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People v. Bass
People of the State of Illinois v. Charlie Bass — Appellate Opinion Summary (Docket No. 1-21-0249)
Factual and Procedural Background
On July 26, 2009, Netisha Stroger was found shot and later died. Defendant Charlie Bass returned home and reported finding Stroger unconscious; he made three 911 calls starting around 3:15 a.m. Phone records and surveillance evidence showed other relevant activity: surveillance footage captured a light-colored vehicle arriving in an alley earlier that night and later showed the Dodge Charger Bass shared with Stroger flashing back lights; phone records indicated Bass called his cousin, Tierre Randle, twice before his first call to 911; a handgun later recovered from Stroger's shared vehicle was ballistically linked to the fatal bullet; Bass's left hand tested positive for gunshot residue.
A jury convicted Bass of first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1 (West 2008)). The circuit court sentenced him to 30 years for first degree murder and an additional 25 years for personally discharging a firearm, for a total of 55 years. On direct appeal, the conviction and sentence were affirmed.
Bass filed a postconviction petition under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The petition was advanced to the second stage; the State moved to dismiss; the circuit court dismissed the petition; Bass timely appealed.
The primary claims raised in the petition (and before the appellate court) were: (1) trial counsel never privately consulted with Bass (all discussions occurred in a bullpen/holding cell) and therefore misinformed him about the State's evidence (specifically, the order of the 911 calls and the anticipated value of witness Mullins's testimony), causing Bass to reject a 20-year plea offer and proceed to a trial resulting in a much longer sentence; and (2) counsel was ineffective in failing to call Grace Ross as a witness at trial.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether Bass alleged a substantial showing of ineffective assistance of counsel arising from trial counsel's failure to hold a private, confidential consultation and from counsel's alleged mischaracterizations of the State's evidence (including the order of the 911 calls and the anticipated significance of Mullins's testimony), such that dismissal at the second stage was improper and an evidentiary hearing is required.
- Whether Bass alleged a substantial showing of ineffective assistance of counsel arising from counsel's failure to call Grace Ross as a witness at trial.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's (Defendant's) Arguments
- Counsel never held a private consultation with Bass; all discussions took place in the bullpen/holding cell with other detainees present, preventing confidential communication.
- Because counsel failed to privately and meaningfully consult, counsel misinformed Bass about key evidence: counsel told Bass he phoned 911 before phoning his cousin (when records showed the opposite), and counsel downplayed the potentially harmful import of Mullins's testimony by calling it "more helpful than hurtful."
- As a result of counsel's deficient consultation and misinformation, Bass rejected a 20-year plea offer and proceeded to trial, where he received a 55-year sentence.
- Separately, counsel was ineffective for failing to call Grace Ross, whose affidavit indicated she had $14,000 available for Bass and for counsel's legal fees and whose testimony could have undercut the State's asserted motive.
Appellee's (People's / State's) Arguments
- The State contended that there was "no support for an offer being made," implying Bass could not establish the plea offer's existence or terms.
- The State argued Bass, having placed the phone calls, obviously knew their order; therefore his claim that he was misinformed about the order of calls is questionable.
