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Cochran v. Mathis

COURT OF COMMON PLEAS FOR THE STATE OF DELAWARE IN AND FOR NEW CASTLE COUNTY
Jun 18, 2018

WELCH, J.

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER James H. Edwards, Esq.
Mattleman, Weinroth & Miller, P.C.
200 Continental Drive, Ste. 215
Newark, DE 19713
Attorneys for Appellant
Larry Mathis
2601 Carter Street
Wilmington, DE 19802
Pro se Appellee
WELCH, J.




This case concerns the breach of a contract for roofing services. On August 10, 2017, Appellant/Plaintiff-below Mack Cochran ("Appellant") filed a Notice of Appeal from a Justice of the Peace Court ("JP Court") decision. The JP Court's July 21, 2017 decision found in favor of Appellee/Defendant-below Larry Mathis ("Appellee"), holding that Appellant had failed to meet his burden of proof.

On April 3, 2018, trial was commenced in this Court. The second day of trial was conducted on May 9, 2018 and this Court reserved decision. This is the Court's Final Memorandum Opinion and Order after consideration of the oral and documentary evidence submitted at trial, arguments made at trial, and the applicable law. For the reasons discussed below, the Court finds in favor of Appellant.

I. FACTUAL HISTORY

The following testimony and evidence were presented at trial.

Appellant's Case-In-Chief

Appellant, as Plaintiff-below, called his first witness, Mr. Steven Bogino ("Bogino"). Bogino is a Building Code Enforcement Inspector ("Inspector") with the City of Wilmington, and has been employed as an Inspector for fourteen years. Bogino estimated that he performed thousands of inspections a year; inspections that "periodically" involved roofs. In November 2015, Bogino testified that Appellant had contacted him to inspect his roof, as Appellant was concerned with problems stemming from a recent roof replacement. On November 18, 2015, Bogino inspected Appellant's roof at 420 Friend Court, Wilmington, Delaware 19802 (the "Property") based on Appellant's complaints that there was "rotted wood remaining, which can be seen from the attic space area." Appellant introduced a City of Wilmington Building Division Inspection Report ("Report") that was signed by Bogino and noted that the roofing contractor was licensed and had obtained a roofing permit from the City of Wilmington prior to removing the main roof down to the decking and installing new shingles. However, the Report also noted that the Department of Licenses and Inspections did not perform an initial deck inspection or final property inspection at the Property. Bogino further testified that his inspection required him to crawl into a third-floor "eave area" at the Property where Appellant believed evidence of the wood rot was apparent. While the Report seems to insinuate that there was a small area of rotted wood ("There is a small area that can be verified"), Bogino testified that the darkness of the third-floor prevented him from concluding whether that area was rot or naturally existed marks in the wood. On cross-examination, Bogino testified that he did not witness water damage, which included freshwater or drywall stains, while on the third floor.

Plaintiff's Exhibit 1. Appellee stipulated to the entrance of this exhibit into evidence prior to trial.

Plaintiff's Exhibit 3 (Appellee's application for a Building Permit from the City of Wilmington). Appellee stipulated to the entrance of this exhibit into evidence prior to trial.

Plaintiff's Exhibit 1.

Appellant's second witness, Mr. Hugh Lindo ("Lindo") has been a Building Inspector with the City of Wilmington for the last fourteen years. Lindo stated on direct examination that he "occasionally" inspects roofs. He testified that his inspection does not involve standing on the roof if it is sloped, as the City of Wilmington advises against such an inspection for safety reasons. When the roof is sloped, Lindo testified that a visual inspection usually ends at the eaves of the roof from a ladder positioned against the roof. Indeed, Lindo stated that he often relies on the warranty made by the roofing contractor regarding the safety of his or her product.

Nevertheless, Lindo testified that he performed an initial visual roof inspection of the Property in mid-2017. He further testified that he was asked to perform a final roof inspection at the Property on November 27, 2017. Appellant introduced Lindo's City of Wilmington Building Division Inspection Report into evidence. Appellant also noted that the owner of the property, or contractor, can request a "letter of compliance" from the City of Wilmington to verify the contractor's work product after the completion of the project. On cross-examination, Lindo testified that the City of Wilmington does not automatically send the owner or contractor a letter of compliance because there is a fee associated with the letter.

Regarding his 2017 visit to the Property, Lindo testified on cross-examination that he did not examine the rear part of the Property's roof since he did not climb onto the roof.

