from being stifled by more subtle governmental interference." Bates, 361 U.S. at 523. In concurrence, Justices Black and Douglas recognized that mere exposure by the government can impinge these constitutional protections. Bates, 361 U.S. at 528 (Black & Douglas, JJ., concurring). "First Amendment rights," the Justices recognized, "are beyond abridgement either by legislation that directly restrains their exercise or by suppression or impairment through harassment, humiliation, or exposure by government." Bates, 361 U.S. at 528 (Black & Douglas, JJ., concurring) (emphasis added). As in NAACP, the Bates Court discerned no sufficient state interest to compel the disclosure of the membership lists. 361 U.S. at 525.
That same year, the Court addressed the constitutionality of an Arkansas statute requiring public school teachers to disclose, as a condition of employment, all organizations with which they had been associated in the previous five years. Shelton, 364 U.S. 479. Recognizing the State's undoubtedly legitimate interest in investigating the fitness and competency of its teachers, the Court nevertheless observed that the statute's "scope of inquiry" was "completely unlimited." Shelton, 364 U.S. at 485, 488. Significantly, the statute would have required "a teacher to reveal the church to which he belongs, or to which he has given financial support. It [would have required] him to disclose his political party, and every political organization to which he may have contributed over a five-year period." Shelton, 364 U.S. at 488. This "comprehensive interference with associational freedom," the Court held, "goes far beyond what might be justified in the exercise of the State's legitimate inquiry into the fitness and competency of its teachers." Shelton, 364 U.S. at 490.
As in NAACP, the Supreme Court in Shelton again recognized that exposure by the State could impinge constitutional privacy rights. Because the Arkansas statute nowhere required confidentiality of the information involuntarily disclosed to the government, the Court considered that the teachers' religious, political, and other associational ties could additionally be disclosed to the public. Shelton, 364 U.S. at 486-87. The Court was clear that such an intrusion into the teachers' privacy would further impinge their constitutional rights. Such "[p]ublic exposure, bringing with it the possibility of public pressures upon school boards to discharge teachers who belong to unpopular or minority organizations, would simply operate to widen and aggravate the impairment of constitutional liberty." Shelton, 364 U.S. at 486-87.
Four Justices dissented in Shelton, disagreeing with the majority's holding that, under the circumstances presented, the extent of constitutional infringement resulting from compelled disclosure was sufficient to override the countervailing legitimate state interest. Nevertheless, even the dissenting opinions in Shelton recognized both the existence of a constitutional privacy interest and the potential for public exposure of associational ties to impinge upon those rights. For instance, Justice Frankfurter, distinguishing NAACP and Bates due to the absence of a legitimate state interest presented in those cases, recognized "that an interest in privacy, in non-disclosure, may under appropriate circumstances claim constitutional protection." Shelton, 364 U.S. at 490 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Similarly, Justice Harlan suggested that public disclosure of the teachers' associational ties, beyond simply the compelled disclosure to their school boards, might impinge their liberty rights: "I need hardly say that if it turns out that this statute is abused, either by an unwarranted publicizing of the required associational disclosures or otherwise, we would have a different kind of case than those presently before us." Shelton, 364 U.S. at 499 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
See Shelton, 364 U.S. at 496 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (concluding that "the disclosure of teachers' associations to their school boards" is not "without more, such a restriction upon their liberty . . . as to overbalance the State's interest in asking the question"); Shelton, 364 U.S. at 497 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (concluding that the statute's disclosure requirement "cannot be said to transgress the constitutional limits of a State's conceded authority to determine the qualifications of those serving it as teachers").
Three years later, the Court was "called upon once again to resolve a conflict between individual rights of free speech and association and governmental interest in conducting legislative investigations." Gibson, 372 U.S. at 543. There, a Florida legislative committee sought to subpoena NAACP membership lists, presumably to investigate suspected communist involvement. Gibson, 372 U.S. at 540-41. The Supreme Court again affirmed that such an investigation, "which intrudes into the area of constitutionally protected rights of speech, press, association and petition," is lawful only when the State can "convincingly show a substantial relation between the information sought and a subject of overriding and compelling state interest." Gibson, 372 U.S. at 546. The Court held that "all legitimate organizations are the beneficiaries of these protections," but noted that the protections "are all the more essential . . . where the challenged privacy is that of persons espousing beliefs already unpopular with their neighbors." Gibson, 372 U.S. at 556-57. In such circumstances, "the deterrent and 'chilling' effect on the free exercise of constitutionally enshrined rights of free speech, expression, and association is consequently the more immediate and substantial." Gibson, 372 U.S. at 557.
In the decades that have followed, the Supreme Court has continued to hold that First Amendment rights may be impinged when the government compels disclosure of political beliefs and associations. In 1982, the Court again affirmed that "[t]he Constitution protects against the compelled disclosure of political associations and beliefs." Brown, 459 U.S. at 91. "Such disclosures," the Court recognized, "'can seriously infringe on privacy of association and belief guaranteed by the First Amendment.'" Brown, 459 U.S. at 91 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 64). Again, the Court held that only by demonstrating a compelling interest can the State lawfully impinge such rights:
The right to privacy in one's political associations and beliefs will yield only to a "'subordinating interest of the State [that is] compelling,'" NAACP[, 357 U.S. at 463] (quoting Sweezy[, 354 U.S. at 265]) (opinion concurring in result), and then only if there is a "substantial relation between the information sought and [an] overriding and compelling state interest." Gibson[, 372 U.S. at 546].Brown, 459 U.S. at 91-92 (some alterations in original).
Over a decade later, in declaring unconstitutional an Ohio statute prohibiting the distribution of anonymous campaign literature, the Supreme Court once again "embraced [the] respected tradition of anonymity in the advocacy of political causes." McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 343 (citing Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 80 S.Ct. 536, 4 L.Ed.2d 559 (1960)); see also Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y of New York, Inc. v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 122 S.Ct. 2080, 153 L.Ed.2d 205 (2002) (recognizing a right to anonymity in declaring unconstitutional an ordinance requiring individuals to obtain and display a permit to engage in door-to-door advocacy). In McIntyre, the Court recognized the constitutional significance of "core political speech," describing the speech involved therein- the "handing out [of] leaflets in the advocacy of a politically controversial viewpoint"-as "the essence of First Amendment expression." 514 U.S. at 347. Acknowledging that the reasons for anonymity could be many,, the Court held that the freedom to remain anonymous, whether in "the literary realm" or "in the field of political rhetoric," "is an aspect of the freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment." McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 342-43. For Justice Stevens, writing in McIntyre, the value of anonymity in political speech could not be overstated:
"The decision in favor of anonymity," the Court noted, "may be motivated by fear of economic or official retaliation, by concern about social ostracism, or merely by a desire to preserve as much of one's privacy as possible." McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 341-42.
"Even the Federalist Papers, written in favor of the adoption of our Constitution, were published under fictitious names. It is plain that anonymity has sometimes been assumed for the most constructive purposes." Talley, 362 U.S. at 65.
Under our Constitution, anonymous pamphleteering is not a pernicious, fraudulent practice, but an honorable tradition of advocacy and of dissent. Anonymity is a shield from the tyranny of the majority. See generally J. Mill, On Liberty and Considerations on Representative Government 1, 3-4 (R. McCallum ed. 1947). It thus exemplifies the purpose behind the Bill of Rights, and of the First Amendment in particular: to protect unpopular individuals from retaliation-and their ideas from suppression-at the hand of an intolerant society.514 U.S. at 357.
For nearly a century, the rights afforded by the First Amendment have been protected against intrusion by the States as an "inseparable aspect of the 'liberty' assured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which embraces freedom of speech." NAACP, 357 U.S. at 460; see Gitlow, 268 U.S. 652. During this time, the Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that encompassed within this liberty interest is the right of individuals to privacy in their political beliefs and associations, wherein "thought and action are presumptively immune from inquisition by political authority." Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 266 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). This privacy interest "yield[s] only to a 'subordinating interest of the State [that is] compelling,' and then only if there is a 'substantial relation between the information sought and [an] overriding and compelling state interest.'" Brown, 459 U.S. at 91-92 (second and third alterations in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 265; Gibson, 372 U.S. at 546).
It is with cognizance of these principles that we consider whether SPD and the City may disclose the Does' identities in the investigatory records at issue.
B
The Does assert that the disclosure of their identities in the requested records will violate their First Amendment right to political anonymity. They contend that the trial court erred by determining that no constitutional privacy interest is implicated in this situation. We agree.
The parties' initial appellate briefing primarily concerns whether the Does are entitled to a preliminary injunction pursuant to statutory exemptions set forth in the PRA. However, the Does additionally contended that disclosure would violate their First Amendment rights. Following oral argument, the parties submitted supplemental briefing addressing this issue more thoroughly. Because the answer to the Does' request for a remedy is found in First Amendment jurisprudence, we need not address the parties' arguments regarding PRA statutory exemptions to disclosure.
Both the Does' attendance at the January 6 rally and their compelled statements to investigators implicate the First Amendment. Exposure by the government of this information, through disclosure of the unredacted requested records, would impinge the Does' constitutional right to anonymity in their political beliefs and associations.
Pursuant to United States Supreme Court decisional authority, the State must demonstrate that disclosure of the unredacted requested records would further a compelling state interest and that such disclosure is narrowly tailored to achieve that state interest. Because no compelling state interest exists to justify disclosure of the unredacted records, the Does are entitled to an injunction prohibiting exposure by the government of their identities.
1
The Does assert that disclosure of their identities in the requested records, both with regard to their attendance at the January 6 rally and their statements made to investigators concerning their political views and affiliations, will violate their First Amendment right to privacy. They aver that the trial court erred in two respects. First, the Does contend that the trial court erroneously concluded that, because the January 6 rally was a public event, the Does had no right to privacy in attending that event. Second, they argue that the trial court erred by concluding that they had not demonstrated a sufficient probability of a "chilling effect" on their constitutional rights to be entitled to the relief sought.
Sueoka contends, on the other hand, that the Does' attendance at the January 6 rally is not protected by a constitutional privacy right. He further contends that, even if disclosure of the Does' identities in the requested records implicates a First Amendment right, the Does relinquished that right by cooperating with the OPA's investigation. Finally, Sueoka asserts that the trial court properly determined that the Does have not shown a sufficient probability of harm to establish a constitutional right to privacy.
The Does' contentions, consistent as they are with United States Supreme Court decisional authority, are the more persuasive. We conclude that the Does have a First Amendment privacy right in their identities in the requested records.
(a)
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution, as incorporated through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, "protects against the compelled disclosure of political associations and beliefs." Brown, 459 U.S. at 91; see also Buckley, 424 U.S. at 64 (noting that the Court had "repeatedly found that compelled disclosure, in itself, can seriously infringe on privacy of association and belief guaranteed by the First Amendment"). Even when the State takes "no direct action" to abridge an individual's First Amendment rights, those rights may be impinged by "varied forms of governmental action" that "may appear to be totally unrelated to protected liberties." NAACP, 357 U.S. at 461. In other words, it is not solely a "heavy-handed frontal attack" by government that may abridge an individual's First Amendment rights; such constitutional transgression may also arise from "more subtle governmental interference." Bates, 361 U.S. at 523. Indeed, simple "exposure by government" may be sufficient to impinge such rights. Bates, 361 U.S. at 528.
Here, the trial court concluded, and Sueoka presently asserts, that the Does have no right to privacy in having attended a public political rally. The trial court reasoned:
Whether a person attended a public rally is not the type of intimate detail that courts in Washington have said should remain private. Washington courts have not previously found an inherent right to privacy in attendance at a public political rally. Attending a public rally is not an act that is inherently cloaked in privacy.
In so ruling, the court was clearly referring to Washington law concerning whether an individual has a statutory right to privacy pursuant to the PRA. We do not evaluate, however, whether disclosure of the Does' identities is precluded by a statutory right to privacy.
Because the PRA does not define "right to privacy," our Supreme Court adopted the common law tort definition of the term, which provides, in part, that the privacy right is implicated when the "'intimate details of [a person's] life are spread before the public gaze in a manner highly offensive to the ordinary reasonable [person].'" Hearst Corp. v. Hoppe, 90 Wn.2d 123, 136, 580 P.2d 246 (1978) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D, at 386 (Am. Law Inst. 1977)). The trial court referenced this language in ruling that the Does' attendance at the January 6 rally does not implicate a privacy right. Because, at common law, sovereign immunity precluded actions against the government, it comes as little surprise that in this case-wherein the actions of government are directly at issue-the answer is found not in the common law but in the First and Fourteenth Amendments- which are each solely directed at governmental action.
Rather, we conclude that, pursuant to United States Supreme Court decisional authority, the disclosure by the government of the Does' identities in the requested records would violate their federal constitutional right to anonymity in political belief and association. See, e.g., Watchtower Bible, 536 U.S. 150; McIntyre, 514 U.S. 334; Brown, 459 U.S. 87; Buckley, 424 U.S. 1; Gibson, 372 U.S. 539; Shelton, 364 U.S. 479; Talley, 362 U.S. 60; Bates, 361 U.S. 516; Uphaus, 360 U.S. 72; NAACP, 357 U.S. 449; Watkins, 354 U.S. 178; Sweezy, 354 U.S. 234; Wieman, 344 U.S. 183. Such governmental action would expose to the public not only records evidencing the Does' attendance at the January 6 rally, but also the transcripts of interviews in which the Does were compelled to "articulate [their] political views," discuss whether they were "affiliated with any political groups," and describe "[their] impressions of, and reactions to, the content of the Rally." The requested records thus implicate the Does' personal political views and their affiliations, if any, with political organizations. "It cannot require argument," the United States Supreme Court has stated, "that inquiry would be barred to ascertain whether a citizen had voted for one or the other of the two major parties either in a state or national election." Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 266. If such direct governmental action would impinge the Does' constitutional privacy interests, then so, too, does exposure by the government of that same information pursuant to a records request. See Bates, 361 U.S. at 523; NAACP, 357 U.S. at 461.
The trial court did not consider whether the Does' statements regarding their political beliefs and associations, compelled to be disclosed during the OPA investigation, implicated either a statutory or constitutional right to privacy. Instead, the court found that there was "no evidence . . . indicating whether the requested records sought contain explicit information about the Does' political beliefs or associations." The record does not support this finding. The Does' declarations state that each was "ordered to answer all questions asked, truthfully and completely, and that failure to do so may result in discipline up to and including termination." These questions included "why [they] attended" the rally, whether they attended "to articulate [their] political views," whether they were "showing support for a political group" or were "affiliated with any political groups," and what were their "impressions of, and reactions to, the content" of the rally. In their declarations, each of the Does stated: "Because I believed I was under a standing order to answer these personal questions, I did so truthfully and as completely as possible." These declarations are themselves evidence that the requested records contain statements regarding the Does' political beliefs and affiliations.
Sueoka nevertheless contends that our Supreme Court's decision in Spokane Police Guild v. Liquor Control Board, 112 Wn.2d 30, 769 P.2d 283 (1989), "puts to rest any claim" that the Does' attendance at the January 6 rally is protected by a constitutional privacy right. In that case, the court considered whether a statutory exemption precluded disclosure of an investigatory report that identified police officers who had attended a party on Spokane Police Guild Club premises. Spokane Police Guild, 112 Wn.2d at 31. The party, "variously referred to as a bachelor party, stag show and strip show," had been determined to violate regulations of the liquor board. Spokane Police Guild, 112 Wn.2d at 31. Our Supreme Court held that disclosure of the report would not violate the statutory right to privacy conferred by the statutory predecessor of the PRA. Spokane Police Guild, 112 Wn.2d at 37-38. Recognizing that this privacy right pertains "only to the intimate details of one's personal and private life," the court reasoned that there was "no personal intimacy involved in one's presence or conduct at such a well attended and staged event which would be either lost or diminished by being made public." Spokane Police Guild, 112 Wn.2d at 38.
Br. of Resp't/Cross Appellant at 31.
According to Sueoka, this holding compels the conclusion herein that the Does' attendance at the January 6 rally-occurring, as it did, in a public location-does not implicate a right to privacy. However, in so asserting, Sueoka confuses the statutory privacy right bestowed by the PRA with the constitutional privacy right deriving from the First Amendment. In Spokane Police Guild, the disclosure of the officers' political beliefs and associations was not at issue; accordingly, the court considered only whether a statutory exemption prohibited disclosure of the investigative report. 112 Wn.2d at 37-38. Moreover, in focusing solely on the Does' attendance at a public event, Sueoka disregards that disclosure of the requested records would additionally expose the Does' statements regarding their political beliefs and associations, which the Does were compelled to disclose during the OPA investigation. In short, Sueoka asserts that Washington Supreme Court decisional authority concerning a statutory right to privacy stemming from the common law of torts precludes a determination that a federal constitutional right prohibits disclosure by a government. This contention is wholly unavailing.
The Capitol Police issued six permits authorizing gatherings on January 6, 2021 on property under its control. Jason Leopold, The Capitol Police Granted Permits For Jan. 6 Protests Despite Signs That Organizers Weren't Who They Said They Were, Buzzfeed News (Sept. 17, 2021), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/jasonleopold/the-capitol-police-said-jan-6-unrest-on-capitol-grounds [https://perma.cc/LWM5-P3MN].
Sueoka additionally contends that the United States Supreme Court's decisional authority regarding the First Amendment right to political anonymity is inapposite because, he argues, the Does "cannot be compared to members of small and powerless political or religious groups," and are not "seeking anonymity from the government itself." Again, we disagree.
Br. of Resp't/Cross Appellant at 32.
Contrary to Sueoka's assertion, the United States Supreme Court has not limited the applicability of the First Amendment's privacy right to members of "small and powerless political or religious groups." To the contrary, the Court has recognized that "the deterrent and 'chilling' effect on the free exercise of constitutionally enshrined rights of free speech, expression, and association" is "the more immediate and substantial" when "the challenged privacy is that of persons espousing beliefs already unpopular with their neighbors." Gibson, 372 U.S. at 556-57. Nevertheless, the Court was clear that, "of course, all legitimate organizations are the beneficiaries of these protections." Gibson, 372 U.S. at 556. Moreover, the question is not whether an individual is a member of a "small and powerless" group, as Sueoka asserts, but whether the individual "espous[es] beliefs . . . unpopular with their neighbors," Gibson, 372 U.S. at 557, such that exposure of those beliefs could discourage the exercise of constitutional rights.
In Gibson, a Florida legislative committee sought to subpoena NAACP membership lists, 372 U.S. at 540-41, hence the Court's reference to "organizations." However, it was the constitutional rights of the individuals whose identities would be disclosed in the membership lists that was at issue. In any event, we see no reason to distinguish between "organizations" and individuals on this point.
Thus, it is the opprobrium that the community has for the individual's beliefs that is material to any "chilling effect" on constitutional rights. We are cognizant that, in the Seattle community, the Does would likely face opprobrium were their identities disclosed. This is likely notwithstanding the fact that the OPA investigation determined that any allegations of unlawful or unprofessional conduct against the Does were unsustained. We reach this conclusion with an awareness of the events of recent years, including the Department of Justice finding of the systemic use of excessive force by SPD officers (necessitating the federal district court's imposition of a consent decree), the horrific killing of George Floyd and other unarmed Black individuals throughout our country, and the eruption of protests, including in Seattle, in response to those incidents.Whether correctly or not, as Sueoka's briefing demonstrates, the Seattle community is likely to presume that the Does' attendance at the January 6 rally indicates that they are white supremacists who sought to undermine our nation's democracy. But whatever various individuals might infer, it remains true that all citizens, including public employees, may benefit from the constitutional right to privacy in their political beliefs espoused by our nation's highest court.
As discussed infra, case law does not support Sueoka's assertion that the Does were required to demonstrate a more substantial "chilling effect" to establish a First Amendment privacy right in the requested records.
In 2016, Donald Trump received 8 percent of the vote in Seattle precincts. Here's How Seattle Voters' Support for Trump Compared to Other Cities', Seattle Times (Nov. 17, 2016), https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/politics/heres-how-seattle-voters-support-for-trump-stacks-up-to-other-u-s-cities/ [https://perma.cc/4PNL-G68W]. In 2020, he again received 8 percent of the vote in Seattle. Danny Westneat, Don't Look Now, but Trump Did Better in Blue King County Than He Did the Last Time, Seattle Times (Nov. 11, 2020), https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/politics/dont-look-now-but-trump-did-better-in-blue-king-county-than-he-did-the-last-time/ [https://perma.cc/N8F8-TFHL].
Whether records are subject to disclosure must be determined without regard to the motivation of the records requestor. RCW 42.56.080 ("Agencies shall not distinguish among persons requesting records, and such persons shall not be required to provide information as to the purpose for the request except to establish whether inspection and copying would violate RCW 42.56.070(8) or 42.56.240(14), or other statute which exempts or prohibits disclosure of specific information or records to certain persons."); see also Livingston v. Cedeno, 164 Wn.2d 46, 53, 186 P.3d 1055 (2008) (holding that the Department of Corrections, in "its capacity as an agency subject to" the PRA, "must respond to all public disclosure requests without regard to the status or motivation of the requester"). However, when the impingement of constitutional protections for speech and association are at issue, it is clear that courts may consider the pertinent political and cultural atmosphere in determining whether exposure could discourage the exercise of First Amendment rights.
Concurring in Wieman, 344 U.S. at 193, Justice Black recognized the importance of ensuring that First Amendment protections are secured for all individuals:
Our own free society should never forget that laws which stigmatize and penalize thought and speech of the unorthodox have a way of reaching, ensnaring and silencing many more people than at first intended. We must have freedom of speech for all or we will in the long run have it for none but the cringing and the craven. And I cannot too often repeat my belief that the right to speak on matters of public concern must be wholly free or eventually be wholly lost.
As the Court has held, the mere compelling of an individual to disclose "beliefs, expressions or associations is a measure of governmental interference." Watkins, 354 U.S. at 197. When these "forced revelations concern matters that are unorthodox, unpopular, or even hateful to the general public, the reaction in the life of [that individual] may be disastrous." Watkins, 354 U.S. at 197; see also Uphaus, 360 U.S. at 84 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[E]xposure and group identification by the state of those holding unpopular and dissident views are fraught with such serious consequences for the individual as to inevitably inhibit seriously the expression of views which the Constitution intended to make free."). While we have no sympathy for those who sought to undermine our democracy on January 6, 2021, the fact here is that the allegations that the Does were engaged in unlawful or unprofessional conduct were not sustained. They did not forfeit their First Amendment rights.
As our nation's highest court long-ago made clear,
[a] final observation is in order. Because our disposition is rested on the First Amendment as absorbed in the Fourteenth . . . our decisions in the First Amendment area make[] plain that its protections would apply as fully to those who would arouse our society against the objectives of the petitioner. See, e.g., Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697[, 51 S.Ct. 625, 75 L.Ed. 1357 (1931)]; Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1[, 69 S.Ct. 894, 93 L.Ed. 1131(1949)];
Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290[, 71 S.Ct. 312, 95 L.Ed. 280 (1951)]. For the Constitution protects expression and association without regard to the race, creed, or political or religious affiliation of the members of the group which invokes its shield, or to the truth, popularity, or social utility of the ideas and beliefs which are offered.Button, 371 U.S. at 444-45.
Returning to Sueoka's contentions, we are similarly unpersuaded by his assertion that the Does cannot establish a First Amendment right to privacy because, according to him, they are not "seeking anonymity from the government itself." In fact, as Sueoka notes, the Does have already been compelled to disclose their political beliefs and associations to SPD and the City. However, the government need not take "direct action" in order to unlawfully impinge an individual's constitutional privacy right. NAACP, 357 U.S. at 461. Rather, "abridgement of such rights, even though unintended, may inevitably follow from varied forms of governmental action," including action that "may appear to be wholly unrelated to protected liberties." NAACP, 357 U.S. at 461.
Br. of Resp't/Cross Appellant at 32.
Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has held that "First Amendment rights are beyond abridgement either by legislation that directly restrains their exercise or by suppression or impairment through harassment, humiliation, or exposure by government." Bates, 361 U.S. at 528 (Black & Douglas, JJ., concurring) (emphasis added); see also Shelton, 364 U.S. at 486-87 ("Public exposure, bringing with it the possibility of public pressures upon school boards to discharge teachers who belong to unpopular or minority organizations, would simply operate to widen and aggravate the impairment of constitutional liberty.").
Here, the state action challenged is the government's exposure, pursuant to state statute, of the Does' identities in the requested records, which implicate their political beliefs and associations. Sueoka's insinuation that the City's disclosure of the Does' identities would not constitute governmental action is simply wrong.
(b)
Sueoka additionally asserts that, even if disclosure of the Does' identities would impinge their constitutional rights, the Does willingly relinquished their right to privacy. This is so, Sueoka contends, because the Does "had a right to keep their political opinions private," knew that their employer was subject to the PRA, but nevertheless attended the January 6 rally and "then informed their employer of their activities." We disagree. Contrary to Sueoka's assertion, the Does did not relinquish their constitutional rights.
Br. of Resp't/Cross Appellant at 27-28.
The facts are these. The Does submitted to interviews during an investigation in which they were alleged to have violated the law or SPD policies during their attendance at the January 6 rally. They were "ordered to answer all questions asked, truthfully and completely." They were informed that "failure to do so may result in discipline up to and including termination." They were then questioned regarding their reasons for attending the January 6 rally, their political beliefs and affiliations with political groups, if any, and their impressions of the content of the rally. The Does answered these questions "truthfully and as completely as possible" because they were under standing orders to do so.
In other words, the Does did not "ha[ve] a right to keep their political opinions private." Nor, contrary to Sueoka's assertion, did the Does voluntarily "inform[] their employer of their activities." Rather, the Does were placed in the untenable position of either refusing to answer investigators' questions, thus risking their livelihoods, or cooperating with the investigation, thereby compromising their constitutional rights.
Adopting Sueoka's assertion that the Does' cooperation in the investigation was voluntary would also lead to the problematic conclusion that police officers need not cooperate in such investigations. Little public good would flow from such a holding.
Nearly a century ago, the United States Supreme Court rejected the notion that an indirect assault on constitutional protections due to a purported "choice" is less insidious than is direct impingement of such rights. Frost v. RR Comm'n of State of Cal., 271 U.S. 583, 593, 46 S.Ct. 605, 70 L.Ed.2d 1101 (1926). There, a California statute precluded private carriers from the privilege of using public highways for "transacting private business thereon" unless they submitted to regulation lawfully imposed on common carriers. Frost, 271 U.S. at 591. The Supreme Court struck down the statute, which, it concluded, was intended to protect the business of common carriers by controlling competition. Frost, 271 U.S. at 591, 593. In so doing, the Court held that a state may not require the relinquishment of a constitutional right as the basis to confer a privilege. Frost, 271 U.S. at 593. Were it otherwise, "constitutional guaranties, so carefully safeguarded against direct assault, [would be] open to destruction by the indirect but no less effective process of requiring a surrender, which, though in form voluntary, in fact lacks none of the elements of compulsion." Frost, 271 U.S. at 593. To be given only "a choice between the rock and the whirlpool," wherein the option is to forego one's livelihood or "submit to a requirement which may constitute an intolerable burden," is in reality, the Court announced, no choice at all. Frost, 271 U.S. at 593.
