- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
United States v. Gunn
Factual and Procedural Background
Tequila J. Gunn was sentenced for drug and firearm offenses with a term running through March 2024. She requested compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. §3582(c)(1)(A), citing her age (62) and medical vulnerability to COVID-19 as extraordinary and compelling reasons. Gunn sought administrative relief but filed her motion before the Bureau of Prisons Director responded or 30 days elapsed. The district court denied her motion, interpreting the statute and associated policy statements as precluding relief in her circumstances. Gunn appealed this decision.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the district court erred in holding that the lack of an updated Sentencing Commission policy statement applicable to prisoner-initiated motions barred compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. §3582(c)(1)(A).
- Whether a district court has discretion to grant compassionate release motions filed directly by prisoners in the absence of an applicable policy statement issued by the Sentencing Commission.
- The effect of the exhaustion requirement under §3582(c)(1)(A) when the government does not invoke it on appeal.
Arguments of the Parties
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 216 (2007) | Failure to exhaust administrative remedies is an affirmative defense, not jurisdictional. | The court noted the government forfeited the exhaustion defense by not raising it on appeal. |
| Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 767 (1975) | Exhaustion of administrative remedies is an affirmative defense. | Supported the court's conclusion that exhaustion was not jurisdictional and could be forfeited. |
| United States v. Brooker, 976 F.3d 228 (2d Cir. 2020) | Interpretation of §3582(c)(1)(A) allowing district judges discretion to grant compassionate release absent an applicable policy statement. | The court aligned with Brooker in rejecting the district court's restrictive reading of the statute. |
| Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49-50 (2007) | Judicial discretion in sentencing decisions is subject to deferential appellate review. | Cited to illustrate that district courts must exercise discretion guided by but not bound by policy statements. |
| Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85 (2007) | Sentencing guidelines provide advisory guidance, and courts have discretion to deviate. | Supported the view that judges have discretion in compassionate release decisions even absent updated policy statements. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court began by explaining the statutory framework established by the First Step Act, which authorizes prisoners to directly request compassionate release after exhausting administrative remedies or after 30 days without a response from the Bureau of Prisons.
The district court had denied Gunn’s motion based on the lack of an updated Sentencing Commission policy statement applicable to prisoner-initiated motions, relying on U.S.S.G. §1B1.13 and its commentary, which refer only to motions by the Director of the Bureau of Prisons. The district court concluded that without such a policy statement, judges lack authority to grant compassionate release on a prisoner’s own motion.
The appellate court rejected this interpretation, agreeing with the Second Circuit's analysis in Brooker. It reasoned that the statutory phrase "consistent with applicable policy statements" does not bar relief simply because no policy statement yet applies to prisoner-initiated motions. Since the Sentencing Commission has not issued an applicable policy statement addressing prisoner motions, the statutory limitation does not restrict judicial discretion. The court emphasized that "consistent with" differs from "authorized by," meaning the absence of an applicable policy statement does not prohibit granting compassionate release.
The court acknowledged the Department of Justice’s concern that this discretion could lead to inconsistent policies but noted that the statute itself limits relief to "extraordinary and compelling reasons," and that judges risk appellate reversal if they abuse discretion. The court further explained that while the Director of the Bureau of Prisons’ views are not controlling, district judges will likely give substantial weight to the Director’s analysis when available.
Finally, the court noted the hope that the Sentencing Commission will restore its quorum and update its policy statements, but until then, district courts must apply the statutory standard directly, subject to deferential appellate review.
Holding and Implications
The court VACATED the district court's denial of Gunn's compassionate release motion and REMANDED the case with instructions to resolve the motion under the statutory standard of "extraordinary and compelling reasons" without requiring an applicable Sentencing Commission policy statement.
This decision clarifies that district courts retain discretion to grant compassionate release motions filed by prisoners even in the absence of an updated policy statement from the Sentencing Commission. The ruling does not create new policy but affirms that courts must apply the statutory criteria directly, providing guidance for future compassionate release motions under the First Step Act.
EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois.
No. 1:16-cr-10024 — Joe Billy McDade, Judge. Before EASTERBROOK, HAMILTON, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.
EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge. Federal judges have long been able to release prisoners for compassionate reasons such as terminal illness. Until recently that authority depended on a motion by the Bureau of Prisons. But in 2018 the First Step Act created a judicial power to grant compassionate release on a prisoner's own request, provided that the prisoner first allowed the Bureau to review the request and make a recommendation (or it let 30 days pass in silence). 18 U.S.C. §3582(c)(1)(A). Subsection (c) now reads:
The court may not modify a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed except that—
(1) in any case—
(A) the court, upon motion of the Director of the Bureau of Prisons, or upon motion of the defendant after the defendant has fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the Bureau of Prisons to bring a motion on the defendant's behalf or the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by the warden of the defendant's facility, whichever is earlier, may reduce the term of imprisonment (and may impose a term of probation or supervised release with or without conditions that does not exceed the unserved portion of the original term of imprisonment), after considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, if it finds that—
(i) extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction; or
(ii) the defendant is at least 70 years of age, has served at least 30 years in prison, pursuant to a sentence imposed under section 3559(c), for the offense or offenses for which the defendant is currently imprisoned, and a determination has been made by the Director of the Bureau of Prisons that the defendant is not a danger to the safety of any other person or the community, as provided under section 3142(g);
and that such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission[.]
Tequila Gunn's sentence for drug and firearm offenses runs through March 2024. She asked a court to order her release under §3582(c)(1)(A) on the ground that, because of her age (62) and medical condition, she faces extra risks should she contract COVID-19. Gunn sought administrative relief but came to court before the Director had replied or 30 days had run. Yet on appeal the United States has not invoked the statute's exhaustion requirement, thus forfeiting its benefit. Failure to exhaust administrative remedies is an affirmative defense, see Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 216 (2007); Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 767 (1975), not a jurisdictional issue that the court must reach even if the litigants elect not to raise it.
The district court denied Gunn's motion, ruling that the subsection's final language—"that such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission"—prevents judges from granting compassionate release at the request of a prisoner in Gunn's position. That is so because the Sentencing Commission has not updated its policy statements to implement the First Step Act. (It can't, because it lacks a quorum.)
The most recent Guidelines Manual has a policy statement, U.S.S.G. §1B1.13, implementing the compassionate-release statute. But this policy statement begins "Upon motion of the Director of the Bureau of Prisons". The judge added that the commentary to §1B1.13, which defines "extraordinary and compelling reasons", is conclusive against Gunn even if the main text of §1B1.13 is not. Application Note 1(A), which addresses medical conditions, covers only prisoners who suffer from certain medical problems, not those who fear that they may contract a disease; and Application Note 1(D), which addresses other extraordinary circumstances, reads:
As determined by the Director of the Bureau of Prisons, there exists in the defendant's case an extraordinary and compelling reason other than, or in combination with, the reasons described in subdivisions (A) through (C).So the catchall clause in Application Note 1(D) depends on a determination or motion of the Director, and Gunn's request depends on the catchall clause. This makes §1B1.13 inapplicable to Gunn, the judge concluded, and nixes her request.
Like the Second Circuit, see United States v. Brooker, 976 F.3d 228 (2d Cir. 2020), we disagree with this reading of the statute's trailing paragraph. It says that a reduction must be "consistent with" all "applicable" policy statements. Section 1B1.13 addresses motions and determinations of the Director, not motions by prisoners. In other words, the Sentencing Commission has not yet issued a policy statement "applicable" to Gunn's request. And because the Guidelines Manual lacks an applicable policy statement, the trailing paragraph of §3582(c)(1)(A) does not curtail a district judge's discretion. Any decision is "consistent with" a nonexistent policy statement. "Consistent with" differs from "authorized by".
The Department of Justice protests that this leaves district judges free to invent their own policies about compassionate release. Like the Second Circuit, we do not see the absence of an applicable policy statement as creating a sort of Wild West in court, with every district judge having an idiosyncratic release policy. The statute itself sets the standard: only "extraordinary and compelling reasons" justify the release of a prisoner who is outside the scope of §3582(c)(1)(A)(ii). The substantive aspects of the Sentencing Commission's analysis in §1B1.13 and its Application Notes provide a working definition of "extraordinary and compelling reasons"; a judge who strikes off on a different path risks an appellate holding that judicial discretion has been abused. In this way the Commission's analysis can guide discretion without being conclusive. Cf. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49-50 (2007); Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85 (2007).
It is true that a judge acting on a prisoner's motion may lack the advice of the Director, contemplated by Application Note 1(D), about whether some novel "extraordinary and compelling reason" exists. Yet the First Step Act does not muzzle the Director; to the contrary, it gives the Director at least 30 days to articulate the Bureau of Prisons' decision and rationale. We expect that district judges will give the Director's analysis substantial weight, even though under the First Step Act the Director's views are not controlling.
Like the district court, we hope that the Sentencing Commission's ability to revise its guidelines and policy statements will be restored by the appointment of additional members. Until that happens and §1B1.13 is amended, however, the Guidelines Manual lacks an "applicable" policy statement covering prisoner-initiated applications for compassionate release. District judges must operate under the statutory criteria—"extraordinary and compelling reasons"—subject to deferential appellate review.
The district court's decision is vacated, and the case is remanded with instructions to resolve Gunn's motion under the statutory standard.
Alert