- Regarding witness Ross, the State pointed to abundant other incriminating evidence and suggested the single piece of evidence about call order would not have been material to the plea decision.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) | Established the two-pronged standard for ineffective assistance: (1) deficient performance and (2) prejudice; presumption that counsel's conduct falls within reasonable professional assistance. | The court applied the Strickland framework to evaluate Bass's claims of deficient performance and prejudice in both the plea-negotiation and trial contexts. |
| People v. Hale, 2013 IL 113140 | In plea-context prejudice: defendant must show reasonable probability that, absent counsel's deficient advice, he would have accepted the plea offer; also discussed using disparity between plea offer and eventual sentence as objective evidence of prejudice. | The court used Hale to frame the specific prejudice elements Bass must demonstrate for a rejected plea: (1) likely acceptance but for counsel's error and (2) reasonable probability the plea would have been entered. |
| Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134 (2012) | Addressed prejudice and ineffective assistance in the plea negotiation context (cited for analogous federal standard). | Cited as supporting authority for the proposition that prejudice may be analyzed where a defendant rejects a plea due to counsel error. |
| Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156 (2012) | Also addresses plea-negotiation prejudice under Strickland-derived principles. | Cited to reinforce the standard for prejudice where counsel's errors affect plea decisions. |
| Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545 (1977) | Quoted for the proposition that Sixth Amendment assistance-of-counsel guarantee requires the defendant know communications with counsel are private. | Used by the court to support the conclusion that confidential communication is essential and that the lack of privacy (discussions in a bullpen) undermines the ability to consult meaningfully. |
| Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981) | Explained the purpose of attorney-client privilege: to encourage free and open communication so lawyers can provide sound legal advice. | Cited to support the court's emphasis on the importance of confidentiality in attorney-client communications in criminal cases. |
| People v. Williams, 2016 IL App (4th) 140502 | Holds that postconviction claims about counsel's conduct during plea negotiations are often de hors the record and, when well-pled, typically require an evidentiary hearing. | The court relied on Williams to explain why an evidentiary hearing is generally required when plea-negotiation allegations are well-pled but unsupported by the record. |
| People v. Davis, 2019 IL App (3d) 160082 | Illustrates that misadvice about sentencing consequences (e.g., firearms enhancement) can show prejudice where a plea would have avoided a substantially longer maximum sentence. | Used as an example where disparity between potential sentence from trial and plea offer served as objective evidence of prejudice. |
| People v. Hall, 217 Ill.2d 324 (2005) | Describes second-stage standard: dismissal warranted only when petition allegations, liberally construed in light of the record, fail to make a substantial showing of a constitutional violation. | The court applied Hall's standard in determining whether Bass's second-stage allegations required advancement to an evidentiary hearing. |
| People v. Mujica, 2016 IL App (2d) 140435 | Example of an objective, measurable failure to communicate (counsel failed to communicate defendant's desire to accept a plea). | Cited to contrast cases involving clear, objective failures to communicate with the present case, where communication occurred but allegedly not in private. |
| People v. Trujillo, 2012 IL App (1st) 103212 | Another illustration of counsel failing to convey a plea offer. | Used as contrast to show this case is not one of simple failure to convey an offer because Bass alleged that a plea was rejected after communication (albeit not private). |
| People v. Smith, 268 Ill.App.3d 574 (1994) | Example where counsel failed to communicate and concealed reports. | Cited as another example of communication failures in counsel performance cases, for comparison. |
| People v. Hodges, 234 Ill.2d 1 (2009) | Discusses the Post-Conviction Hearing Act as the statutory vehicle for asserting constitutional deprivation claims. | Used to set the statutory framework for postconviction relief under which Bass proceeded. |
| People v. Tate, 2012 IL 112214 | Explains the three stages of noncapital postconviction proceedings. | The court cited Tate to summarize the procedural stages relevant to Bass's postconviction petition. |
| People v. Edwards, 197 Ill.2d 239 (2001) | Cited for standards used at the first and second stages of postconviction proceedings. | Referenced as authority for the standard a petition must meet at early stages of postconviction review. |
| People v. Coleman, 183 Ill.2d 366 (1998) | Cited regarding the second-stage requirement that a petition make a substantial showing of a constitutional violation. | Used to support the procedural standard for second-stage review. |