Four decades later, the Supreme Court explicitly rejected the proposition advanced by Sueoka herein-that statements obtained from police officers as a result of those officers cooperating (in compliance with a lawful request to do so) in investigations conducted by their employer or at their employer's direction are deemed voluntary. Garrity, 385 U.S. 493. In Garrity, police officers were ordered to cooperate in an investigation by the New Jersey Attorney General regarding "alleged irregularities in handling cases in the municipal courts" of certain New Jersey boroughs. 385 U.S. at 494. Prior to questioning, each officer was warned "(1) that anything he said might be used against him in any state criminal proceeding; (2) that he had the privilege to refuse to answer if the disclosure would tend to incriminate him; but (3) that if he refused to answer he would be subject to removal from office." Garrity, 385 U.S. at 494. After cooperating in the investigation, the officers were convicted of conspiracy to obstruct the administration of the traffic laws, and "their convictions were sustained over their protests that their statements were coerced, by reason of the fact that, if they refused to answer, they could lose their positions with the police department." Garrity, 385 U.S. at 495 (footnote omitted).
The Supreme Court held that, where the officers were given the choice between self-incrimination and losing their livelihoods, their statements were not voluntary:
The choice given petitioners was either to forfeit their jobs or to incriminate themselves. The option to lose their means of livelihood or to pay the penalty of self-incrimination is the antithesis of free choice to speak out or to remain silent. That practice, like interrogation practices we reviewed in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 464-65[, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966)], is "likely to exert such pressure upon an individual as to disable him from making a free and rational choice." We think the statements were infected by the coercion inherent in this scheme of questioning and cannot be sustained as voluntary under our prior decisions.Garrity, 385 U.S. at 497-98 (footnote omitted). Police officers, the Court concluded, "are not relegated to a watered-down version of constitutional rights." Garrity, 385 U.S. at 500. Moreover, the Court therein confirmed that the rights secured by the First Amendment are among those "rights of constitutional stature whose exercise a State may not condition by the exaction of a price." Garrity, 385 U.S. at 500.
As in Garrity, the Does here were informed by SPD, their employer, that their continued employment could be contingent on their cooperation with the investigation. The answers elicited from the Does during interviews directly implicate speech protected by the First Amendment. The Does, as with the police officers in Garrity, were afforded a choice "'between the rock and the whirlpool,'" 385 U.S. at 496 (quoting Stevens v. Marks, 383 U.S. 234, 243, 86 S.Ct. 788, 15 L.Ed.2d 724 (1966)), whereby only by relinquishing their constitutional privacy interests could the Does ensure their continued employment. "[D]uress is inherent" when statements are thusly obtained. Garrity, 385 U.S. at 498.
As the precedent of our nation's highest court makes clear, the Does' statements to investigators were not voluntary. We reject Sueoka's assertion that the Does relinquished their constitutional rights by cooperating with the OPA's investigation.
(c)
Sueoka next contends that the Does have not set forth sufficient evidence that harm would result from disclosure of their identities in the requested records, such that they should be entitled to an injunction precluding such disclosure. He asserts that the Does must demonstrate that disclosure would create a "chilling effect" on their constitutional rights and that they have not done so. Again, we disagree. Adhering to precedent from our Supreme Court, and cognizant that federal courts have determined that a "chilling effect" may, at times, be assumed, we hold that the evidence submitted by the Does is sufficient to meet the necessary showing of potential harm.
In Doe v. Reed, the United States Supreme Court considered whether, pursuant to Washington's PRA, the disclosure of referendum petitions, and thereby of the identities of the petition signers, would violate the First Amendment. 561 U.S. 186. The Court therein concluded that disclosure would not violate the First Amendment with respect to referendum petitions in general. Reed, 561 U.S. at 202. However, the Court articulated the standard it had applied "in related contexts," that "those resisting disclosure can prevail under the First Amendment if they can show 'a reasonable probability that the compelled disclosure [of personal information] will subject them to threats, harassment, or reprisals from either Government officials or private parties.'" Reed, 561 U.S. at 200 (alteration in original) (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 74).
Our Supreme Court applied this standard in evaluating the constitutionality of a discovery order compelling the disclosure of meeting minutes of the Freedom Socialist Party. See Snedigar v. Hoddersen, 114 Wn.2d 153, 156, 786 P.2d 781 (1990). In that case, the court reversed a decision of this court, in which we had held that the party resisting the discovery order was required to make "an initial showing of actual infringement on First Amendment rights." Snedigar, 114 Wn.2d at 158. This was wrong, our Supreme Court explained, because "[t]he party asserting the First Amendment associational privilege is only required to show some probability that the requested disclosure will harm its First Amendment rights." Snedigar, 114 Wn.2d at 158. And, indeed, in that case, the Party's national secretary submitted affidavits stating that (1) "Party members and supporters had been subjected to acts of reprisal and harassment in the past," and (2) that "the expectation of confidentiality in internal discussions [was] essential to the Party's survival." Snedigar, 114 Wn.2d at 163. These affidavits, our Supreme Court held, were sufficient to demonstrate that disclosure would "chill" the Party's constitutional rights. Snedigar, 114 Wn.2d at 164.
In evaluating whether sufficient probability of harm was shown, our Supreme Court in Snedigar recognized that some courts have explicitly held that "a concrete showing of 'chill' is unnecessary" to determine that disclosure would impinge First Amendment rights. 114 Wn.2d at 162 (citing Black Panther Party v. Smith, 661 F.2d 1243, 1267-68, (D.C. Cir. 1981); Britt v. Superior Court, 20 Cal.3d 844, 855, 574 P.2d 766, 143 Cal.Rptr. 695 (1978)). Indeed, the court noted, some courts "have overlooked the absence of a factual record of past harassment and . . . assumed that disclosure of information" would chill such rights. Snedigar, 114 Wn.2d at 162 (citing Shelton, 364 U.S. at 485-86; Talley, 362 U.S. at 64; Local 1814, Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, AFL-CIO v. Waterfront Comm'n of New York, 667 F.2d 267, 272 (2d Cir.1981); Pollard v. Roberts, 283 F.Supp. 248, 258 (E.D. Ark. 1968), aff'd, 393 U.S. 14, 89 S.Ct. 47, 21 L.Ed.2d 14 (1968)).
Moreover, as the Second Circuit has recognized, "a factual record of past harassment is not the only situation in which courts have upheld a First Amendment right of non-disclosure." Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, 667 F.2d at 271. Rather,
[t]he underlying inquiry must always be whether a compelling governmental interest justifies any governmental action that has "the practical effect 'of discouraging' the exercise of constitutionally protected political rights," "even if any deterrent effect . . . arises . . . as an unintended but inevitable result of the government's conduct in requiring disclosure."Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, 667 F.2d at 271 (citation omitted) (quoting NAACP, 357 U.S. at 461; Buckley, 424 U.S. at 65). Based on this principle, courts, including the United States Supreme Court, have in various circumstances "adopted a commonsense approach [that] recognized that a chilling effect was inevitable." Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, 667 F.2d at 272 (citing Shelton, 364 U.S. at 486; Pollard, 283 F.Supp. at 258).
Such a "commonsense approach"-which assumes a "chilling effect" on speech and associational rights-has been utilized when disclosure was required to be made to a public employer and when the individuals seeking anonymity espoused beliefs unpopular in their communities. For instance, in Shelton, the Supreme Court recognized that impingement of teachers' rights to free association "is conspicuously accented when the teacher serves at the absolute will of those to whom the disclosure must be made." 364 U.S. at 486. "[T]he pressure upon a teacher to avoid any ties which might displease those who control his professional destiny would be constant and heavy." Shelton, 364 U.S. at 486; see also Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, 667 F.2d at 272 (recognizing that the investigatory body had "pervasive control over the economic livelihood" of those seeking anonymity). Likewise, in Pollard, there was "no evidence" that the individuals seeking anonymity had "been subjected to reprisals on account of" their contributions to the Arkansas Republican Party. 283 F.Supp. at 258. Nevertheless, given the unpopularity of the party in the state at that time, the court held that "it would be naïve not to recognize" that disclosure would subject the contributors to "potential economic or political reprisals," thus discouraging the exercise of constitutional rights. Pollard, 283 F.Supp. at 258. The court described the constitutional injury thereby inflicted thusly:
To the extent that a public agency or officer unreasonably inhibits or discourages the exercise by individuals of their right to associate with others of the same political persuasion in the advocacy of principles and candidates of which and of whom they approve, and to support those principles and candidates with their money if they choose to do so, that agency or officer violates private rights protected by the First Amendment.Pollard, 283 F.Supp. at 258.
Here, the Does' declarations state that they have "a significant fear that disclosure of [their] attendance at the January 6 Rally would result in significant jeopardy to [their] personal safety and [their] ability to provide effective law enforcement to the community." Two of the Does described their fears for the safety and well-being of their families were their identities disclosed, one noting "the extreme volatility that has gone hand in hand with politics in this region over the last year regarding law enforcement." The Does additionally submitted the declarations of other SPD officers who stated that they had endured harassment and threats made against them and their families from members of the public.
Consistent with the cases cited above, we conclude that the Does have submitted sufficient evidence that disclosure of their identities would discourage the exercise of political speech and associational rights. In so holding, we are mindful that it is not only the Does' constitutional rights that may be "chilled" by disclosure here, but also those of other public employees whose employers are subject to the PRA. Indeed, as the United States Supreme Court has recognized, in addition to the impact on the exercise of rights by those seeking anonymity, there is a "more subtle and immeasurable effect upon those who tend to adhere to the most orthodox and uncontroversial views and associations in order to avoid a similar fate at some future time." Watkins, 354 U.S. at 197-98.
We reach this conclusion notwithstanding Sueoka's assertion, in supplemental briefing, that the identities of the Does are already publicly known. As our Supreme Court has held, an individual's statutory right to privacy is not nullified because some members of the public may already know that individual's identity. Bainbridge Island Police Guild, 172 Wn.2d at 414 ("[J]ust because some members of the public may already know the identity of the person in the report does not mean that an agency does not violate the person's right to privacy by confirming that knowledge through its production."). The same is certainly true of the right to privacy inhering in the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.
We conclude that disclosure of the Does' identities in the requested records constitutes governmental action that would impinge their First Amendment rights. This is so despite the public nature of the January 6 rally. We find unmeritorious Sueoka's contentions that the Does relinquished their constitutional rights by cooperating with the OPA's investigation or that they failed to demonstrate that disclosure would discourage the exercise of such rights. Having so concluded, we must determine whether the State's interest in impinging those rights is sufficient to nevertheless mandate disclosure.
(d)
Before we do so, however, we must address a related contention. In a statement of additional authorities submitted following oral argument, Sueoka asserts that, because the Does did not notify the attorney general of any intent to challenge the constitutionality of the PRA, we cannot consider whether the PRA violates the federal constitution if it is construed so as to require disclosure of unredacted records in this case.
This ground has been previously trod. Indeed, the District Court of the Western District of Washington considered this very issue in Roe v. Anderson, 2015 WL 4724739 (W.D. Wash. 2015), which we cite as evidence of our state attorney general's official position on this aspect of PRA analysis. In the cited case, certain erotic dancers and managers of an erotic dance studio sought to enjoin the disclosure of their personal information pursuant to a PRA request. Anderson, 2015 WL 4724739, at *1. They asserted that disclosure would violate their constitutional rights to privacy and free expression and sought a declaration that the PRA, as applied to them, was unconstitutional. Anderson, 2015 WL 4724739, at *1.
At the court's invitation, the Washington attorney general filed an amicus brief asserting that the PRA "does not require the disclosure of information protected from disclosure by the Constitution" because "its exemptions incorporate any constitutionally-required limitation on such disclosures." Anderson, 2015 WL 4724739, at *1 (emphasis added). The "other statute[s]" provision, RCW 42.56.070(1), the attorney general explained, is a "'catch all' saving clause" that "does not require a disclosure that would violate the Constitution." Anderson, 2015 WL 4724739, at *2 (emphasis added). Citing decisional authority from our Supreme Court, the attorney general clarified that
"[i]f the requested records are constitutionally protected from public disclosure, that protection exists without any need of statutory permission, and may constitute an exemption under the PRA even if not implemented through an explicit statutory exemption."
"In other words, it is not necessary to read the PRA in conflict with the Constitution when the Act itself recognizes and respects other laws (including constitutional provisions) that mandate privacy or confidentiality."Anderson, 2015 WL 4724739, at *2-3 (emphasis added).
The district court held that "[t]he State is correct." Anderson, 2015 WL 4724739, at *3. "The PRA, by design, cannot violate the Constitution, and constitutional protections (such as freedom of expression) are necessarily incorporated as exemptions, just like any other express exemption enumerated in the PRA." Anderson, 2015 WL 4724739, at *3.
We agree with and adopt this analysis. Thus, once the constitutional right is established and the constitutional injury that disclosure would cause is shown, it is entirely unnecessary for the citizen to establish an additional entitlement to an injunction in order to preclude disclosure. The law is clear and the principle simple-the government may not violate a person's First Amendment rights, even in the absence of an injunction specifically forbidding it from doing so.
See discussion infra § III C.
2
The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed that
[t]he right to privacy in one's political associations and beliefs will yield only to a "'subordinating interest of the State [that is] compelling,'" NAACP[, 357 U.S.] at 463 (quoting Sweezy, 354 U.S. [at 265] (opinion concurring in result)), and then only if there is a "substantial relation between the information sought and [an] overriding and compelling state interest." Gibson[, 372 U.S. at 546].Brown, 459 U.S. at 91-92 (some alterations in original). Thus, having concluded that disclosure of the Does' identities in the requested records would impinge their First Amendment rights, we must determine whether an overriding and compelling state interest nevertheless requires such disclosure.
For its part, the City contends that a less stringent standard should apply because, according to the City, "public employees have diminished First Amendment rights, even for purely private speech." Not so. Police officers, such as the Does, "are not relegated to a watered-down version of constitutional rights." Garrity, 385 U.S. at 500. The City's assertion to the contrary, reliant as it is on inapposite decisional authority, is unpersuasive.
City of Seattle, Suppl. Mem. at 2.
We conclude that the State has no compelling interest in disclosing the Does' identities in the requested records. The state interest in disclosing the entirety of a particular public record is illuminated by the purpose of the PRA and its scope, as determined by our legislature and Supreme Court. Such considerations demonstrate that the state interest here falls short of the standard required to impinge the Does' First Amendment rights. We thus hold that the State has no compelling interest in disclosing the Does' identities in the requested records.
(a)
We first address the City's argument, set forth in supplemental briefing, that the state actor need not demonstrate a compelling interest in order to impinge the Does' constitutional rights. The City, itself an employer of vast numbers of public employees, asserts that "public employees have diminished First Amendment rights, even for purely private speech." Hence, the City contends, the constitutional rights of public employees, unlike those of other citizens, can be impinged absent the demonstration of a compelling state interest. We disagree.
City of Seattle, Suppl. Mem. at 2.
When the State seeks to compel disclosure of an individual's political beliefs and associations, it can do so only by demonstrating a compelling state interest with sufficient relation to the information sought to be disclosed. See, e.g., Brown, 459 U.S. at 91-92; Gibson, 372 U.S. at 546; NAACP, 357 U.S. at 463; Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 265. That the State's interest must be compelling reflects the United States Supreme Court's recognition that "political freedom of the individual" is a "fundamental principle of a democratic society," Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 250, and that "compelled disclosure, in itself, can seriously infringe on privacy of association and belief guaranteed by the First Amendment." Buckley, 424 U.S. at 64.
Moreover, as we have discussed, our nation's highest Court has rejected the notion that public employees are not entitled to the same stature of constitutional rights as are other citizens. In 1967, the Court in Garrity considered whether police officers, by virtue of being compelled to cooperate in an investigation by the New Jersey Attorney General, relinquished the constitutional right against self-incrimination. 385 U.S. at 494-98. The Court determined that the statements of the police officers, who were given the choice between self-incrimination and losing their livelihoods, were not voluntary. Garrity, 385 U.S. at 497-98. In so holding, the Court "conclude[d] that policemen, like teachers and lawyers, are not relegated to a watered-down version of constitutional rights." Garrity, 385 U.S. at 500.
In asserting to the contrary-that the Does are, indeed, condemned to a diluted version of First Amendment rights-the City urges us to apply the "balancing test" set forth by the Supreme Court in Pickering v. Board of Education of Township High School District 205, Will County, Ill., 391 U.S. 563, 88 S.Ct. 1731, 20 L.Ed.2d 811 (1968). The City's reliance on Pickering is misplaced.
See City of Seattle, Suppl. Mem. at 6 ("It is this balancing test, not strict scrutiny, that applies to disclosure of the public records containing employees' speech.").
In Pickering, a public school teacher submitted to a local newspaper a letter regarding a proposed tax increase that was critical of the manner in which the school board and superintendent had "handled past proposals to raise new revenue for the schools." 391 U.S. at 564. The teacher was dismissed from his position pursuant to an Illinois statute that permitted such dismissal for actions detrimental to the interests of the school system. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 564-65. He thereafter filed suit, asserting that the Illinois statute was unconstitutional as applied pursuant to the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 565.
In considering the constitutionality of the Illinois statute, the Court recognized that "the State has interests as an employer in regulating the speech of its employees that differ significantly from those it possesses in connection with regulation of the speech of the citizenry in general." Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568. Thus, the Court announced what has come to be known as the "Pickering balancing test," which seeks to "arrive at a balance between the interests of the [public employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees." Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568.
See, e.g., Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418, 126 S.Ct. 1951, 164 L.Ed.2d 689 (2006) (describing the "two inquiries to guide interpretation of the constitutional protections accorded to public employee speech" as set forth in "Pickering and the cases decided in its wake"); Moser v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep't, 984 F.3d 900, 904-05 (9th Cir. 2021) (describing the "Pickering balancing test"). Neither of these opinions, both of which are cited by the City, is apposite to the circumstances presented in this case.
However, the teacher's statements in Pickering were "neither shown nor [could] be presumed to have in any way either impeded the teacher's proper performance of his daily duties in the classroom or to have interfered with the regular operation of the schools generally." 391 U.S. at 572-73 (footnote omitted). The Court held that, in such circumstances, "the interest of the school administration in limiting teachers' opportunities to contribute to public debate is not significantly greater than its interest in limiting a similar contribution by any member of the general public." Pickering, 391 U.S. at 573. In other words, the "Pickering balancing test," which the City urges us to apply here, is applicable only when a public employee's speech may affect the employer's operations. See also Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418, 126 S.Ct. 1951, 164 L.Ed.2d 689 (2006) ("A government entity has broader discretion to restrict speech when it acts in its role as employer, but the restrictions it imposes must be directed at speech that has some potential to affect the entity's operations." (emphasis added)). Only then may a government employer have "an adequate justification for treating the employee differently from any other member of the general public," thus permitting it to restrict the public employee's speech. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418.
Indeed, in Pickering, the United States Supreme Court explicitly rejected the proposition that public employees are entitled to lesser constitutional protections simply by virtue of their public employment:
To the extent that the Illinois Supreme Court's opinion may be read to suggest that teachers may constitutionally be compelled to relinquish the First Amendment rights they would otherwise enjoy as citizens to comment on matters of public interest in connection with the operation of the public schools in which they work, it proceeds on a premise that has been unequivocally rejected in numerous prior decisions of this Court. E.g., Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183[, 73 S.Ct. 215, 97 L.Ed.2d 216] (1952); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479[, 81 S.Ct. 247, 5 L.Ed.2d 231] (1960); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589[, 87 S.Ct. 675, 17 L.Ed.2d 629] (1967). "[T]he theory that public employment which may be denied altogether may be subjected to any conditions, regardless of how unreasonable, has been uniformly rejected." Keyishian[, 385 U.S.] at 605-06.391 U.S. at 568 (some alterations in original).
Put simply, the notion that the Does, as public employees, "have curtailed First Amendment rights," as the City brazenly asserts, is directly contradicted by United States Supreme Court decisional authority. Unlike this case, each of the cases cited by the City involves an adverse employment action based on a speech restriction that precluded public employees from engaging in speech alleged to injuriously impact their employer's operations. Indeed, it is only when a public employee's speech "has some potential to affect [the employer's] operations" that the employer may have "an adequate justification for treating the employee differently from any other member of the general public." Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418. This rule is premised on the recognition that the government possesses a "legitimate purpose in 'promot[ing] efficiency and integrity in the discharge of official duties, and . . . maintain[ing] proper discipline in the public service.'" Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 150-51, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 75 L.Ed.2d 708 (1983) (some alterations in original) (quoting Ex parte Curtis, 106 U.S. 371, 373, 1 S.Ct. 381, 27 L.Ed. 232 (1882)). Such principles do not apply to the facts of this case.
City of Seattle. Suppl. Mem. at 5.
See Progressive Democrats for Soc. Just. v. Bonta, 588 F.Supp.3d 960 (N.D. Cal. 2022); Garcetti, 547 U.S. 410; City of San Diego, Cal. v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 125 S.Ct. 521, 160 L.Ed.2d 410 (2004); Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 114 S.Ct. 1878, 128 L.Ed.2d 686 (1994); Pickering, 391 U.S. 563; Hernandez v. City of Phoenix, 43 F. 4th 966 (9th Cir. 2022); Moser, 984 F.3d 900; Berry v. Dep'. of Soc. Servs., 447 F.3d 642 (9th Cir. 2006). For the reasons described above, each of these cases is inapposite here.
In Connick, Justice Brennan disagreed with the majority's balancing of the competing considerations set forth in Pickering. 461 U.S. at 157-58 (Brennan, J., dissenting). However, as pertinent here, he adeptly explained that the government, as a public employer, has an interest in regulating employee speech only when such speech may impact the government's ability to perform its duties. He wrote:
The balancing test articulated in Pickering comes into play only when a public employee's speech implicates the government's interests as an employer. When public employees engage in expression unrelated to their employment while away from the workplace, their First Amendment rights are, of course, no different from those of the general public.Connick, 461 U.S. at 157 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Pickering, 391 U.S. at 574).
The City also asserts that our Supreme Court's decision in Service Employees International Union Local 925 v. University of Washington, 193 Wn.2d 860, 447 P.3d 534 (2019) (SEIU), indicates that "disclosure of public records is mandated by the PRA notwithstanding any speech rights or a chilling effect thereon." City of Seattle, Suppl. Mem. at 3. We disagree. In that decision, our Supreme Court addressed only whether particular faculty e-mails relating to union organizing constitute "public records" pursuant to the PRA. SEIU, 193 Wn.2d at 867-76. Although the labor union seeking to enjoin disclosure of the requested e-mails asserted that "their release would chill union organizing efforts, restrain speech, and violate individuals' privacy rights," SEIU, 193 Wn.2d at 865, our Supreme Court explicitly stated that its "holding on the 'scope of employment' test does not dispose of" the labor union's other arguments, including "assertions of statutory and constitutional exemptions from PRA coverage." SEIU, 193 Wn.2d at 876. Contrary to the City's assertion, our Supreme Court did not suggest in that decision that the constitutional rights of our state's citizens can be summarily dismissed on the basis of a legislative enactment. While we agree with the City that the PRA is an important statute, it nevertheless remains merely a statute. See Freedom Found., 178 Wn.2d at 695.
Here, the Does' employer, SPD, did not impose a restriction on the Does' speech. Nor does the speech at issue-the Does' attendance at a political rally and their statements regarding their political views and affiliations-have any impact on their employer's operations. Indeed, any allegation that the Does engaged in conduct contrary to their employer's policies was found to be unsustained.
We decline the City's invitation to contravene United States Supreme Court decisional authority in order to restrict public employee speech in circumstances beyond those in which such speech may interfere with the public employer's operations. Instead, we take the United States Supreme Court at its word that police officers "are not relegated to a watered-down version of constitutional rights." Garrity, 385 U.S. at 500; see also Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568. Similarly, we recognize the Supreme Court's repeated affirmations that "[t]he right to privacy in one's political associations and beliefs will yield only to a 'subordinating interest of the State [that is] compelling,' and then only if there is a 'substantial relation between the information sought and [an] overriding and compelling state interest.'" Brown, 459 U.S. at 91-92 (second and third alterations in original) (citation and internal quotations marks omitted) (quoting Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 265; Gibson, 372 U.S. at 546). Accordingly, only if an overriding and compelling state interest exists to impinge the Does' constitutional rights may their identities be disclosed in the requested records. As discussed below, we determine that no such compelling interest exists.
(b)
The scope of the State's interest in public record disclosure-and, thus, whether the City, as a state actor, has a compelling interest in disclosing the Does' identities-is illuminated by the purpose of the PRA's disclosure mandate. "The basic purpose of the [PRA] is to provide a mechanism by which the public can be assured that its public officials are honest and impartial in the conduct of their public offices." Cowles Publ'g Co., 109 Wn.2d at 719. The statute "ensures the sovereignty of the people and the accountability of the governmental agencies that serve them by providing full access to information concerning the conduct of government." Predisik, 182 Wn.2d at 903. Similarly, our legislature has defined the policy of the PRA as such: "That, mindful of the right of individuals to privacy and of the desirability of the efficient administration of government, full access to information concerning the conduct of government on every level must be assured as a fundamental and necessary precondition to the sound governance of a free society." RCW 42.17A.001(11); see also In re Request of Rosier, 105 Wn.2d 606, 611, 717 P.2d 1353 (1986) (recognizing the policy underlying the statute as "allow[ing] public scrutiny of government, rather than . . . promot[ing] scrutiny of particular individuals who are unrelated to any governmental operation").
To this end, while the PRA contains a broad mandate for disclosure, our legislature also included in the statute an exemption whereby "[p]ersonal information in files maintained for employees . . . of any public agency" are not subject to disclosure "to the extent that disclosure would violate their right to privacy." RCW 42.56.230(3). This "right to privacy" is "invaded or violated," such that the statutory exemption applies, when disclosure of the information would be "highly offensive to a reasonable person" and is "not of legitimate concern to the public." RCW 42.56.050.
We do not hold that the personal information exemption, RCW 42.56.230(3), a statutory exemption set forth within the PRA, precludes disclosure of the Does' identities in the requested records. Rather, as discussed supra, it is the First Amendment to the United States Constitution that precludes such disclosure, absent an overriding and compelling state interest. Nevertheless, the purpose of the PRA and the scope of its disclosure mandate, as set forth by our legislature and decisional authority interpreting the act, illuminates the state interest here at issue.