Plaintiff's Exhibit 2. Appellee stipulated to the entrance of this exhibit into evidence prior to trial.

Appellant testified third. He testified that he contacted Appellee in 2015 to replace the Property's roof. In October 2015, Appellee provided Appellant with an A&B Roofing Company estimate of $4,500.00. On October 28, 2015, Appellant provided Appellee with an initial down payment of $2,250.00. And, on November 6, 2015, Appellant paid Appellee the remaining amount of $2,250.00. The finalized estimate was introduced into evidence. It stated:

Appellant testified that he is a self-employed insurance agent and financial advisor.

Plaintiff's Exhibit 5. Appellee stipulated to the entrance of this exhibit into evidence prior to trial.

Id.

Plaintiff's Exhibit 4. Appellee stipulated to the entrance of this exhibit into evidence prior to trial. Plaintiff's Exhibit 12 is a copy of the same.

We purpose [sic] to furnish material and complete job at the above address for the amount of $4,500.oo [sic]. Tear off shingles down to wooden deck, replace bad wood arears. Remove all trash from job site. Clean gutters and ground. Install 151b felt underlayment. Re-roof using 25 year shingles, [c]olor of choice. Install new pipe collars [sic] 10-year WARRANTY leak free on workmanship. Plus, transferable Warranty [sic] new owner need to contact [r]oofing contractor shortly after purchasing [the Property].
PAID IN FULL

11-29-15

The finalized estimate bears only Appellee's signature. Appellant testified that he continuously requested documentation verifying that the wood underneath the shingles had been inspected prior to Appellee re-shingling the roof. Appellee allegedly informed him that it had been inspected and Appellant would receive proper documentation—including a letter of compliance—when the roofing work was completed. Appellant testified that Appellee gave him the name of an inspector who Appellee believed had inspected the Property's roof; however, Appellant discovered that Bogino had actually been the inspector of the Property. Appellant confirmed that Bogino had inspected the Property in 2015. Appellant further testified that Bogino informed him that in order for Bogino to be able to issue a letter a compliance, Appellee would have to remove the new shingles, allow Bogino to inspect the underlying wood, and replace any "bad wood." Appellant testified that the letter of compliance was very important to him because he intended to sell the home and had been informed by his real estate agent that he needed a letter of compliance. Likewise, Appellant did not believe he could rely on Appellee's "ten-year warranty," as Appellee had failed to appear previously to fix leaks in the Property's roof.

Plaintiff's Exhibit 4. Plaintiff's Exhibit 6, which was also stipulated to by Appellee, is an estimate for $3,000.00 dated October 29, 2015 that does bear Appellant's signature. Plaintiff's Exhibit 13 is a copy of the same. The estimate indicates that it was signed on October 30, 2015. Appellant testified that he did not sign this document, accusing Appellee of forgery. While neither a counterclaim nor criminal charges are before this Court, this Court finds this exhibit to be unreliable and; accordingly, afforded it appropriate weight in its final determination.

Plaintiff's Exhibit 4.

Regarding water damage to the property's exterior, Appellant testified that Appellee's poor workmanship in replacing the roof on the Property resulted in water running off the soffits and damaging the Property's windows and the patio door. Appellant also testified that the molding on the inside of his front entrance door had been damaged by water running down the wall to the first floor. Specifically, Appellant testified that the caulking had been separated from the wood trim and the woodwork had separated from the brick wall. In reference to water damage to the interior of the Property, Appellant testified that his third floor was composed of a bedroom, which contained drywall, and an attic for storage, which consisted of exposed plywood. Appellant testified that he witnessed water leaking into the attic portion, which he used a garbage pail to collect. Appellant testified that he observed "rotting spots, weak spots, water stains, and wet spots" in this area. In the bedroom portion, Appellant testified that he observed numerous cracks on the ceiling, peeling paint, and "rain spots and water tracks" in the bedroom closets.

