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Baker v. General Motors Corp.

United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division

Oct 4, 1950

Judgment

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Opinion Summary — Erle K. Baker v. General Motors Corporation (District Court, Thornton, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

Erle K. Baker brought suit against General Motors Corporation alleging infringement of certain patents and seeking damages of $200,000. Plaintiff demanded a jury trial. The District Court examined whether that demand was made in conformity with Rule 38 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Relevant dates and procedural events provided in the opinion:

The defendant's answer was filed on April 15, 1949.
The first pretrial conference was held on February 21, 1950; at that conference the trial date was set for October 10, 1950.
The plaintiff's demand for a jury trial was made on August 30, 1950 — described in the opinion as approximately sixteen months after the answer and about six months after the case was set for trial.
A letter dated August 29, 1950 informed the court that plaintiff had been substituted as his own attorney (pro se) and that he would appear at the August 30 pretrial hearing. Plaintiff did appear and made an oral demand for a jury trial, which the defendant opposed.
At the August 30 and subsequent September 7, 1950 pretrial proceedings, the court observed that plaintiff had a hearing impairment that interfered with his ability to hear the court, requiring close-range assistance from his wife; on September 7 the court noted plaintiff appeared with a hearing aid but still had difficulty. A member of plaintiff's former counsel informed the court he had "no direct instruction that a jury trial should be demanded."

Based on the procedural posture and circumstances, the District Court denied the plaintiff's demand for a jury trial.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether a jury demand made after the time required by Rule 38, F.R.C.P., and long after the defendant's answer and the setting of a trial date, constitutes a waiver of the right to a jury trial.
Whether the court should exercise its discretion under Rule 39(b), F.R.C.P., to allow a jury trial notwithstanding a failure to serve a proper and timely demand.
Whether the specific circumstances surrounding plaintiff's late, oral demand (substitution of counsel, plaintiff appearing pro se, plaintiff's hearing impairment, and statements by former counsel) provide a substantial reason to permit a late jury demand.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Arguments

Plaintiff asserted, in court, that two different sets of attorneys had handled the litigation for him and that he had made known to his counsel that he wanted a jury trial. The court granted an adjournment to permit plaintiff to assemble further evidence of that claim.
Plaintiff appeared pro se at the pretrial hearing after substitution of attorneys and made an oral demand for a jury trial at that time.
Plaintiff's difficulties hearing the court's remarks (and reliance on his wife to assist) were noted as pertinent circumstances.

Defendant's Arguments

The defendant opposed the late, oral demand for a jury trial at the pretrial hearing. (The opinion records the defendant's opposition but does not elaborate additional specific argumentation beyond the opposition.)

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
McNabb v. Kansas City Life Insurance Company, 8th Cir., 139 F.2d 591, 595	Authority that failure to serve a jury demand in the manner and within the time required by Rule 38(b), F.R.C.P., constitutes a waiver; Rule 39(b) allows trial court discretion to permit a jury trial despite failure to serve a proper demand, but the court is not required to do so.	The court cited McNabb to explain both (1) that failure to make a proper demand under Rule 38 results in a legal waiver of jury trial rights and (2) that although Rule 39(b) permits the court to exercise discretion to allow a jury trial despite such failure, the court is not compelled to do so. The District Court applied these principles in denying the late demand here.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded from procedural rules and the particular factual circumstances. The key analytical steps stated in the opinion are:

The court recognized the governing rule that a jury demand must be made in conformity with Rule 38, F.R.C.P., and that a failure to serve a demand within the required time constitutes a waiver under Rule 38(d), as explained by the McNabb opinion.
The court acknowledged that, under Rule 39(b), it retained discretion to allow a jury trial notwithstanding a defective or late demand, but emphasized that such discretion is not mandatory — the court may deny a late demand.
The court considered the length of the delay: the demand was made approximately sixteen months after the answer and about six months after the cause had been set for trial. The court stated that because of this long delay, there should be a substantial reason to exercise discretion in favor of the plaintiff.
The court examined the specific circumstances offered by the plaintiff as reasons for the late demand: substitution of attorneys and plaintiff's pro se appearance; a letter notifying the court of substitution; plaintiff's claimed prior communications to former counsel about wanting a jury; the practical difficulty plaintiff had hearing the court and requiring his wife's assistance; and the statement by a member of plaintiff's former counsel that he had "no direct instruction that a jury trial should be demanded."
Balancing these considerations, the court concluded that the circumstances did not present a sufficient basis to exercise its discretion to allow a jury trial despite the procedural default, and that "the ends of justice would be better served by not allowing a jury trial."

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court denied plaintiff Erle K. Baker's demand for a jury trial.