| People v. Johnson, 2021 IL 125738 | Noted for the proposition that, after the State moves to dismiss at second stage, the court may hold a hearing on that motion. | Cited to explain procedural discretion at the second-stage dismissal process. |
| People v. Makiel, 358 Ill.App.3d 102 (2005) | Addresses the third-stage evidentiary hearing for postconviction petitions and counsel's obligation to explore evidence. | Cited both to describe that an evidentiary hearing occurs at the third stage and to support the duty to explore readily available evidence. |
| People v. Jones, 2021 IL App (1st) 182392 | States that when a postconviction petition is dismissed without an evidentiary hearing, review is de novo. | Cited to describe the appellate review standard applicable to the dismissal Bass challenges. |
| People v. Snow, 2012 IL App (4th) 110415 | When evaluating a motion to dismiss, all well-pleaded facts not positively rebutted by the record are taken as true. | The court applied this principle to accept Bass's well-pled factual allegations that were not contradicted by the record. |
| People v. King, 316 Ill.App.3d 901 (2000) | Where counsel is aware of exculpatory evidence and does not present it, counsel can be deemed ineffective. | Cited in the context of the duty to present exculpatory evidence when available; used in analyzing Ross-related claim. |
| People v. O'Banner, 215 Ill.App.3d 778 (1991) | Supports the rule that failure to present exculpatory evidence may support an ineffective assistance claim. | Cited along with King to explain when failure to present evidence may be deficient performance. |
| People v. Willingham, 2020 IL App (1st) 162250 | Notes that the decision to call witnesses is generally trial strategy, but failure to call witnesses who would contradict the State can indicate deficient performance. | Applied to the Ross claim: the court concluded counsel's decision not to call Ross was strategic and within the range of reasonable professional assistance. |
| People v. Bass, 2015 IL App (1st) 130904-U | Direct appeal of Bass's conviction and sentence (affirmed on direct appeal). | Cited as the appellate history confirming the underlying conviction and sentence upon which this postconviction petition is based. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court proceeded in two analytical parts corresponding to Bass's two primary claims.
1. Whether counsel's failure to privately consult constituted deficient performance:
- The court emphasized the centrality of confidential, private communication to the attorney-client relationship, citing the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct and the attorney-client privilege (including Upjohn) as underpinning the need for privacy in criminal defense.
- It recognized that not every communication deficiency is objectively measurable; here Bass's petition admitted that communication occurred, but alleged it took place in a bullpen/holding cell with other detainees present, which the court found compromised confidentiality.
- Considering the seriousness of the murder charge and the complexity and nature of the evidence (video surveillance, phone records, text messages, physical evidence), the court concluded that counsel's failure to secure a private meeting to meaningfully review discovery and advise the client fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.
- The court declined to create a categorical rule requiring private meetings in all cases, noting that adequacy of communication depends on context, but found that in this context the alleged conduct was deficient.
2. Whether Bass showed prejudice from the alleged deficient consultation (plea-negotiation prejudice):
- The court recited the two-pronged prejudice standard for rejected pleas (Hale): (1) reasonable probability the defendant would have accepted the plea absent counsel's error and (2) reasonable probability the plea would have been entered and not rescinded by prosecution or rejected by the court.
- The State raised a threshold factual challenge, arguing there was no evidence the plea offer existed. The court noted the practical difficulty of proving plea-negotiation facts at the second stage because such matters are usually de hors the record.
- Relying on precedent (including Williams), the court observed that where well-pled factual allegations assert substantial constitutional violations about plea negotiations and the record does not contradict them, an evidentiary hearing is ordinarily required to resolve credibility and factual disputes.
- The court found the trial court's skepticism (based on abundant other incriminating evidence) was a credibility determination better suited for an evidentiary hearing rather than resolution on a second-stage dismissal.
- Because Bass's allegations about deficient consultation and resulting misinformation were unrebutted by the record, the court concluded these claims made a substantial showing of a constitutional violation and reversed dismissal as to those specific claims, remanding for a third-stage evidentiary hearing.
3. Counsel's failure to call Grace Ross (trial-witness claim):
- The court acknowledged the general obligation for attorneys to explore readily available evidence and that failure to present known exculpatory evidence can be deficient.