Plaintiff's Exhibit 11A, 11C, & 11D. Appellant testified that Exhibit 11C and 11D evidence tracks of water running down the property. Exhibit 11C is a colored picture that evidences faint streaks on brick next to a patio door. Exhibit 11D contains black-and-white pictures that are indiscernible because of their color gradients. The Court can discern: (a) a bucket with dark liquid, (b) what appears to be a porch light, (c) a wire hanging down a brick wall, and (d) a human hand near shingles. Appellant testified that (a) is a bucket full of water which was leaking from the roof, (b) is a solar light filled with water; (c) evidences stains that resulted from the leaking water eroding brick caulking, and (d) establishes separated shingles which allowed water to divert from its path to the gutter and run down the Property's brick walls. Appellant also testified that another picture in the packet—which is a black-and-white square—evidence rotted plywood in the third floor. Based on the picture quality, the Court cannot concur with Appellant's interpretations. While Appellant's counsel did mention that the pictures submitted into evidence were identical to the original colored pictures, these originals were not submitted into evidence. Finally, Plaintiff's Exhibit 8 evidences Appellee's roofing work, but was not addressed at trial.

Plaintiff's Exhibit 11E. Again, Exhibit 11E contains black-and-white pictures that are indiscernible.

One month after Appellee installed the Property's new roof, Appellant testified that he contacted Appellee after the first rain occurred since the installation because water was leaking inside the Property. Appellee showed up at the property, but informed Appellant that he would need to witness the water leaking into the Property before making any judgments. Despite approximately five subsequent attempts to petition Appellee to visit the Property when it was raining, Appellee showed up approximately two months later. Appellant asserted that Appellee claimed the water damage could have occurred prior to his installation of the new roof.

Appellant testified that Appellee made excuses as to why he could not travel to the Property, such as being "busy," out-of-town, involved in day-care duties, and at a child's karate practice.

After Appellee refused to address problems with his work product, Appellant was required to hire a second contractor to address water that was leaking inside the Property through openings around the chimney. Appellant testified that he acquired estimates from multiple contractors, however, he employed Kirkin Roofing LLC ("Kirkin LLC") to replace his roof. Kirkin LLC charged Appellant $4,250.00 for shingling and metal flashing roof work, specifically:

Appellant testified that Appellee refused to perform the necessary repairs, but provided Appellant with materials to guard against water leakage if Appellant wanted to perform the repairs himself.

Kirkin Roofing LLC ("Kirkin LLC") introduced its business license with the City of Wilmington into evidence as Plaintiff's Exhibit 7. Appellee stipulated to the entrance of this exhibit into evidence prior to trial.

1. "Remove existing shingles down to exposed roof deck";

2. "Replace any rotted or damaged roof deck to match material of existing roof deck";

3. "Apply ice and water shield underlayment along eves, rakes, valleys, pipe collars, chimney, and all penetrations through the roof;

4. "Apply Tam-shield synthetic underlayment over the entire roof deck";

5. "Install Tamko 10" shingle starter strip on the perimeter of the roof;

6. "Install Tamko Heritage Series architectural dimensional asphalt shingles according to manufactures requirements";

7. "Install new lifetime pipe collars on all vent pipes";

8. "Install F 4½ aluminum drip edge on the roof perimeters";

9. "Inspect ALL flashing, step flashing, and wall flashing. Replace any damaged or missing flashing using aluminum metal or coil stock metal";

10. "[C]utting existing sheething [sic], approximately 3" on the ridge of the roof to install a Ridge Vent System with asphalt shingle capping."


















Appellant also received an estimate for $3,175.00 from Kirkin LLC to replace his garage door, front entrance door, and back sliding door. Appellant claimed that these items required replacement because of Appellee's poor workmanship in installing the Property's new roof. Appellant further testified that he has not experienced any problems with leaks since Kirkin LLC's repairs to the Property.

Plaintiff's Exhibit 9. Appellee stipulated to the entrance of this exhibit into evidence prior to trial.

Plaintiff's Exhibit 10. Appellee stipulated to the entrance of this exhibit into evidence prior to trial. Plaintiff's Exhibit 11B evidences water damage to a garage door.

Appellant's final witness, Mr. Chris McGonigal ("McGonigal") has been an employee of Kirkin LLC for approximately two-and-a-half years. He previously worked for approximately seven years at Power Home Remodeling, which he characterized as one of the nation's largest re-roofing companies. He testified that his title at Kirkin LLC is Sales Manager, which includes regularly conducting roof estimates and inspections for potential clients. Regarding the interior of the Property, McGonigal testified that he witnessed water damage while examining Appellant's third-floor attic area, water stains in "newer" drywall in third-floor attic area, and wood rot in the plywood underneath the roof. McGonigal further testified that the water stains in the drywall were recent based on the stains' damp feel and the lack of mold on the drywall.