Implications and direct effect:

As a direct consequence of the holding, the action will proceed without a jury; plaintiff will not have a jury trial on his patent infringement claim.
The court grounded its decision on failure to comply with the timing and manner requirements of Rule 38 and on its discretionary authority under Rule 39(b). The opinion does not announce or purport to establish any new legal precedent beyond application of established rules and the cited authority (McNabb).

Show all summary ...

THORNTON, District Judge.

This is an action by Erle K. Baker against the General Motors Corporation wherein the plaintiff is asking damages in the sum of two hundred thousand dollars by reason of defendant's infringement of certain alleged patents, the matter under immediate consideration being a demand on the part of the plaintiff for a jury trial, the said demand not having been made in conformity with the provisions of Rule 38, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Title 28 U.S.C.A.

The answer of the defendant was filed in this cause on April 15, 1949, and the demand for a jury trial was made by the plaintiff on August 30, 1950; on February 21, 1950, the first pretrial conference was had, at which time October 10, 1950, was designated as the trial date for the hearing of said cause, thus establishing the demand for jury as having been made some sixteen months after the answer was filed and some six months after the cause had been set for trial.

McNabb v. Kansas City Life Insurance Company, 8 cir., 139 F.2d 591, 595, is authority for the following: ‘ (6) Finally, it is argued that the judgment should be reversed because the trial court wrongfully denied the agent the right to a jury trial. It is doubtful if any issue of fact actually existed, on the general questions which have been discussed, which a jury would otherwise have been entitled to settle. But, however that may be, the record shows that the agent had not served a demand for a jury trial on the company in the manner and within the time required by Rule 38(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A. following section 723c. Under Rule 39(b), the trial court, of course, could have exercised its discretion to allow a jury trial, notwithstanding the failure to serve a proper demand, but, in the situation shown, it was not required to do so. Rule 38(d) specifically provides that the failure of a party to serve the required demand constitutes a waiver by him of a trial by jury. Failure to serve such a demand is a legal waiver, whether it is inadvertent or intentional.’

In spite of the long delay in making the demand for a jury the matter is still one of discretion for the Court, but because of the long delay there should be a substantial reason for the exercise of discretion in favor of the plaintiff, and to that end we have the following circumstances to consider in arriving at a proper decision; August 30, 1950 had been designated as an adjourned date for a continuance of a pretrial conference, and on that date a letter dated August 29, 1950, from the attorneys of record for the plaintiff was received by the Court wherein it was stated as follows: ‘ We have given a Substitution of Attorneys in the above case to Mr. Erle K. Baker, plaintiff, who is to prosecute the matter in his own behalf. We trust that he will appear on August 30th at 11:00 a. m. at the pretrial hearing of which we have advised him. In the event Mr. Baker should neglect to file the substitution and his appearance, this will explain our absence from the case.’ In keeping with this arrangement Mr. Baker appeared at the allotted time as attorney for himself and made an oral demand for a jury trial which was opposed by the attorney for the defendant. This pretrial hearing was conducted in the court room, and in a discussion between the Court and Mr. Baker, the plaintiff, as to the merits of his demand, it was soon apparent that Mr. Baker was unable to hear the remarks made by the Court because of defective hearing, and it was necessary that the remarks of the Court be transmitted at close range to Mr. Baker by a woman companion who, upon inquiry, turned out to be his wife. In support of his demand for jury Mr. Baker informed the Court that two different sets of attorneys had handled the litigation for him and that he had made known the fact that he wanted a jury trial, and the pretrial conference was adjourned to permit the plaintiff to assemble further evidence of the fact that he had made known his desire for a jury trial to his counsel; and before adjourning the said matter the Court suggested to Mr. Baker that in justice to himself he should, if possible, obtain a hearing aid to assist him at the trial of this cause.

On September 7, 1950, another pretrial conference was had on the question at which time a member of the firm of attorneys who withdrew from plaintiff's case appeared and informed the Court that, ‘ Well, I had no direct instruction that a jury trial should be demanded.’

At the first pretrial conference held on February 21, 1950, the Court commenced the conference by asking this question: ‘ Are there any proposed or contemplated amendments to these pleadings?’ The attorney representing Mr. Baker at that conference answered: ‘ I don't believe so.’

At this adjourned conference of September 7, 1950, Mr. Baker appeared in court with a hearing aid, but still had difficulty in understanding the Court's remarks to the extent that he again had to be assisted by his wife who transmitted the Court's remarks to him at close range.

In view of the foregoing circumstances, it is the distinct impression of this Court that the ends of justice would be better served by not allowing a jury trial and, therefore the demand for a jury trial is denied.