- However, the court treated the decision about whether to call Ross as trial strategy: counsel had met Ross multiple times and she had paid counsel's fees, and counsel made a reasoned decision not to call a romantic partner whose testimony would only negate a single potential motive.
- Because this decision reflected a conscious strategic choice, Bass failed to overcome the presumption that counsel's action was within reasonable professional assistance; the court affirmed dismissal of the Ross-related ineffective assistance claim.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The appellate court affirmed in part and reversed in part. It affirmed the circuit court's dismissal of Bass's claim concerning counsel's failure to call Grace Ross, and it reversed the dismissal of Bass's claims that counsel failed to hold a private consultation and thereby misinformed him about the evidence (the order of 911 calls and the significance of Mullins's testimony). The matter is remanded to the circuit court for a third-stage evidentiary hearing as to the private-consultation/misinformation claims.
Implications / Direct Effect:
- On remand, the circuit court must hold an evidentiary hearing to resolve factual disputes concerning whether a 20-year plea offer existed, whether counsel failed to privately consult with Bass, what counsel told Bass about the evidence (including the order of phone calls and the significance of Mullins's testimony), and whether Bass would have accepted the plea but for any deficient advice.
- The appellate court left intact the dismissal of the claim regarding counsel's decision not to call Grace Ross, finding that decision to be within the range of reasonable professional judgment.
- The opinion applies and synthesizes existing precedent governing ineffective assistance in both plea-negotiation and trial contexts but does not purport to establish a categorical new rule; rather, it emphasizes contextual analysis and the need for an evidentiary hearing where well-pled, unrebutted allegations about out-of-record plea negotiations are presented.
This summary is based exclusively on the text of the provided appellate opinion and does not add facts or inferences not contained therein.
MITCHELL, JUSTICE
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County. No. 11 CF 00686 (01) Honorable Timothy J. Joyce, Judge presiding.
Dean C. Morask, of Park Ridge, for appellant.
Kimberly M. Foxx, State's Attorney, of Chicago (Enrique Abraham, Matthew Connors, and Noah Montague, Assistant State's Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.
JUSTICE MITCHELL delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Justice Mikva and Justice Oden Johnson concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
MITCHELL, JUSTICE
¶ 1 Defendant Charlie Bass appeals the second-stage dismissal of his postconviction petition alleging ineffective assistance of counsel in plea negotiations and at trial. Bass's chief claim is that his counsel never met with him privately and misinformed him about the State's evidence. Bass alleges that as a result of counsel's failure, he rejected a 20-year plea offer and, instead, proceeded to trial where a jury found him guilty of first degree murder. The circuit court later sentenced Bass to 55 years in prison (30 years for first degree murder plus 25 years for personally discharging a firearm).
¶ 2 Because we conclude that Bass has alleged a substantial showing of a constitutional violation on his claim related to counsel's failure to privately consult and to inform him of the evidence against him, we reverse the dismissal of those claims and remand for an evidentiary hearing. As to the other claim dismissed, we affirm.
¶ 3 I
¶ 4 On the afternoon of July 26, 2009, Netisha Stroger overheard her live-in boyfriend, Charlie Bass, talking on the phone with his other girlfriend, Rita Mullins. As it turns out, Mullins would visit Bass almost every day while Stroger was at work. Stroger told Bass that she would not write, call, or visit him in jail on his pending burglary case or send him money.
¶ 5 That evening, Bass went out with his cousin, Tierre Randle, and together they spent the evening drinking and driving around Chicago's west side. When Bass returned home, he said he found Stroger unconscious on the floor of the locked apartment, bleeding from the mouth and nose. Stroger had been shot.
¶ 6 Bass made three phone calls to 911 starting around 3:15 a.m. Curiously, phone records show that Bass called Randle (at 3:12 a.m. and 3:14 a.m.) before making the first call to 911. When Chicago police arrived around 3:25 a.m., Randle was sitting in a white Cadillac parked in the alley behind the apartment.