Appellant's motion to deem Chris McGonigal ("McGonigal") qualified as an expert was granted by the Court.

He testified that he holds an associate degree from the University of Delaware and is certified quarterly through Kirkin LLC's roofing manufacturer, GAF. Kirkin LLC continuous to seek certification in order to maintain its Master Elite status as a seller in the top two percent of roofing installers nationwide.

McGonigal referenced pictures at trial that were not submitted into evidence based on a lack of proper authentication.

On cross-examination, McGonigal admitted that stains underneath may not be indicative of water damage to the plywood. However, Appellee did not question further as to the stains' damp character.

Regarding the exterior of the Property, McGonigal testified to witnessing water damage along windows, the garage door, the front entrance door, and the back sliding door. McGonigal testified that this occurred because the shingles were incorrectly overlaid so that the rainwater was falling behind the gutter and down the brick walls, washing out the mortar around the windows in the process. Hence, the rainwater would travel down the front and back of the house, rotting the frames of the front entrance door and back sliding door as well as rotting the garage door itself. He also testified that the chimney was incorrectly "flashed" so that it failed to prevent rainwater from leaking into the Property's attic through gaps surrounding the chimney. McGonigal also testified that Appellee had incorrectly "flashed" the chimney by not replacing the old flashing and failing to caulk the gap that remained. In McGonigal's view, according to manufacturer specifications, caulk is necessary as the "final line of defense" against rain. In accordance with Appellant's testimony, McGonigal testified that he quoted Appellant $4,250.00 to replace the Property's roof and $3,175.00 to repair the damage done to the Property's garage door, front entrance door, and back sliding door.

On cross-examination, McGonigal admitted that caulk would not technically be needed if the flashing was correctly laid—that is, level with the chimney so as to prevent rainwater from entering the interior of the home.

Plaintiff's Exhibits 9 & 10.

Appellee's Case-In-Chief

Appellee's first witness, Mr. Keith McDougal ("McDougal") briefly testified that he did not witness rotting wood when he inspected Appellant's roof in 2015. Appellee then testified on his own behalf. Appellee testified that Appellant contacted him in order to assess the Property's roof for an insurance claim. Appellee inspected the roof and informed Appellant that the roof would likely need to be replaced. Appellee then quoted Appellant a $4,500.00 estimate. Appellee testified that they then orally agreed to the terms of the estimate. Appellee then stated that he tore off the roof, cleaned the gutters, under-laid fifteen pound felt, shingled the roof, and capped the roof.

Appellee introduced Mr. Keith McDougal as a contractor, but did not question the witness regarding his occupation.

Appellee testified that he has been involved in the roofing business for thirty (30) years and stands by his work product.

Sometime after completing the job, Appellee testified that he received a phone call from Appellant who claimed that two pieces of siding had detached from the Property in a storm and accused Appellee of poor workmanship. Appellee testified that he did not perform work on the siding beyond providing step flashing around the chimney. Appellee then testified that he and Appellant attempted to coordinate a time for Appellee to inspect the roof; however, the two parties' schedules kept conflicting. Appellee further testified that he would call Appellant when it was raining and inquire regarding the roof and leaks, yet he stated that Appellant was not at the Property on these occasions. Appellee also testified that Appellant kept requesting a letter of compliance during these telephonic interactions.

On cross-examination, Appellee admitted that he only visited the Property on one occasion after it had rained.

According to Appellee, Appellant did not live at the Property while he was attempting to sell it.

Appellee reiterated that he never witnessed leakage in Appellant's roof when he visited the Property. He testified that he witnessed dry stains in the Property's third-floor attic area, which he asserted were indicative of leaks that predated his work. Appellee posited that he would not promise a ten-year warranty on his craftsmanship and nail new shingles to rotting wood, as the shingles would easily detach from the roof's deck. In a similar vein, Appellee expressed frustration when he witnessed employees from Kirkin LLC tearing off the Property's shingles during one of his visits to the Property. In Appellee's mind, he testified that his ten-year warranty precluded others from working on the Property's roof.

Appellee admitted on cross-examination that he did not examine the alleged stains in the Property's third floor attic area before he began his work. He also testified that he did not use a "moisture meter." Appellee asserted that such a meter is unnecessary as it is mainly intended for flat roofs where the naked eye cannot detect visible moisture.

