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Patel v. Frankfother ( In re Facebook Biometric Info. Privacy Litig.)

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit
Mar 17, 2022
Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal arises from a class-action lawsuit against Facebook, Inc. alleging violations of the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act by collecting user biometric data without permission. The district court initially rejected a $550 million settlement and subsequently approved a $650 million settlement resolving the class claims. The court then awarded Class Counsel attorneys' fees of $97.5 million from the settlement fund. Two class members objected to the attorneys' fees award and appealed the decision.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the district court abused its discretion in awarding $97.5 million in attorneys' fees to Class Counsel out of the $650 million settlement fund.
  2. Whether the appellants waived their argument against including lobbying activities in the attorneys' fees award, and if not waived, whether the district court abused its discretion in this regard.
  3. Whether the $5,000 incentive awards to Named Plaintiffs constituted an abuse of discretion.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

  • Objected to the $97.5 million attorneys' fees award, challenging its reasonableness.
  • Argued that attorneys' fees should not include amounts attributable to lobbying activities, asserting such fees are not properly recoverable from a Rule 23(b)(3) damages class.
  • Challenged the $5,000 incentive awards to Named Plaintiffs.

Appellees' Arguments

  • Supported the district court's approval of the attorneys' fees award as reasonable based on the percentage-of-recovery method and cross-checked by the lodestar method.
  • Maintained that the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding incentive payments to Named Plaintiffs.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
In re Bluetooth Headset Prods. Liab. Litig., 654 F.3d 935 (9th Cir. 2011) Independent obligation of courts to ensure attorneys' fees awards are reasonable; methods for calculating fees (lodestar and percentage-of-recovery). The court relied on this precedent to affirm the district court's use of the percentage-of-recovery method and its lodestar cross-check, confirming the reasonableness of the $97.5 million fee award.
In re Mercury Interactive Corp. Sec. Litig., 618 F.3d 988 (9th Cir. 2010) Waiver of arguments not presented or developed before the district court. The court held appellants waived their lobbying fees argument by failing to adequately raise it below.
In re Online DVD-Rental Antitrust Litig., 779 F.3d 934 (9th Cir. 2015) Upholding incentive awards of similar size. The court cited this case to support the reasonableness of the $5,000 incentive awards to Named Plaintiffs.
Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) Standard for overruling prior circuit precedent only when clearly irreconcilable with intervening higher authority. The court noted appellants did not argue that prior incentive award precedents were clearly irreconcilable with higher authority, supporting affirmance.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court first analyzed the attorneys' fees award, emphasizing the district court's independent obligation to ensure reasonableness. It recognized two accepted methods for calculating fees: the lodestar and the percentage-of-recovery methods. The district court primarily used the percentage-of-recovery method, awarding 15% of the $650 million settlement, which fell within the range of comparable settlements of similar size. The court found the district court's explanation adequate, citing the excellent result achieved and the hard-fought nature of the litigation.

As a cross-check, the district court applied the lodestar method, calculating a base lodestar of approximately $20.7 million and applying a multiplier of 4.71, which was consistent with multipliers in comparable cases and justified by the risks and results in this litigation. The appellate court found no abuse of discretion in this calculation.

Regarding the lobbying fees argument, the court held that appellants waived this argument by failing to sufficiently develop it before the district court, and even if not waived, the district court did not abuse its discretion because the primary fee calculation was based on the percentage-of-recovery method.

Finally, the court addressed the incentive awards, noting that $5,000 awards are regularly upheld in this circuit and that appellants failed to argue that controlling precedent was overruled or undermined by higher authority. Therefore, the incentive awards were not an abuse of discretion.

Holding and Implications

AFFIRMED.

The court affirmed the district court's decision awarding Class Counsel $97.5 million in attorneys' fees and approving $5,000 incentive awards to Named Plaintiffs. The appellants' argument regarding lobbying fees was deemed waived, and the district court's methodology and discretion were upheld. The decision directly resolves the fee and incentive award disputes in this litigation without establishing new precedent beyond affirming established legal standards and practices in class-action fee awards.