¶ 7 Surveillance footage of imperfect quality from area security cameras showed a light color vehicle arriving in the alley at 2:45 a.m. A person exited the passenger side of the vehicle and ran toward the Bass-Stroger apartment. At 3:15 a.m., surveillance footage also showed that the back lights of the Dodge Charger that Bass shared with Stroger flashed as if activated by a remote. A person could be seen approaching the driver's side door and then proceeding toward the apartment.
¶ 8 Later that day, Stroger's sister found a handgun underneath the driver's seat of the Dodge Charger. Testing confirmed that the bullet that killed Stroger came from that gun. Bass's left hand tested positive for gunshot residue.
¶ 9 Based on this and other evidence, a jury convicted Bass of first degree murder. 720 ILCS 5/9-1 (West 2008). The circuit court sentenced Bass to 30 years in prison for first degree murder plus 25 years for personally discharging a firearm, for a total sentence of 55 years. On direct appeal, we affirmed. People v. Bass, 2015 IL App (1st) 130904-U.
¶ 10 Bass subsequently petitioned for postconviction relief, asserting ineffective assistance of counsel. 725 ILCS 5/122-1 (West 2014). The circuit court advanced his petition to the second stage, and the State moved to dismiss. After briefing and argument, the circuit court dismissed the petition, and this timely appeal followed. Ill. S.Ct. Rs. 606, 651 (eff July 1, 2017).
¶ 11 II
¶ 12 Bass contends that the circuit court erred in dismissing his petition at the second stage because he properly alleged two grounds for ineffective assistance of counsel. First, he contends that trial counsel's failure to consult with him privately resulted in a lack of meaningful discussion regarding the State's evidence. He asserts that counsel misinformed him about the order of the phone calls to 911 and mischaracterized the significance of Mullins's testimony. This caused him to turn down a plea offer from the State. Second, Bass challenges counsel's failure to call Grace Ross at trial.
¶ 13 The Post-Conviction Hearing Act (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2014)) provides a means for individuals to assert that their criminal convictions were the result of a substantial denial of their rights under the state or federal constitutions. People v. Hodges, 234 Ill.2d 1, 9 (2009) (citing 725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2006)).
¶ 14 In a noncapital case, a postconviction proceeding contains three stages. People v. Tate, 2012 IL 112214, ¶ 9. At the first stage, the court must determine whether the petition is" 'frivolous or is patently without merit.'" Hodges, 234 Ill.2d at 10 (quoting People v. Edwards, 197 Ill.2d 239, 244 (2001), and citing 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(a)(2) (West 2006)). If the petition survives the first stage, it then moves to the second stage, where the circuit court must determine whether the petition makes "a substantial showing of a constitutional violation." Edwards, 197 Ill.2d at 24546 (citing People v. Coleman, 183 Ill.2d 366, 381 (1998)). The State may then file a motion to dismiss, and the court may hold a hearing on that motion. People v. Johnson, 2021 IL 125738, ¶ 27. At the third stage, the trial court conducts an evidentiary hearing. People v. Makiel, 358 Ill.App.3d 102, 104 (2005) (citing 725 ILCS 5/122-6 (West 2000)). When a postconviction petition is dismissed without an evidentiary hearing, the trial court's decision is reviewed de novo. People v. Jones, 2021 IL App (1st) 182392, ¶ 39.
¶ 15 In evaluating a motion to dismiss, the trial court is concerned only with determining whether the petitioner's allegations sufficiently show a constitutional infirmity that would necessitate relief under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act. 725 ILCS 5/122-2 (West 2014). "[A]ll well-pleaded facts that are not positively rebutted by the trial record are to be taken as true." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Snow, 2012 IL App (4th) 110415, ¶ 15.