Appellee's third and final witness, Mr. Lawrence Ringgold, testified that he was involved in installing the new roof on the Property in 2015 and the wood underneath the shingles was in "good shape."

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

As trier of fact, the Court is the sole judge of the credibility of each fact witness and any other documents submitted to the Court for consideration. If the Court finds that the evidence presented at trial conflicts, then it is the Court's duty to reconcile these conflicts—if reasonably possible—in order to find congruity. If the Court is unable to harmonize the conflicting testimony, then the Court must determine which portions of the testimony deserve more weight in its final judgment. In ruling, the Court may consider the witnesses' demeanor, the fairness and descriptiveness of their testimony, their ability to personally witness or know the facts about which they testify, and any biases or interests they may have concerning the nature of the case.

See Nat'l Grange Mut. Ins. Co. v. Davis, 2000 WL 33275030, at *4 (Del. Com. Pl. Feb. 9, 2000) (Welch, J.).

See id.

See id.

See State v. Westfall, 2008 WL 2855030, at *3 (Del. Com. Pl. Apr. 22, 2008).

In civil actions, the burden of proof is by a preponderance of the evidence. "The side on which the greater weight of the evidence is found is the side on which the preponderance of the evidence exists."

See Gregory v. Frazer, 2010 WL 4262030, at *1 (Del. Com. Pl. Oct. 8, 2010).

See Reynolds v. Reynolds, 237 A.2d 708, 711 (Del. 1967).

III. DISCUSSION

Based on the evidence and testimony produced at trial, the Court finds that Appellant has met his burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that Appellee's poor workmanship resulted in a breach of their contractual agreement. To prevail on a claim for breach of contract, the plaintiff must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that: (1) a contract existed between the parties; (2) the defendant breached his obligation imposed by the contract, and (3) plaintiff suffered damages as a result of the defendant's breach. Neither party disputes that a contract existed in this case. Appellant and Appellee agreed that Appellant would pay Appellee $4,500.00 to tear off the Property's existing roof and install a new roof on his residence.

See VLIW Technology, LLC v. Hewlett-Packard, Co., 840 A.2d 606, 612 (Del. 2003).

Appellant did not dispute that the estimate for $4,500.00 constituted a contract between the parties, despite the estimate only containing Appellee's signature. Plaintiff's Exhibit 4.

Regarding prong (2), implicit in the contract between the parties was Appellee's promise to perform his work according to the Implied Warranty of Good Quality and Workmanship. The Court recently outlined this warranty:

Under the Implied Warranty of Good Quality and Workmanship, contractors involved in building homes or home additions must have the

appropriate skill to "perform the work they offer ... 'in a skillful and workmanlike manner.' " This Court has held that a breach occurs if the contractor fails to " 'display [ ] the degree of skill or knowledge normally possessed by members of their profession or trade in good standing in similar communities[] in performing the work.' "
Even so, the implied warranty does not ensure "excellence," but only "reasonable" workmanship. Phrased differently, "[a] 'good faith attempt to perform a contract, even if the attempted performance does not precisely meet the contractual requirement, is considered complete if the substantial purpose of the contract is accomplished.' " Indeed, if the construction is able to "fully accomplish" its intended purpose, and a "reasonable person would be satisfied by it, the builder is entitled to recover despite the owner's dissatisfaction." Importantly, the purchaser is not protected under this warranty if he was aware of the defect before purchasing the property, or—in the case of an addition—before he "accepted the work."


As this implied warranty has been applied to contracts between homeowner and contractor, and home additions, it is applicable to the present adjudication. The Court finds that Appellee's workmanship clearly fell below this standard as the main purpose of the roof (to prevent water from entering the Property) was not accomplished. Additionally, McGonigal's expert testimony regarding the professional standard of roof installation support this finding. Therefore, Appellee materially breached the contract by failing to provide what Appellant bargained for—a functional roof.

Lee-Scott v. Shute, 2017 WL 1201158, at *4-5 (Del. Com. Pl. Jan. 30, 2017) (Welch, J.).

See id. at *5.

Because the Implied Warranty of Good Quality and Workmanship requires "[c]ompliance with applicable laws and regulations," a potential second failure exists. See Estall v. John E. Campanelli & Sons, Inc., 1993 WL 189500, at *2 (Del. Super. Apr. 30, 1993). However, as the Court finds Appellee liable on Appellant's primary claim, and Appellant failed to specify the particular compliance violations in the pleadings or at trial, the Court will not address this alternative argument.

