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People v. Blankenbaker
Summary of Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
Defendant William F. Blankenbaker III pleaded guilty, in satisfaction of a two-count indictment, to criminal contempt in the first degree. County Court (Catena, J.) sentenced him, as a second felony offender, to 1½ to 3 years' imprisonment. Defendant appealed, contending that his plea was not knowing, voluntary and intelligent. The record did not reflect that an appropriate postallocution motion had been made. During the plea allocution defendant initially made equivocal statements ("I'm guilty and I'm not guilty") but later affirmatively answered that he was pleading guilty freely and voluntarily, that he intentionally disobeyed an order of protection of which he was aware (stating the protected person "came to me" and he "didn't leave fast enough"), acknowledged inappropriate contact with that person, and acknowledged a prior conviction of criminal contempt in the second degree within the preceding five years. The court affirmed the judgment.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether defendant's guilty plea was knowing, voluntary and intelligent.
- Whether defendant's statements during the plea colloquy, presentence interview, or at sentencing negated an element of the offense or otherwise triggered the narrow exception to the preservation requirement (thereby permitting appellate review despite the absence of a postallocution motion).
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- Defendant contended that his plea was not knowing, voluntary or intelligent.
- He asserted that statements he made during the plea colloquy and at sentencing were inconsistent with guilt or otherwise called into question the voluntariness of his plea.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| People v. Brown, 191 A.D.3d 1047, 1047, 137 N.Y.S.3d 748 [2021] | Preservation requirement for postallocution challenges to pleas. | Used to support that defendant's contention was unpreserved because no appropriate postallocution motion was made. |
| People v. Botts, 191 A.D.3d 1044, 1045, 140 N.Y.S.3d 632 [2021], lv denied 36 N.Y.3d 1095, 144 N.Y.S.3d 123, 167 N.E.3d 1258 [2021] | Preservation requirement and postallocution motion authority. | Relied upon to conclude the challenge to the plea was unpreserved in the absence of a postallocution motion. |
| People v. Lopez, 71 N.Y.2d 662, 666, 529 N.Y.S.2d 465, 525 N.E.2d 5 [1988] | Narrow exception to preservation when plea colloquy or other statements negate an element of the offense or otherwise cast doubt on voluntariness. | Applied to determine that defendant's statements did not trigger the exception and thus did not cure lack of preservation. |
| Penal Law § 215.51[c] | Statutory elements of criminal contempt in the first degree (intentional disobedience of order of protection of which defendant had actual knowledge because present in court when issued; order requires staying away; prior conviction within five years). | Cited to define the elements the allocution had to address; the allocution established those elements. |
| People v. Larock, 139 A.D.3d 1241, 1242, 31 N.Y.S.3d 665 [2016], lv denied 28 N.Y.3d 932, 40 N.Y.S.3d 360, 63 N.E.3d 80 [2016] | Plea allocution sufficiency to remove doubt about guilt or voluntariness. | Supported the conclusion that defendant's affirmative responses during allocution removed any doubt about guilt or voluntariness. |
| People v. Perez, 82 A.D.3d 1451, 1451, 918 N.Y.S.2d 754 [2011], lv denied 17 N.Y.3d 799, 929 N.Y.S.2d 107, 952 N.E.2d 1102 [2011] | Statements outside allocution (e.g., presentence interview or sentencing) that assert innocence because of lack of evidence do not necessarily negate intent or trigger further inquiry. | Applied to reject the notion that defendant's presentence interview statement of innocence or sentencing remarks negated intent or required further court inquiry. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court first determined the preservation status of defendant's challenge, concluding it was unpreserved because the record did not show an appropriate postallocution motion (relying on cited authority). The court then examined the plea allocution: although defendant initially made an equivocal remark, he later affirmatively stated he was pleading guilty freely and voluntarily, admitted intentionally disobeying the order of protection of which he was aware, acknowledged inappropriate contact with the protected person, and admitted a prior contempt conviction within five years. The court held those affirmative responses were sufficient to remove any doubt as to guilt or voluntariness. Finally, the court considered defendant's presentence interview assertion of innocence and sentencing statements and concluded, citing authority, that those remarks did not negate the element of intent or trigger the narrow Lopez exception requiring further inquiry.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The judgment of conviction is AFFIRMED (ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed).
