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People v. Guevara
McKINSTER J.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County Super. Ct. No. RIF103546, Matthew C. Perantoni, Judge. Affirmed.
Abacuc Guevara, in pro. per., and Jill M. Klein, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
McKINSTER J.
Defendant and appellant, Abacuc Guevara, filed a petition for resentencing pursuant to Penal Code former section 1170.95, which the court denied. After defense counsel filed a notice of appeal, this court appointed counsel to represent defendant.
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated. Effective June 30, 2022, Assembly Bill No. 200 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) amended and renumbered Penal Code section 1170.95 as section 1172.6. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.)
Counsel has filed a brief under the authority of People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende), Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 (Anders), and People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216 (Delgadillo), setting forth a statement of the facts, a statement of the case, and identifying one potentially arguable issue: whether the court erred in finding defendant ineligible for relief.
In Delgadillo, the California Supreme Court held that Wende and Anders procedures do not apply in appeals from the denial of a section 1172.6 postjudgment petition. (Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 224-226.)
This court offered defendant the opportunity to file a personal supplemental brief, which he has done. Defendant requests this court remand the matter for a youth offender parole hearing pursuant to People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261 (Franklin), In re Cook (2019) 7 Cal.5th 439 (Cook), and section 3051. We affirm.
"If the defendant . . . files a supplemental brief or letter, the Court of Appeal is required to evaluate the specific arguments presented in that brief and to issue a written opinion." (Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 232.)
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Defense counsel filed a motion to augment the record with the record in defendant's appeal from the judgment, which this court granted. (People v. Guevara (Jan. 18, 2007, E038475) [nonpub. opn.] (Guevara I).) We take our factual recitation from Guevara I. On our own motion, we take judicial notice of our prior nonpublished opinion from defendant's appeal from the trial court's judgment upon remand from this court in Guevara I. (People v. Guevara (Apr. 29, 2008, E043473) [nonpub. opn.] (Guevara II).)
"On March 29, 2002, around 11:00 a.m., Carlos Cornejo and Jose Vargas, Jr., (Junior) were sitting on a wall outside the Lincoln Apartments in the Casa Blanca area of Riverside. Defendant walked up and began talking with them. The three apparently drank beer together before an argument broke out that ended when defendant shot Cornejo and Junior. After defendant shot him, Cornejo fell over and off the wall. Junior, however, tried to run away but defendant shot him again, this time in the back. . . . [¶] Cornejo and Junior both died at a hospital . . . ." (Guevara I, supra, E038475.)
A jury found defendant "guilty as charged of two counts of murder . . ., both the proximate result of personally and intentionally discharging a firearm, and intentionally killing the victims, . . . Cornejo (count 1) and [Junior], (count 2), for the benefit of a criminal street gang (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 12022.53, subd. (d), 186.22, subd. (b), 190.2, subd. (a)(3) & (22)); one count of using a firearm to dissuade a witness . . . from testifying or reporting a suspected crime, all for the benefit of a criminal street gang (Pen. Code, §§ 136.1, subd. (c)(1), 186.22, subd. (b), 12022.5, subd. (a)(1)) (count 3); one count of possessing methamphetamine for sale for the benefit of a criminal street gang (Health and Saf. Code, § 11378; Pen. Code, § 186.22, subd. (b)) (count 4); and two counts of possessing a firearm for the benefit of a criminal street gang and after having previously been convicted of violating Penal Code section 12020, subdivision (a) (Pen. Code, §§ 12021, subd. (a)(1), 186.22, subd. (b)) (counts 5 and 6). The jury further found true an allegation under Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (b), that defendant had served a term in prison for his conviction in 2000 of illegally possessing a weapon in violation of Penal Code section 12020, subdivision (a)." (Guevara I, supra, E038475.)
"Based on the jury's verdicts and true findings, the trial court sentenced defendant to prison for two consecutive terms of life without the possibility of parole on counts 1 and 2, the first degree murder convictions, with consecutive terms of 25 years to life on the firearms use and gang enhancements related to those counts." (Guevara I, supra, E038475.)
Defendant appealed. This court reversed defendant's convictions for the counts 3 through 5 offenses but affirmed the judgment as to the remaining counts. (Guevara I, supra, E038475; Guevara II, supra, E043473.)
On remand, the "prosecutor elected not to retry counts 3, 4, and 5; the court dismissed those counts in the interest of justice. The court adopted the sentence it originally imposed as to counts 1, 2, and 6: A term of life without the possibility of parole on count 1, with a consecutive term of 25 years to life for a firearm enhancement pursuant to section 12022.53; a consecutive term of life without the possibility of parole on count 2, with a consecutive term of 25 years to life for a firearm enhancement pursuant to section 12022.53; and a term of three years on count 6, with a four-year gang enhancement pursuant to section 186.22, subdivision (b) and a one-year prior prison term enhancement pursuant to section 667.5, subdivision (b), for a total determinate term of eight years." (Guevara II, supra, E043473.)
Defendant appealed again. This court affirmed the judgment but directed the trial court to recalculate the days defendant had spent in custody, amend the abstract of judgment, and correct the sentencing minute order. (Guevara II, supra, E043473.)
On May 26, 2022, defendant filed a form petition for resentencing pursuant to former section 1170.95, in which he contended he could not currently be convicted of murder. At a hearing on July 29, 2022, the People moved the court to deny the petition. The People, citing this court's opinion in Guevara I, noted that defendant had shot the two victims and fired an additional shot after one of the victims ran. The People contended defendant was "the actual killer' and, therefore, statutorily ineligible for the relief requested.
Defense counsel responded, "I've confirmed everything that counsel just stated." The court ruled, "Based on statutory ineligibility and statements of counsel, the petition is denied."
II. DISCUSSION
Defendant requests this court remand the matter for a youth offender parole hearing pursuant to Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th 261, Cook, supra, 7 Cal.5th 439, and section 3051. We affirm.
Defendant was 20 years old at the time he committed the offenses.
"Senate Bill 1437 [(2017-2018 Reg. Sess.)] significantly limited the scope of the felony-murder rule to effectuate the Legislature's declared intent 'to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life.'" (People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 707-708.)
"When the trial court receives a petition containing the necessary declaration and other required information, the court must evaluate the petition 'to determine whether the petitioner has made a prima facie case for relief.' [Citations.] If the petition and record in the case establish conclusively that the defendant is ineligible for relief, the trial court may dismiss the petition." (Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 708.)
Here, a review of the jury instructions and verdicts conclusively demonstrate that the jury convicted defendant of express malice murder, i.e., as the actual, intentional killer of the victims. Thus, defendant was per se ineligible for relief, and the court properly denied the petition.
Defendant's request that we remand the matter for a Franklin hearing fails because he never requested one below. We decline to treat his petition for resentencing, in the first instance on appeal, as a request for a Franklin hearing. Our decision does not foreclose defendant from filing a motion for a Franklin hearing pursuant to section 1203.01 and Cook.
III. DISPOSITION
The court's order denying the petition is affirmed. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
We concur: RAMIREZ, P. J., CODRINGTON, J.
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