Finally, "the standard remedy for breach of contract is based upon the reasonable expectations of the contracting parties. Expectation damages are measured by determining 'the amount of money that would put the promisee in the same position as if the promisor had performed the contract.' " Yet, Delaware law still requires the promisee to mitigate his or her losses prior to seeking compensation from the promisor. In this case, the Court finds that Appellant satisfactorily mitigated his damages by complaining to Appellee regarding water leaking inside the Property; attempting to satisfy Appellee's demand that he witness the water leaking inside the Property by contacting Appellee numerous times to notify him to visit the Property; and by seeking estimates from multiple contractors before hiring Kirkin LLC to repair Appellee's inferior workmanship. Appellee's—implicit—argument that Appellant failed to mitigate his damages because Appellee's ten-year warranty granted Appellee the sole right to repair his own workmanship is meritless. If the Court were to subscribe to Appellee's logic, then he could never be said to breach the contract within the ten-year period. Indeed, it would seem Appellee could even languish in his response and Appellant would have no recourse for ten years. This position is not only illogical, but runs afoul of basic breach of contract principles. The Court declines to follow such a position.

Anderson v. Sutton, 2016 WL 8650115, at *4 (Del. Com. Pl. Dec. 20, 2016) (Welch, J.) (footnote omitted) (quoting Duncan v. Theratx, Inc., 775 A.2d 1019, 1022 (Del. 2001)).

See Cedar Tree Books Ltd. v. Sushi Rock, Inc., 2014 WL 12684298, at *3 (Del. Com. Pl. May 20, 2014); accord Freeman v. Scott, 2017 WL 2992523, at *6 (Del. Com. Pl. June 19, 2017) ("Under Delaware law, if feasible, a party is obligated to mitigate damages. '[A] party cannot recover damages for loss that he could have avoided by reasonable efforts.' In other words, 'the injured party has a duty to minimize ... its costs and losses.' " (footnotes omitted) (quoting John Petroleum, Inc. v. Parks, 2010 WL 3103391, at *6 (Del. Super. June 4, 2010))).

See Veltre v. Keener, 2018 WL 323830, at *4 (Del. Com. Pl. Jan. 5, 2018) (finding that the homeowner mitigated his damages after he contacted the contractor "multiple times").

For example, the "time is of the essence" doctrine would become a nullity. See Lee-Scott, 2017 WL 1201158, at *7.

Appellant has requested $7,425.00 in damages. This figure includes $4,250.00 to Kirkin LLC to replace the Property's roof and $3,175.00 to Kirkin LLC to repair the damage done to the Property's garage door, front entrance door, and back sliding door because of Appellee's poor workmanship. Despite a few gradient issues with exhibits, the Court finds Appellant's rendition of events more credible. In fact, Appellee has failed to provide the Court with a compelling, competing narrative besides his assertion that the roof did not leak. Instead, he harped on his thirty years of experience on numerous occasions and called two witnesses to the stand that provided brief assessments of his work product. While these witnesses' assessments were favorable to Appellee, it is not difficult to understand why since they worked on the Property as well. On the other hand, Appellant and his witnesses provided detailed analyses and a cohesive story. Moreover, Appellant's witnesses included an expert who could inform the Court of the proper professional standards that Appellee failed to follow in this case. The Court, therefore, finds that Appellant has proven his requested damages by a preponderance of the evidence.

Plaintiff's Exhibits 9 & 10.

Appellee introduced two exhibits into evidence and Appellant did not object to these exhibits, however, Appellee never addressed his exhibits at trial. Defendant's Exhibit 1 contains, what appears to be, pictures Appellee took after his roof was installed in 2015 and during Kirkin LLC's installation of the Property's new roof in 2017. The pictures' importance is not apparent. Defendant's Exhibit 2 appears to be his building permit for the Property.

See Veltre, 2018 WL 323830, at *4 (finding the homeowner entitled to expectation damages resulting from the first contractor's poor workmanship). --------

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court enters judgment in favor of Appellant Cochran in the amount of $7,425.00, plus pre- and post- judgment interest at the legal interest rate according to 6 Del. C. § 2301, et seq.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 18th day of June, 2018.

/s/_________


John K. Welch, Judge cc: Ms. Tamu White, Chief Civil Clerk