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Sanders v. United States
Summary of Opinion: Sanders v. United States, 209 F. Supp. 116 (D. Mass. 1962)
Factual and Procedural Background
The plaintiff brought this action against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b), seeking recovery for personal injuries allegedly caused by negligent operation of a motor vehicle by an employee of the defendant. The defendant denied negligence and asserted contributory negligence by the plaintiff.
The collision occurred on November 4, 1959 at approximately 10:25 a.m. at the intersection of Peter Parley Road and Forest Hills Street in a thickly settled district of Boston, Massachusetts. Both streets are about 26 feet wide, intersect at right angles, and the operators' views of approaching traffic were obstructed by houses and vegetation. The weather was clear and the roadway dry.
The defendant's postal-service vehicle, traveling easterly and uphill on Peter Parley Road, stopped at the intersection and looked toward the plaintiff's direction. The plaintiff's car was then over 200 feet away and not visible from the stopping point because of a curve. The government vehicle entered the intersection at first speed and, after traversing about one-third of the intersection, observed the plaintiff's car about 120 feet away approaching at roughly 40 miles per hour. The government driver continued, believing he could clear the intersection. The plaintiff applied his brakes but, due to excessive speed, was unable to stop and struck the government truck in the southeasterly quadrant of the intersection. Tire marks nearly 50 feet long extended from the point where the plaintiff applied his brakes to the point of collision.
The court found that the defendant's employee did not operate negligently. The court found that the plaintiff violated Mass. Gen. Laws c. 89, § 8 (failure to yield right of way) and Mass. Gen. Laws c. 90, § 17 (excessive speed where view was obstructed and operating at a speed greater than was reasonable and proper), and that the plaintiff's negligence was the sole cause of the collision. Judgment was entered for the defendant.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the United States (through its employee) was negligent in the operation of the postal service vehicle causing the collision.
- Whether the plaintiff was contributorily negligent, including violations of Mass. Gen. Laws c. 89, § 8, and c. 90, § 17, and whether such negligence was the proximate cause of the collision.
Arguments of the Parties
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.
Table of Precedents Cited
No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court's analysis proceeded from its factual findings. It first described the sequence of events at the intersection and the visibility limitations caused by the road geometry and obstructions. Observing that the government vehicle stopped before entering the intersection and then entered while the plaintiff's vehicle was not yet visible from that stopping point, the court found no negligent operation by the defendant's employee.
The court then applied Massachusetts statutory standards to the plaintiff's conduct. It found specific statutory violations: failure to yield the right of way in violation of Mass. Gen. Laws c. 89, § 8, and operating at an excessive and unreasonable speed under Mass. Gen. Laws c. 90, § 17, particularly given the obstructed view at the intersection. The court relied on the observed speed (about 40 miles per hour), the long skid marks (nearly 50 feet), and the fact that the plaintiff could not stop in time to avoid the collision as factual bases for these findings.
On the basis of these findings, the court concluded that the plaintiff's negligence was the sole proximate cause of the collision and that there was no actionable negligence attributable to the defendant's employee under the theory advanced in the complaint.
Holding and Implications
Judgment for the defendant.
Direct effect: The court entered judgment dismissing the plaintiff's claim and in favor of the United States based on the court's findings that the government employee was not negligent and that the plaintiff's statutory violations and negligent operation were the sole cause of the collision.
Broader implications: The opinion does not announce or discuss any new legal principle or precedent beyond its application of the governing Massachusetts traffic statutes to the facts; the decision's consequence is limited to the parties (judgment for the defendant).
Poster, Wilinsky & Goldstein, G. Robert Pierce, Boston, Mass., for plaintiff.
W. Arthur Garrity, Jr., U.S. Atty., Stanislaw R. J. Suchecki, Asst. U.S. Atty., for defendant. JULIAN, District Judge.
The plaintiff brings this action against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b), for personal injuries which he alleges were caused by the negligent operation of a motor vehicle by an employee of the defendant.
The defendant denies that its employee was negligent and alleges contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff.
On November 4, 1959, at about 10:25 a.m., a motor vehicle operated by the plaintiff and a postal service truck operated by an employee of the defendant collided at the intersection of Peter Parley Road and Forest Hills Street, both being public ways in a thickly settled district of Boston, Massachusetts. The streets are about 26 feet wide and intersect each other at right angles. Each operator's view of the road traffic approaching the intersection was obstructed by houses and vegetation. The weather was clear and the roadway dry.
The defendant's employee, travelling easterly and upgrade on Peter Parley Road, reached the intersection of Forest Hills Street and there brought his vehicle to a full stop. He looked to his right, the direction from which the plaintiff was then approaching the intersection on Forest Hills Street. The plaintiff's car was then more than 200 feet away from the intersection and because of a curve on Forest Hills Street was not visible from the point where the government vehicle had come to a stop. There was no other traffic in view. The defendant's employee thereupon entered the intersection at first speed and after traversing about a third of the intersection saw the plaintiff's car about 120 feet away, on his right, approaching the intersection at a speed of about 40 miles per hour. The defendant's employee continued on, believing he could clear the intersection before the plaintiff entered it. The plaintiff applied his brakes hard, but because of his excessive speed he did not succeed in stopping his car in time to avoid entering the intersection and striking the defendant's truck. The left front corner of the plaintiff's car struck the right side of the government vehicle between the rear fender and the side door. The collision occurred in the southeasterly quadrant of the intersection. Tire marks nearly 50 feet long made by the plaintiff's car extended from the point on Forest Hills Street where the plaintiff applied his brakes to the point of collision.
I find that the defendant's employee did not operate the defendant's vehicle negligently.
I find that the plaintiff, in violation of Mass.G.L. c. 89, § 8, failed to grant the right of way to the defendant's vehicle which had entered the intersection well ahead of the plaintiff's vehicle. I further find that the plaintiff, in violation of Mass.G.L. c. 90, § 17, approached the intersection of Peter Parley Road and Forest Hills Street, where his view of the road traffic was obstructed, at a rate of speed greatly in excess of 15 miles per hour. I find that the plaintiff, in violation of Mass.G.L. c. 90,§ 17, operated his vehicle at a rate of speed greater than was reasonable and proper, having regard to traffic and the use of the two ways and the safety of the public as he approached the intersection where the collision took place. I find that the plaintiff operated his vehicle negligently and that his own negligence was the sole cause of the collision.
Judgment will be entered for the defendant.
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