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United States v. Hurst
Case Summary: United States v. Ollie Hurst, 302 F. Supp. 714 (E.D. Tenn. 1969)
Factual and Procedural Background
A federal grand jury returned an indictment charging Ollie Hurst with (1) possession of distilled spirits required to be stamped under 26 U.S.C. ยง 5205(a)(2) where the containers lacked tax stamps, and (2) selling one-half gallon of whiskey in unstamped containers. The defendant waived a jury trial, and the court heard evidence from a single witness, Mr. Childers, a Government agent. Childers testified that he and an "unwitting informer" went to Hurst's home; the informer knocked, was invited in by a boy at the house, and asked Hurst if he would sell whiskey. Hurst went to the back of the house, returned with a jar of unstamped whiskey, and the informer received or was to pay $5.00 for it.
The defendant moved to suppress the evidence on the ground that the Government agent had entered her home by guile, deceit or other surreptitious means in violation of her constitutional rights. The court received testimony and considered prior authorities cited by the defense before ruling on the suppression motion.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the entry of a Government agent (with an unwitting informer) into the defendant's home under the factual circumstances described constituted an unconstitutional entry obtained by misrepresentation, deceit, subterfuge or fraud that requires suppression of evidence.
- Whether evidence obtained after such entry is admissible, assuming the entry was by invitation rather than by stealth, guile or deceit.
Arguments of the Parties
Defendant's Arguments
- The Government agent gained entrance to the defendant's home by guile, deceit and in a surreptitious manner amounting to fraud in fact and in law.
- Because entry was obtained by such subterfuge, the defendant relied on authorities (including United States v. Bush and Fraternal Order of Eagles v. United States) holding that evidence obtained after entry by fraud or deceit should be suppressed as violative of constitutional rights.
Government's Position (as reflected by testimony and court recounting)
- The testimony of the Government's sole witness (Mr. Childers) indicated that the informer knocked, was invited in by someone at the house, and that both the informer and the agent were visible to Mrs. Hurst; there was no evidence of misrepresentation by the agent or informer.
- Accordingly, the entry was by invitation and not accomplished through misrepresentation, deceit, subterfuge or fraud, so the evidence should not be suppressed.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| United States v. Bush, 136 F. Supp. 490 (E.D. Tenn. Jan. 3, 1956) | Held that where officers without warrants entered defendants' premises (state officer onto back porch without permission; federal officer used horn to cause occupant to appear) and then entered and searched, the search was illegal; evidence suppressed. | The Court cited this decision as an example of an earlier ruling suppressing evidence when officers gained entry without proper authority or consent; the defendant relied on it to support suppression here. |
| Fraternal Order of Eagles, No. 778, Johnsontown, Pa. v. United States, 57 F.2d 93 (3d Cir. 1932) | Established that entry into a home by fraud, stealth, social acquaintance, business pretense or force was unreasonable and violated constitutional rights, warranting suppression. | The defendant relied on this principle to argue that entry obtained by deceit should render evidence inadmissible; the Court considered it as supportive authority for suppression when entry is fraudulent. |
| United States v. Bush, 172 F. Supp. 818 (E.D. Tenn. Dec. 12, 1958; supp. opn. Apr. 23, 1959) | The district court held that an agent's misrepresentations about residence and occupation to obtain entry into defendants' kitchen constituted violation of rights and invalidated a subsequently issued search warrant; suppression was required. | The Court observed that if this district-court decision had been upheld it would have strengthened the defendant's argument here, because that decision treated agent misrepresentations as decisive in requiring suppression. |
| United States v. Bush, 283 F.2d 51 (6th Cir.) | The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court's suppression ruling, holding the Government agent had not gained access through stealth, guile, or deceit and that evidence obtained later (via warrant based on what agent observed) was admissible. | The Court cited the Sixth Circuit's reversal to show that similar factual allegations of subterfuge had been rejected on appeal; the appellate outcome weakened the force of the district-court Bush decisions for the defendant's argument. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court examined the testimony and the circumstances surrounding entry. Only Mr. Childers testified; he described accompanying an unwitting informer to the defendant's home, where the informer knocked, was invited in by someone in the house, and asked Mrs. Hurst to sell whiskey. Childers stated he was immediately behind the informer and that Mrs. Hurst could have seen him. After the request, Mrs. Hurst walked to the back of the house, heard a man's voice, and returned with a jar of unstamped whiskey which she delivered in the presence of the informer and the agent.
The court then considered the defendant's contention that the agent gained entry by guile or deceit and surveyed relevant precedents in which courts had suppressed evidence when entry was gained through misrepresentation, stealth, or similar means. The court specifically compared the present facts to the earlier Bush decisions and the Fraternal Order of Eagles case, noting differences in the presence or absence of misrepresentations by the Government agent.
Critically, the court stated it was unable to find any misrepresentation to the defendant by either the informer or the Government agent in this case. The court relied on the testimony that the agent was visible and immediately behind the informer and concluded that, on these facts, the agent and informer were in the home by invitation rather than by misrepresentation, deceit, subterfuge, or fraud. That factual conclusion was dispositive of the suppression motion.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The court overruled the defendant's motion to suppress evidence. The court concluded that the Government agent and the informer entered the defendant's home by invitation and did not gain entry through misrepresentation, deceit, subterfuge, or fraud.