The PRA does not define the "right to privacy." Our Supreme Court thus sought to "'fill [this] definitional void'" by adopting the common law tort definition set forth in the Restatement. Cowles Publ'g Co., 109 Wn.2d at 721 (quoting Hearst Corp. v. Hoppe, 90 Wn.2d 123, 136, 580 P.2d 246 (1978)); see Restatement (Second) of Torts §652D (Am. Law Inst. 1977). Employing this definition, and consistent with the purpose of the PRA, our Supreme Court has deemed significant to the question of privacy whether a public employee's conduct "occurred in the course of public service." Cowles Publ'g Co., 109 Wn.2d at 726. "Instances of misconduct of a police officer while on the job are not private, intimate, personal details of the officer's life," but rather, "are matters with which the public has a right to concern itself." Cowles Publ'g Co., 109 Wn.2d at 726. Premised on this principle, the court held that "a law enforcement officer's actions while performing his public duties or improper off duty actions in public which bear upon his ability to perform his public office" are not within the ambit of conduct exempt from disclosure due to statutory "personal privacy." Cowles Publ'g Co., 109 Wn.2d at 727.
In addition, in determining whether a public employee's statutory right to privacy is implicated, the court has distinguished between "substantiated" and "unsubstantiated" allegations. "[W]hen a complaint regarding misconduct during the course of public employment is substantiated or results in some sort of discipline, an employee does not have a right to privacy in the complaint." Bellevue John Does 1-11 v. Bellevue Sch. Dist. No. 405, 164 Wn.2d 199, 215, 189 P.3d 139 (2008). However, the court has held that public employees have a statutory right to privacy in their identities in connection with unsubstantiated allegations of sexual misconduct, "because the unsubstantiated allegations are matters concerning [the employees'] private lives." Bainbridge Island Police Guild, 172 Wn.2d at 413; see also Bellevue John Does, 164 Wn.2d at 215-16. "An unsubstantiated or false accusation," the court reasoned, "is not an action taken by an employee in the course of performing public duties." Bellevue John Does, 164 Wn.2d at 215.
Similarly, our Supreme Court has concluded that whether allegations against a public employee are substantiated bears on whether disclosure of the employee's identity is a matter of "legitimate" public concern. Bainbridge Island Police Guild, 172 Wn.2d at 416; Bellevue John Does, 164 Wn.2d at 221. Thus, consistent with the PRA's purpose to enable the public to oversee governmental agencies, the court determined that the public has no legitimate interest in the identities of public employees against whom unsubstantiated allegations of misconduct were asserted. Bellevue John Does, 164 Wn.2d at 220. This is because, when the allegations are unsubstantiated, precluding disclosure of the employee's identity would "not impede the public's ability to oversee" government investigations into alleged employee misconduct. Bellevue John Does, 164 Wn.2d at 220. Rather, disclosure in such circumstances, the court reasoned, "'serve[s] no interest other than gossip and sensation.'" Bellevue John Does, 164 Wn.2d at 221 (quoting Bellevue John Does 1-11 v. Bellevue Sch. Dist. No. 405, 129 Wn.App. 832, 854, 120 P.3d 616 (2005)).
The state interest in disclosure pursuant to the PRA is to uphold the purpose of the statute-that is, to enable the public to ensure "that its public officials are honest and impartial in the conduct of their public offices." Cowles Publ'g Co., 109 Wn.2d at 719 (emphasis added); see also RCW 42.56.030 ("The people insist on remaining informed so that they may maintain control over the instruments that they have created."). To that end, in the context of defining the scope of statutory exemptions to disclosure, our Supreme Court has determined that disclosure of the identities of public employees is not permitted when (1) the allegations asserted against the employees are unsubstantiated and (2) the conduct did not occur in the course of public service or occur off-duty and impact the performance of public duties. Bainbridge Island Police Guild, 172 Wn.2d at 413; Bellevue John Does, 164 Wn.2d at 213-16, 221; Cowles Publ'g Co., 109 Wn.2d at 726. In other words, in such circumstances, the State does not have an interest in disclosing the employees' identities.
Significantly, in those cases, whether disclosure of the public officials' identities was precluded was determined pursuant to statutory exemptions, not premised upon the disclosure's impingement on constitutional First Amendment rights. Thus, the public officials' interests at issue in those cases, not being of constitutional import, were less significant than those presented here, where the Does' First Amendment rights are implicated. Nevertheless, here, as in those cases, the Does' alleged misconduct did not occur in the course of their public duties, and the allegations against the Does were determined to be unsustained. Even when constitutional rights were not implicated by disclosure, those same circumstances have been deemed by our legislature and Supreme Court to fall outside the ambit of the state interest in such disclosure. Thus, here, where the Does' constitutional rights would be impinged by disclosure, the state interest cannot be said to be compelling, such that disclosure would nevertheless be permitted.
We note that, while some of the OPA's findings were "not sustained" because the allegations were determined to be "unfounded," others were unsustained because the investigation as to those findings was deemed to be "inconclusive." However, an "inconclusive" finding remains a finding that the allegations were unsustained; it neither constitutes a finding against the officer nor authorizes disciplinary action. Accordingly, we treat the "inconclusive" unsustained findings in the same manner as the "unfounded" unsustained findings.
Sueoka asserts that the trial court properly determined that the public has a legitimate interest in disclosure of the Does' identities in the requested records because OPA Director Andrew Myerberg may have previously represented one of the Does in a civil rights case. This purported conflict, Sueoka contends, may have undermined the investigation. However, even when only a statutory privacy interest is implicated, Washington courts have held that complete records need not be disclosed for the public interest of government oversight to be achieved. See, e.g., Bainbridge Island Police Guild, 172 Wn.2d at 416 ("Although lacking a legitimate interest in the name of a police officer who is the subject of an unsubstantiated allegation of sexual misconduct, the public does have a legitimate interest in how a police department responds to and investigates such an allegation against an officer."); Bellevue John Does, 164 Wn.2d at 220 ("Precluding disclosure of the identities of teachers who are subjects of unsubstantiated allegations will not impede the public's ability to oversee school districts' investigations of alleged teacher misconduct."). Indeed, our Supreme Court has made plain that a public employee's "right to privacy does not depend on the quality of the [public employer's] investigations." Bellevue John Does, 164 Wn.2d at 223. Here, given the constitutional right at stake, we hold that the State has no compelling interest in disclosure of the Does' identities for this purpose. Moreover, "[a]n agency should look to the contents of the document and not the knowledge of third parties when deciding if the subject of a report has a right to privacy in their identity." Bainbridge Island Police Guild, 172 Wn.2d at 414. In Bainbridge Island Police Guild, our Supreme Court held that notwithstanding the fact that some members of the public might know the identity of the individual identified in the records, the agency must nevertheless refuse to disclose those records if an exemption exists. 172 Wn.2d at 414. Otherwise, agencies would be required to "engage in an analysis of not just the contents of the report" but also of outside knowledge regarding the incident described therein. Bainbridge Island Police Guild, 172 Wn.2d at 414. The same logic applies here. Additionally, the City, in evaluating a records request, cannot be charged with presuming the need to disclose individuals' identities in investigative records on the chance of potential conflict of interest of the investigator that is not established in the records themselves. Such a presumption would gut the disclosure exemptions of the PRA.
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that "[t]he public is, of course, entitled to be informed concerning the workings of its government. That cannot be inflated into a general power to expose where the predominant result can only be an invasion of the private rights of individuals." Watkins, 354 U.S. at 200 (footnote omitted). Here, disclosure of the Does' identities would fulfill only the "impermissible [objective] of exposure for exposure's sake." Uphaus, 360 U.S. at 82 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Based on our legislature's and Supreme Court's delineation of the purpose of the PRA's disclosure mandate, we conclude that the State has no compelling interest in disclosure of the Does' identities in the requested records. Accordingly, because the Does have established a constitutional privacy right that would be impinged by disclosure, the superior court erred by denying the Does' motion for a preliminary injunction precluding such disclosure.
The Does sought a preliminary injunction precluding the disclosure of their identities in the requested records. They did not seek to prevent disclosure of redacted versions of those records. Thus, we do not consider whether the redacted records are subject to disclosure pursuant to the PRA. We do note, however, that once the Does' identities and other identifying information are redacted from the requested records, their constitutional rights are no longer implicated. Accordingly, it is the PRA, not federal constitutional principles, that dictate whether the redacted records may be disclosed. As no party seeks to preclude such disclosure, that issue is not before us. However, we note that, when a constitutional right would not thereby be infringed, the State has an interest in permitting disclosure of public records to enable government oversight, thus fulfilling the purpose of the PRA. See, e.g., Bainbridge Island Police Guild, 172 Wn.2d at 416 ("Although lacking a legitimate interest in the name of a police officer who is the subject of an unsubstantiated allegation of sexual misconduct, the public does have a legitimate interest in how a police department responds to and investigates such an allegation against an officer."); Bellevue John Does, 164 Wn.2d at 220 ("Precluding disclosure of the identities of teachers who are subjects of unsubstantiated allegations will not impede the public's ability to oversee school districts' investigations of alleged teacher misconduct."). See also RCW 42.56.210 (requiring disclosure of records when exempted information can be redacted therefrom). "[E]ven though the governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved." Shelton, 364 U.S. at 488. Here, the purposes of the PRA are achieved through disclosure of the redacted records.
(c)
We recognize that much of the United States Supreme Court's jurisprudence establishing a constitutional privacy right to anonymity in political belief and association, which is grounded in the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, predates the Court's modern formulation of the strict scrutiny standard applicable to governmental action impinging such rights. See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Ariz., 576 U.S. 155, 167, 135 S.Ct. 2218, 192 L.Ed.2d 236 (2015) (recognizing that the Court's decision in Button, 371 U.S. 415, "predated [its] more recent formulations of strict scrutiny"). However, even applying these "more recent formulations" of the standard, Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. at 167, the result herein remains unchanged.
The Court in Button held that a Virginia state law purporting to regulate the legal profession unconstitutionally infringed on "the [First Amendment] right of the NAACP and its members and lawyers to associate for the purpose of assisting persons who seek legal redress for infringements of their constitutionally guaranteed and other rights." 371 U.S. at 428. This decision is among those cited by the Court for the proposition that "compelled disclosure, in itself, can seriously infringe on privacy of association and belief guaranteed by the First Amendment." Buckley, 424 U.S. at 64 (citing Gibson, 372 U.S. 539; Button, 371 U.S. 415; Bates, 361 U.S. 516; Shelton, 364 U.S. 479; NAACP, 357 U.S. 449).
As demonstrated by the profusion of legislatively enacted exceptions to our state's public records law, there is no compelling government interest in disclosure of the unredacted requested records. Rather, the constitutionally mandated narrow tailoring here requires precisely the remedy sought by the Does-the redaction of their names and personal identifying information from the requested records prior to disclosure. Thus, we hold that, applying the United States Supreme Court's modern formulation of the strict scrutiny standard, disclosure of the requested records in redacted form serves to protect the First Amendment interests at stake while allowing for the attainment of the government's legitimate interest in disclosure.
The Supreme Court's modern formulation of the strict scrutiny standard, as pertinent here, is articulated in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. 310, 130 S.Ct. 876, 175 L.Ed.2d 753 (2010), in which the Court pronounced:
Speech is an essential mechanism for democracy, for it is the means to hold officials accountable to the people. The right of citizens to inquire, to hear, to speak, and to use information to reach consensus is a precondition to enlightened self-government and a necessary means to protect it. . . .
For these reasons, political speech must prevail against laws that would suppress it, whether by design or inadvertence. Laws that burden political speech are "subject to strict scrutiny," which requires the Government to prove that the restriction "furthers a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest."Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 339-40 (citation omitted) (quoting Fed. Election Comm'n v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 464, 127 S.Ct. 2652, 168 L.Ed.2d 329 (2007)). Thus, the Supreme Court's more recent formulations of the strict scrutiny standard require that government restrictions on protected speech be "narrowly tailored" to achieving the government's compelling interest, a mandate that was not explicitly articulated in the Court's previous jurisprudence establishing a First Amendment privacy right in political belief and association. See, e.g., Brown, 459 U.S. 87; Gibson, 372 U.S. 539; Bates, 361 U.S. 516; Shelton, 364 U.S. 479; NAACP, 357 U.S. 449.
We acknowledge that differing levels of scrutiny apply to various claims of infringement on federal constitutional rights. See, e.g., Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. at 172 (in the context of federal free speech guarantees, distinguishing between those laws subject to strict scrutiny analysis and those "subject to lesser scrutiny"); Progressive Democrats for Soc. Just., 588 F.Supp.3d at 975-76 (describing differing levels of scrutiny in the context of the First and Fourteenth Amendments, including rational basis review and strict scrutiny). However, no party credibly seeks to establish that other such constructs are applicable in this case. We take the United States Supreme Court at its word in Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 340, that the strict scrutiny standard applies in cases such as this.
The Citizens United explication of the modern formulation is grounded in the Court's historical jurisprudence and finds its genesis in the Court's statement in McIntyre that "[w]hen a law burdens core political speech, we apply 'exacting scrutiny,' and we uphold the restriction only if it is narrowly tailored to serve an overriding state interest." 514 U.S. at 347.
As discussed above, our Supreme Court's decisional authority and the policies animating the PRA lead to the inexorable conclusion that, here, the government has no compelling interest in disclosure of the Does' identities in the requested records. Rather, the government's interest in the disclosure of public records is to uphold the PRA's purpose of enabling the public to ensure "that its public officials are honest and impartial in the conduct of their public offices." Cowles Publ'g Co., 109 Wn.2d at 719. Further evidencing the absence of a compelling state interest in total disclosure of all records, our legislature has enacted a plethora of exceptions to the PRA's disclosure mandate-in fact, as of March 2022, there were 632 such legislatively enacted exceptions. Without question, this proliferation of exceptions to the PRA's disclosure mandate renders implausible any argument that a compelling state interest in disclosure of the Does' identities exists here. Rather, the government's interest in disclosure of the requested records inheres only in making public a redacted version of those records.
See Appendix A ("Public Records Exemptions Accountability Committee - Sunshine Committee," Schedule of Review, updated March 2022). Original available at https://agportal-s3bucket.s3.amazonaws.com/uploadedfiles/Schedule%20of%20Review%20Update%20March% 202022.pdf.
When applying the modern strict scrutiny standard, we must ensure that the government's application of the PRA-the state action at issue here-is narrowly tailored to serve its legitimate interest in the disclosure of public records. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 340. Such narrow tailoring compels us to identify the "least restrictive alternative" that will achieve the pertinent state interest. Ashcroft v. Am. Civ. Liberties Union, 542 U.S. 656, 666, 124 S.Ct. 2783, 159 L.Ed.2d 690 (2004). "The purpose of [this] test is to ensure that speech is restricted no further than necessary to achieve the [government's] goal, for it is important to ensure that legitimate speech is not chilled or punished." Ashcroft, 542 U.S. at 666.
Here, the very remedy sought by the Does-redaction of their names and identifying information from the requested records-is precisely the narrow tailoring that serves to protect the First Amendment rights at stake while simultaneously allowing for the attainment of the government's legitimate interest in public records disclosure. Thus, applying the United States Supreme Court's more recent formulations of strict scrutiny, which require that governmental action impinging on speech rights be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest, we reach the same conclusion as when applying the Court's earlier jurisprudence. In both circumstances, we conclude that disclosure of the unredacted requested records would unconstitutionally impinge on the Does' federal privacy rights-rights that are grounded in First Amendment guarantees. The government's sole legitimate interest in disclosure here is in making public a redacted version of the requested records that excludes the Does' names and other identifying information.
An appropriate grant of such relief, as articulated by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, would preclude the disclosure of "'all personally identifying information or information from which a person's identity could be derived with reasonable certainty.'" Does 1-10 v. Univ. of Wash., 798 Fed.Appx. 1009, 1010 (9th Cir. 2020).
C
Sueoka and the City next assert that, even if the requested records are exempt from disclosure, the Does are nevertheless entitled to a preliminary injunction only if they can additionally demonstrate that they are likely to succeed on the merits of meeting the statutory injunction standard set forth in the PRA. We disagree.
When the disclosure of an individual's identity in public records would impinge a First Amendment right to privacy, the State may not place on that individual an additional burden to vindicate that right. In such a circumstance, the establishment of the right itself mandates the issuance of an injunction. This is consistent with our Supreme Court's jurisprudence establishing that, when a statutory right precludes disclosure, the individual seeking to vindicate that right must demonstrate not only that an exemption to disclosure applies, but also that the PRA's injunctive relief standard is satisfied. Mindful as we are that we must, when possible, read statutes to avoid constitutional infirmity, we hold that the PRA does not require that its statutory injunctive relief standard be met when a First Amendment right to privacy precludes the disclosure of public records.
The PRA provides that "[t]he examination of any specific public record may be enjoined if . . . the superior court . . . finds that such examination would clearly not be in the public interest and would substantially and irreparably damage any person, or would substantially and irreparably damage vital governmental functions." RCW 42.56.540. This two-part injunctive relief provision "'governs access to a remedy' when records are found to fall within an exemption" to the PRA's disclosure mandate. Lyft, 190 Wn.2d at 789 (quoting PAWS, 125 Wn.2d at 258). Thus, when a statutory exemption to disclosure is asserted, the trial court may impose an injunction pursuant to RCW 42.56.540 only if the court finds that "a specific exemption applies and that disclosure would not be in the public interest and would substantially and irreparably damage a person or a vital government interest." Soter, 162 Wn.2d at 757.
Our Supreme Court so held in Lyft, 190 Wn.2d 769, wherein the court addressed whether the disclosure of certain public records could be enjoined pursuant to a statutory exemption to the PRA's disclosure mandate. There, the parties seeking to enjoin disclosure asserted that the records at issue contained trade secrets protected by the federal Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA), chapter 19.108 RCW. Lyft, 190 Wn.2d at 773. Our Supreme Court determined that portions of the public records likely met "the definition of 'trade secrets' under the UTSA." Lyft, 190 Wn.2d at 777, 780-84. The court nevertheless held that disclosure of the records could be enjoined only if the PRA's injunctive relief standard, set forth in RCW 42.56.540, was also satisfied. Lyft, 190 Wn.2d at 773. Thus, our Supreme Court held that "finding an exemption applies under the PRA does not ipso facto support issuing an injunction." Lyft, 190 Wn.2d at 786.
It is on the basis of this decisional authority that Sueoka and the City contend that, in order to obtain the relief that they seek, the Does must demonstrate that they are likely to succeed on the merits of meeting the PRA's two-part statutory injunctive relief standard. However, because disclosure of the Does' identities in the requested records would impinge their First Amendment right to privacy, the argument advanced by Sueoka and the City is untenable. Requiring that parties seeking to vindicate such rights establish not only the First Amendment right itself, but also the requirements of the PRA's injunctive relief standard, would run afoul of the Supremacy Clause of our federal constitution, which mandates that courts "'shall' regard the 'Constitution,' and all laws 'made in Pursuance thereof,' as 'the supreme Law of the Land.'" Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 575 U.S. 320, 324, 135 S.Ct. 1378, 191 L.Ed.2d 471 (2015) (quoting U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2). We cannot interpret the PRA in a manner that would render it unconstitutional. Utter ex rel. State v. Bldg. Indus. Ass'n of Wash., 182 Wn.2d 398, 434, 341 P.3d 953 (2015) ("We construe statutes to avoid constitutional doubt."). Nor does this resolution of the issue do so.
The Supremacy Clause provides:
This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, any thing in the Constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding.U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.
Rather, we read the PRA as consistent with the federal constitution simply by recognizing the distinction between a legislatively created statutory right and a federal constitutional right. When the state legislature creates a right, such as a statutory exemption from the PRA's disclosure mandate, the legislature may impose conditions on the exercise of that right. This is precisely what the legislature has done in enacting the PRA's injunctive relief standard, RCW 42.56.540. Thus, as our Supreme Court has held, when a statutory right is implicated, a finding that an exemption applies "does not ipso facto support issuing an injunction." Lyft, 190 Wn.2d at 786. Rather, the two-part standard set forth in RCW 42.56.540 must also be satisfied, as the legislature has imposed this statutory condition on the exercise of the statutory right against disclosure.
However, here, the Does' claim of right does not depend upon a statutory exemption, and the disclosure of the unredacted records would not merely impinge a statutory right. Rather, the Does' First Amendment right to privacy in their political beliefs and associations would be impinged. The significance of this distinction is readily apparent. Our state legislature can impose a condition on the exercise of a right created by the legislature itself. However, the legislature, having created neither the First nor Fourteenth Amendments, cannot condition the exercise of this federal constitutional right on whether the Does can satisfy the statutory injunctive relief standard. Put simply, such a requirement would authorize a state or local government to violate citizens' constitutional rights when they establish the impingement of such rights but are unable to also demonstrate satisfaction of an additional statutory requirement to obtain injunctive relief. The PRA injunction standard cannot serve as a bar to the City's obligation under the Fourteenth Amendment to safeguard the First Amendment rights of Washington citizens in its application of state law. See, e.g., Seattle Times Co., 170 Wn.2d 581 (discussed infra at 9-10).
This very absurdity appears to be consistent with the City's understanding of its duty to Washington's citizens. In supplemental briefing, the City asserts that it has no "freestanding obligation to honor" the constitutional rights of our state's citizens. Specifically, the City contends that the third party notice provision set forth in the PRA is the proper means for it to address exceptions to disclosure premised on a constitutional right. The City argues, in other words, that it has no obligation to independently honor the constitutional rights of third parties in response to records requests. We do not so hold. When, after receiving notice, an individual seeks injunctive relief premised on a constitutional right, and thereafter establishes both that the right would be impinged by disclosure and that no sufficient interest of the state permits disclosure, the City plainly has an obligation under the Fourteenth Amendment not to violate the individual's constitutional right, notwithstanding the PRA's injunction standard. In other words, here, once the constitutional right is established, the City does not have unfettered discretion to either refuse to disclose the records, pursuant to the PRA, or to permit disclosure premised upon the RCW 42.56.540's standard not being met. Such unfettered discretion of government actors to either honor citizens' constitutional rights or refuse to honor such rights is anathema to the constitutional rule of law. The City need not serve as the lawyer for every individual mentioned in requested public records. However, when the constitutional right implicated by disclosure of particular requested records is clear, the City must refuse to disclose the records (or the relevant portions thereof). The City must then defend against any challenge to the action by the records requestor, unless, following notice, the individual whose rights are implicated does not object to disclosure. The City's supreme obligation is to the federal constitution, not to the state statute. See U.S. Const. art. VI, cl.2.
Again, this analysis does not suggest a constitutional infirmity of the PRA. Rather, recognizing the distinction between legislatively created statutory rights and the First Amendment constitutional right implicated here, we note that the application of RCW 42.56.540 would necessarily mandate the issuance of an injunction. Given the State's paramount interest in affirming the federal constitutional rights of its citizens, disclosure that would impinge the Does' First Amendment right to privacy "would clearly not be in the public interest." RCW 42.56.540. Moreover, because the Does' constitutional rights would be impinged by disclosure of the unredacted records, such disclosure would of necessity "substantially and irreparably damage" the Does. RCW 42.56.540.
Thus, when disclosure is precluded by a First Amendment right to privacy, rather than a statutory exemption, the establishment of that constitutional right does, indeed, ipso facto mandate the issuance of an injunction. The State has no lawful authority to impose an additional requirement on parties seeking to vindicate their constitutional rights in order to trigger its obligations pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment. Because disclosure of the unredacted records would impinge their First Amendment rights, the Does cannot be required to additionally demonstrate satisfaction of an injunctive relief standard in order to obtain the relief they seek, unless that standard is one that is ipso facto satisfied by virtue of the establishment of the First Amendment right. Because the PRA standard is one such standard, the Does have met their burden.
We acknowledge the existence of case law, primarily from lower federal courts, that occasionally applies non-PRA injunctive relief standards. Our Supreme Court has determined that PRA disclosure is regulated by only the PRA injunctive relief standard. Lyft, 190 Wn.2d at 784-85.
IV
In his cross appeal, Sueoka contends that the trial court erred by denying his motion to "change the case title and bar the use of pseudonyms" in this litigation. According to Sueoka, Washington's open courts principles, emanating from article I, section 10 of our state constitution, require that the Does litigate this matter using their actual names. We disagree.
In seeking to preclude the disclosure of their identities in the requested records, the Does assert a First Amendment right. Thus, it is federal open courts jurisprudence, which itself derives from the First Amendment, that here applies. Such jurisprudence permits litigants to proceed pseudonymously when the injury litigated against would be incurred as a result of the disclosure of their identities. Herein, that precise outcome would occur were the Does not permitted to litigate using pseudonyms.
Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not err in ruling that the Does could proceed in pseudonym in this litigation. For the same reason, we decline to grant Sueoka's request to preclude the use of pseudonyms on appeal.
A
In these proceedings, both the trial court and our commissioner have repeatedly entertained Sueoka's argument that the Does should not be permitted to litigate pseudonymously. In each instance, they have rejected that argument. First, Sueoka objected to the Does' motion to proceed in pseudonym filed concurrent with their initial complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief. On March 9, 2021, Judge Cahan granted the Does' motion. Prior to so doing, Judge Cahan considered the factors for redaction set forth in Seattle Times Co. v. Ishikawa, 97 Wn.2d 30, 640 P.2d 716 (1982), and made the findings required therein. Judge Cahan also determined that the Does had complied with the relevant court rules, including General Rule (GR) 15. Three days later, on March 12, 2021, Judge Widlan denied the Does' complaint for injunctive relief, and the Does sought discretionary review.
Sueoka then filed a "motion to change the case title and bar the use of pseudonyms" in this court. He subsequently filed a notice of cross appeal, challenging Judge Cahan's order permitting the Does to litigate in pseudonym. Our commissioner denied Sueoka's motion to change the case title on April 9, 2021. The commissioner explained that there "appear[ed] to be no dispute that Judge Cahan evaluated the Ishikawa factors in reaching the March 9, 2021 decision and that no party asked Judge Widlan to revisit [that] order." The commissioner further reasoned that the "substance of Sueoka's motion to change the case title is inextricably tangled up with the merits of his appeal" and concluded that "maintaining the case name adopted by the trial court . . . appears to be necessary to allowing [this court] to reach the merits of this case."
Following transfer of the appeal from Division One to our Supreme Court, and that court's subsequent dismissal of review and remand to the superior court, Sueoka again filed a "motion to change the case title and bar the use of pseudonyms." Sueoka did not therein challenge Judge Cahan's order granting the Does' motion to proceed in pseudonym. Judge Widlan denied Sueoka's motion, reasoning that "the purpose of [the Does'] lawsuit is to procure an injunction to prevent disclosure of their names" and, thus, requiring use of their names in court filings "would effectively prevent them from seeking any relief."
