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United States v. Burke
Case Summary: United States v. James M. Burke, Helen V. Burke
Factual and Procedural Background
A default judgment for $678.76 (the balance due with interest on a promissory note) was entered against defendant James M. Burke. The note was executed by defendant and his wife in 1951 and became due July 7, 1954. The printed word "(seal)" appeared at the end of the signature line. The note was insured by the Federal Housing Administration under Title I, sec. 2 of the National Housing Act, cited in the opinion as 12 U.S.C.A. § 1703. The payee endorsed the note without recourse to a lending institution, which subsequently assigned the note to the United States of America. The government filed this action on August 5, 1957. Defendant moved to vacate the default judgment, arguing that under Maryland law an action on a promissory note is barred by the lapse of three years (Art. 57, sec. 1 of the Maryland Code).
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether a Maryland three-year statute of limitations (Art. 57, sec. 1) bars the United States from maintaining this action on the promissory note.
- Whether Maryland Art. 57, sec. 3 rather than sec. 1 is applicable to this action.
Arguments of the Parties
Defendant's Arguments
- Defendant contended that under Maryland law (Art. 57, sec. 1) an action on a promissory note is barred after three years and therefore the United States' action filed August 5, 1957, was time-barred.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| United States v. Summerlin, 310 U.S. 414, 416, 417, 60 S.Ct. 1019, 84 L.Ed. 1283 | The principle that the United States is not bound by state statutes of limitation when it asserts claims in its governmental capacity. | The court relied on this authority to support the proposition that the United States cannot be deemed to have abdicated its governmental authority so as to become subject to a state time bar. |
| United States v. Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Railway Co., 118 U.S. 120, 125, 6 S.Ct. 1006, 30 L.Ed. 81 | Support for the rule that the United States is not bound by state statutes of limitation when enforcing governmental claims. | Used alongside other authorities to establish that a state statute of limitations does not bar the government's action. |
| United States v. Schaeffer, D.C.D.Md., 33 F.Supp. 547 | A district-court authority cited in support of the general rule concerning the United States and state statutes of limitation. | Cited as an additional authority consistent with the view that the United States is not subject to state time bars in such cases. |
| General Petroleum Corp. v. Seaboard Terminals Corp., D.C.D.Md., 23 F.Supp. 137, 140 | Used to address which provision of Maryland's statute (Art. 57) is applicable—suggesting sec. 3 rather than sec. 1 is applicable. | The court referenced this authority to indicate that Maryland Art. 57 sec. 3, rather than sec. 1, appears to be applicable to the circumstances. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court began by reciting the relevant facts about the note, its insurance under the National Housing Act (12 U.S.C.A. § 1703), its endorsement and assignment to the United States, and the filing date of the action (August 5, 1957). Addressing defendant's contention that Maryland's three-year limitation (Art. 57, sec. 1) barred the suit, the court explained that it is well settled that the United States is not bound by state statutes of limitation when it asserts a claim in its governmental capacity. To support that legal principle the court cited United States v. Summerlin and United States v. Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Railway Co., and cited United States v. Schaeffer as additional district-court authority.
The court further observed that Congress had enacted no statute of limitation that would bar the government's suit in this kind of case. The court also noted that, as a matter of Maryland law, Art. 57 sec. 3 rather than sec. 1 appears to be applicable, citing General Petroleum Corp. v. Seaboard Terminals Corp. as supporting authority. Based on these legal points, the court concluded that the defendant's motion to vacate the default judgment could not be sustained.
Holding and Implications
Motion denied.
Direct effect: The defendant's motion to vacate the default judgment was denied, leaving the judgment undisturbed. The opinion states that Congress has passed no statute of limitation barring suit by the government in this type of case and cites authority for the proposition that the United States is not bound by state statutes of limitation. The opinion does not announce or establish a new legal precedent beyond applying the cited authorities and does not discuss broader implications beyond the disposition of the motion.
Leon H. A. Pierson, U.S. Atty., and J. Jefferson Miller, II, Asst. U.S. Atty., Baltimore, Md., for plaintiff.
James M. Burke, rpo se.
THOMSEN, Chief Judge.
Defendant has moved to vacate a default judgment entered against him for $678.76, the balance due with interest on a note executed by defendant and his wife in 1951, which became due and payable on July 7, 1954. The word 'seal' in parentheses was printed at the end of the line on which defendant's signature was written. The note was insured by the Federal Housing Administration in accordance with the provisions of Title I, sec. 2 of the National Housing Act, 12 U.S.C.A. § 1703. It was endorsed without recourse by the payee to a lending institution and was subsequently assigned by the latter to the United States of America. This action was filed on August 5, 1957. In support of his motion, defendant argues that 'in the State of Maryland, an action on a promissory note is barred by the lapse of three years', and cites Art. 57, sec. 1 of the Maryland Code.
It is well settled that the United States is not bound by state statutes of limitation. When the United States becomes entitled to a claim, acting in its governmental capacity, and asserts its claim in that right, it cannot be deemed to have abdicated its governmental authority so as to become subject to a state statute putting a time limit upon enforcement. United States v. Summerlin, 310 U.S. 414, 416, 417, 60 S.Ct. 1019, 84 L.Ed. 1283; United States v. Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Railway Co., 118 U.S. 120, 125, 6 S.Ct. 1006, 30 L.Ed. 81; United States v. Schaeffer, D.C.D.Md., 33 F.Supp. 547. Congress has passed no statute of limitation to bar suit by the government in such a case as this.
Moreover, it seems that sec. 3 of Art. 57 rather than sec. 1 is applicable. General Petroleum Corp. v. Seaboard Terminals Corp., D.C.D.Md., 23 F.Supp. 137, 140, and authorities cited.
Motion denied.
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