¶ 16 Here, Bass argues that he was denied effective assistance of counsel in violation of the sixth amendment. See U.S. Const., amend. VI. Under the familiar standard for evaluating claims of ineffective assistance established in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), a defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient and that the defendant suffered prejudice as a result. To establish deficient performance, the defendant must demonstrate that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Id. at 688. "[A] court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance." Id. at 689.
¶ 17 To establish prejudice under Strickland, "[t]he defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Id. at 694. In the context of a plea, our supreme court has held that the defendant "must establish that there is a reasonable probability that, absent his attorney's deficient advice, he would have accepted the plea offer." People v. Hale, 2013 IL 113140, ¶ 18.
¶ 18 A. Counsel's Failure to Conduct a Private Consultation
¶ 19 Bass alleges that his trial counsel never held a private consultation with him-either in person or over the phone. All discussions between Bass and counsel took place in the holding cell behind Judge Kazmierski's courtroom, with other detainees present. Bass contends that this failure led him to be misinformed regarding the evidence against him: (1) counsel told him that he phoned 911 before he phoned his cousin when, in fact, Bass phoned his cousin twice before calling 911, and (2) counsel mischaracterized the significance of Mullins's likely testimony by describing it as "more helpful than hurtful."
¶ 20 A hallmark of the attorney-client relationship in our adversarial system is full and open communication between a client and his lawyer. This relationship of trust and confidence allows the client to obtain informed legal advice, and it provides the attorney with the information necessary to provide competent representation. Virtually every role a lawyer fulfills depends on communication with the client, be it as an advisor, an advocate, a negotiator, or an evaluator. Ill. R. Prof'l Conduct (2010), Preamble, ¶ 2 (eff. Jan. 1, 2010). The Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct further amplify the need for communication and confidentiality. Ill. R. Prof'l Conduct (2010) R. 1.4 cmt. 1 (eff. Jan. 1, 2016) ("Reasonable communication between the lawyer and the client is necessary for the client effectively to participate in the representation."); R. 1.6(e) (eff. Jan. 1, 2016) ("A lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to prevent the inadvertent or unauthorized disclosure of, or unauthorized access to, information relating to the representation of a client.").
¶ 21 Running hand in glove with these professional duties is the attorney-client privilege, the oldest of the common law evidentiary privileges. 8 John H. Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law § 2290, at 542-43 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961). Its purpose is to encourage free and open communication between client and lawyer, thus promoting informed, effective representation. See, e.g., Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) ("The privilege recognizes that sound legal advice or advocacy serves public ends and that such advice or advocacy depends upon the lawyer's being fully informed by the client.").
¶ 22 The professional need for confidential communication is perhaps greatest in a criminal representation where a client, with his liberty at stake, may well need to share incriminating, or at least embarrassing, information with his counsel. And counsel seeking to advise and to advocate must deliver an unvarnished assessment of his client's prospects. Cf. ABA Criminal Justice Standards, Defense Function, Standard 4-2.2 (4th ed. 2017), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/ criminalJustice/standards/DefenseFunctionFourthEdition (last visited Aug. 30, 2022) [https://perma.cc/4AGW-3N6Q] (delineating the need for "confidential and unmonitored" telephone calls and in-person meetings between defense counsel and his detained client). A thorough, meaningful discussion between attorney and client about discovery, trial strategy, and legal options requires privacy.
¶ 23 Can we say that counsel's failure to have a one-on-one, confidential meeting with his client falls "below an objective standard of reasonableness"? That all depends on context: The "[a]dequacy of communication depends in part on the kind of advice or assistance that is involved." Ill. R. Prof'l Conduct (2010) R. 1.4 cmt. 5 (eff. Jan. 1, 2016). This is not a case where there was an objective, measurable failure to communicate. See People v. Mujica, 2016 IL App (2d) 140435, ¶ 10 (counsel allegedly failed to communicate to the State the defendant's desire to accept the plea); People v. Trujillo, 2012 IL App (1st) 103212, ¶¶ 9-10 (counsel allegedly failed to convey the State's plea offer); see also People v. Smith, 268 Ill.App.3d 574, 578-79 (1994) (counsel failed to communicate with the defendant and concealed reports). Indeed, Bass's petition alleges communication: "All discussions between the petitioner and trial counsel regarding the evidence in the case were in the bullpen behind Judge Kazmierski's courtroom, where other detainees were present." Further, the petition alleges that Bass rejected a plea offer. So, Bass and his counsel certainly communicated.