B
Washington's open courts jurisprudence derives from article I, section 10 of our state constitution, which requires that "[j]ustice in all cases shall be administered openly, and without unnecessary delay." Wash. Const. art. I, § 10. Because "[t]he openness of our courts 'is of utmost public importance,'" Washington courts begin "with the presumption of openness when determining whether a court record may be sealed from the public." Hundtofte v. Encarnacion, 181 Wn.2d 1, 7, 330 P.3d 168 (2014) (quoting Dreiling v. Jain, 151 Wn.2d 900, 903, 93 P.3d 861 (2004)). Whether redaction implicates article I, section 10's mandate of open access to courts and court documents "depends on application of the experience and logic test." State v. S.J.C., 183 Wn.2d 408, 412, 352 P.3d 749 (2015). When article I, section 10 applies, redaction is permitted only after consideration of the factors set forth in Ishikawa, 97 Wn.2d 30. When our state constitution is not implicated, GR 15 permits the redaction of names in pleadings if the court "enters written findings that the specific sealing or redaction is justified by identified compelling privacy or safety concerns that outweigh the public interest in access to the court record." GR 15(c)(2).
In a recent opinion, our Supreme Court reversed a decision of this court wherein we had determined that allowing the plaintiffs to litigate using pseudonyms did not implicate article I, section 10. John Doe G v. Dep't of Corr.,190 Wn.2d 185, 191, 410 P.3d 1156 (2018) (citing John Doe G v. Dep't of Corr., 197 Wn.App. 609, 627-28, 391 P.3d 496 (2017)). The Supreme Court therein addressed a privacy right arising from a state statute. The questions presented were (1) whether special sex offender sentencing alternative evaluations are exempt from disclosure pursuant to statutory exemptions, and (2) whether "pseudonymous litigation was proper in [that] action." Doe G, 190 Wn.2d at 189.
On appeal before this court, we had looked to federal open courts jurisprudence for "guidance," recognizing the "parallel rights [to those derived from article I, section 10] under the First Amendment." Doe G, 197 Wn.App. at 627. We noted federal court holdings that the use of pseudonyms is appropriate when "'the injury litigated against would be incurred as a result of the disclosure of the plaintiff's identity.'" Doe G, 197 Wn.App. at 627 (quoting Doe v. Frank, 951 F.2d 320, 324 (11th Cir. 1992)). Based, in part, on this reasoning, we held that "[e]xperience and logic" demonstrated "that allowing [the] plaintiffs to proceed under pseudonyms [did] not implicate article I, section 10 where the public's interest in the plaintiffs' names is minimal and use of those names would chill their ability to seek relief." Doe G, 197 Wn.App. at 628. Thus, we affirmed the trial court's ruling permitting the plaintiffs to litigate using pseudonyms, notwithstanding that the trial court had not applied the Ishikawa factors. Doe G, 197 Wn.App. at 624.
Our Supreme Court reversed our decision, holding that "pseudonymous litigation was improper . . . because the trial court did not adhere to the requirements of article I, section 10 . . . and [GR] 15." Doe G, 190 Wn.2d at 189. In so holding, the court explained that it had "never used [the] analysis" set forth in the federal appellate court decisions on which we had relied for guidance. Doe G, 190 Wn.2d at 198. Instead, the court held, Washington courts "rely on GR 15 and Ishikawa." Doe G, 190 Wn.2d at 198.
C
Citing our Supreme Court's decision in Doe G, 190 Wn.2d 185, Sueoka contends that Judge Widlan "used the wrong legal standard" in denying his motion to preclude the Does from litigating pseudonymously. However, in so asserting, Sueoka misperceives the issue as one of Washington law. It is not. Accordingly, his argument fails.
Br. of Resp't/Cross Appellant at 69-71.
We note that, if Washington law did apply here, Sueoka's contention would nevertheless be unavailing. As discussed above, Judge Cahan did apply GR 15 and the Ishikawa factors in ruling that the Does could proceed in pseudonym. Sueoka does not challenge Judge Cahan's findings, which are, therefore, verities on appeal. In re Welfare of A.W., 182 Wn.2d 689, 711, 344 P.3d 1186 (2015); see also Doe AA v. King County, 15 Wn.App. 2d 710, 717, 476 P.3d 1055 (2020) (accepting as true the trial court's Ishikawa findings that were unchallenged on appeal). Following Sueoka's subsequent motion seeking, once again, to preclude the Does from litigating in pseudonym, Judge Widlan simply declined to revisit Judge Cahan's earlier ruling.
Unlike in Doe G, in this case, the Does assert that disclosure of their identities would impinge a federal constitutional First Amendment right. Preventing the Does from proceeding in pseudonym would preclude their ability to obtain the relief that they seek in this action. In other words, requiring the Does to use their actual names in the case caption would undermine their ability to assert the First Amendment right that they seek to vindicate herein. Such a result would violate the Supremacy Clause, U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2, which mandates that we must not "give effect to state laws that conflict with federal laws." Armstrong, 575 U.S. at 324. When parties who assert that disclosure of their identities would violate a federal constitutional right seek to litigate pseudonymously, it is federal open courts jurisprudence, arising from the First Amendment itself, that we must apply.
This holding is consistent with our Supreme Court's decision in Doe G, 190 Wn.2d 185. There, the litigants seeking to use pseudonyms asserted that disclosure of their identities in the requested records was precluded by statutory rights arising from statutory exemptions, including an exemption enumerated within the PRA itself. Doe G, 190 Wn.2d at 189. Thus, our Supreme Court properly held that Washington's open courts jurisprudence applied and that we had erred by importing federal case law into Washington law. Doe G, 190 Wn.2d at 189, 198.
Here, however, the Supremacy Clause requires that First Amendment jurisprudence be applied, both as to the constitutional right at issue-whether disclosure of the Does' identities in the requested records would violate a constitutional privacy right-and as to the question of whether the Does may use pseudonyms in seeking to vindicate that right. Accordingly, because the Does assert an exemption from disclosure premised on a federal constitutional right, rather than a statutory exemption, the application of federal open courts jurisprudence does not conflict with our Supreme Court's decision in Doe G but does comport with the requirements of the Supremacy Clause.
Federal courts have made clear that "[p]ublic access [to plaintiffs' names in a lawsuit] is more than a customary procedural formality; First Amendment guarantees are implicated when a court decides to restrict public scrutiny of judicial proceedings." Doe v. Stegall, 653 F.2d 180, 185 (5th Cir. 1981); see also Roe II v. Aware Woman Ctr. for Choice, Inc., 253 F.3d 678, 688 (11th Cir. 2001) (Hill, J., concurrence in part). When federal law applies, "[t]he ultimate test for permitting a plaintiff to proceed anonymously is whether the plaintiff has a substantial privacy right which outweighs the 'customary and constitutionally-embedded presumption of openness in judicial proceedings.'" Frank, 951 F.2d at 323 (quoting Stegall, 653 F.2d at 186). "A plaintiff should be permitted to proceed anonymously only in those exceptional cases involving matters of a highly sensitive and personal nature, real danger of physical harm, or where the injury litigated against would be incurred as a result of the disclosure of the plaintiff's identity." Frank, 951 F.2d at 324 (emphasis added).
Thus, the First Amendment both confers privacy rights in political speech and also, in the standard regulating when a party can proceed in pseudonym, provides that these substantive rights cannot be extinguished merely because a party seeks to vindicate them. In other words, it provides that concerns about public access to the courts cannot be applied to the detriment of First Amendment rights under federal law, such that the vindication of constitutional rights would be improperly conditioned on disclosure. In this action, the "injury litigated against" is disclosure of the Does' identities in the requested records. Were the Does not permitted to litigate pseudonymously, the very injury they seek to litigate against would be incurred. Pursuant to federal open courts jurisprudence, in this circumstance, "the almost universal practice of disclosure must give way . . . to the privacy interests at stake." Stegall, 653 F.2d at 186.
In NAACP, 357 U.S. at 459-60, the United States Supreme Court relied on this principle-that federal law not be applied in a manner that precludes the vindication of individuals' constitutional rights to privacy-in holding that the plaintiff organization had standing to assert the rights of its members. The Court held that the general principle that parties must assert only those constitutional rights "which are personal to themselves" is "not disrespected where constitutional rights of persons who are not immediately before the Court could not be effectively vindicated except through an appropriate representative before the Court." NAACP, 357 U.S. at 459. There, the NAACP challenged a court order mandating disclosure of its membership lists to the Alabama Attorney General, asserting that such disclosure would violate its members' constitutional privacy rights. NAACP, 357 U.S. at 451, 458. The Court held that the "right [was] properly assertable by the [NAACP]," reasoning that "[t]o require that [the constitutional right] be claimed by the [NAACP's] members themselves would result in nullification of the right at the very moment of its assertion." NAACP, 357 U.S. at 459. See also Pollard, 283 F.Supp. At 256 (recognizing "recent Supreme Court decisions establish[ing] that an organization made up of private individuals has standing to protect those individuals from unwarranted invasions of government of their rights of association and privacy guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments"). Similarly, here, the Does would be precluded from vindicating their constitutional rights were they unable to litigate pseudonymously. First Amendment open courts jurisprudence prohibits disclosure in such circumstances. Frank, 951 F.2d at 324.
In summary, the Supremacy Clause prohibits the application of state open courts jurisprudence to a pending First Amendment claim when such application would cause the injury litigated against to be incurred, as federal open courts principles, arising as they do from the First Amendment itself, would not mandate the disclosure of the parties' names in that circumstance. If the Does ultimately prevail, they would be entitled to full protection of their First Amendment rights against the government-here, protection against disclosure of their identities within the requested records. State constitutional open courts provisions cannot be applied in contravention of First Amendment jurisprudence in a manner that frustrates protection of the citizen's federal constitutional rights.
Accordingly, we hold that the Does must be permitted to use pseudonyms in this action. The trial court did not err by so ruling. We additionally deny Sueoka's request that we change the case title in this appeal to require it to include the Does' actual names.
D
The Does seek herein to vindicate rights enshrined in the federal constitution. Thus, applying the open courts principles arising from article I, section 10 of our state constitution to determine whether the Does may be permitted to litigate in pseudonym would contravene the Supremacy Clause's mandate of state law supersession. Accordingly, as discussed above, we must apply federal law to this question. We nevertheless note that application of Washington open courts law would dictate the same resolution of this issue.
Again, this is due to the Supremacy Clause's mandate that we not give effect to state laws that conflict with federal laws. Precluding the Does from litigating in pseudonym pursuant to article I, section 10 would itself be a state action that would compel the disclosure of the Does' individual political beliefs and associations. Indeed, application by Washington courts of our state constitution is itself a state action. Thus, only by demonstrating that the disclosure of the Does' identities "'furthers a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest,'" Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 340 (quoting Fed. Election Comm'n, 551 U.S. at 464), could a Washington court require such disclosure when a party seeking to litigate in pseudonym asserts a federal First Amendment claim. Washington courts, too, are subject to the Supremacy Clause's mandate.
Here, as we have discussed, there is no compelling state interest in the disclosure of the Does' identities in the requested records. Similarly, there is no compelling state interest in requiring that the Does litigate using their actual names. Given the profusion of exceptions to the disclosure mandate, this conclusion is inescapable. Our state law currently includes 632 legislatively created exceptions to the PRA's disclosure mandate. See Appendix A. This proliferation of exceptions undoubtedly demonstrates the absence of a compelling state interest in the disclosure of the Does' identities here.
Moreover, neither our legislature nor our Supreme Court, in permitting broad categories of persons to retain their anonymity in court records, has engaged in the particularized analysis that would be required if the disclosure of those persons' identities implicated a compelling state interest. For instance, our legislature has determined that individuals are automatically entitled to anonymity in certain court records, including records regarding adoptions, RCW 26.33.330; confidential name changes, RCW 4.24.130(5); child victims of sexual assault, RCW 10.52.100; juvenile nonoffender records, such as juvenile dependencies, parental terminations, and truancy, at risk youth, and child in need of services cases, RCW 13.50.100; juvenile offender records, RCW 13.50.050; mental illness commitments, RCW 71.05.620; and mental illness commitments of minors, RCW 71.34.335.
Similarly, by both court rule and order, Washington courts have deemed certain categories of persons to be exempt from the general mandate that court records include the actual names of the litigants. Washington court rule General Rule 15, consistent with article I, section 10 of our state constitution, "preserves a long-established principle that the complete names of parties are to be listed with the actions to which they are parties," subject to "carefully delimited" exceptions. Hundtofte, 181 Wn.2d at 16 (Madsen, C.J., concurring). These exceptions, however, are not based on a particularized analysis of each case. Rather, like the legislative enactments discussed above, they exempt litigants in broad categories of cases from the disclosure mandate. For instance, in adopting Rule of Appellate Procedure (RAP) 3.4, our Supreme Court has determined that all juvenile offenders are entitled to anonymity in court records. By order, the Washington Court of Appeals has similarly required that case titles in certain appeals-including those regarding adoption, civil commitment, dependency, termination of parental rights, truancy, at risk youth, child in need of services, and juvenile offender-use the parties' initials rather than their full names. Gen. Ord. for the Ct. of Appeals, In re Changes to Case Title (Wash.Ct.App. Aug. 22, 2018) (effective Sept. 1, 2018).
RAP 3.4 provides:
In a juvenile offender case, the parties shall caption the case using the juvenile's initials. The parties shall refer to the juvenile by his or her initials throughout all briefing and pleadings filed in the appellate court, and shall refer to any related individuals in such a way as to not disclose the juvenile's identity. However, the trial court record need not be redacted to eliminate references to the juvenile's identity.
Thus, neither our state legislature nor Washington courts, in adopting exceptions to our state open courts law, have deemed it necessary to conduct a particularized case-by-case analysis prior to permitting the redaction of parties' names in court records. Instead, whether by legislative enactment, court rule, or court order, our state has exempted broad categories of persons from the general disclosure requirement. Certainly, such broad exemptions do not indicate the narrow tailoring that would be necessary were the state interest in the disclosure of litigants' actual names compelling. Thus, by exempting broad swaths of persons from article I, section 10's open courts mandate, both the Washington legislature and Washington courts have impliedly indicated that the state interest in disclosure of litigants' actual names is not a compelling one.
The Supremacy Clause prohibits the application of state open courts jurisprudence when, as here, the right asserted is established by the federal First Amendment. Nevertheless, even were we to apply Washington law to the question of whether the Does may litigate in pseudonym, we would reach the same conclusion-that not only "may" they so litigate, but that the federal constitution demands they be permitted to do so. Such a determination by a Washington court is, itself, state action. The broad exemptions to the open courts mandate, both enacted by our legislature and adopted by our courts, demonstrate that the state interest in the disclosure of individuals' actual names in court records is not a compelling one. Absent such an interest, and given the Does' First Amendment right to anonymity in political belief and association, we cannot require the Does to litigate using their actual names here.
V
A
All members of the panel have taken an oath to "'support the Constitution of the United States.'" RCW 2.06.085. Each panel member views the methods of analyses employed herein and the decisions reached as being in accord with this oath.
Nevertheless, we are aware of the cultural and political tenor of our times. This includes an awareness that many Americans despair that judicial decisions have become result-oriented to achieve political ends. To disabuse those so inclined from defaulting to such a judgment concerning this opinion, and to assure the general public that its appellate court exists in a reality-based environment, we choose to acknowledge several of the pertinent facts that underlie the dispute at issue.
1
The 2020 Presidential Election
1. Joseph R. Biden, Jr. won the 2020 presidential election, receiving 81,283,501 popular votes. Donald J. Trump lost the 2020 presidential election, receiving 74,223,975 popular votes. Biden received 7,059,526 more votes than did Trump.
U.S. Fed. Election Comm'n, Federal Elections 2020: Election Results for the U.S. President, the U.S. Senate, and the U.S. House of Representatives 5 (Oct. 2022), at 5, https://www.fec.gov/resources/cms-content/documents/federalelections2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/5XDB-2XJA]
Federal Elections 2020, supra, at 5.
2. Biden's popular vote total was the largest ever received by a candidate for President of the United States.
Domenico Montanaro, President-Elect Joe Biden Hits 80 Million Votes in Year Of Record Turnout, Nat'l Pub. Radio (Nov. 25, 2020), https://www.npr.org/2020/11/25/937248659/president-elect-biden-hits-80-million-votes-in-year-of-record-turnout [https://perma.cc/4FZS-AWKK].
3. Biden received 51.3 percent of the popular vote. This was the highest percentage of the popular vote attained by a challenger to a sitting president since 1932, when Franklin Roosevelt defeated Herbert Hoover.
Federal Elections 2020, supra, at 5.
Presidential Election Margin of Victory, Am. Presidency Project (Mar. 7, 2020), https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/statistics/data/presidential-election-mandates [https://perma.cc/9MJG-RAHE]; Share of Electoral College and Popular Votes from Each Winning Candidate, in All United States Presidential Elections from 1789 to 2020, Statista (Dec. 2020), https://www.statista.com/statistics/1034688/share-electoral-popular-votes-each-president-since-1789 [https://perma.cc/B5SE-NLLY].
4. Biden earned 306 electoral votes. Trump earned 232. In 2016, Trump earned 306 electoral votes, while Hillary Clinton earned 232. Thus, Biden defeated Trump by the same Electoral College margin as Trump defeated Clinton.
Federal Elections 2020, supra, at 7.
2016 Presidential Election Results, N.Y. Times (Aug. 19, 2017, 9:00 AM), www.nytimes.com/elections/2016/results/president.
2
The Rally on January 6, 2021
1. A "Stop the Steal" rally was held on January 6, 2021 on public property in the District of Columbia. Various permits were sought and obtained, authorizing use of the public property.
See note 13, supra.
2. The theme of the rally was that the election had been "stolen" from Donald Trump. Thus, Trump and rally organizers urged, Congress should not finalize Biden's victory by certifying the Electoral College results (as the law required).
H.R. Rep. No. 117-663, at 231-33, 499-502 (2022), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-J6-REPORT/pdf/GPO-J6-REPORT.pdf [https://perma.cc/UH8B-ZQ7D].
3. Trump, the sitting president, spoke at the rally.
H.R. Rep. No. 117-663, at 231-33.
3
The Insurrection at the Capitol
1. As the rally ended, a civil disturbance began at the Capitol. Hundreds of persons illegally broke through security lines and eventually into the Capitol Building.
Audrey Kurth Cronin, The Capitol Has Been Breached Before: This Time It Was Different, Am. Univ. Sch. of Int'l Serv. (Feb. 9, 2021), https://www.american.edu/sis/centers/security-technology/the-capitol-has-been-attacked-before-this-time-it-was-different.cfm [https://perma.cc/Y4NJ-7GE3]. See discussion H.R. Rep. No. 117-663, at 637-88.
2. Both the House of Representatives and the Senate were forced to adjourn and flee to safety.
H.R. Rep. No. 117-663, at 664-66.
3. In the riotous melee that ensued over 140 law enforcement officers were injured. According to a U.S. Senate report, seven deaths were attributed to the violence that took place.
Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs & Comm. on Rules & Admin., U.S. Senate, Examining the U.S. Capitol Attack: A Review of the Security, Planning, and Response Failures on January 6, at 33 (June 2021), https://www.rules.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Jan%206%20HSGAC%20Rules%20Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/DL5Q-5XT3].
Examining the U.S. Capitol Attack, supra, at 1.
4. The common goal of the rioters was to keep Congress from performing its lawful function-certification of Biden's presidential election victory. Some rioters, including those who chanted "Hang Mike Pence," had other goals, such as the killing or kidnapping of members of Congress.
Examining the U.S. Capitol Attack, supra, at 1.
H.R. Rep. No. 117-663, at 37-39; Cronin, supra.
5. For the first time since the War of 1812, the United States government lost physical control of the Capitol Building to a group of attackers.
Cronin, supra; Amanda Holpuch, US Capitol's Last Breach Was More Than 200 Years Ago, Guardian (Jan. 6, 2021, 7:59 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2021/jan/06/us-capitol-building-washington-history-breach [https://perma.cc/RU25-E3LP]; Amy Sherman, A History of Breaches and Violence at the U.S. Capitol, PolitiFact (Jan. 6, 2021), https://www.politifact.com/article/2021/jan/07/history-breaches-and-violence-us-capitol/ [https://perma.cc/8A7C-5L2H].
6. Over 1,000 persons have been charged with crimes premised on actions occurring at the Capitol on January 6, 2021. Over 630 have, to date, pleaded guilty or been found guilty after trial.
The Jan. 6 Attack: The Cases Behind the Biggest Criminal Investigation in U.S. History, Nat'l Pub. Radio (May 12, 2023, 5:25 PM), https://www.npr.org/2021/02/09/965472049/the-capitol-siege-the-arrested-and-their-stories [https://perma.cc/S38K-B8DK].
The Jan. 6 Attack: The Cases Behind the Biggest Criminal Investigation in U.S. History, supra.
7. Many of the insurrectionists belonged to groups espousing white supremacist views. Others of the rioters, while not group members, were shown to possess such views.
See discussion H.R. Rep. No. 117-663, at 499-576; Sabrina Tavernise & Matthew Rosenberg, These Are the Rioters Who Stormed the Nation's Capitol, N.Y. Times (May 12, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/07/us/names-of-rioters-capitol.html; Deena Zaru, The Symbols of Hate and Far-Right Extremism on Display in Pro-Trump Capitol Siege, ABC News (Jan. 14, 2021, 2:01 AM), https://www.abcnewsgo.com/us/symbols-hate-extremism-display-pro-trump-captiol-siege/story?id=75177671 [https://perma.cc/3T4R-2JRL]; Matthew Rosenberg & Ainara Tiefenthäler, Decoding the Far-Right Symbols at the Capitol Riot, N.Y. Times (Jan. 13, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/13/video/extremist-signs-symbols-capitol-riot.html.
Given all of these facts, it is easy to understand the concerns motivating the City and the requesters. Nevertheless, our duty to the United States Constitution, and the Constitution's embrace and protection of a right to anonymity in political activity, lead us to the decisions we announce today.
B
The trial court's denial of the Does' motion for a preliminary injunction is reversed and remanded.
The trial court's issuance of a temporary restraining order is affirmed.
