Platt v. Jones

         The fact that parol evidence is necessary to establish the possession of Hugal's improvements, does not make a latent ambiguity. If so, every deed contains a latent ambiguity, for the most definite landmark must be shown to exist as described in the deed. It is plain that the parties intended that Hugal should have a league of land and his house and improvements; but they did not know exactly how wide the tract was, and therefore adopted this description. If the tract had proved more than a league wide this line would have been deflected up the coast, and Hugal would have had less than a league on the ocean. So, having proven less than a league in width, it must run down the coast for quantity. But if a latent ambiguitydid exist the parol evidence should have been confined to the ambiguous matter, which, in this case, is claimed to be the doubt as to the improvements. This would not justify the admission of parol evidence as to other matters, and did not justify the evidence that this line was intended to run parallel to the first line, instead of so as to include a league of land according to the plain language of the deed.

         JUDGES: Wallace, J. Rhodes, J., specially concurring. Mr. Chief Justice Sprague did not participate in the foregoing decision.

         OPINION

          WALLACE, Judge

         We are of opinion that the third call in the deed from Rufus to Hugal, in these words: " Thence in a southern direction to the Pacific Ocean, so as to include the improvements and house of said Hugal, and to include a quantity of land equal to one Spanish league" --imports that in approaching the ocean, the line must deflect from a right angle to such an extent as, at all events, will include one league of land in superficial area, and so much more than that quantity as may be necessary to include the improvements of Hugal as they existed in September, 1847. This results by construction of the terms of the deed itself, and parol evidence is not admissible to vary it in that respect.

         The judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded for a new trial.

         CONCUR

          RHODES

         Rhodes, J., specially concurring:

         The first call in the deed from Rufus to Hugal commences at a point on the Pacific Ocean, and runs thence to a boundary of the rancho, called in the deed the northern boundary. The parties agree as to this line; and it accords with the construction it gives to the deed. The boundary line which is intersected by that line is the only boundary line which that line will meet; and it will, therefore, be construed as the boundary line intended by the parties, though it is the northeastern rather than the northern boundary. Both parties agree that the second line runs along the northern boundary line southeasterly, and that its length is required to be exactly one league. I am not prepared to say that that is the true construction of the deed, so far as respects the length of the line; but as the parties agree in their construction, I accept it as correct. The deed requires the third line to be so run as to include within the boundaries of the tract conveyed the improvements of Hugal and one Spanishleague of land. That is to say, the lines must include one league, and more than that area, should it be necessary to do so in order to inclose the improvements of Hugal. This is imperatively required by the proper construction of the deed. There is no latent ambiguity in the deed as to the quantity of land conveyed; and parol evidence is not admissible to show that a less quantity was intended to be conveyed, or that the third line should be run so as to inclose an area less than one square league.

         I concur in the judgment.