Deputy v. Stapleford

         The order denying the plaintiff's motion for a new trial not having been appealed from, and the statement presenting no exceptions to the rulings or judgment of the Court, the only question presented is: Do the findings support the judgment?

         I. The respondent Willis being a bona fide purchaser for a valuable consideration without notice, is not affected by the fraud or duress of her grantor. She holds the land purged of the fraud. (1 Story's Eq. Jurisp. secs. 64 c, 434, 436, 410, 381; Broom's Legal Maxims, top p. 458; 2 Story's Eq. Jurisp. sec. 1502; Jerrard v. Saunders, 2 Vesey Ch. R. 453; Story's Eq. Plead. secs. 603-4; Jackson v. Henry, 10 John, 197, and cases there cited; Bean v. Smith et al. ,2 Mason, 252; Astor v. Wells, 4 Wheat. 487; Trull v. Bigelow , 16 Mass. 418; Wood v. Mann et al., 1 Sumner, 509; Boone v. Chiles, 10 Pet. 210; 2 Sug. Vend. top p. 426, and see the numerous cases cited in note 2, to the text; 2 Leading Cases in Equity, Part I, and the numerous authorities there collected; Somes v. Brewer, 2 Pick. 192); and this doctrine is applicable to the case of a deed obtained by duress, which is only voidable, (Id. 197; 1 Parsons on Cont. 322) for duress differs but little in its character and effects from fraud. (Somes v. Brewer, supra, 203; 2 Black. Com. top p. 234, Chitty's Ed.)

         II. The appellant's silence for forty-one days after the deed to Stapleford has been executed, (thirty-four of which it was on record) and until months after the respondent Willis had purchased, is as conclusive upon him as if he had consented to the sale and been a party to the conveyance to her. (1 Story's Eq. Jurisp. secs. 385-6, 391; Wendell v. Van Rensselaer, 1 John. Ch. 354; Stores v. Barker , 6 Id. 168; Pickard v. Sears, 6 Adolph. & Ellis, 474.)

         JUDGES: Baldwin, J. delivered the opinion of the Court. Cope, J. concurring.

         OPINION

          BALDWIN, Judge

         It is to be regretted, for the sake of public justice, that the alleged outrage, in which the claim of the plaintiff to the relief he seeks in his bill had its origin, cannot be redressed by a restoration of the property of which he was lawlessly deprived. The deed to Stapleford, though procured by fraud and duress, was only voidable, and the vendee of Stapleford, purchasing in ignorance of the facts, can hold the property. This seems to be the rule supported by the general current of decisions. As no motion for a new trial was made and appealed from, we cannot review the findings upon the question of notice to Mrs. Willis of the plaintiff's claim or the facts in connection with it, even if on such review, we could disregard the findings of the Judge, and assign conclusive effect to the statement of the plaintiff's witnesses.

         We are compelled reluctantly to affirm the decree.