The trial court's order denying Sueoka's motion to preclude the Does' use of pseudonyms is affirmed. Sueoka's motion to change the case title is denied.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
APPENDIX A
Public Records Exemptions Accountability Committee - Sunshine Committee
Schedule of Review - Updated March 2022
"Legislation" = bills with Committee recommendations + other bills related to Committee recommendations (+ some related bills where the Legislature independently introduced legislation)
Category
RCW (thru 2012)
Description
Date * Enacted
Materials Presented
Recommendation
Proposed Legislation & Related Bills
1
Agriculture
42.56.380(6)
Information on individual American ginseng growers or dealers
1996
Oct. 2007
June 2008
SB 5295 (Ch. 128, 2010 Laws)
2
Personal Information -Research Data/Health Care
42.56.360(1)(f); [now (3)(a)]
Information relating to infant mortality pursuant to RCW 70.05.170
1992
Oct. 2007
Mar. 2008
SB 5295 (Ch. 128, 2010 Laws)
3
Personal Information -Research Data/Health Care
70.05.170
Medical records collected by a local department of health in the course of conducting a child mortality review
1992
Oct. 2007
Mar. 2008
SB 5295 (Ch. 128, 2010 Laws); SB 5049 (2011, 2012)
4
Legislative Records
42.56.010(2); [now (3)]
Definition of "public records" for the senate and the house are limited to definition of legislative records in RCW 40.14.100 and budget, personnel, travel records and certain reports. [Definition]
1995
Oct. 2007
Aug.2009
5
Personal Information -Public Employment
42.56.250(2)
Applications for public employment, including names, resumes
1987
Oct. 2007; March 2008; Sept. 2008; Feb. 2017; May 2017
Mar. 2008; September 2008; May 2017
SB 5294 (2009); SB 5049 (2011,2012); HB 1298 (2013); SB 5169 (2013); HB 1537 (Ch. 229, 2019 Laws); SB 5246 (2019)
6
Agriculture
42.56.380(1); 15.86.110
Business records the department of agriculture obtains regarding organic food products
1992
Nov. 2007 Jan. 2008
June 2008
7
Agriculture
42.56.380(2); 15.54.362
Information regarding business operations contained in reports on commercial fertilizer
1987
Nov. 2007 Jan. 2008
June 2008
8
Agriculture
42.56.380(3)
Production or sales records required to determine payments to various agricultural commodity boards and commissions (Relates to exemptions in 10 commission statutes)
1996
Nov. 2007 Jan.2008
June 2008
9
Agriculture
42.56.380(4)
Consignment information contained on phytosanitary certificates issued by the department of agriculture
1996
Nov. 2007 Jan. 2008
June 2008
10
Agriculture
42.56.380(5)
Financial and commercial information and records held by the department of agriculture for potential establishment of a commodity board or commission regarding domestic or export marketing activities or individual production information
1996
Nov. 2007 Jan. 2008
June 2008; November 2012
11
Agriculture
42.56.380(7)
Identifiable information collected by department of agriculture regarding packers and shippers of fruits and vegetables for purposes of inspections and certification
1996
Nov. 2007 Jan.2008
June 2008
12
Agriculture
42.56.380(8)
Financial statements provided to the department of agriculture for purposes of obtaining public livestock market license
2003
Nov. 2007 Jan. 2008
June 2008
13
Agriculture
42.56.380(9)
(Voluntary) National animal identification systems -herd inventory mgmt., animal disease
2006
Nov. 2007 Jan. 2008
June 2008
Category
RCW
Description
Date Enacted
Materials Presented
Recommendation
Proposed Legislation & Related Bills
14
Agriculture
42.56.380(10);16.36
Animal disease reporting
2006
Nov. 2007
Jan. 2008
June 2008
15
Agriculture
42.56.270(17)
Farm plans that are voluntary and developed with conservation district assistance
2006
Jan. 2008; *See also May 2016, Aug. 2016 & Oct. 2016 - 42.56.270 & trade secrets
June 2008; November 2012; * See also Oct. 2016 - 42.56.270 & trade secrets
2017: HB 1160/SB 5418
16
Agriculture
42.56.610
Livestock nutrient management information: Certain information obtained by state and local agencies from dairies, animal feeding operations not required to apply for a national pollutant discharge elimination system permit disclosable only in ranges that provide meaningful information to public
2005 (c510s5)
Nov. 2007
Jan.2008
June 2008
;
17
Agriculture
15.49.370(8)
Seeds: operations and production information
1969
Nov. 2007
Jan. 2008
June 2008
18
Agriculture
15.53.9018
Commercial Feed required reports
1975
Nov. 2007
Jan. 2008
June 2008
19
Agriculture
15.58.060(1)(c)
Washington Pesticide Control Act: Business information of a proprietary nature regarding pesticide formulas
1971
Nov. 2007
Jan. 2008
June 2008
20
Agriculture
15.58.065(2)
Washington Pesticide Control Act: Privileged or confidential commercial or financial information, trade secrets re: pesticides
1971
Nov. 2007
Jan.2008
June 2008
21
Agriculture
15.65.510
Information regarding agricultural marketing agreements (including info from noncompliance hearings)
1961
Feb. 2008
June 2008
22
Agriculture
15.86.110
Business related information obtained by the department of agriculture regarding entities certified to handle and process organic or transitional food, or entities applying for such certification
1992
Nov. 2007
Jan. 2008
June 2008
23
Agriculture
17.24.061(2)
Insect Pests & Plant Diseases (including: trade secrets or commercial or financial information obtained by department of agriculture regarding insect pests, noxious weeds, or organisms affecting plant life
1991
Nov. 2007
Jan.2008
June 2008
24
Agriculture
22.09.040(9)
Financial information provided by applicants for a warehouse license to the department of agriculture
1987
Feb. 2008
June 2008
25
Agriculture
22.09.045(7)
Financial information provided by applicants for a grain dealer license to the department of agriculture
1987
Feb. 2008
June 2008
26
Agriculture
43.23.270
Financial and commercial information obtained by the department of agriculture for export market development projects
1996
Nov. 2007
Feb. 2008
June 2008
27
Personal Information
28C.18.020
List of nominees for director of work force training & education board [Later eliminated]
1991
Feb. 2008
Sept. 2008
SB 5295 (Ch. 128 Laws of 2010)
28
Personal Information
79A.25.150
Names of candidates for director of interagency committee for outdoor recreation [Later eliminated]
1989
Feb. 2008
Sept. 2008
SB 5295 (Ch. 128 Laws of 2010)
Category
RCW
Description
Date Enacted
Materials Presented
Recommendation
Proposed Legislation & Related Bills
29
Personal Information
43.33A.025(2)
State investment board criminal history record checks of finalists for board positions
1999
May 2008
June 2008
30
Personal Information: Employment and Licensing
42.56.250(4)
Address, phone numbers, email addresses, SSNs, drivers' license numbers, identicard numbers, payroll deductions, and emergency contact information of public employees or volunteers held by public
1987; 2020
May 2008; Feb. 2016; May 2016
May 2016
2017: HB 1160/SB 5418; HB 1538 (2019)
31
Personal Information
42.56.230(1)&(2)
Personal information in files for students in public schools, patients or clients of public institutions or public health agencies, or welfare programs (1); children in listed programs (2)
1973 (I-276); Re (2): 2011 c 173 s 1,2013 c 220 s 1, 2015 c 47 s 1
Nov. 2008; May 2014; Feb. 2016; May 2016
May 2016 (re consent)
2017: HB 1160/SB 5418. See also HB 1293 (2011); SB 5314 (2011), HB 2646 (2011); HB 1203 (Ch. 220, 2013 Laws); SB 5198 (2013); SB 5098 (Ch. 173, 2011 Laws); HB 1538 (2019); SB 5246 (2019)
32
Public Utilities & Transportation
42.56.330(3)
Personal information in vanpool, carpool, ride-share programs
1997
May 2008
Nov. 2008; November 2012
SB 5294 (2009); SB 5049 (2011,2012); HB 1298 (2013); SB 5169 (2013); HB 1980 (2015); SB 6020 (2015) HB 1554 (2015) (re (2))
33
Public Utilities & Transportation
42.56.330(4)
Personal information of current or former participants or applicants in transit services operated for those with disabilities or elderly persons
1999
May 2008
Oct. 2008
34
Personal Information
41.04.364 (repealed) - 41.04.362 - also see
42.56.360(1)(j)
(same)
Personally identifiable information in state employee wellness program
1987; 2010 c. 128 s 3
May 2008 (2008 law)
July 2008 (2008 law)
SB 5295 (Ch. 128, 2010 Laws)
35
Public Utilities & Transportation
42.56.330(5)
Personal information of persons who use transit passes and other fare payment media
1999; 2012
May 2008
Oct. 2008
SB 5294 (2009); SB 5295 (Ch. 129, 2010 Laws); SB 5049 (2011); SB 2552 (Ch. 68, 2012 Laws); HB 1298 (2013); SB 5169 (2013); HB 1980 (2015); SB 6020 (2015)
36
Misc. Government Functions
42.56.290
Agency records relevant to a controversy but which would not be available to another party under the rules of pretrial discovery for causes pending in the superior courts
1973 (I-276)
June 2008
Nov. 2008
SB 5294 (2009)
37
Personal Information
42.56.250(6)
Information that identifies a person who, while an agency employee: (a) Seeks advice, under an informal process established by the employing agency, in order to ascertain his or her rights in connection with a possible unfair practice under chapter 49.60 RCW against the person; and (b) requests his or her identity or any identifying information not be disclosed
1992
Sept. 2008
Oct. 2008
HB 1538 (2019)
Category
RCW
Description
Date Enacted
Materials Presented
Recommendation
Proposed Legislation & Related Bills
38
Personal Information
42.56.250(5)
Investigative records compiled by an employing agency conducting a current investigation of a possible unfair practice under chapter 49.60 RCW or of a possible violation of other federal, state, or local laws prohibiting discrimination in employment.
1994
Sept. 2008; Feb. 2016; May 2016
Oct. 2008; May 2016
SB 5295 (Ch. 128, 2010 Laws); see also HB 2761 (2012) (employer investigations); 2017: HB 1160/SB 5418
39
Personal Information
42.56.250(8)
Employee salary and benefit information collected from private employers for salary survey information for marine employees
1999
Sept. 2008
Oct. 2008
SB 5295 (Ch. 128, 2010 Laws)
40
Personal Information
42.56.230(3) (formerly (2))
Personal information in files on employees, appointees, or elected officials if disclosure would violate their right to privacy
1973 (I-276)
Nov. 2008; Jan. 2012; March 2012; Feb. 2014;
Aug. 2014; Oct. 2014; Feb. 2015; May 2016 (re consent)
Nov. 2012; May 2016 (re consent)
2017: HB 1160/SB 5418 (re consent)
41
Court Proceedings
13.34.100
Background information regarding a court appointed guardian ad litem.
1993
Oct. 2008
May-10
SB 5049 (2011); HB 1297 (2013); SB 5170 (2013) HB 1298 (2013), HB 1980 (2015); SB 6020 (2015)
42
Public Utilities & Transportation
42.56.330(7)
Personally identifying information of persons who use transponders and other technology to facilitate payment of tolls
2005
Mar. 2009
May 2009
43
Public Utilities & Transportation
42.56.330(8)
Personally identifying information on an ID card that contains a chip to facilitate border crossing.
2008
Mar. 2009
May 2009
44
Public Utilities & Transportation
42.56.330(2)
Residential addresses and phone numbers in public utility records
1987; 2014 c 33 s 1
Mar. 2009; Nov. 2013
Oct. 2009; Nov. 2013
HB 2114 (2014); SB 6007 (Ch. 33, 2014 Laws)
45
Public Utilities & Transportation
42.56.330(6)
Information obtained by governmental agencies and collected by the use of a motor carrier intelligent transportation system or comparable information equipment
1999
Mar. 2009
May 2009
46
Public Utilities & Transportation
42.56.335
Records of any person belonging to a public utility district or municipality owned electrical utility
2007
Mar. 2009
May 2009
47
Public Utilities & Transportation
42.56.330(1)
Valuable commercial information, trade secrets, etc. supplied to the utilities and transportation commission
1987
Mar. 2009
Mar. 2009
48
Public Utilities & Transportation
80.04.095
Utility records filed with utilities and transportation commission containing valuable commercial information
1987
Mar. 2009
Oct. 2009
49
Insurance & Financial Inst.
42.56.400(2)
Information obtained and exempted by the health care authority that is transferred to facilitate development, acquisition, or implementation of state purchased health care
2003
May 2009; May 2010
May 2010
50
Insurance & Financial Inst.
42.56.400(3)
Names of individuals in life insurance policy settlements
1995
May 2009; May 2010
May 2010
51
Insurance & Financial Inst.
48.102.030
Insurance viatical settlement broker records which may be required and examined by the insurance commissioner [later repealed]
1995
May 2009; May 2010
May 2010
Category
RCW
Description
Date Enacted
Materials Presented
Recommendation
Proposed Legislation & Related Bills
52
Insurance & Financial Inst.
42.56.400(4)
Insurance antifraud plans
1995
May 2009; May 2010
May 2010
53
Insurance & Financial Inst.
48.30A.060
Insurance company antifraud plans submitted to the insurance commissioner
1995
May 2009; May 2010
May 2010
54
Insurance & Financial Inst.
42.56.400(5)
Insurers' reports on material acquisitions and disposition of assets, etc. filed with the insurance commission
1995
May 2009; May 2010
May 2010
55
Insurance & Financial Inst.
42.56.400(7)
Information provided to the insurance commissioner regarding service contract providers
1997
May 2009; May 2010
May 2010
56
Insurance & Financial Inst.
48.110.040(3)
Monthly financial reports made by service contract providers to the insurance commissioner
2005
May 2009; May 2010
May 2010
57
Insurance & Financial Inst.
42.56.400(8)
Information obtained by the insurance commissioner relating to market conduct examinations
2001
May 2009; May 2010
May 2010
58
Insurance & Financial Inst.
42.56.400(12)
Documents obtained by the insurance commissioner to perform market conduct examinations. Report is disclosable under RCW 48.37.060.
2007
May 2009; May 2010
May 2010
SB 5049 (2012); HB 1298 (2013); SB 5169 (2013) re RCW 48.37.060
59
Insurance & Financial Inst.
42.56.400(13)
Confidential and privileged documents obtained in market conduct examination
2007
May 2009; May 2010
May 2010
60
Insurance & Financial Inst.
42.56.400(14)
Information provided to the insurance commissioner by insurance company employees asserting market conduct violations
2007
May 2009; May 2010
May 2010
61
Insurance & Financial Inst.
48.37.080
Documents related to insurance commissioner's market conduct examination
2007
May 2009; May 2010
May 2010
62
Insurance & Financial Inst.
42.56.400(9)
Proprietary information provided to the insurance commissioner regarding health carrier holding companies
2001; 2015 c 122 ss 13 & 14
May 2009; May 2010
May 2010
63
Insurance & Financial Inst.
42.56.400(10)
Data filed with the insurance commissioner that reveals identity of claimant, provider, or insurer
2001
May 2009; Aug. 2010
SB 5049 (2012); HB 1299 (2013); SB 5171 (2013)
64
Insurance & Financial Inst.
42.56.400(11)
Documents obtained by insurance commissioner relating to insurance fraud
2006
May 2009; Aug. 2010
Aug. 2010
65
Insurance & Financial Inst.
48.135.060
Documents obtained by insurance commissioner relating to insurance fraud
2006
May 2009; Aug. 2010
Aug. 2010
66
Insurance & Financial Inst.
42.56.400(15)
Documents obtained by insurance commissioner regarding misconduct by agent/broker
2007 Eff. 1/1/09
May 2009; Aug. 2010
Aug. 2010
67
Insurance & Financial Inst.
48.17.595(6)
Information obtained by insurance commissioner in investigation of misconduct by agent/broker
2007
May 2009; Aug. 2010
Aug.2010
68
Insurance & Financial Inst.
42.56.403
Documents that provide background for actuarial opinion filed with insurance commissioner
2006
May 2009; Aug. 2010
Aug.2010
69
Insurance & Financial Inst.
48.02.120
i oimulas, statistics, assumptions, etc. used by insurance companies to create rates; such information that is submitted to the insurance
1985
May 2009; Aug. 2010
Aug. 2010
70
Insurance & Financial Inst.
48.05.385(2)
Statement of actuarial opinion is a public record. Documents that provide background for statement of actuarial opinion filed with insurance commissioner are exempt
2006
May 2009; Aug. 2010
Aug. 2010
Category
RCW
Description
Date Enacted
Materials Presented
Recommendation
Proposed Legislation & Related Bills
71
Insurance & Financial Inst.
48.03.040(6)(a)
Examinations and investigations by state insurance commissioner
1937
May 2009; Aug 2010
Aug. 2010
72
Insurance & Financial Inst.
48.03.050
Examinations and investigations by state insurance commissioner
1937
May 2009
Oct. 2009
SB 5049 (2011)
73
Insurance & Financial Inst.
48.05.465
Insurance companies risk based capital (RBC) reports and plans
1995
May 2009; Aug. 2010
Aug. 2010
74
Insurance & Financial Inst.
48.43.335(1)
Insurance companies risk based capital (RBC) reports and plans (should not be used to compare insurance companies and are therefore confidential)
1998
May 2009; Aug. 2010
Aug. 2010
75
Insurance & Financial Inst.
48.20.530
Proof of nonresident pharmacy licensure used by insurance companies to provide drugs to residents
1991
May 2009; Aug. 2010
Aug. 2010
76
Insurance & Financial Inst.
48.21.330
Proof of nonresident pharmacy licensure used by insurance companies to provide drugs to residents
1991
May 2009; Aug. 2010
Aug. 2010
77
Insurance & Financial Inst.
48.44.470
Proof of nonresident pharmacy licensure used by insurance companies to provide drugs to residents
1991
May 2009; Aug. 2010
Aug. 2010
78
Insurance & Financial Inst.
48.46.540
Proof of nonresident pharmacy licensure used by insurance companies to provide drugs to residents
1991
May 2009; Aug. 2010
Aug. 2010
79
Insurance & Financial Inst.
48.31B.015(2)(b)
Source of consideration (identity of the lender) for loan associated with acquiring an insurance company
1993
May 2009; Aug. 2010
Aug. 2010
80
Insurance & Financial Inst.
48.62.101(2)
Local government self-insurance liability reserve funds-----------------------------------------------
1991
May 2009; Aug. 2010
Aug. 2010
81
Placeholder
82
Insurance & Financial Inst.
48.94.010(5)
Summary of reasoning for insurance commissioner's refusal to issue reinsurance intermediary license
1993
May 2009; Aug. 2010
Aug. 2010
83
Insurance & Financial Inst.
48.130.070
Records of the interstate insurance product regulation compact involving privacy of individuals and insurers' trade secrets
2005
May 2009; Aug. 2010
Aug. 2010
84
Insurance & Financial Inst.
70.148.060(1)
Examination and proprietary records of potential insurers obtained by the director of the Washington state pollution liability insurance agency when soliciting bids to provide reinsurance for owners of underground storage tanks
1989; 2015 c224 s 5
May 2009; Aug. 2010
Aug. 2010-modify
SB 5049 (2011,2012); HB1298 (2013); SB 5169 (2013); HB 1980 (2015); SB 6020 (2015)
85
Insurance & Financial Inst.
70.149.090
Business and proprietary information of insurers obtained by the director of the Washington state pollution liability insurance agency, to provide insurance to owners of heating oil tanks
1995
May 2009; Aug. 2010
Aug. 2010
86
Insurance & Financial Inst.
42.56.400(6)
Examination reports and information obtained by the department of financial institutions from banking institutions
1997
Oct. 2010
Sept. 2011
87
Insurance & Financial Inst.
21.20.855
Reports and information from department of financial services examinations
1988
Oct. 2010
Sept. 2011
88
Insurance & Financial Inst.
30.04.075(1)
Information obtained by the director of financial institutions when examining banks and trust comnanies------------------------------------
1977
Oct. 2010
Sept. 2011
89
Insurance & Financial Inst.
30.04.230(4)(a)
Information obtained during investigations of out of state banks
1983
Oct. 2010
Sept. 2011
Category
RCW
Description
Date Enacted
Materials Presented
Recommendation
Proposed Legislation & Related Bills
90
Insurance & Financial Inst.
31.12.565(1)
Examination reports and information obtained by the director of financial institutions while examining credit unions
1984
Oct. 2010
Sept. 2011
91
Insurance & Financial Inst.
32.04.220(1)
Information from examinations of mutual savings bmkr------------------------------------
1977
Oct. 2010
Sept. 2011
92
Insurance & Financial Inst.
33.04.110(1)
Information from examinations of savings and loan associations
1977
Oct. 2010
Sept. 2011
93
Insurance & Financial Inst.
32.32.228(3)
Findings disapproving conversion from mutual savings bank to capital stock savings bank
1989
Oct. 2010
Sept. 2011
94
Insurance & Financial Inst.
32.32.275
Information applicants deem confidential relating to conversion of mutual savings bank to capital stock savings bank
1981
Oct. 2010
Sept. 2011
95
Insurance & Financial Inst.
7.88.020
Financial institution compliance review documents
1997
Oct. 2010
Sept. 2011
96
Insurance & Financial Inst.
9A.82.170
Information obtained from a financial institution's records pursuant to subpoena under the criminal profiteering act
1984
Oct. 2010
Sept. 2011
97
Insurance & Financial Inst.
21.30.855
Reports and information from department of financial services examinations
1988
Oct. 2010
Sept. 2011
98
Insurance & Financial Inst.
30.04.410(3)
Findings related to disapprovals of bank acquisitions
1989
Oct. 2010
Sept. 2011
99
Insurance & Financial Inst.
33.24.360(1)(d)
Name of lender financing the acquisition of a savings and loan, if requested by the applicant
1973
Oct. 2010
Sept. 2011
100
Insurance & Financial Inst.
42.56.450
Personal information on check cashers and sellers licensing applications and small loan endorsements
1991; 1995
Oct. 2010
Sept. 2011
101
Insurance & Financial Inst.
31.35.070
Reports on examinations of agricultural lenders
1990
Oct. 2010
Sept. 2011
102
Insurance & Financial Inst.
31.45.030(3)
Addresses and phone numbers and trade secrets of applicants of a check casher or seller license
1991
Oct. 2010
Sept. 2011
103
Insurance & Financial Inst.
31.45.077(2)
Addresses, phone numbers and trade secrets of applicants for a small loan endorsement to a check cashers or sellers license
1995
Oct. 2010
Sept. 2011
104
Insurance & Financial Inst.
31.45.090
Trade secrets supplied by licensed check cashers and sellers as part of the annual report to director of financial institutions
2003
Oct. 2010
Sept. 2011
105
L&I-Injured workers
51.16.070(2)
Information in employer's records obtained by labor & industries under industrial insurance
1957
Oct. 2010
Aug.2011
106
L&I-Injured workers
51.28.070
Information and records of injured workers contained in industrial insurance claim files
1957
Oct. 2010
Aug.2011
107
L&I-Injured workers
51.36.110(1)
Information (including patients' confidential information) obtained in audits of health care providers under industrial insurance
1994
Oct. 2010
Aug. 2011
108
Personal Information
42.56.230(5) (formerly (3))
Credit card numbers, debit card numbers, electronic check numbers, and other financial information, except when disclosure is required by other law
Aug. 2010
Aug.2010; November 2012
SB 5049 (2011); HB 1298 (2013); SB 5169 (2013); HB 1980 (2015); HB 1980 (2015)
109
Personal Information
42.56.230(4)
Certain taxpayer information if it would violate taxpayers right of privacy
1973
Feb., May, Aug. 2016
May 2016 (re consent)
Category
RCW
Description
Date Enacted
Materials Presented
Recommendation
Proposed Legislation & Related Bills
110
Personal Information
42.56.230(5)
Personal and financial information related to a small loan or any system of authorizing a small loan in section 6 of this act (RCW 31.45.-)
2009
May 2016 (re consent)
May 2016 (re consent)
111
Personal Information
42.56.230(6)
Personal information required to apply for a driver's license or identicard
2008
May 2016 (re consent)
May 2016 (re consent)
112
L&I-Injured workers
49.17.080(1)
Name of employee of company seeking industrial safety & health act
1973
Aug.2011
Aug. 2011
113
L&I-Injured workers
49.17.200
Trade secrets reported to labor & industries under Washington industrial safety & health act
1973
Aug.2011
Aug. 2011
114
L&I-Injured workers
49.17.210
Identification of employer or employee in labor & industries studies
1973
Aug.2011
Aug. 2011
115
L&I-Injured workers
49.17.250(3)
Info obtained by labor & industries nom employer-requested consultation re. industrial safety & health act--------------------------------------------------
1991
Aug.2011
Aug. 2011
116
L&I-Injured workers
49.17.260
Labor & industries investigative reports on industrial catastrophes
1973
Aug.2011
Aug. 2011
117
L&I-Injured workers
51.36.120
Financial or valuable trade info from health care providers
1989
Aug.2011
Aug. 2011
118
L&I-Injured workers
42.56.400(1)
Board of industrial insurance records pertaining to appeals of crime victims' compensation claims
Aug.2011
Aug. 2011
119
Fish & Wildlife
42.56.430 (1)
Commercial fishing catch data provided to the department of fish and wildlife that would result in unfair competitive disadvantage
May 2017; Aug. 2017; Oct. 2017; Feb. 2018
120
Fish & Wildlife
42.56.430 (2)
Sensitive wildlife data obtained by the department of fish and wildlife
May 2017; Aug. 2017; Oct. 2017; Feb. 2018
121
Fish & Wildlife
42.56.430 (3)
Personally identifying information of persons who acquire recreational or commercial licenses
May 2017; Aug. 2017; Oct. 2017; Feb. 2018
122
Fish & Wildlife
42.56.430(4)
Information subject to confidentiality requirements of Magnuson-Stevens fishery conservation and management reauthorization act of 2006
2008 c 252 s 1
May 2017; Aug. 2017; Oct. 2017; Feb. 2018
123
Employment and Licensing
42.56.250(1)
Test questions, scoring keys, and other exam information used on licenses, employment or academics
1973
May 2021; Aug. 2021; Oct. 2021
124
Personal Information
66.16.090
Records of LCB showing individual purchases of liquor-confidential
1933
Jun. 2013
Jun. 2013
HB 2764 (2013); HB 2663 (Ch. 182, 2016 Laws) -Repealed
125
Investigative, law enforcement and crime victims
42.56.240(9)
Personally identifying information collected by law enforcement agencies pursuant to local security alarm system programs and vacation crime watch programs
2012 c 288 s 1
126
Investigative, law enforcement and crime victims
42.56.240(11)
Identity of state employee or officer who files a complaint with an ethics board under RCW 42.52.420 or reports improper governmental action to the auditor or other official
2013 c 190 s 7
127
Employment and Licensing
42.56.250(7)
Criminal history record checks for investment board finalist candidates
2010
Category
RCW
Description
Date Enacted
Materials Presented
Recommendation
Proposed Legislation & Related Bills
128
Employment and Licensing
42.56.250(7)
Employee salary and benefit information collected from private employers for salary survey information for maritime employees
1999
129
Employment and Licensing
42.56.250(8)
Photographs, month/year of birth in personnel files of public employees; news media has access
2010; 2020
HB 2447 (2010); See also HB 2259 (criminal justice agency/employee info) and HB 1317 (Ch. 257, 2010 Laws) (amending 230);
130
Real estate Appraisals
42.56.260
Real estate appraisals for agency acquisition or sale until project or sale abandoned, but no longer than 3 years in all cases
1973; 2015 c 150 s 1
Aug. 2014; Oct. 2014
Oct. 2014
HB 1431 (Ch. 150, 2015 Laws); SB 5395
131
Investigative, law enforcement and crime victims
42.56.240(1)
Specific intelligence and investigative information completed by investigative, law enforcement, and penology agencies, and state agencies that discipline members of professions, if essential to law enforcement or a person's right to privacy*
1973
Jan. 2012; March 2012; May 2012; March 2013; June 2013; Feb. 2014; Oct. 2014; Oct. 2019
Oct .2019
Burglar alarm info - HB 2896 (2010); HB 1243 (Ch. 88, 2012 Laws); SB 5244 (2011); SB 5344 (2011). Traffic stop info -SB 6186 (2009)
132
Investigative, law enforcement and crime victims
42.56.240(2)
Identity of witnesses, victims of crime, or persons who file complaints, if they timely request nondisclosure and disclosure would endanger their life, personal safety, or property-does not apply to PDC complaints
Jan. 2012; March 2012; March 2013; June 2013; Sept. 2013; May 2014; August 2014
HB 2764 (2013); see also HB 2610 (2010), SB 6428 (2010) (to amend .230))
133
Investigative, law enforcement and crime victims
42.56.240(3)
Records of investigative reports prepared by any law enforcement agency pertaining to sex offenses or sexually violent offenses which have been transferred to WASPC
Jan. 2012; March 2012; June 2013
134
Investigative, law enforcement and crime victims
42.56.240(4)
Information in applications for concealed pistol licenses
1988
May 2011; March 2013
May, 2011
135
Investigative, law enforcement and crime victims
42.56.240(5)
Identifying information regarding child victims of sexual assault
1992
May 2011; Feb. 2015; May 2015; Aug. 2015; Aug. 2018; Oct. 2018; Feb. 2019; May 2019; Aug. 2019; Oct. 2019
Sept. 2011; August 2015
SB 5049 (2012); HB 1299 (2013); SB 5171 (2013); HB 1980 (2015); SB 6020 (2015)
136
Investigative, law enforcement and crime victims
42.56.240(6)
Statewide gang database in RCW 43.43.762
2008
May, 2011
Sept. 2011; November 2012
SB 5049 (2012); HB 1299 (2013); SB 5171 (2013); HB 1980 (2015); SB 6020 (2015)
137
Investigative, law enforcement and crime victims
42.56.240(7)
Data from electronic sales tracking system (pseudoephedrine)
2010
May, 2011
May, 2011
138
Investigative, law enforcement and crime victims
42.56.240(8)
Person's identifying info submitted to sex offender notification and registration system to receive notice regarding registered sex offenders
2010
May, 2011
May, 2011
139
Personal Information/proprietary and tax information
82.36.450(3)
Information filed with department of licensing or open to department of licensing inspection under agreement is personal information under RCW 42.56.230(3) (b) and exempt from public inspection and copying
2007
Sept. 2011
Category
RCW
Description
Date Enacted
Materials Presented
Recommendation
Proposed Legislation & Related Bills
140
Personal Information/proprietary and tax information
82.38.310(3)
Information filed with department of licensing or open to department of licensing inspection under agreement is personal information under RCW 42.56.230(3) (b) and exempt from public inspection and copying
2007
Sept. 2011
141
Lists of Individuals
42.56.070(9)
Lists of individuals for commercial purposes.
