Barker v. Stanford

         Therespondents claim that the decree of distribution disposed of all the residue of the estate: that administration was thereby closed, and the duties of the administratrix then ceased. The mere fact that the Court appointed the administratrix a trustee to take care of and invest this money, instead of some other person, adds nothing to the liability of the sureties. The trust was not imposed upon her because it belonged to her duties in connection with the administration. It was no part of her duties as administratrix " to invest this money to the best advantage, and appropriate the income for the promotion of the best religious and temporal prosperity of the children of testator." She was the most suitable person for that purpose, and was probably selected by the Court for that reason, but such a duty does not belong to the administration of an estate. This money which, during the process of administration, belonged to the estate and was held by the administratrix for the payment of debts, was taken out of the estate and out of her hands as administratrix by the decree of distribution.

         The bond is in the ordinary form, and binds the sureties to the faithful performance of her dutiesas administratrix. Those duties cease with the distribution of the estate fully executed. The property could not have gone to the parties entitled, and still remain in the hands of the administratrix. This money was distributed as effectually, so far as concerns the sureties, as if it had been handed over to the children themselves. It was placed in the custody of a person for them, and so was taken out of the custody of the administratrix as administratrix. There is but one final decree of distribution, and the condition of this money was settled, so far as the administration of the estate was concerned, by this decree of July 11th, 1859.

         If the Court erred in this decree, in the disposition of this money, such error cannot be the basis of liability on the part of the sureties. The parties in interest were duly notified of the time and place of the hearing, and were constructively before the Court. Appellant's counsel makes a point of the fact that the record does not show that any attorney was appointed to represent the minors on the hearing; we do not find that the law required an attorney to be appointed in such cases. But the sureties are not bound to answer for the actsof the Court.

         Now, if we are wrong in this view of the effect of the distribution, and it is held that the administratrix continued to act as such after the decree, and while this money remained in her hands as trustee, then we submit that the sureties, in simply signing an administration bond, did not intend to become bound for this additional risk.

         The liabilities of sureties are strictissimi juris, and cannot be extended beyond the reasonable, necessary import of the language of the bond. (United States v. Cheesman, 3 Sawyer, 424.)

         JUDGES: Rhodes J.

         OPINION

          RHODES, Judge

         The order made by the Probate Court, on the 11th day of July, 1859, is an order of final distribution. The funds in the hands of the administratrix were ordered " to be held and managed by her in trust, in pursuance of the will of the deceased, for the children of the deceased"; and she thereupon took the funds and thereafter held them in her capacity as trustee. Having taken the funds in that capacity, she was no longer subject, in respect to those funds, to the orders of the Probate Court, as the administratrix of the estate of the deceased. The sureties upon her bond as administratrix did not become liable for her acts or default as such trustee in the application of the funds.

         Judgment and order affirmed.