Implications: The direct effect is that defendant's conviction and sentence (1½ to 3 years) stand. The court applied existing preservation and plea-colloquy principles and did not announce any new legal rule or broader precedent.
Clark, J.
Stephen J. Carney, Schenectady, for appellant.
Lorraine Diamond, District Attorney, Fonda (James P. Melita of counsel), for respondent.
Before: Egan Jr., J.P., Lynch, Clark, Aarons and Reynolds Fitzgerald, JJ.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Clark, J. Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Montgomery County (Catena, J.), rendered April 23, 2018, convicting defendant upon his plea of guilty of the crime of criminal contempt in the first degree.
In satisfaction of a two-count indictment, defendant pleaded guilty to criminal contempt in the first degree. County Court thereafter sentenced defendant, as a second felony offender, to a prison term of 1½ to 3 years. Defendant appeals.
Defendant's contention that the plea was not knowing, voluntary and intelligent is unpreserved for our review as the record does not reflect that an appropriate postallocution motion was made (see People v. Brown, 191 A.D.3d 1047, 1047, 137 N.Y.S.3d 748 [2021] ; People v. Botts, 191 A.D.3d 1044, 1045, 140 N.Y.S.3d 632 [2021], lv denied 36 N.Y.3d 1095, 144 N.Y.S.3d 123, 167 N.E.3d 1258 [2021] ). We are unpersuaded by defendant's assertion that statements he made during the plea colloquy and at sentencing negated an element of the crime, were inconsistent with his guilt or otherwise called into question the voluntariness of his plea, so as to trigger the narrow exception to the preservation requirement (see People v. Lopez, 71 N.Y.2d 662, 666, 529 N.Y.S.2d 465, 525 N.E.2d 5 [1988] ).
As relevant here, a defendant commits the offense of criminal contempt in the first degree when he or she intentionally disobeys an order of protection of which he or she has actual knowledge because he or she was present in court when the order was issued, the order requires the defendant to stay away from the protected party and the defendant has been convicted of criminal contempt in the first or second degree during the preceding five years (see Penal Law § 215.51[c] ). When asked by County Court at the commencement of the plea proceeding whether it was his decision to enter a guilty plea, defendant responded, "Yeah, kind of. I mean, I'm guilty and I'm not guilty. I mean it's a catch–22, your Honor." Thereafter, the court proceeded to the plea allocution, during which defendant answered in the affirmative when asked if he was pleading guilty because he was, in fact, guilty of the offense and was doing so freely and voluntarily.
Additionally, defendant affirmatively responded when County Court asked whether he intentionally disobeyed the mandate, of which he was aware, that he stay away from the person on whose behalf the order of protection was issued. When the court asked again whether he had intentionally disobeyed the order of protection, defendant answered, "Yes, she came to me, yes. But, yes, I violated it because I didn't leave fast enough, I guess, so, yes, I violated it." Upon further inquiry by the court, defendant acknowledged that he had inappropriate contact with such person. Finally, defendant acknowledged that he had a prior conviction of criminal contempt in the second degree within the preceding five years. Defendant's affirmative responses to the court's inquiries were sufficient to remove any doubt about defendant's guilt or otherwise call into question the voluntariness of his plea (see People v. Lopez, 71 N.Y.2d at 666–667, 529 N.Y.S.2d 465, 525 N.E.2d 5 ; People v. Larock, 139 A.D.3d 1241, 1242, 31 N.Y.S.3d 665 [2016], lv denied 28 N.Y.3d 932, 40 N.Y.S.3d 360, 63 N.E.3d 80 [2016] ). Further, neither defendant's assertion in the presentence investigation interview that he was innocent because the police did not have evidence that he committed the crime nor any statements made at sentencing negated the element of intent so as to trigger further inquiry by the court (see People v. Perez, 82 A.D.3d 1451, 1451, 918 N.Y.S.2d 754 [2011], lv denied 17 N.Y.3d 799, 929 N.Y.S.2d 107, 952 N.E.2d 1102 [2011] ).
Egan Jr., J.P., Lynch, Aarons and Reynolds Fitzgerald, JJ., concur.
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.
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