1973
Feb. 2017; May 2017
142
Juries
2.36.072(4)
Information provided to court for preliminary determination of statutory qualification for jury duty
1993
143
Personal Information
42.56.230 (7)(a)
Personal information required to apply for a driver's license or identicard
2008 c 200 s 5
Nov. 2013; Dec. 2013; May 2016 (re consent)
Feb. 2014; May 2016 (re consent)
2017: HB 1160/SB 5418
144
Personal Information
42.56.230 (7)(b)
Persons who decline to register for selective service under RCW 46.20.111
2011 c 350 s 2
May 2016 (re consent)
May 2016 (re consent)
2017: HB 1160/SB 5418
145
Financial, Commercial, and Proprietary Information
42.56.270(1)
Valuable formulae, designs, drawings and research obtained by agency within 5 years of request for disclosure if disclosure would produce private gain and public loss
1973 (I-276)
*May 2016, Aug. 2016 & Oct. 2016 - 42.56.270 & trade secrets/proprietary info
*Oct. 2016 - 42.56.270 & trade secrets/proprietary info
2017: HB 1160/SB 5418
146
Financial, Commercial, and Proprietary Information
42.56.270(2)
Financial information supplied by a bidder on ferry work or highway construction
1983
*May 2016, Aug. 2016 & Oct. 2016 - 42.56.270 & trade secrets/proprietary info
*Oct. 2016 - 42.56.270 & trade secrets/proprietary info
2017: HB 1160/SB 5418
147
Financial, Commercial, and Proprietary Information
42.56.270(3)
Financial information and records filed by persons pertaining to export services
1986
*May 2016, Aug. 2016 & Oct. 2016 - 42.56.270 & trade secrets/proprietary info
*Oct. 2016 - 42.56.270 & trade secrets/proprietary info
2017: HB 1160/SB 5418
148
Financial, Commercial, and Proprietary Information
42.56.270(4)
Financial information in economic development loan applications
1987
*May 2016; Aug. 2016 & Oct. 2016 - 42.56.270 & trade secrets/proprietary info
*Oct. 2016 - 42.56.270 & trade secrets/proprietary info
2017: HB 1160/SB 5418
149
Financial, Commercial, and Proprietary Information
42.56.270(5)
Financial information obtained from business and industrial development corporations
1989
*May 2016, Aug. 2016 & Oct. 2016 - 42.56.270 & trade secrets/proprietary info
*Oct. 2016 - 42.56.270 & trade secrets/proprietary info
2017: HB 1160/SB 5418
150
Financial, Commercial, and Proprietary Information
42.56.270(6)
Financial information on investment of retirement moneys and public trust investments
1989
May 2015; Aug. 2015; *May 2016, Aug. 2016 & Oct. 2016 - 42.56.270 & trade secrets/proprietary info
Aug. 2015; see also *Oct. 2016 -42.56.270 & trade secrets/proprietary info
SB 6170 (Chap. 8, 2016 Laws 1st Sp. Sess.); 2017: HB 1160/SB 5418
151
Financial, Commercial, and Proprietary Information
42.56.270(7)
Financial and trade information supplied by and under industrial insurance coverage
1989
*May 2016, Aug. 2016 & Oct. 2016 - 42.56.270 & trade secrets/proprietary info
*Oct. 2016 - 42.56.270 & trade secrets/proprietary info
2017: HB 1160/SB 5418
152
Financial, Commercial, and Proprietary Information
42.56.270(8)
Financial information obtained by the clean Washington center for services related to marketing recycled products
1994
May 2016, Aug. 2016 & Oct. 2016 - 42.56.270 & trade secrets/proprietary info
*Oct. 2016 - 42.56.270 & trade secrets/proprietary info
2017: HB 1160/SB 5418
153
Financial, Commercial, and Proprietary Information
42.56.270(9)
Financial and commercial information requested by public stadium authority from leaser
1997
*May 2016, Aug. 2016 & Oct. 2016 - 42.56.270 & trade secrets/proprietary info
*Oct. 2016 - 42.56.270 & trade secrets/proprietary info
2017: HB 1160/SB 5418
Category
RCW
Description
Date Enacted
Materials Presented
Recommendation
Proposed Legislation & Related Bills
154
Financial, Commercial, and Proprietary Information
42.56.270(10)
Financial information supplied for application for a liquor, gambling, lottery retail or various marijuana licenses
2014 c 192 s 6
*May 2016, Aug. 2016 & Oct. 2016 - 42.56.270 & trade secrets/proprietary info
*Oct. 2016 - 42.56.270 & trade secrets/proprietary info
2017: HB 1160/SB 5418
155
Financial, Commercial, and Proprietary Information
42.56.270(11)
Proprietary data, trade secrets, or other information submitted by any vendor to department of social and health services for purposes of state purchased health care
*May 2016, Aug. 2016 & Oct. 2016 - 42.56.270 & trade secrets/proprietary info
*Oct. 2016 - 42.56.270 & trade secrets/proprietary info
2017: HB 1160/SB 5418
156
Financial, Commercial, and Proprietary Information
42.56.270(12)(a)(i)
Financial or proprietary information supplied to DCTED in furtherance of the state's economic and community development efforts
1993, 1989
*May 2016, Aug. 2016 & Oct. 2016 - 42.56.270 & trade secrets/proprietary info
*Oct. 2016 - 42.56.270 & trade secrets/proprietary info
2017: HB 1160/SB 5418
157
Financial, Commercial, and Proprietary Information
42.56.270(12)(a)(ii)
Financial or proprietary information provided to the DCTED regarding businesses proposing to locate in the state
1999
*May 2016, Aug. 2016 & Oct. 2016 - 42.56.270 & trade secrets/proprietary info
*Oct. 2016 - 42.56.270 & trade secrets/proprietary info
2017: HB 1160/SB 5418
158
Financial, Commercial, and Proprietary Information
42.56.270(14)
Financial, commercial, operations, and technical and research information obtained by the life sciences discovery fund authority
2005 (c424s6)7/25/2006
May 2016, Aug. 2016 & Oct. 2016 - 42.56.270 & trade secrets/proprietary info
*Oct. 2016 - 42.56.270 & trade secrets/proprietary info
2017: HB 1160/SB 5418
159
Financial, Commercial, and Proprietary Information
42.56.270(20)
Financial and commercial information submitted to or obtained by the University of Washington relating to investments in private funds
2009 c 384 s 3
*May 2016, Aug. 2016 & Oct. 2016 - 42.56.270 & trade secrets/proprietary info
*Oct. 2016 - 42.56.270 & trade secrets/proprietary info
2017: HB 1160/SB 5418
160
Financial, Commercial, and Proprietary Information
42.56.270(21)
Market share data submitted by a manufacturer under RCW 70.95N.190(4)
2013 c 305 s 14
*May 2016, Aug. 2016 & Oct. 2016 - 42.56.270 & trade secrets/proprietary info
*Oct. 2016 - 42.56.270 & trade secrets/proprietary info
2017: HB 1160/SB 5418
161
Preliminary records containing opinions or policy formulations
42.56.280
Preliminary drafts, notes, recommendations, and intraagency memos where opinions are expressed or policies formulated or recommended, unless cited by an agency
1973 (I-276)
May 2021; Oct. 2021
162
Archaeological sites
42.56.300(3)
Information identifying the location of archaeological sites
1976; 2014 c 165 s 1
163
Library records
42.56.310
Library records disclosing the identity of a library user
1982
164
Educational Information
42.56.320(1)
Financial disclosures filed by private vocational schools
1986
165
Educational Information
42.56.320(2)
Financial and commercial information relating to the purchase or sale of tuition units
166
Educational Information
42.56.320(3)
Individually identifiable information received by the WFTECB for research or evaluation purposes
167
Educational Information
42.56.320(4)
Information on gifts, grants, or bequests to institutions of higher education (1975)
1975
May 2021; Oct. 2021
168
Educational Information
42.56.320(5)
The annual declaration of intent filed by parents for a child to receive home-based instruction
2009 c 191 s 1
Category
RCW
Description
Date Enacted
Materials Presented
Recommendation
Proposed Legislation & Related Bills
169
Timeshare, condominium owner lists
42.56.340
Membership lists and lists of owners of interests in timeshare projects, condominiums, land developments, or common-interest communities, regulated by the department of licensing
1987
Feb. 2017; May 2017;
Aug.2017
Aug. 2017
2019: HB 1537 (repealed exemption) (Ch. 229, 2019 laws)
170
Health Professionals
42.56.350(1)
SSNs of health care professionals maintained in files of the department of health
1993
171
Health Professionals
42.56.350(2)
Residential address and telephone numbers of health care providers maintained in files of the department of health
1993
172
Investigative, law enforcement and crime victims
42.56.230(7)(c)
Records pertaining to license plates, drivers' licenses or identicards that may reveal undercover work, confidential public health work, public assistance fraud, or child support investigations
2013 c 336 s 3
173
Employment and Licensing
42.56.240(13)
Criminal justice agency employee/worker residence GPS data
2015 c 91 s 1
174
Health Care
42.56.360(1)(c)
Information and documents created, collected, and maintained by the health care services quality improvement program and medical malpractice prevention program
1995
175
Health Care
42.56.360(1)(d)
Proprietary financial and commercial information provided to department of health relating to an antitrust exemption
1997
*See also May 2016, Aug. 2016 & Oct. 2016 -42.56.270 & trade secrets/proprietary info
176
Health Care
42.56.360 (1) (e)
Physicians in the impaired physicians program
1987, 1994, 2001
177
Health Care
RCW 70.05.170(3) -see also 42.56.360(3)
Information relating to infant mortality pursuant to former RCW 70.05.170/RCW 42.56.360 - See 184 and 185
1992; Amended 2010 c
128 s 3
2008 (2008 law)
March 2008 (2008 law)
178
Financial, Commercial, and Proprietary Information
42.56.270(23)
Notice of crude oil transfers
2015 c 274 s 24
*See also May 2016, Aug. 2016 & Oct. 2016 -42.56.270 & trade secrets/proprietary info
179
Health Care
42.56.360(1)(f)
Complaints filed under the health care professions uniform disciplinary act
1997
180
Financial, Commercial, and Proprietary Information
42.56.270(24)
Certain information supplied to the liquor and cannabis board per RCW 69.50.325, 9.50.331, 69.50.342 and 69.50.345
2015 c 178 s 2
*See also May 2016, Aug. 2016 & Oct. 2016 -42.56.270 & trade secrets/proprietary info
181
Health Care
42.56.360(1)(i)
Information collected by the department of health under chapter 70.245 RCW.
2009 c 1 s 1
182
Health Care
42.56.360(1)(k)
Claims data and information provided to the statewide all-payer health care claims database that is exempt under RCW 43.373.040
2014 c 223 s 17
183
Health Care
42.56.360(2) and 70.02
Health care information disclosed to health care provider without patients permission
1991
Category
RCW
Description
Date Enacted
Materials Presented
Recommendation
Proposed Legislation & Related Bills
184
Financial, Commercial, and Proprietary Information
42.56.270(24)
Certain information and data submitted to or obtained by the liquor and cannabis board re applications for licenses or reports required under RCW 69.50.372
2016 1st sp.s. c 9 s 3
*See also May 2016, Aug. 2016 & Oct. 2016 -42.56.270 & trade secrets/proprietary info
185
Health Care; Marijuana
42.56.625
Records in medical marijuana authorization database I RCW 69.51A.230
2015 c 70 s 22
186
Domestic Violence
42.56.370
Client records of community sexual assault program or services for underserved populations [amended 2012]
1991; 2012c29s 13
Check
Check
187
Agriculture and Livestock
42.56.380(10)
Results of animal testing from samples submitted by the animal owner
2012 c 168 s 1(10)
Aug. 2017; Oct. 2017; May 2018; Aug. 2018
Aug. 2018
188
Agriculture and Livestock
42.56.380(11)
Records of international livestock importation that are not disclosable by the U.S.D.A. under federal law.
2012 c 168 s 1(11)
Aug. 2017; Oct. 2017; May 2018; Aug. 2018
Aug. 2018
189
Agriculture and Livestock
42.56.380(12)
Records related to entry of prohibited agricultural products imported into Washington that are not disclosable by the U.S.D.A. under federal law
2012 c 168 s 1(12)
Aug. 2017; Oct. 2017; May 2018; Aug. 2018
Aug. 2018
190
Emergency or Transitional Housing
42.56.390
Names of individuals residing in emergency or transitional housing furnished to the department of revenue or a county assessor
1997
191
Insurance & Financial Inst.
42.56.400(16)
Documents, materials, or information obtained by the insurance commissioner under RCW 48.102.-051 (1) and 48.102.-140 (3) and (7)(a)(ii))
2009 c 104 s 37
192
Insurance & Financial Inst.
42.52.400(17)
Documents, materials, or information obtained by the insurance commissioner under RCW 48.31.025 and 48.99.025
2010 c 97 s 3
193
Insurance & Financial Inst.
42.56.400(18)
Documents, material, or information relating to investment policies obtained by the insurance commissioner under RCW 48.13.151
2011 c 188 s 21
194
Insurance & Financial Inst.
42.56.400(19)
Data from (temporary) study on small group health plan market
2010 c 172 s 2
195
Insurance & Financial Inst.
42.56.400(20); 48.19.040(5)(b)
Information in a filing of usage-based component of the rate pursuant to RCW 48.19.040(5)(b)
2012 c 222 s 1
196
Insurance & Financial Inst.
42.56.400(21); 42.56.400(22); 42.56.400(23); 42.56.400(24); 42.56.400(25)
Data, information, and documents submitted to or obtained by the insurance commissioner
2012 2nd sp. s. c 3 s 8; 2013c65s5; 2013c277 s 5; 205 c 17 ss 10 & 11
197
Employment Security
42.56.410
Most records and information supplied to the employment security department
198
Security
42.56.420(1)
Records relating to criminal terrorist acts
199
Security
42.56.420(2)
Records containing specific and unique vulnerability assessments and emergency and escape response plans - adds civil commitment facilities
2009 c 67 s 1
200
Security
42.56.420(3)
Comprehensive safe school plans that identify specific vulnerabilities
Category
RCW
Description
Date Enacted
Materials Presented
Recommendation
Proposed Legislation & Related Bills
201
Security
42.56.420(4)
Information regarding infrastructure and security of computer and telecommunications networks to the extent that they identify specific system vulnerabilities
1999
Feb. 2014
Feb. 2014
202
Security
42.56.420(5)
Security sections of transportation security plans for fixed guideway systems
203
Personal Information
42.56.230(8)
Information regarding individual claim resolution settlement agreements submitted to the board of industrial insurance appeals
2014 c 142 s 1
204
Veterans' discharge papers
42.56.440
Veterans' discharge papers
205
Fireworks, Explosives
42.56.460
Records and reports produced under state fireworks law, chapter 70.77 RCW and the Washington state explosives act, chapter 70.74 RCW
1995
206
Correctional industries workers
42.56.470
Records pertaining to correctional industries class I work programs
2004
207
Inactive programs
42.56.480(1)
Contracts files by railroad companies with the utilities & transportation commission prior to 7/28/91
1984
Jun. 2013
Jun. 2013
HB 2764 (2013); HB 2663 (Chap. 282, 2016 Laws) (repealed)
208
Inactive programs
42.56.480(2)
Personal information in international contact data base
1996 c 253 s 502
Jun. 2013
Jun. 2013
HB 2663 (Chap. 282, 2016 Laws) (repealed)
209
Inactive programs
42.56.480(3)
Data collected by department of social and health services pertaining to payment systems for licensed boarding homes
2003
Jun. 2013
Jun. 2013
HB 2764 (2013); HB 2663 (Chap. 282, 2016 Laws) (repealed)
210
Enumeration Data
42.56.615
Enumeration data used by office of financial management for population estimates per RCW 43.43.435
2014 c 14 s 1
211
Financial, Commercial, and Proprietary Information;
Marijuana
42.56.620
Reports submitted by marijuana research licensees that contain proprietary information
2015 c 71 s 4
*See also May 2016, Aug. 2016 & Oct. 2016 -42.56.270 & trade secrets/proprietary info
212
Mediation Communication
42.56.600
Records of mediation communications that are privileged under the uniform mediation act
2005 c 424 s 16
213
Code Reviser
1.08.027
Code Reviser drafting services
1951
Feb. 2015
Feb. 2015
214
Judicial - Investigative
2.64.111
Judicial conduct commission investigations and initial proceedings
1989
215
Health Care Professions
4.24.250
Hospital review committee records on professional staff
1971
Sept. 2020; Oct. 2020
216
Financial, Commercial, and Proprietary Information
4.24.601
Trade secrets and confidential research, development or commercial information
1994
*See also May 2016, Aug. 2016 & Oct. 2016 -42.56.270 & trade secrets/proprietary info
217
Financial, Commercial, and Proprietary Information
4.24.611
Trade secrets, confidential research, development or commercial information concerning products or business methods
1994
*See also May 2016, Aug. 2016 & Oct. 2016 -42.56.270 & trade secrets/proprietary info
Category
RCW
Description
Date Enacted
Materials Presented
Recommendation
Proposed Legislation & Related Bills
218
Claims
4.92.210
Information in centralized risk management claim tracking system
1989
219
Privileges
5.60.060
General statements of privileged communications between persons & various professionals, e.g., attorneys or physicians - presumably applies to records (see also # 276)
1954 & later dates
220
Mediation Communication
5.60.070
Materials used in any court ordered mediation
1991
Feb. 2017; May 2017;
221
Mediation Communication
7.07.050(5)
Mediation communications
2005
Feb. 2017; May 2017
222
Mediation Communication
7.07.070
Mediation communications
2005
Feb. 2017; May 2017
223
Health Care Records
7.68.080(9)(a)
The director may examine records of health care provider notwithstanding any statute that makes the records privileged or confidential
2011 c 346 s 501
224
Financial, Commercial, and Proprietary Information
7.68.080(10)
At the request of health care contractor, department must keep financial and trade information confidential
2011 c 346 s 501
-see also May 2016, Aug. 2016 & Oct. 2016 -42.56.270 & trade secrets/proprietary info
225
Crime Victims and Witnesses
7.68.140
Records re. Victims of crimes confidential & not open to inspection
1973
May 2021
226
Crime Victims and Witnesses
7.69.A.030(4)
Name, address, or photograph of child victim or child witness
1985
Feb. 2015; May 2015; Aug. 2015; Aug. 2018; Oct. 2018; Feb. 2019; May 2019; Aug. 2019; Oct. 2019
Oct. 2019
HB 2485 (2019)
227
Mediation Communication
7.75.050
County or city dispute resolution center records
1984
228
Financial, Commercial, and Proprietary Information
7.88.020 & .30
Financial institution compliance review documents
1997
229
Health Care
9.02.100
General statement of fundamental right to reproductive privacy - could apply to records
1991
230
Health Care - Concealed Pistols
9.41.097(2)
Mental health info provided on persons buying pistols or applying for concealed pistol licenses
1994
231
Concealed Pistols
9.41.129
Concealed pistol license applications
1994
232
Crime Victims and Witnesses
9.73.230
Name of confidential informants in written report on wire tapping
1989
233
Crime Victims and Witnesses
72.09.710 (recod eff 8/1/09) (See also # 451)
Names of witnesses notified when drug offenders released (formerly 9.94A.610)
1991 - Recod 2008 c 231 s 26, 56 (See dispositions table)
234
Placeholder
235
Crime Victims and Witnesses
72.09.712 (recod eff 8/1/09) (See also # 451)
Names of victims, next of kin, or witnesses who are notified when prisoner escapes, on parole, or released (formerly 9.94A.610)
1985 - Recod 2008 c 231 s 27, 56 (see dispositions table)
236
Privileges
5.60.060
Alcohol or drug addiction sponsor privilege
2016 st sp. ss. c 24 s 1
237
Offender Information
9.94A.745
Records of the interstate commission for adult offender supervision that would adversely affect personal privacy rights or proprietary interests
2002
*See also May 2016, Aug. 2016 & Oct. 2016 -42.56.270 & trade secrets/proprietary info
Category
RCW
Description
Date Enacted
Materials Presented
Recommendation
Proposed Legislation & Related Bills
Crime Victims and Witnesses 238
9.94A.885
Information regarding victims, survivors of victims, or witnesses that are sent clemency hearing notices may not be released to offender
1999
239
Offender Information
9A.44.138
Sex offender registration information given to high school or institution of higher education regarding an employee or student is confidential
2011 c 337 s 4
240
Criminal Proceedings -Investigative
10.27.090
Grand jury testimony
1971
Sept. 2020; Oct. 2020
241
Criminal Proceedings -Investigative
10.27.160
Grand jury reports
1971
Sept. 2020; Oct. 2020; Feb. 2021; May 2021; Aug. 2021; Oct. 2021
242
Public Utilities & Transportation
19.29A.100
Electric utilities may not disclose private or proprietary customer information
2015 3rd sp. S. c 21 s 1
Check on any prior Committee discussion re utilities
243
Insurance & Financial Inst.
48.31B.015(1)(b)
Filing by controlling person of insurer seeking to divest its controlling interest is confidential until conclusion of transaction
2015 c 122 s 3
244
Investigative, law enforcement and crime victims
42.56.240(14)
Body worn camera recordings
2016 c 163 s 2
245
Investigative, law enforcement and crime victims
42.56.240(14)
Records and info in the statewide sexual assault kit tracking system under RCW 43.43.
2016 c. 173 s 8
246
Crime Victims and Witnesses
10.52.100
Identity of child victims of sexual assault
1992
Aug. 2018; Oct. 2018; Feb. 2019; May 2019; Aug. 2019; Oct. 2019
247
Crime Victims and Witnesses
10.77.205
Information about victims, next of kin, or witnesses requesting notice of release of convicted sex or violent offenders
1990
248
Offender Information
10.77.210
Records of persons committed for criminal insanity
1973
May 2021
249
Crime Victims and Witnesses
10.97
Privacy of criminal records, including criminal history information on arrests, detention, indictment, information, or other formal criminal charges made after 12/31/77 unless dispositions are included
1977
250
Crime Victims and Witnesses
10.97.130
Names of victims of sexual assaults who are 18 years of age or younger
1992
Aug. 2018; Oct. 2018; Feb. 2019; May 2019; Aug. 2019; Oct. 2019
2018
HB 1505 (Ch.300, 2019 Laws); HB 2484 (2019)
251
Judicial - Indigent Defense
10.101.020
Information given by persons to determine eligibility for indigent defense
1989
252
Crime Victims and Witnesses - Juvenile
13.40.150
Sources of confidential information in dispositional hearings on juvenile offenses
1977
Aug. 2018; Oct. 2018; Feb. 2019; May 2019; Aug.2019
253
Crime Victims and Witnesses - Juvenile
13.40.215 and .217
Information about victims, next of kin, or witnesses requesting notice of release of juvenile convicted of violent sex offense or stalking
1990
Aug. 2018; Oct. 2018; Feb. 2019; May 2019; Aug. 2019
Category
RCW
Description
Date Enacted
Materials Presented
Recommendation
Proposed Legislation & Related Bills
254
Juvenile Records
13.50.010(12)
Electronic research copy of juvenile records maintains same level of confidentiality and anonymity as juvenile records in judicial information system
2009c440s 1; 2014c 117 s 5
255
Juvenile Records
13.50.010(13)
Information in records released to the Washington state office of public defense retain confidential nature
2009 c 440s 1; 2014c 117 s 5; 2016 c 72 s 109
256
Juvenile Records
13.50.050(3)
Records on commission of juvenile crimes
1979; Oct. 2019
Oct. 2019
HB 2484 (2019)
257
Juvenile Records
13.50.010(14)(b)
Records of juveniles who receive a pardon are confidential, including the existence or nonexistence of the record
2011 c 338 s 4
258
Juvenile Records
13.50.100(2)
Juvenile justice or care agency records not relating to commission of juvenile crimes
1979
Re 42.56.380(6) - Oct. 2007; May 2019; Aug. 2019; Oct. 2019
Re. 42.56.380(6) - Jun. 2008
259
Agriculture and Livestock
15.19.080
Information on purchases, sales, or production of ginseng by individual growers or dealers (see also 42.56.380 (6))
1998
See # 1 on Schedule of Review; Aug. 2017; Oct. 2017; May 2018; Aug.
2018
See # 1 on Schedule of Review Aug.2018
See # 1 on Schedule of Review
260
Agriculture and Livestock
16.65.030(1)(d)
Financial statement info in public livestock market license applications
2003
Aug. 2017; Oct. 2017; May 2018; Aug. 2018
Aug. 2018
261
Health Care Professions
18.130.095(1)(a)
Complaints filed under uniform disciplinary act for health professionals
1997
262
Health Care Professions
18.130.172(1)
Summary and stipulations in complaints against health care professionals
1993
263
Health Care Professions
18.130.175(4)
Voluntary substance abuse records on health care professionals
1988
264
Health Care Professions
18.130.057 (c 157 s 1(2)(b)
Disciplining authority may not disclose information in a file that contains confidential or privileged information regarding a patient other than the person making the complaint or report
2011 c 157 s 1
265
Counselors
18.19.180
Information counselors acquire and acknowledgement of practice disclosure statements
1987
266
Boarding Homes
18.20.120
Identity of individual or name of boarding homes from boarding home licensing records
1959
Sept. 2020; Oct. 2020
267
Health Care Professions
18.20.390
Information and documents created, collected and maintained by a quality assurance committee
2004
268
Health Care Professions
18.32.040
Implication that information in dentistry registration records is only accessible by the registered person unless disclosure would compromise the examination process
1937
Sept. 2020; Oct. 2020; Oct. 2021
269
Placeholder
270
Health Care Professions
18.44.031(2)
Personal information in applications for escrow agent licenses
1999
271
Health Care Professions
18.46.090
Information on maternity homes received by department of health identifying individuals or maternity homes
1951
Sept. 2020; Oct. 2020; Feb. 2021; May 2021; Aug.2021
Category
RCW
Description
Date Enacted
Materials Presented
Recommendation
Proposed Legislation & Related Bills
272
Health Care Professions
18.53.200
Information and records of optometrists
1975
May 2021; Aug. 2021; Oct. 2021
273
Health Care Professions
18.64.420
Records obtained by department of health regarding various insurance companies
1991
274
Health Care Professions
18.71.0195
Contents of physician disciplinary report
1979
275
Health Care Professions
18.71.340
Entry records under impaired physician program
1987
276
Privileges
18.83.110 - also 5.60.060 (# 219)
Communications between client and psychologist-could apply to records
1955
Sept. 2020; Oct. 2020
277
Other Professions -Plumbers
18.106.320(2)
Info obtained from contractors on plumbing trainee hours
2002
278
Health Care Professions
18.130.095(1)(a)
Complaints filed under uniform disciplinary act for health professionals
1997
279
Health Care Professions
18.130.172(1)
Summary and stipulations in complaints against health care professionals
1993
280
Health Care Professions
18.130.095(1)(a) (Repealed 2019)
Complaint of unprofessional conduct against health profession licensee
1997
281
Health Care Professions
18.130.175(4)
Voluntary substance abuse records on health care professionals
1988
282
Health Care Professions
18.130.175(4)
Substance abuse treatment records of licensed health professionals
283
Elderly Adults - Referrals
18.330.050(2)(f)
On referral disclosure statement, must include statement that agency will need client authorization to obtain or disclose confidential information
2011 c 357 s 6
284
Other Professions -Business Licenses
19.02.115
Master license service program licensing information is confidential and privileged except as provided in this section
2011 c 298 s 12
285
Financial, Commercial and Proprietary
19.16.245
Collection agency financial statements
1973
*See also May 2016, Aug. 2016 & Oct. 2016 -42.56.270 & trade secrets/proprietary info
286
Other Professions -Electrical
19.28.171
Info obtained from electrical contractors on electrical trainee hours
1996
287
Other Professions -Electrical
19.28.171
Information obtained from electrical contractor by department of licenses
1996
288
Security - Electronic Keys
19.34.240
Private keys under the electronic authentication act
1996
289
Security - Electronic Keys
19.34.420
Electronic authentication info
1998
290
Financial, Commercial and Proprietary Information
19.108
Trade Secrets Act
1981
*May 2016, Aug. 2016 & Oct. 2016 - 42.56.270 & trade secrets/proprietary info
*Oct. 2016 - 42.56.270 & trade secrets/proprietary info
2017: HB 1160/SB 5418
291
Juvenile Records
13.50.010(14)
Records released by the court to the state office of civil legal aid
2015 c 262 s 1
292
Financial, Commercial and Proprietary - Mortgages
19.146.370(4)
Chapter 42.56 RCW relating to supervisory information or information subject to subsection (1) of this section is superseded by this section
2009 c 528 s 15
*See also May 2016, Aug. 2016 & Oct. 2016 -42.56.270 & trade secrets/proprietary info
Category
RCW
Description
Date Enacted
Materials Presented
Recommendation
Proposed Legislation & Related Bills
293
Other Professions - Money Transfer Co's.