¶ 24 The deficiency in counsel's performance, if any, was in failing to secure a private setting for a discussion with Bass. Given the significance of the murder charge Bass faced and the nature of the evidence against him-which included video surveillance footage, phone calls, and text messages-counsel's alleged failure to have a confidential consultation (either by phone or in person) fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. It would seem practically impossible to have a meaningful review of the discovery in this case in a holding cell with other detainees present. See, e.g., Weatherfordv. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 554 n.4 (1977) ("the Sixth Amendment's assistance-of-counsel guarantee can be meaningfully implemented only if a criminal defendant knows that his communications with his attorney are private" (internal quotation marks omitted)). Indeed, the presence of the detainees threatened to compromise any privileged communication between Bass and his counsel. Based on the relative complexity of the representation stemming from the charge and nature of the evidence, counsel's performance was deficient in failing to hold a private meeting with his client. This, however, does not establish a categorial rule, and what constitutes appropriate consultation will vary depending on the case.
¶ 25 But was there any prejudice to Bass? To establish prejudice where a defendant rejects a plea offer, a defendant must demonstrate (1) a reasonable probability that he would have accepted the plea offer but for counsel's deficient performance and (2) a reasonable probability that the plea would have been entered without the prosecution canceling it or the trial court refusing to accept it. See Hale, 2013 IL 113140, ¶ 19; see also Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 147 (2012); Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 163-64 (2012). Here, Bass would also need to establish that the plea offer was ever extended because the State argued below that "there's no support for an offer being made." This highlights the difficulty in analyzing prejudice at the second stage involving a rejected plea because, unlike an ineffective assistance claim arising from performance at trial, there typically is no record of plea negotiations. The absence of a record makes it particularly challenging to evaluate the consequence of counsel's supposed deficiencies. After all, "[t]he dismissal of a postconviction petition is warranted at the second stage of the proceedings only when the allegations in the petition, liberally construed in light of the trial record, fail to make a substantial showing of a constitutional violation." (Emphasis added.) People v. Hall, 217 Ill.2d 324, 334 (2005).
¶ 26 In one of the few Illinois Appellate Court opinions addressing this analytic quandary, Justice Steigmann wrote that the absence of an objective benchmark (i.e., a record) virtually compels an evidentiary hearing if the allegations in the petition are well-pled:
"[P]ostconviction challenges based on a claim that the defendant was denied his constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel during guilty-plea negotiations with the State are almost always based on matters that occur de hors the record. Thus, absent a pretrial hearing in which the trial court could make a record regarding guilty-plea negotiations by asking questions of the parties on the record ***, the court must take all well-pleaded facts as true. When those well-pleaded facts allege a substantial constitutional violation-as in this case-the court must advance the postconviction petition to the third stage of postconviction proceedings for an evidentiary hearing." People v. Williams, 2016 IL App (4th) 140502, ¶ 44.
In Williams, the defendant had alleged that his counsel failed to accurately inform him of potential penalties and that he was prejudiced in that, if he knew he was facing the possibility of consecutive sentences, he would have accepted the State's 18-year guilty plea offer. Id. ¶ 43. Similarly, where counsel failed to advise a defendant of a firearms enhancement and principles of accountability, the appellate court found a substantial showing of prejudice where a blind plea would have subjected the defendant to a maximum sentence of 30 years versus the 50-year sentence imposed after trial. People v. Davis, 2019 IL App (3d) 160082-U, ¶¶ 5, 25. A court can consider the disparity between "the sentence a defendant faced" and a plea offer as objective evidence of prejudice supporting a defendant's claim. Hale, 2013 IL 113140, ¶ 18.