Implications: The immediate effect is that the challenged evidence was not suppressed and remained admissible for the Government's case. The opinion does not announce or claim to establish a new legal rule; rather, it applies existing authorities and precedent distinctions to the particular facts and determines that the prior cases recommending suppression were distinguishable because no misrepresentations or subterfuge were found here.
Source: United States District Court, E.D. Tennessee, Chief Judge Robert L. Taylor, June 10, 1969. Summary prepared strictly from the provided opinion text.
Robert E. Simpson, U.S. Atty., Knoxville, Tenn., for plaintiff.
John P. Davis, Jr., Knoxville, Tenn., for defendant.
OPINION
ROBERT L. TAYLOR, Chief Judge.
The Grand Jury charges that on or about the 12th day of December, 1968 in this District, Ollie Hurst possessed a quantity of distilled spirits required to be stamped under the provisions of Section 5205(a)(2), Title 26 of the United States Federal Code, the immediate containers thereof not having affixed thereto stamps evidencing the determination of the tax and indicating compliance with the provisions of the Internal Revenue Laws of the United States with respect to distilled spirits.
The second count in the indictment charges the defendant with selling a quantity of distilled spirits, namely one-half gallon of whiskey which was in containers that did not have affixed thereto stamps evidencing the determination of the tax and indicating compliance with the provisions of the Internal Revenue Laws relating to distilled spirits.
Evidence has been heard by the Court relating to the two charges contained in the indictment, the defendant having waived her right to be tried by a jury. Only one witness, Mr. Childers, testified.
Mr. Childers stated in substance that he, along with an informer which he described as an unwitting informer, meaning that the informer did not know that Childers was a Government agent, went to the home of the defendant, and upon arrival at the Hurst home the informer knocked on the front door and some boy stated in substance 'Come in.'
Thereupon, the informer and Mr. Childers entered the front door of the house, the informer being in front, and the informer asked Mrs. Hurst, in effect, if she would sell him some whiskey.
Mr. Childers stated that he was immediately behind the informer and Mrs. Hurst could see both of them.
Immediately following the informer's request for whiskey, Mrs. Hurst went to the back end of the house, presumably the kitchen, where a man's voice was heard, and shortly returned to the place where the informer and Mr. Childers were located with a jar of unstamped whiskey for which she received or was supposed to receive $5.00.
Counsel for the defendant has moved to suppress all of this evidence upon the ground that the Government agent violated constitutional rights of the defendant by entering her home under the foregoing circumstances.
Defendant contends that the Government agent gained entrance to her house through guile and deceit and in a surreptitious manner which amounted to fraud in fact and in law. In support of her contention, she relies upon a case from this Court styled United States v. Bush, decided January 3, 1956 and reported at 136 F.Supp. 490.
In that case the Court held that where a federal officer and state officer went to the home of defendants to search for whiskey, neither having an arrest warrant or search warrant, and the state officer went onto the back porch of defendants' house without permission and there knocked on the door but received no response, and the federal officer then sounded the horn on the automobile in which he was sitting and one of the defendants then came to the door, and after a conversation with the state officer agreed to sell him and the federal officer some whiskey and the officers then entered defendants' house and after being presented the whiskey by one of the defendants, placed her under arrest and searched her home for whiskey, the search was illegal and the evidence was suppressed.
Also the case of Fraternal Order of Eagles, No. 778, Johnsontown, Pa. v. United States, (C.A.3) March 1, 1932, 57 F.2d 93, is relied upon by defendant. In that case, the federal officers entered the accused's home through fraud, stealth, social acquaintance or business pretense as well as force and the Court held that such entry was unreasonable and violated the accused's constitutional rights, and the motion to suppress the evidence was sustained.
Along the same line is another Bush case that originated in this Court and decided on December 12, 1958, with supplemental opinion on April 23, 1959 which is reported in 172 F.Supp. 818.
In the second case, the Court held that where Government agent entered the defendants' premises in violation of their rights when he drove his car about 40 feet in their driveway and misrepresented to them his residence and occupation in his conversation about the purchase of whiskey and through such subterfuge was able to get into the kitchen of the defendants and obtain evidence of violation of the revenue laws, the defendants' constitutional rights were violated and a search warrant that issued under those circumstances was invalid. The motion to suppress the evidence was sustained.
But, the decision of the lower court was appealed to the Sixth Circuit where it was reversed, and that Court held that the Govrnment agent had not gained access through stealth, guile or deceit, and evidence obtained in search later conducted with a warrant obtained by agent on the basis of what he had seen was admissible. (United States v. Bush, 283 F.2d 51.)
If this Court's decision in the second Bush case had been upheld the argument of defendant's counsel in the present case would have much more strength. In the second Bush case, the Government agent misrepresented his residence and employment. As this Court recalls, the agent said to defendants in that case 'I work at some well known plant here in Knoxville' which was not true, and also stated to the defendants that he lived at a certain place, which was not true, and it was under those circumstances that the Government agent gained access to the defendants' home.
In the present case, the Court is unable to find any misrepresentation to the defendant either by the informer or by the Government agent. True, Mrs. Hurst may have not known that the Government agent was in her home at the time she walked back to her kitchen to get the whiskey or when she returned and delivered the whiskey to the informer. Mr. Childers stated that he was there and she could have seen him.
Under these circumstances, the Court is of the opinion that at the time the informer and Government agent were in her home by invitation and that they did not gain entry through misrepresentation, deceit, subterfuge or fraud. The Court, is, therefore, constrained to overrule the motion to suppress.
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