19.230.190
Money transfer licensing information
2003
294
Financial, Commercial and Proprietary Information
19.330.080(5)
Confidential technology information used in manufacturing products sold in state is subject to a protective order
2011 c 98 s 8
*See also May 2016, Aug. 2016 & Oct. 2016 -42.56.270 & trade secrets/proprietary info
295
Investigative Records
21.20.480
Security act investigations
1959
Sept. 2020; Oct. 2020; Feb.2021
296
Financial, Commercial and Proprietary information -Investigations
21.30.170
Some information obtained by the department of financial institutions
1986
*See also May 2016, Aug. 2016 & Oct. 2016 -42.56.270 & trade secrets/proprietary info
297
Placeholder
298
Financial, Commercial and Proprietary information -Nonprofits & Mutuals
24.06.480
Information in interrogatories of nonprofit miscellaneous and mutual corporations by secretary of state
1969; Feb 2021
*See also May 2016, Aug. 2016 & Oct. 2016 -42.56.270 & trade secrets/proprietary info; Sept. 2020; Oct. 2020;
Feb. 2021; May 2021
299
Crime Victims and Witnesses
26.04.175
Marriage applications and records about participants in address confidentiality program
1991
300
Mediation Communications
26.09.015
Divorce mediation proceedings-may apply to records of the proceedings
1986
301
Judicial - Court Files
26.12.080
Superior court may order family court files closed to protect privacy
1949
Sept. 2020; Oct. 2020; Feb. 2021
302
Child Support Records
26.23.120(1)
Records concerning persons owing child support
1987
303
Child Support Records
26.23.150
Social security numbers collected by licensing agencies not to be disclosed
1998
304
Adoption Records
26.33.330 & .340 & .345
Adoption records (except by order of the court under showing of good cause); adoption contact preference form and parent medical history
1984; 2013c321 s 1
305
Archaeological Records
27.53.070 (42.56.300)
Communications on location of archaeological sites not public records
1975
May 2021; Oct. 2021
306
Financial, Commercial and Proprietary Information
28B.85.020(2)
Financial disclosures provided to HEC Board by private vocational schools
1996
*See also May 2016, Aug. 2016 & Oct. 2016 -42.56.270 & trade secrets/proprietary info
307
Financial, Commercial and Proprietary Information
28C.10.050(2)(a)
Financial disclosures by private vocational schools
1986
*See also May 2016, Aug. 2016 & Oct. 2016 -42.56.270 & trade secrets/proprietary info
308
Voter and Election Information
29A.08.710
Original voter registration forms or their images
1991
Oct. 2017; Feb. 2018; May 2018; Aug. 2018; Oct. 2018
Category
RCW
Description
Date Enacted
Materials Presented
Recommendation
Proposed Legislation & Related Bills
309
Voter and Election Information
29A.08.720
The department of licensing office at which any particular individual registers to vote
1994
Oct. 2017; Feb. 2018; May 2018; Aug. 2018; Oct. 2018
310
Voter and Election Information
29A.20.191; recod to 29A.56.670
Minor party and independent candidate nominating petitions
2004; 2013 c 11 s 93(4)
Oct. 2017; Feb. 2018; May 2018; Aug. 2018; Oct. 2018
311
Voter and Election Information
29A.32.100
Argument or statement submitted to secretary of state for voters' pamphlet
1999
Oct. 2017; Feb. 2018; May 2018; Aug. 2018; Oct. 2018
312
Financial, Commercial and Proprietary Information -Mortgages
31.04.274(4)
Chapter 42.56 RCW relating to disclosure of supervisory information or any information described in subsection (1) of this section is superseded by this section
2009 c 120 s 26
*See also May 2016, Aug. 2016 & Oct. 2016 -42.56.270 & trade secrets/proprietary info
313
Security
35.21.228(4)
Rail fixed guideway system security and emergency preparedness plan
1999
314
Security
35A.21.300(4)
Rail fixed guideway system security and emergency preparedness plan
1999
315
Security
36.01.210(4)
Rail fixed guideway system security and emergency preparedness plan
1999
316
Placeholder
317
Security
36.57.120(4)
Rail fixed guideway system security and emergency preparedness plan
1999
318
Security
36.57A.170(4)
Rail fixed guideway system security and emergency preparedness plan
1999
319
Financial, Commercial and Proprietary Information
36.102.200
Financial info on master tenant, concessioners, team affiliate, or sublease of a public stadium authority's facilities
1997
*See also May 2016, Aug. 2016 & Oct. 2016 -42.56.270 & trade secrets/proprietary info
320
Financial, Commercial and Proprietary Information
39.10.100 (2) recod. as 39.10.470 (2); 39.10.470(3)
Trade secrets & proprietary information from contractors under alternative public works; proposals from design-build finalists for alternative public works until selection is made or terminated
1994
*See also May 2016, Aug. 2016 & Oct. 2016 -42.56.270 & trade secrets/proprietary info
321
Financial, Commercial and Proprietary Information -Bids
39.26.030(2)
Competitive bids subject to chapter 42.56 RCW except exempt from disclosure until apparent successful bidder announced
2012 c 224 s 4
Aug. 2016; Oct. 2016
Oct. 2016
2017: HB 1160/SB 5418
322
Archive Records
40.14.030 (2)
Records transferred to state archives
2003
May 2012; August 2012; June 2013
Aug. 2012
323
Offender Records
40.14.070 (2)(c)
Sex offender records transferred to Washington association of sheriffs and police chiefs
1999
324
Bill Drafting Records
40.14.180
Bill drafting records of the code reviser's office
1971
Feb. 2015
Feb. 2015
325
Crime Victims and Witnesses
40.24.070
Names of persons in domestic violence or sexual assault programs; and records in address confidentiality program
1999; 1991; 2015 c 190 s 2
326
Public Employment Information
41.06.160
Salary and fringe benefit info identifying private employer from department of personnel salary survey
1981
Category
RCW
Description
Date Enacted
Materials Presented
Recommendation
Proposed Legislation & Related Bills
327
Public Employment Information
41.06.167
Salary and fringe benefit rate info collected from private employers
1980
328
Collective Bargaining
41.56.029(2)
Collective bargaining authorization cards of adult family home provider workers
2007
329
Personal Information -Research
42.48.020 & .040
Personally identifiable public records used in scientific research
1985
330
Health Care Records
43.01.425
Crisis referral services communications and information are confidential
2009 c 19 s 2
331
Investigative Records
43.06A.050
Investigative records of office of family and children's ombudsman
1996
332
Financial, Proprietary and Commercial Information
43.07.100
Info from businesses deemed confidential held by bureau of statistics in secretary of state
1895
*See also May 2016, Aug. 2016 & Oct. 2016 -42.56.270 & trade secrets/proprietary info
333
Investigative Records -Whistleblower
43.09.186(4)
Identity of person and documents in report to toll-free efficiency hotline - state auditor
2007
334
Financial, Proprietary and Commercial Information
42.56.270(22)
Certain financial information supplied to department of financial institutions or a portal to obtain an exemption from state securities registration
2014 c 144 s 6
335
Juvenile Records
13.50.010(15)
Child welfare records that may assist in meeting the educational needs of foster youth
2016 c 71 s 2
May 2019; Aug. 2019
336
Placeholder
337
Personal Information -Printing Vendors
43.19.736
Print jobs contracted with private vendors must require vendor to enter into a confidentiality agreement if materials contain sensitive or personally identifiable information
2011 c 43 1st sp. s. s 309
338
Claims
43.41.350 Recod 43.19.781
Risk management loss history information
1989; 20111st sp. s. c 43 s 535
339
Financial, Proprietary and Commercial Information -Marijuana
42.56.270(25)
Marijuana transport, vehicle and driver ID data and account numbers or unique access identifiers issued for traceability system access per RCW 69.50.325, 9.50.331,69.50.342, 69.50.345
2016 c 178 s 2
340
Financial, Commercial and Proprietary Information
43.21A.160
Information on unique production processes given to the DOE
1970
*See also May 2016, Aug. 2016 & Oct. 2016 -42.56.270 & trade secrets/proprietary info; Sept. 2020; Oct. 2020; Feb. 2021
341
Financial, Commercial and Proprietary Information
43.21F.060(1)
Proprietary information received by the state energy office
1976
*See also May 2016, Aug. 2016 & Oct. 2016 -42.56.270 & trade secrets/proprietary info
342
Employer - Labor Statistics
43.22.290
Employer labor statistics reports provided to the department of labor & industries
1901
Sept. 2020; Oct. 2020
Category
RCW
Description
Date Enacted
Materials Presented
Recommendation
Proposed Legislation & Related Bills
343
Financial, Commercial and Proprietary Information
43.22.434
Info obtained from contractors through an audit
2002
*See also May 2016, Aug. 2016 & Oct. 2016 -42.56.270 & trade secrets/proprietary info
344
Deliberative Process -Records Provided to Governor
43.41.100
Confidential reports made to the governor by director of office of financial management
1969
Sept. 2020; Oct. 2020; Feb. 2021; May 2021
345
Investigative Records
43.43.710
Washington state patrol information in records relating to the commission of any crime by any person
1972
May 2021; Aug. 2021
346
Investigative Records
43.43.762 -referenced in 42.56.240(6)
Information in criminal street gang database
2008 c 276 s 201
347
Investigative Records
43.43.856
Washington state patrol organized crime Investigative information
1973
May 2021
348
Financial, Commercial and Proprietary Information
43.52.612
Financial information provided to operating agencies in bid forms and experience provided by a contractor to a joint operating agency regarding bids on constructing a nuclear project
1982
*See also May 2016, Aug. 2016 & Oct. 2016 -42.56.270 & trade secrets/proprietary info
349
Health Care
43.70.050(2)
Health care related data identifying patients or providers obtained by state agencies
1989
350
Health Care
43.70.052
American Indian health data
1995; 2014 c 220 s 2
351
Health Care
43.70.056(2)(e)(ii)
Hospital reports and information on health care-associated infections
2007
352
Health Care
42.56.360(4); 70.54
Info and documents relating to maternal mortality reviews per RCW 70.54
2016 c 238 s 2
353
Health Care Professions -Whistleblower
43.70.075
Identity of whistleblower who makes a complaint to the department of health re: improper care
1995
354
Health Care Professions
43.70.510
Information and documents created, collected and maintained by a quality assurance committee
2005
355
Health Care Professions
43.70.695(5)
Healthcare workforce surveys identifying individual providers
2006
356
Investigative Records
43.190.110
Complaint and investigation records of long-term care ombudsman
1983
357
Employment Records, Investigative Records
Criminal justice training commission records from initial background investigations 43.101.400
2001; 2021
358
Investigative Records -Fatality Review
43.235.040(1)
Domestic violence fatality review info
2000
359
Financial, Commercial and Proprietary Information
43.330.062
Protocols may not require release of information that associate development organization client company has requested remain confidential
2011 c 286 s 1
*See also May 2016, Aug. 2016 & Oct. 2016 -42.56.270 & trade secrets/proprietary info
Category
RCW
Description
Date Enacted
Materials Presented
Recommendation
Proposed Legislation & Related Bills
360
Health Care
43.370.050(2)
Individual identification in released health care data for studies and analysis
2007
361
Motor Vehicle/Driver Records
46.12.380(1) Recod 46.12.635
Names and addresses of motor vehicle owners except for "business" & other purposes
1984; 2016 c 80 s 2
362
Placeholder
Check codified citation
2010c161 s 1210
363
Motor Vehicle/Driver Records
46.20.041
Info on physically or mentally disabled person demonstrating ability to drive
1965
Sept. 2020; Oct. 2020; Feb.2021
364
Motor Vehicle/Driver Records
46.20.118
Photos on drivers' licenses & identicards
1981
365
Motor Vehicle/Driver Records
46.52.065
Blood sample analyses done by state toxicology
1971
May 2021; Aug. 2021; Oct. 2021
366
Motor Vehicle/Driver Records
46.52.080 & .083
Most info in police accident reports
1937
Feb. 2021
367
Motor Vehicle/Driver Records
46.52.120
Individual motor vehicle driver records
1937
Feb. 2021; May 2021; Aug.2021
368
Motor Vehicle/Driver Records
46.52.130
Abstracts of motor vehicle driver records
369
Motor Vehicle/Driver Records
46.70.042
Application for vehicle dealer licenses, for 3 years
1967
Feb. 2021; May 2021; Aug. 2021; Oct. 2021
370
Motor Vehicle/Driver Records
46.35.030(1)(a)
Information obtained by a court order pursuant to discovery is not subject to public disclosure
2009 c 485 s 3
371
Financial, Commercial and Proprietary Information
47.28.075
Info supplied to department of transportation to qualify contractors for highway construction
1981
*See also May 2016, Aug. 2016 & Oct. 2016 -42.56.270 & trade secrets/proprietary info
372
Financial, Commercial and Proprietary Information
47.60.760
Financial info submitted to qualify to submit bid for ferry construction contracts
1983
*See also May 2016, Aug. 2016 & Oct. 2016 -42.56.270 & trade secrets/proprietary info; and RCW39.26.030 (bid information)
373
Personal Information
42.56.420(6)
Personally identifiable info of employees and other security info of a private cloud service provider that has entered into a criminal justice information services agreement
2016 c 152 s 1
374
Insurance Information
48.02.065(1)
Information provided in the course of an insurance commissioner examination
2007
375
Insurance Information
48.05.510(4)
Insurer's reports to insurance commissioner
1995
376
Insurance Information
48.13.151
Information related to investment policies provided to the insurance commissioner is confidential and not a public record
2011 c 188 s 16 (eff 7/1/12)
377
Insurance Information
48.31.405(1)
Commissioner info relating to supervision of any insurer
2005
378
Insurance Information
48.74. __(6)
Information obtained in the course of an actuarial examination/investigation
2016 c 142 s 6
Category
RCW
Description
Date Enacted
Materials Presented
Recommendation
Proposed Legislation & Related Bills
379
Insurance Information
48.32.110(2)
Request for examination into insurer's financial condition
1971
May 2021; Oct. 2021
380
Insurance Information
48.43.200(4)
Reports of material transactions by certified health plans
1995
381
Insurance Information
48.44.530(4)
Reports of material transactions by health care service contractors
1995
382
Insurance Information
48.46.540
Current licensure of nonresident pharmacies through which an insurer provides coverage
1991
383
Insurance Information
48.46.600(4)
Reports of material transactions by health maintenance organizations
1995
384
Insurance Information -Investigations
48.102.140(5)(a)
Documents and evidence provided regarding life settlement act fraud investigations are confidential and not public records
2009 c 104 s 17
385
Insurance Information
48.104.050(1)
Holocaust insurance company registry records
1999
386
Workers Compensation Records
49.17.260
Labor & industries investigative reports on industrial catastrophes
1973
May 2021; Aug. 2021; Oct. 2021
387
Investigative Records
49.60.240
Option for human rights commission complaints not to be made public
1993
388
Agriculture and Livestock
49.70.119(6)(a)
Name of employee seeking records of agricultural pesticide applications
1973
Aug. 2017; Oct. 2017; May 2018; Aug. 2018
Aug. 2018
389
Crime Victims and Witnesses
49.76.040
Employee's information regarding domestic violence is confidential
2008 c 286 s 4
390
Crime Victims and Witnesses
49.76.090
Domestic violence leave information in files and records of employees is confidential and not open to public inspection
2008 c 286 s 10
391
Employment Security Records
50.13.060(8)
Welfare reform info in WorkFirst program
2000
392
Financial, Commercial and Proprietary Information
53.31.050
Financial & commercial info & records supplied to port district export trading company
1986
*See also May 2016, Aug. 2016 & Oct. 2016 -42.56.270 & trade secrets/proprietary info
393
Financial, Commercial and Proprietary Information
63.29.380
Info relating to unclaimed property that is furnished to the department of revenue
1983
*See also May 2016, Aug. 2016 & Oct. 2016 -42.56.270 & trade secrets/proprietary info
394
Insurance Information
48.43.730
Provider compensation agreements are confidential
2013 c 277 s 1
395
Financial, Commercial and Proprietary Information
63.29.300(4)
Material obtained during an examination under RCW 63.29 is confidential and may not be disclosed except per RCW 63.29.380
2015 3rd sp s c 6 s 2107
396
Health Care; Investigative Records
68.50.105
Records of autopsies and post mortems
1953; 2013 c 295 s 1
397
Health Care
68.64.190
Certain information released to tissue or organ procurement organization is confidential
2008 c 139 s 21
Category
RCW
Description
Date Enacted
Materials Presented
Recommendation
Proposed Legislation & Related Bills
398
Financial, Commercial and Proprietary Information;
Health Professions; Health Care
69.41.044; 42.56.360(1)(a); 42.56.360(1)(b); 69.45.090
Records and information supplied by drug manufacturers, and pharmaceutical manufacturer info obtained by the pharmacy quality assurance commission
1987; 1989; 2013 c 19 s 47
*See also May 2016, Aug. 2016 & Oct. 2016 -42.56.270 & trade secrets/proprietary info
399
Health Care
69.41.280
Info on legend drugs obtained by the pharmacy quality assurance commission
1989
400
Insurance Information
48.74.--(1)(a)
Opinion and memo submitted to the insurance commissioner under RCW 48.74.025
2016 c 142 s 7
401
Health Care
69.51.050
Names of persons participating in controlled substances therapeutic research programs
1979
402
Health Care
70.02.020, .050, et. al.
Health care info disclosed to heath care provider w/o patients permission
1991
403
Health Care
70.24.022
Info gathered by health care workers from interviews re. sexually transmitted diseases
1988
404
Placeholder
405
Health Care
70.24.034
Records on hearings on dangerous sexual behavior of sexually transmitted disease carriers
1988
406
Placeholder
407
Health Care
70.28.020
Tuberculosis records
1899
Feb.2021
408
Health Care
70.41.150
Department of health info on inspections of hospitals
1955
Feb. 2021; May 2021
409
Health Care Professions
70.41.200(3)
Info maintained by a health care services quality improvement committee
1986
410
Health Care Professions
70.41.220
Hospital records restricting practitioner's privileges in possession of medical disciplinary board
1986
411
Health Care
70.42.210
Identity of person from whom specimens of material were taken at a medical test site
1989
412
Health Care
70.47.150
Records of medical treatment
1990
413
Law Enforcement
70.48.100
Jail register records
1977
414
Health Care
70.54.250
Cancer registry program
1990
415
Health Care
70.58.055(2)
Info on birth & manner of delivery kept in birth certificate records
1991
416
Fireworks
70.77.455
Fireworks license records
1995
417
Financial, Commercial and Proprietary Information
70.94.205
Info provided to DOE on processes or if may affect competitive position relating to air quality
1967
*See also May 2016, Aug. 2016 & Oct. 2016 -42.56.270 & trade secrets/proprietary info; May 2021; Oct. 2021
418
Financial, Commercial and Proprietary Information
70.95.280
Guidelines for proprietary info on solid waste management practices in possession of DOE [Since this addresses guidelines, not clear if it is an exemption.]
1989
*See also May 2016, Aug. 2016 & Oct. 2016 -42.56.270 & trade secrets/proprietary info
Category
RCW
Description
Date Enacted
Materials Presented
Recommendation
Proposed Legislation & Related Bills
419
Financial, Commercial and Proprietary Information
70.95C.040(4)
Proprietary info re. waste reduction in possession of DOE
1988
*See also May 2016, Aug. 2016 & Oct. 2016 -42.56.270 & trade secrets/proprietary info
420
Financial, Commercial and Proprietary Information
70.95C.220(2)
Waste reduction plans
1990
*See also May 2016, Aug. 2016 & Oct. 2016 -42.56.270 & trade secrets/proprietary info
421
Financial, Commercial and Proprietary Information
70.95C.240(1)
Some info in executive summaries of waste reduction efforts
1990
*See also May 2016, Aug. 2016 & Oct. 2016 -42.56.270 & trade secrets/proprietary info
422
Financial, Commercial and Proprietary Information
70.95N.140(4)
Proprietary info in electronic product recycling reports
2006
*See also May 2016, Aug. 2016 & Oct. 2016 -42.56.270 & trade secrets/proprietary info
423
Placeholder
424
Health Care
70.104.055
Reports on pesticide poisoning
1989
425
Financial, Commercial and Proprietary Information
70.105.170
Manufacturing or business info re: Hazardous waste management in possession of DOE
1983
*See also May 2016, Aug. 2016 & Oct. 2016 -42.56.270 & trade secrets/proprietary info
426
Financial, Commercial and Proprietary Information
70.118.070
Trade secret info re: On-site sewage disposal in possession of DOE
1994
*See also May 2016, Aug. 2016 & Oct. 2016 -42.56.270 & trade secrets/proprietary info
427
Investigative Records -Whistleblower
70.124.100
Name of whistleblower in nursing home or state hospital
1997
428
Crime Victims and Witnesses
70.125.065
By implication records of community sexual assault program or underserved populations provider
1981; 2012c29s 11
429
Placeholder
430
Health Care
70.127.190
Hospice records
1988
431
Health Care
70.129.050
Personal and clinical records of long-term care residents
1994
432
Financial, Commercial and Proprietary Information
70.158.050
Tobacco product manufacturers' information required to comply with chapter 70.58 RCW is confidential and shall not be disclosed
2003
*See also May 2016, Aug. 2016 & Oct. 2016 -42.56.270 & trade secrets/proprietary info
433
Health Care
70.168.070
Limitations on disclosure of reports made by hospital trauma care on-site review teams
1990
434
Health Care
70.168.090
Patient records and quality assurance records associated with trauma care facilities
1990
435
Health Care
70.170.090
Charity care information in hospitals
1989
Category
RCW
Description
Date Enacted
Materials Presented
Recommendation
Proposed Legislation & Related Bills
436
Health Care
70.230.110
Ambulatory surgical facilities data related to the quality of patient care
2007
437
Health Care
70.230.170
Information received by department of health regarding ambulatory surgical facilities
2007
438
Health Care
71.05.425
Persons receiving notice and the notice of release or transfer of a person committed following dismissal of offense
2013 c 289 s 6
439
Health Care
71.05.620
Records on mental health treatment
1989; 2013c200s34
440
Investigative Records;
Attorney Client Privilege
74.34.035(10);
74.34.067
Investigation relating to vulnerable adult; attorney client privilege
2013 c 263 s 2
441
Crime Victims and Witnesses
71.09.140(2)
Names of victims, next of kin, or witnesses who are notified when sexually violent predator escapes, on parole, or released
1995
442
Health Care
71.24.035(5)(g)
Mental retardation records
1982
443
Health Care
71.34.340
Records on mental treatment of minors
1985
444
Health Care
71.34.335
Mental health court records are confidential
1985
445
Health Care; Investigative Records
74.66.030; 74.66.120
Information furnished pursuant to the Medicaid fraud false claims act is exempt until final disposition and all seals are lifted; records and testimony provided under civil investigative demand
2012 c241 s203, 212
446
Health Care
71A.14.070
Confidential info re. developmentally disabled persons
1988
May 2019
447
Health Care
72.05.130(1)
Reports regarding children with behavioral problems
1951
Feb. 2021; May 2021
448
Offender Records
72.09.116
Info from correctional industries work program participant or applicant
2004
449
Offender Records
72.09.345(4)
Certain info on sex offenders held in custody
1997; 2011 c 338 s 5
450
Personal Information
70.39A.