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NOT FOR PUBLICATION

Argued and Submitted February 17, 2022 Honolulu, Hawaii

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California D.C. No. 3:15-cv-03747-JD James Donato, District Judge, Presiding

Before: HAWKINS, R. NELSON, and FORREST, Circuit Judges.

MEMORANDUM [*]

This appeal stems from a class-action suit against Facebook for allegedly violating the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act for collecting user data without permission. The district court rejected a $550 million settlement before approving a $650 million settlement resolving the class claims, then granted Class Counsel a $97.5 million fee out of the settlement. Two class members objected to the attorneys' fees award and appealed. We affirm.

1. The district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding Class Counsel $97.5 million in fees. Courts have "an independent obligation" to ensure that attorneys' fees awards, "like the settlement itself, [are] reasonable." In re Bluetooth Headset Prods. Liab. Litig., 654 F.3d 935, 941 (9th Cir. 2011). The purpose of awarding attorneys' fees from a common fund "is to avoid the unjust enrichment of [the class who] benefit[s] from the fund that is created, protected, or increased by the litigation and who otherwise would bear none of the litigation costs." Id. (cleaned up).

Courts may use two methods to calculate attorneys' fees: the lodestar method or the percentage-of-recovery method. Id. at 942. Here, the district court used the percentage-of-recovery method. The district court awarded 15% of the $650 million settlement, or 17.7% of the rejected $550 million settlement. These percentages were like the awards in "11 similarly sized settlements ($400-$800 million)," with "the average percentage award across 10 of these settlements 16.0% and the percentage award . . . in the median case of the 10 being 15.5%." The court adequately explained why this was a reasonable fee on the facts of this case: "class counsel achieved an excellent result for the class" and the settlement "is real money by any standard and sets a new high bar for privacy-related settlements, . . . particularly in light of how hard fought this case was and the substantial factual disputes that remained for trial."

The district court also cross-checked the reasonableness of this amount using the lodestar method. The lodestar method calculates a fee award by "multiplying the number of hours the prevailing party reasonably expended on the litigation (as supported by adequate documentation) by a reasonable hourly rate for the region and for the experience of the lawyer." Id. at 941. This amount may then be adjusted "upward or downward by an appropriate positive or negative multiplier reflecting a host of reasonableness factors." Id. at 941-42 (internal quotation marks omitted).

The base lodestar figure here was about $20.7 million. The evidence before the district court demonstrated that "multipliers in cases of comparable size show[ed] average multipliers between 2.39 and 4.50." The district court held that a multiplier of 4.71 is "in line with comparable settlements, still sufficiently and appropriately generous, and more reasonable in the circumstances here. The results obtained and the risks at trial warrant a higher-end multiplier of 4.71, but not more." Lodestar multipliers tend to increase as the size of the class's fund increases and are reasonable based on the risks trial would have presented.

We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorneys' fees of $97.5 million.

2. Next, we hold that Appellants waived their argument against attorneys' fees for lobbying activities. An argument is waived if it was "not presented or developed before the district court." In re Mercury Interactive Corp. Sec. Litig., 618 F.3d 988, 992 (9th Cir. 2010). "Although no bright line rule exists to determine whether a matter has been properly raised below, an issue will generally be deemed waived on appeal if the argument was not raised sufficiently for the trial court to rule on it." Id. (cleaned up). Appellants made a perfunctory, one-paragraph argument to the district court that lobbying activities are "not properly included in a request for fees to be paid by [a] Rule 23(b)(3) damages class." This is not enough to raise an argument "sufficiently for the trial court to rule on it," nor is the record adequately developed to permit us to reach the issue in our discretion. Id. To the extent that Appellants did not waive the general argument that lobbying fees should not be included in the lodestar calculation, the district court did not abuse its discretion because its primary calculation tool was the percentage-of-recovery method.

3. Finally, we hold that the $5, 000 incentive awards to Named Plaintiffs were not an abuse of discretion. We regularly uphold incentive awards of this size, see, e.g., In re Online DVD-Rental Antitrust Litig., 779 F.3d 934, 947-48 (9th Cir. 2015), and Appellants do not argue that "the reasoning or theory of" these prior Ninth Circuit cases are "clearly irreconcilable with the reasoning or theory of intervening higher authority." Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 893 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (emphasis added).

AFFIRMED.

[*] This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.