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Weinberg v. Valeant Pharms. N. Am., LLC
Factual and Procedural Background
Joseph Weinberg filed a lawsuit against Valeant Pharmaceuticals North America, LLC, claiming intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED). The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Valeant Pharmaceuticals, concluding that Weinberg's claim was time-barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Weinberg appealed the district court's decision, specifically challenging the district court's refusal to toll the statute of limitations under California's incapacity-tolling statute, Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 352(a). The appeal was heard by the Ninth Circuit, which has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the district court erred in declining to toll the two-year statute of limitations for Weinberg's IIED claim under California Code of Civil Procedure § 352(a), which provides tolling for persons lacking legal capacity.
- Whether Weinberg's IIED claim was barred by the statute of limitations.
Arguments of the Parties
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Pugliese v. Superior Court, 146 Cal. App. 4th 1444, 1450 (2007) | Establishes the two-year statute of limitations for IIED claims in California. | Confirmed that without tolling, Weinberg’s IIED claim was time-barred. |
| Johnson v. Lucent Techs. Inc., 653 F.3d 1000, 1008 (9th Cir. 2011) | Defines when an IIED claim accrues, here the last day of employment. | Used to determine that Weinberg's claim accrued on August 5, 2013. |
| Hsu v. Mt. Zion Hosp., 259 Cal. App. 2d 562, 571 (1968) | Defines legal incapacity for tolling purposes under Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 352(a). | Applied to assess Weinberg’s capacity to care for his property and transact business on the accrual date. |
| Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986) | Standards for summary judgment and absence of triable issues. | Used to conclude no genuine dispute existed regarding Weinberg’s legal capacity. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court analyzed whether the statute of limitations for Weinberg’s IIED claim could be tolled under California Code of Civil Procedure § 352(a), which allows tolling if the plaintiff lacked legal capacity to sue. The court found undisputed evidence that Weinberg possessed legal capacity on the last day his claim could have accrued, August 5, 2013. On that day, Weinberg actively negotiated a severance package and made decisions rejecting the offer and resigning, demonstrating his ability to care for his property and understand the nature and effects of his actions. Because Weinberg did not lack capacity on the accrual date, the statute of limitations could not be tolled. Consequently, his IIED claim, filed more than two years later, was time-barred. The court did not address the merits of the IIED claim because the statute of limitations issue was dispositive.
Holding and Implications
The court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Valeant Pharmaceuticals.
The direct effect of this decision is that Weinberg’s IIED claim is barred by the statute of limitations because the tolling provision under California law does not apply. No new legal precedent was established, and the court did not reach the substantive merits of the IIED claim.
D.C. No. 8:15-cv-01260-KES MEMORANDUM Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California
Karen E. Scott, Magistrate Judge, Presiding Argued and Submitted March 8, 2019 Pasadena, California Before: WARDLAW and BENNETT, Circuit Judges, and CARDONE, District Judge.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
The Honorable Kathleen Cardone, United States District Judge for the Western District of Texas, sitting by designation.
Joseph Weinberg appeals the district court's grant of summary judgment to Valeant Pharmaceuticals on his claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress ("IIED"). He argues the district court erroneously declined to toll the statute of limitations under California's incapacity-tolling statute, Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 352(a). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
The district court also granted summary judgment to Valeant on the basis that its conduct was not sufficiently outrageous to support a claim for IIED. However, because Weinberg's claim is time-barred, we do not reach the merits of this issue. --------
Weinberg concedes that without tolling the two-year statute of limitations for at least one day, his IIED claim would be time-barred. See Pugliese v. Superior Court, 146 Cal. App. 4th 1444, 1450 (2007). The latest that Weinberg's IIED claim could have accrued is August 5, 2013, the day his employment with Valeant ended. See Johnson v. Lucent Techs. Inc., 653 F.3d 1000, 1008 (9th Cir. 2011). Weinberg filed his complaint more than two years later, on August 6, 2015.
The district court correctly concluded the statute of limitations cannot be tolled under California Code of Civil Procedure § 352(a) because Weinberg did not lack legal capacity to make decisions the last day his IIED claim could have accrued. Rather, the undisputed evidence establishes Weinberg's capacity on August 5, 2013. On that day, Weinberg communicated with Valeant through email and in person about a severance package. He then decided not to "sign away [his] rights," rejected the offered package, and sent a resignation email. Weinberg's negotiation and decision-making establish he was not "incapable of caring for his property or transacting business, or understanding the nature or effects of his acts" on August 5, 2013. See Hsu v. Mt. Zion Hosp., 259 Cal. App. 2d 562, 571 (1968).
With the undisputed evidence in the record, no triable issue exists whether Weinberg became incapacitated for the purposes of section 352(a) the last day his IIED claim could have accrued. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986). Weinberg possessed legal capacity to make decisions. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 352(a); Hsu, 259 Cal. App. 2d at 574. The limitations period, therefore, cannot be tolled, and Weinberg's claim is time-barred.
AFFIRMED.
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