Personally identifiable info used to develop quarterly expenditure reports for certain long term care services
2016 1st sp s. c 30 s 3
451
Investigative, law enforcement and crime victims
[Former
9.94A.610(1)(b)]
72.09.710 (recod eff 8/1/09) (see also ## 233 and 235)
Names of witnesses notified when drug offenders released
1991; Recod 2008 c 231 s 26 9 (see dispositions table)
452
Placeholder
453
Investigative, law enforcement and crime victims
[Former
9.94A.612(1)]
72.09.712 (recod eff 8/1/09)
Names of victims, next of kin, or witnesses who are notified when prisoner escapes, on parole, or released
1995; Recod 2008 c 231 s 27
454
Placeholder
455
Public Assistance
74.04.060 & .062
Limited access to information in department of social and health services registry concerning parents of dependent children
1941
Feb. 2021
456
Public Assistance
74.20.280
Child support records
1963
Feb.2021
457
Public Assistance
74.04.520
Names of recipients of food stamps
1969
Feb. 2021
Category
RCW
Description
Date Enacted
Materials Presented
Recommendation
Proposed Legislation & Related Bills
458
Health Care
74.09.290(1)
Medical records of persons on public assistance
1979
459
Juvenile Records
74.13.075(5)
A juvenile's status as a sexually aggressive youth and related information are confidential and not subject to public disclosure by department of social and health services
2009 c 250 s 2
460
Juvenile Records
74.13.640
Child fatality reports are subject to disclosure but confidential information may be redacted
2011 c 61 s 2
May 2019; Aug. 2019
461
Juvenile Records
[Former 74.13.121] 74.13A.045 (recod)
Info from adoptive parents of kids receiving public assistance
1971; 2009c520s95
May 2019; Aug. 2019
462
Placeholder
463
Juvenile Records
[Former 74.13.133] 74.13A.065 (recod)
Adoption support records
1971; 2009c520s95
May 2019; Aug. 2019
464
Placeholder
465
Juvenile Records
74.13.280(2)
Info on child in foster care & child's family
1990
May 2019; Aug. 2019
466
Juvenile Records; Public Assistance
74.13.500 - .525
Disclosure of child welfare records
1997
May 2019; Aug. 2019;
Oct. 2019; Feb. 2020
467
Personal information -clients
74.18.127(1)
Personal info maintained by the department of services for the blind
2003
468
Juvenile Records; Public Assistance
74.20A.360 & .370
Certain records in division of child support
1997
May 2019; Aug. 2019
469
Whistleblower;
Investigative, law enforcement and crime victims
74.34.040
Identity of person making report on abuse of vulnerable adult
1984
470
Investigative, law enforcement and crime victims
74.34.090
Identity of persons in records of abused vulnerable adults
1984
471
Investigative, law enforcement and crime victims
74.34.095(1)
Info concerning the abuse of vulnerable adults
1999
472
Whistleblower
74.34.180(1)
Name of whistleblower reporting abuse of vulnerable adults in various facilities
1997
473
Investigative, law enforcement and crime victims
74.34.300
Files, etc. used or developed for vulnerable adult fatality reviews
2008 c 146 s 10
474
Health Care
74.42.080
Records on nursing home residents
1979
475
Health Professions
74.42.640
Information and documents created, collected and maintained by a quality assurance committee
2005
476
Financial, Commercial and Proprietary Information
78.44.085(5)
Surface mining info
2006
*See also May 2016, Aug. 2016 & Oct. 2016 -42.56.270 & trade secrets/proprietary info
Category
RCW
Description
Date Enacted
Materials Presented
Recommendation
Proposed Legislation & Related Bills
477
Financial, Commercial and Proprietary Information
78.52.260
Well logs on oil capable of being produced from a “wildcat” well
1951
*See also May 2016, Aug. 2016 & Oct. 2016 -42.56.270 & trade secrets/proprietary info;
Feb. 2021; May 2021
478
Financial, Commercial and Proprietary Information
[Former 79.76.230] -recodified as 78.60.230
Geothermal records filed w. department of natural resources
1974 - Recodified 2003
*See also May 2016, Aug. 2016 & Oct. 2016 -42.56.270 & trade secrets/proprietary info
479
Investigative, law enforcement and crime victims
79A.60.210
Certain boating accident reports provided to the parks & recreation commission
1984
480
Investigative, law enforcement and crime victims
79A.60.220
Boating accident reports/coroner
1987
481
Security
81.104.115(4)
Rail fixed guideway system security and emergency preparedness plan
1999; 2016 c 33 s 8
482
Security
81.112.180(4)
Rail fixed guideway system security and emergency preparedness plan
1999
483
Financial, Commercial and Proprietary Information -Tax Info
82.32.330(2)
Certain tax return and tax information
At least 1935
*See also May 2016, Aug. 2016 & Oct. 2016 -42.56.270 & trade secrets/proprietary info; Feb. 2021; Aug. 2021
484
Financial, Commercial and Proprietary Information -Tax Info
82.32.585
Taxpayer info supplied for survey is not disclosable. Amt of tax deferral is not subject to 82.32.330 confidentiality provisions
2010 c 114 s 102(4)
*See also May 2016, Aug. 2016 & Oct. 2016 -42.56.270 & trade secrets/proprietary info
485
Placeholder
486
Financial, Commercial and Proprietary Information -Tax Info
82.38.310(4)
Info from tribes or tribal retailers received by the state under a special fuel taxes agreement
2007
*See also May 2016, Aug. 2016 & Oct. 2016 -42.56.270 & trade secrets/proprietary info
487
Financial, Commercial and Proprietary Information -Tax Info
Taxpayer info supplied for survey is not disclosable. Amt of tax deferral is not subject to 82.32.330 confidentiality provisions
2008 c 15 s 2
*See also May 2016, Aug. 2016 & Oct. 2016 -42.56.270 & trade secrets/proprietary info
488
Financial, Commercial and Proprietary Information -Tax Info
82.32.808
Amounts less than $10,00 claimed in a tax preference; exceptions
2012 snd sp s. c 13 s
1702
489
Financial, Commercial and Proprietary Information -Tax Info
84.08.210
Tax info obtained by department of revenue if highly offensive to a reasonable person and not a legitimate concern to public or would result in unfair competitive disadvantage
1997
*See also May 2016, Aug. 2016 & Oct. 2016 -42.56.270 & trade secrets/proprietary info
Category
RCW
Description
Date Enacted
Materials Presented
Recommendation
Proposed Legislation & Related Bills
490
Financial, Commercial and Proprietary Information -Tax Info
84.36.389
Income data for retired or disabled persons seeking property tax exemptions
1974
*See also May 2016, Aug. 2016 & Oct. 2016 -42.56.270 & trade secrets/proprietary info
491
Financial, Commercial and Proprietary Information -Tax Info
84.40.020
Confidential income data in property tax listings
1973
*See also May 2016, Aug. 2016 & Oct. 2016 -42.56.270 & trade secrets/proprietary info
492
Financial, Commercial and Proprietary Information
84.40.340
Utilities & transportation commission records containing commercial info a court determines confidential
1961
*See also May 2016, Aug. 2016 & Oct. 2016 -42.56.270 & trade secrets/proprietary info;
May 2021; Oct. 2021
493
Agriculture and Livestock
90.64.190
Livestock producer info
2005
Aug. 2017; Oct. 2017; Feb. 2018; May 2018
494
Financial, Commercial and Proprietary Information
2007 c 522 § 149 (3) (uncodified)
Names and identification data from participants in survey to identify factors preventing the widespread availability and use of broadband technologies
2007
*See also May 2016, Aug. 2016 & Oct. 2016 -42.56.270 & trade secrets/proprietary info
495
Health Care
70.02.220 - .260
Health care information
2013 sp. S c 200 ss 6-10
496
Health Care
42.56.360(1)(f)
Information relating to infant mortality pursuant to RCW 70.05.170
1992
497
Dairies, Animal Feeding Operations
42.56.610
Certain information obtained by state and local agencies from dairies, animal feeding operations not required to apply for a national pollutant discharge elimination system permit disclosable only in ranges that provide meaningful information to public
2005 (c510s5)
Aug. 2017; Oct. 2017; Feb. 2018; May 2018
498
Investigative, law enforcement and crime victims
9.95.260
Information regarding victims, survivors of victims, or witnesses that are sent pardon hearing notices may not be released to offender
1999
499
Financial, Commercial and Proprietary Information -Trusts
11.110.075
Instrument creating a charitable trust, possibly only if the instrument creates a trust for both charitable and non-charitable purposes
1971
*See also May 2016, Aug. 2016 & Oct. 2016 -42.56.270 & trade secrets/proprietary info; Feb. 2021; May 2021
500
Juvenile Records
13.04.155; 28A.320.163(5)
Information on juvenile conviction by adult criminal court given to school principal and received by school district staff
1997; 2020
501
Juvenile Records
13.24.011
Records of the interstate compact for juveniles that would adversely affect personal privacy rights or proprietary interests
2003
502
Boarding Homes
13.40.150
Sources of confidential information in dispositional hearings on juvenile offenses
1977
Category
RCW
Description
Date Enacted
Materials Presented
Recommendation
Proposed Legislation & Related Bills
503
Placeholder
504
Employment Security
50.13.015, .020, .040, .050, .100 & 110
Most info supplied to employment security department
1977
505
Financial, Commercial and Proprietary Information
51.36.120
Financial or valuable trade info from health care providers, if request
1989
506
Health Care
70.05.170
Medical records re. Child morality review
1992
507
Juvenile Records
13.34.046
j-moimauon regarding a youth subject to rcw 13.34 is confidential except as required under lawful court order
2013 c 182 s 5
May 2019; Aug. 2019
508
Placeholder
509
Investigative, law enforcement and crime victims
79A.60.210
79A.60.220
Certain boating accident reports provided to the parks & recreation commission
1984
510
Investigative, law enforcement and crime victims
42.56.240(10)
Felony firearm offense conviction database of felony firearm offenders established in RCW 43.43.822
2013 c 183 s 1
511
Investigative, law enforcement and crime victims
42.56.240(12)
Security threat group information collected and maintained by department of corrections
2013 c 315 s. 2
512
Legal proceedings;
Privilege
7.77.140; 7.77.150; 7.77.160; 7.77.170
Confidentiality of collaborative law proceedings; privilege
2013 c 119ss 15 - 18
513
Emergency Information
38.32; 42.56.230(9); 38.52.575; 38.52.577
Enhanced 911 Call information
2015 c 224 s 2, 6
Feb. 2014; Feb. 2015
Feb. 2015
SB 1980 (2015); Ch. 224, 2015 Laws
514
Investigative, law enforcement and crime victims
42.56.240(16)
Campus sexual assault/domestic violence communications and records
2017 c 72 s 3
515
Investigative, law enforcement and crime victims
42.56.240(17)
Law enforcement information from firearms dealers
2016 c 261 s 7
516
Employment and Licensing
42.56.250(3)
Professional growth plans
2017 c 16 s 1
517
Employment and Licensing
42.56.250(10)
GPS data of public employees or volunteers using GPS system recording device
2017 c 38 s 1
518
Financial, Commercial and Proprietary Information
42.56.270(28)
Trade secrets etc. re to licensed marijuana business, submitted to LCB
2017 c 317 s 7
519
Public Utilities and Transportation
42.56.330(9)
Personally identifying information in safety complaints submitted under ch. 81-61 RCW
2017 c 333 s 7
520
Insurance & Financial Inst.
42.56.400(26)
Non public personal health information obtained by, discussed to, or in custody of the insurance commissioner
2017 c 193 s 2
521
Insurance & Financial Inst.
42.56.400(27)
Data, information, documents obtained by insurance commissioner under RCW 48.02
2017 3rd sp. sess. c 30 s 2
522
Fish & Wildlife
42.56.430(3); 77.12.885
Damage prevention agreement, non lethal preventative/measures to minimize wolf interactions
2017 c 246 s 1
May 2017; Aug. 2017; Oct. 2017; May 2018; Aug. 2018; Feb. 2019; Aug. 2020; Feb. 2021; May 2021; Aug. 2021; Oct. 2021; Nov. 2021
Category
RCW
Description
Date Enacted
Materials Presented
Recommendation
Proposed Legislation & Related Bills
523
Fish & Wildlife
42.56.430(4); 77.12.885
Reported depredation by wolves on pets or livestock
2017 c 246 s 1
May 2017; Aug. 2017; Oct. 2017; May 2018; Aug. 2018; Feb. 2019; Aug. 2020; Feb. 2021; May 2021; Aug. 2021; Oct. 2021; Nov. 2021
524
Fish & Wildlife
42.56.430(7)
Tribal fish & shellfish harvest information -department of fish & wildlife
2017 c 71 s 1
May 2017; Aug. 2017; Oct. 2017
525
Fish & Wildlife
42.56.430(8)
Commercial shellfish harvest information -department of fish & wildlife
2017 c 71 s 1
Aug. 2017; Oct. 2017
526
Juvenile Records
13.50.010(16)
Health/safety information from DYF to department of commerce re youth in foster care admitted to CRCs/HOPE centers
2017 c 272 s 1
May 2019; Aug. 2019
527
Juvenile Records
13.50.010(17)
DYF disclosures re child abuse/neglect, and for health care coordination
2017 3rd sp. s. c 6 5312
May 2019; Aug. 2019
528
Personal Information
40.26.020
Biometric identifiers
2017 c 306 s 2; 2017 2nd sp. s. c 1 s 1
529
Insurance Information
48.02.230
Information used to develop an individual health insurance market stability program
2017 3rd sp. s. c 30 s 1
530
Health Care
50A.04.195(4)&(5)
Family/medical leave
2017 3rd sp. s. c 5 s 29
531
Health Care
50A.04.080(2)(b)
Family/medical leave from employer records
2017 3rd sp. s. c 5 s 33
532
Health Care
50A.04.205
Family/medical leave ombuds surveys
2017 3rd sp. sess. c 5 s 88
533
Voter and Election Information - Personal Information
42.56.230(10)
Personally Identifiable voter registration information for individuals under 18
2018
534
Religious Beliefs; Personal Information
42.56.235
Personal identifying information about an individual's religious beliefs
2018
Oct. 2018; Feb. 2019; May 2019; Aug. 2019
Aug. 2019
535
Investigative, law enforcement, crime victims; Juvenile Records
42.56.240(18)
Audio and video recordings of child interviews regarding child abuse or neglect
2018
536
Voter and Election Information - Employment and Licensing; Personal Information
42.56.250(11)
Personally Identifiable voter registration information for individuals under 18
2018
537
Financial, Commercial and Proprietary Information
42.56.270(29)
Financial, commercial, operations, technical, and research information submitted to the Andy Hill cancer research endowment program pertaining to grants under chapter 43.348 RCW, that if revealed would result in private loss
2018
538
Financial, Commercial and Proprietary Information; Health Care
42.56.270(30)
Proprietary information filed with the department of health
2018
Category
RCW
Description
Date Enacted
Materials Presented
Recommendation
Proposed Legislation & Related Bills
539
Agriculture and Livestock
42.56.380(13)
Information obtained from the federal government if exempt from disclosure under federal law and personal financial information or proprietary data obtained by the department of agriculture
2018
540
Agriculture and Livestock
42.56.380(14)
Hop grower lot numbers and lab results
2018
541
Insurance & Financial Inst.
42.56.400(28)
An insurer's corporate governance annual disclosure and related information obtained by the insurance commissioner
2018
542
Insurance & Financial Inst.; Health Care
42.56.400(28)
Claims, health care, and financial information submitted by school districts to the office of the insurance commissioner and health care authority
2018
543
Firearms
9.41.350(6)
Records regarding a person's voluntary waiver of firearm rights
2018
544
Agriculture and Livestock
15.135.100(1)
Information obtained from the federal government if exempt from disclosure under federal law
2018
545
Agriculture and Livestock; Personal Information; Financial, Commercial, and Proprietary Information
15.135.100(2)
Personal financial information or proprietary data obtained by the department of agriculture
2018
546
Child Abuse; Juvenile Records; Investigative Records
26.44.187
Recorded child interviews regarding child abuse or neglect
2018
547
Parentage; Personal Information
26.26A.050
Personally identifiable information of the child and others in parentage proceedings
2018
548
Elections; Personal Information
29A.08.720(2)(b)
The personally identifiable voter registration information of individuals under 18
2018
549
Elections; Personal Information
29A.08.770
The personally identifiable voter registration information of individuals under 18 maintained by the secretary of state and county auditors
2018
550
Elections; Personal Information
29A.08.359
Personal information supplied to obtain a driver's license or identicard and used to certify registered voters
2018
551
Elections
29A.92.100(3)
A plaintiff's filing of an action regarding equal voting rights under the Washington voting rights act of 2018
2018
552
School District Insurance
41.05.890(2)
Claims, health care, and financial information submitted by school districts to the office of the insurance commissioner and health care authority
2018
553
State Government
43.216.015(15)
Oversight board for children, youth, and families records, only the information if otherwise confidential under state or federal law
2018
554
State Government; Investigative Records
43.06C.060(3)
Information regarding investigations exchange between the office of the corrections ombuds and the department of corrections
2018
Category
RCW
Description
Date Enacted
Materials Presented
Recommendation
Proposed Legislation & Related Bills
555
Insurance Information
48.195.040(1)
An insurer's corporate governance annual disclosure and related information submitted to the insurance commissioner
2018
556
Unwanted Medication Disposal; Financial, Commercial and Proprietary Information
69.48.170
Proprietary information submitted to the department of health regarding unwanted medication disposal
2018
557
Financial, Commercial, and Proprietary Information
42.56.270(13)
Financial and proprietary information submitted to or obtained by the department of ecology
558
Financial, Commercial, and Proprietary Information
42.56.270(15)
Financial and commercial information provided as evidence to the department of licensing from special fuel licensees or motor vehicle fuel licensees
559
Financial, Commercial, and Proprietary Information
42.56.270(18)
Financial, commercial, operations, and technical and research information submitted to health sciences and services authorities if private loss would result
560
Financial, Commercial, and Proprietary Information
42.56.270(19)
Information that can be identified to a particular business that was gathered as part of agency rule making
561
Health Care Professionals;
Health Care
42.56.355
Information distributed to a health profession board or commission by an interstate health professions licensure compact
2017
562
Marijuana
42.56.630
Registration information of members of medical marijuana cooperatives submitted to the liquor and cannabis board
2015
563
Health Professionals; Personal Information
42.56.640
Personal identifying information of vulnerable individuals and in-home caregivers
2017
564
Health Care
71.05.445(4)
Court-ordered mental health treatment records received by the department of corrections
2000
565
Health Care Professionals; Whistleblower
74.09.315(2)
Identity of whistleblower
566
Personal Information; Public Assistance
43.185C.030
Personal information collected in homeless census
567
Juvenile Records
26.44.125(6)
Child abuse or neglect review hearings
2012
568
Juvenile Records
74.13.285(4)
Information on a child in foster care or child's family
2007
569
Health Professionals; Personal Information
74.39A.275(5)
Personal information of vulnerable adults and inhome care providers
2016
570
Health Professionals; Personal Information
43.17.410
Personal information of vulnerable individuals and inhome caregivers
2017
571
Health Care; Personal Information; Investigative Records
74.39A.060(6)
Personal identifying information of complainant and residents in a complaint against a long-term care facility
572
Health Care; Financial, Commercial, and Proprietary Information; Trade Secret
41.05.026
Health care contractor proprietary information
Category
RCW
Description
Date Enacted
Materials Presented
Recommendation
Proposed Legislation & Related Bills
573
Collective Bargaining
41.56.510
Collective bargaining authorization cards of public employees
2010
574
Personal Information
42.56.230(11)
Information submitted to state regarding people selfexcluding themselves from gambling activities under RCW 9.46.071 and 67.70.040
2019
575
Personal Information; Firearms
42.56.230(12)
Personal information of individuals who participated in the bump-fire stock buy- back program under RCW 43.43.920
2019
576
Financial Commercial, and Proprietary Information
42.56.270(31)
Confidential, valuable, commercial information filed with the Department of Ecology regarding the architectural paint stewardship program
2019
577
Agriculture and Livestock; Financial, Commercial, and Proprietary Information; Trade Secret
42.56.380(15)
Trade secrets, commercial information, and other confidential information obtained by the federal Food and Drug Administration by contract
2019
578
Agriculture and Livestock; Financial, Commercial, and Proprietary Information; Trade Secret
15.130.150
Trade secrets, commercial information, and other confidential information obtained by the federal Food and Drug Administration by contract
2019
579
Insurance & Financial Inst.
42.56.400(29)
Findings and orders that disapprove the acquisition of a state trust company
2019
580
Personal Information; Employment and Licensing
42.56.660 (effective 7/1/2020)
Agency employee records if the requester sexually harassed the agency employee
2019
581
Personal Information; Employment and Licensing
42.56.675 (effective 7/1/2020)
Lists of agency employees compiled by agencies to administer RCW 42.56.660
2019
582
Health Care
42.56.650, 41.05.410(3)(b)
Data submitted by health carriers to the Health Benefit Exchange and Health Care Authority
2019
583
Court Proceedings; Guardian
11.130.300(3) (effective 1/1/21)
Visitor report and professional evaluation regarding appointment of guardian for an adult
2019
584
Court Proceedings; Conservator
11.130.410(3) (effective 1/1/21)
Visitor report and professional evaluation regarding conservatorship of a minor
2019
585
Health Care
19.390.070
Information submitted to the attorney general regarding potential anticompetitive conduct in the health care market
2019
586
Placeholder
587
Personal Information; Investigative, law enforcement, and crime victims
26.44.175(5)
Information provided to multidisciplinary child protection team members in the course of a child abuse or neglect investigation
2019
588
Insurance and Financial Institutions; Financial Commercial and Proprietary
30B.44B.170
Department of Financial Institutions' records in connection to involuntary liquidation of a state trust company
2019
Category
RCW
Description
Date Enacted
Materials Presented
Recommendation
Proposed Legislation & Related Bills
589
Insurance and Financial Institutions; Financial Commercial and Proprietary
30B.53.100(3)
Department of Financial Institutions' findings and order on the disapproval of a proposed acquisition of a state trust company
2019
590
State Government; Financial Commercial, and Proprietary Information
43.155.160(6)(g)
Broadband service provider confidential business and financial information submitted as part of an objection to an application for a grant to expand access to broadband service
2019
591
State Government
42.17A.120(3)
Modification hearing information on the suspension or modification of campaign finance reporting requirements under 42.17A.710
2019
592
State Government; Health Care
43.71C.030(2)
Pharmacy benefit manager information reported to the Health Care Authority
2019
593
State Government; Health Care
43.71C.050(7); 060(5); 070(3)
Prescription drug manufacturer information reported to the Health Care Authority
2019
594
State Government; Health Care
43.71C.100
Health Care Authority prescription drug data
2019
595
Insurance; Health Care; Personal Information
48.43.505(4)
Nonpublic personal health information held by health carriers and insurers
2019
596
Financial, Commercial, and Proprietary Information;
Marijuana
69.50.561(6)
Licensed marijuana business's financial and proprietary information supplied during consultative services by the Washington State Liquor and Cannabis Board
2019
597
State Government; Health Care
70.225.040(1)
Information submitted to the prescription monitoring program
2019
598
State Government; Financial Commercial, and Proprietary Information
70.375.130
Confidential, valuable, commercial information filed with the Department of Ecology regarding the architectural paint stewardship program
2019
599
State Government; Health Care
70.58A.400(5) (effective 1/1/21)
Sealed birth records with adoption decrees under chapter 26.33 RCW
2019
600
State Government; Health Care
70.58A.500(3) (effective 1/1/21)
Sealed live birth records
2019
601
State Government; Health Care
70.58A.530(15), (16)
Certification of birth or fetal death, including certification of birth resulting in stillbirth, that includes information from the confidential section of the birth or fetal death record
2019
602
State Government; Health Care
70.58A.540 (effective 1/1/21)
Vital records, reports, statistics, and data
2019
603
Employment and Licensing; Personal --------Information
42.56.250(11)
Personal demographic details voluntarily submitted by state employees
2020
604
Financial, Commercial, and Proprietary Information
42.56.270(32)
Commercial information obtained by the Liquor and Cannabis Board in connection with distiller licensing
2020
605
Educational Information
42.56.315
Certain student information received by school districts
2020
606
Health Care
42.56.360(1)(I); 41.04.830
Medical information about members of retirement plans
2020
Category
RCW
Description
Date Enacted
Materials Presented
Recommendation
Proposed Legislation & Related Bills
607
Health Care
70.390.030(7)
Health care information held by the Health Care Cost Transparency Board that could identify a patient
2020
608
Educational Information; Crime Victim and Witnesses
42.56.375; 28B.112.060(3); 28B.112.070(2); 28B.112.080(5)
Identifying information regarding sexual misconduct complainants and witnesses
2020
609
Insurance and Financial Information; Health Care
42.56.400(31); 48.200.040; 48.43.731
Contracts with health care benefit managers filed with the Insurance Commissioner
2020
610
Firearms; Health Care
9.41.111(1)(c)
Mental health information received in connection with a firearm frame or receiver purchase or transfer application
2020
611
Juvenile Records; Investigative, law enforcement and crime victims
13.50.260(12)
Confidential information and sealed records accessed through the Washington state identification system by criminal justice agencies
2020
612
Juvenile Records; Public Assistance
74.13.730(7)
Reports, reviews, and hearings involving certificates of parental improvement
2020
613
Education Information
28B.96.020(8)
Data collected by the Undocumented Student Support Loan Program
2020
614
Motor Vehicle/Driver Records
43.59.156(6)(a)
Confidential information obtained by the Cooper Jones Active Transportation Safety Council
2020
615
Motor Vehicle/Driver Records
46.20.117(6); 46.20.161(6)
Self-attestations and data provided for identicard and driver's license designations
2020
616
Juvenile Records
28A.300.544(6)
Confidential information received by the work group on students in foster care and/or experiencing homelessness
2020
617
Public Utilities and Transportation
81.88.160(7)
Gas pipeline company reports submitted to the UTC that contain proprietary data or where disclosure would affect public safety
2020
618
Financial, Commercial, and Proprietary Information
42.56.270(12)(a)(iii)
Financial and proprietary information provided to the Department of Commerce in connection with the industrial waste coordination program
2021
619
State Government; Public Health
42.56.380(16)
Certain information obtained from the federal Food and Drug Administration by Department of Health public health laboratories for monitoring food supplies for contaminants
2021
620
Elections
42.56.420(7)
Certain election security information
2021
621
Personal Information
42.56.680
Personal information obtained by the Department of Commerce from residential real property notices of default
2021 c 151 s 12
622
Security
42.56.422; 43.105.450(7)(d)
State agency information technology security reports and information compiled in connection with the Office of Cybersecurity
2021 c291 s8; 2021 c 291 s 1
Category
RCW
Description
Date Enacted
Materials Presented
Recommendation
Proposed Legislation & Related Bills
623
Personal information;
Crime Victims
7.105.105(2)
Confidential party information forms accompanying petitions for civil protection orders
2021 c 215 s 14
624
Financial, Commercial, and Proprietary Information; Trade Secret
36.32.234(7)(a)
Trade secrets and proprietary information submitted by bidders, offerors, and contractors in connection with electric ferry design and procurement, when requested and county concurs
2021 c 224 s 1
625
State Government;
Financial, Commercial, and Proprietary Information
36.32.234(7)(b)
Electric ferry procurement documents, until notification of finalist made or selection terminated
2021 c 244 s 1
626
Personal Information; Motor Vehicle/Driver Records
46.22.010
Information and records containing personal and identity information obtained by the Department of Licensing to administer driver and vehicle records
2021 c 93 s 4
627
Personal Information;
Health Care
49.17.062(3)
During public health emergencies, certain personally identifiable information regarding employees of the Department of Labor and Industries
2021 c 252 s 2
628
Health Care
70.14.065(4)
Records obtained or created relating to partnership agreements for production, distributing, and purchasing generic prescription drugs and insulin
2021 c 274 s 1
629
Health Care
71.40.140; 71.40.120(3)
Communications, records, and files of the Office of Behavioral Health Consumer Advocacy, and related organizations and advocates
2021 c202 s12; 2021 c 202 s 14
630
State Government
70A.245.030(2)
Reports and information submitted to the Department of Ecology by producers of certain plastic products, when requested
2021 c 313 s 4
631
Security; State Government
42.56.422
The report detailing the Office of Cybersecurity's independent security assessment of state agency information technology security program audits
2021
632
Industrial Insurance;
Injured Worker
51.04.063(13)
Information relating to individual claim resolution settlement agreements submitted to the board of industrial insurance appeals
2014
*For subsequent legislative history, see statutes online on the state legislative's website; see also Code Reviser's Office list ("Exemptions from Public Records Disclosure and Confidential Records") available on Sunshine Committee web page.
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