¶ 27 Bass's complaint is not as concrete as being misadvised of a sentencing range, but it goes to being misadvised of the significance of the evidence against him-the order of the 911 calls and the significance of Mullins's anticipated testimony. Specifically, Bass claims that he would have accepted the State's 20-year plea rather than proceeding to trial (and receiving a 55-year sentence) if counsel had thoroughly and properly communicated the evidence against him. The State argues that Bass, since he placed the phone calls, certainly knew the order. Perhaps this is so, but the setting in which Bass met his counsel-a holding cell with other detainees present-made it impossible for Bass, privately, to correct or to question his counsel about the evidence. The very able trial judge questioned Bass's "but for" assertion that if he knew the correct order of the phone calls, he would have accepted the State's supposed plea offer because there was an abundance of other incriminating evidence. How could this one piece of evidence really be material to the plea decision when there was so much other damning evidence? But that analysis approaches a credibility determination more appropriately made at an evidentiary hearing than on second-stage dismissal. And as our supreme court has cautioned, a showing of prejudice at an evidentiary hearing must encompass more than "a defendant's own subjective, self-serving testimony." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. In sum, in light of Bass's unrebutted allegations and the absence of anything in the record to contradict those allegations, we conclude that the circuit court erred in dismissing these claims in Bass's petition without holding an evidentiary hearing.
¶ 28 B. Counsel's Failure to Call Grace Ross
¶ 29 Finally, Bass contends that his counsel was ineffective in failing to call Ross-another girlfriend of Bass. Bass claims Ross's testimony would have fostered reasonable doubt and negated his supposed financial motive for killing Stroger. At trial, the State argued that Bass's motive for killing Stroger was that "she would not call him, send him money or visit him (at) jail because she found out about his relationship with Mullins." However, Ross specified in her affidavit that she had $14,000 available for Bass and for trial counsel's legal fees. Defendant argues that trial counsel's failure to call Ross as a witness or otherwise investigate the potential value of her testimony to his case establishes ineffective assistance of counsel.
¶ 30 Attorneys have an obligation to explore all readily available sources of evidence that might benefit their clients. Makiel, 358 Ill.App.3d at 107. Where a defendant's attorney is aware of exculpatory evidence and does not present it, counsel can be deemed ineffective. People v. King, 316 Ill.App.3d 901, 915 (2000) (citing People v. O'Banner, 215 Ill.App.3d 778, 790 (1991)). The decision to call witnesses is one of trial strategy generally immune from ineffective assistance of counsel claims, but counsel's failure to call witnesses who would have contradicted the State's evidence and supported the defense can indicate deficient performance. People v. Willingham, 2020 IL App (1st) 162250, ¶ 48.
¶ 31 In this case, choosing not to call a witness who was romantically involved with Bass was strategic, particularly when the testimony only stood to negate a single potential motive. Moreover, Bass states in his petition that counsel and Ross had met multiple times and that she was even paying counsel's fees. Counsel was aware of Ross and her relationship to Bass, and he made the reasoned and conscious choice not to call Bass's third girlfriend. Bass therefore fails to overcome the presumption that the challenged action was within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.
¶ 32 III
¶ 33 In summary, the circuit court erred in dismissing Bass's postconviction petition without an evidentiary hearing with respect to the allegations concerning counsel's failure to hold a private consultation in connection with the order of the 911 phone calls and the significance of Mullins's testimony. Accordingly, we remand the matter to the circuit court to hold a third-stage evidentiary hearing as to these claims. We affirm the circuit court's order dismissing Bass's petition in all other respects.
¶ 34 Affirmed in part and reversed in part; cause remanded.
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