- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
People v. Oldright
Opinion by JUDGE FREYRE
El Paso County District Court No. 15CR1403
Honorable Lin Billings Vela, Judge SENTENCE VACATED AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS Division IV
Opinion by JUDGE FREYRE
Ashby, J., concurs
Hawthorne, J., concurs in part and dissents in part Cynthia H. Coffman, Attorney General, Brian M. Lanni, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee Robin M. Lerg, Alternate Defense Counsel, Montrose, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant ¶ 1 Defendant, Scott Alan Oldright, appeals the trial court's order denying his request for an extended proportionality review. We vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing and an extended proportionality review.
¶ 2 A jury convicted Oldright of first degree assault. According to the prosecution's evidence, Oldright hit the victim in the head with a metal rod. The victim lost consciousness. When the victim regained consciousness, he wandered outside, still bleeding, and asked a stranger for help before he lost consciousness again. He suffered a fractured skull, a concussion, and two deep lacerations. ¶ 3 Oldright's theory at trial was that he did not intend to hurt the victim. Rather, he struck the victim to prevent property damage that could otherwise have occurred because the victim was fighting with two other men. ¶ 4 Following trial, the court adjudicated Oldright a habitual criminal, and sentenced him to sixty-four years in prison. Oldright's prior offenses included aggravated driving after revocation prohibited, forgery, fraud by check, theft by receiving, and theft. sentence and remand for an extended proportionality review of Oldright's habitual criminal sentence.
II. Proportionality Review¶ 7 Oldright contends that the court erred in two ways. First, he argues that the court failed to consider his version of circumstances for the triggering offense that showed the crime was not grave or serious. Second, he asserts that the court erred in concluding that all of his prior convictions were "serious" by virtue of them being felonies. He argues that, as part of the abbreviated proportionality review, the court should have considered the General Assembly's reclassification of the prior offenses. We reject his first argument and agree with the court that first degree assault is a grave and serious offense. We agree with his second argument and conclude that an extended proportionality review is warranted under the circumstances of this case.
A. Legal Principles¶ 8 Whether a sentence is constitutionally disproportionate is a question of law that we review de novo. Rutter v. People, 2015 CO 71, ¶ 12. Both the United States and Colorado Constitutions prohibit cruel and unusual punishment, including grossly ¶ 13 An extended proportionality review is required when the abbreviated review gives rise to an inference of gross disproportionality. McRae, ¶ 6. An extended review involves a comparison of the sentences imposed on other criminals who commit the same crime in the same jurisdiction and a comparison of the sentences imposed for the commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions. Id.; see also Deroulet, 48 P.3d at 524.
Under the habitual criminal statute, a convicted felon who has been previously convicted of three felonies shall be adjudicated a habitual criminal and must be sentenced to four times the maximum of the presumptive range for the class of the triggering felony conviction. See § 18-1.3-801(2)(a), C.R.S. 2016.
In Rutter, the supreme court granted certiorari to consider "[w]hether a court, when conducting an abbreviated proportionality review of a habitual criminal sentence can consider the [G]eneral [A]ssembly's subsequent reclassification of a crime and/or amendment of the habitual criminal statute that made an underlying crime inapplicable for purposes of a habitual criminal adjudication." Rutter v. People, 2015 CO 71, ¶ 1 n.1. It ultimately did not address the question, because no reclassification of the triggering offense had occurred. Id. at ¶ 13.
B. Discussion¶ 14 We begin by concluding that Oldright's triggering offense, first degree assault, is a grave and serious offense because the legislature deems it a crime of violence and an extraordinary risk crime, Oldright used a deadly weapon to commit the crime, and the victim suffered serious bodily injury. Thus, we reject Oldright's argument that the circumstances of his specific offense somehow reduce the crime's severity or gravity. Absent the habitual criminal finding, this class 3 felony conviction carries a minimum prison sentence of ten years and a maximum sentence of thirty-two years. See § 18-1.3-406(1)(a),(2)(a)(I)(c), C.R.S. 2016. ¶ 15 Oldright's habitual criminal convictions are as follows:
• Aggravated driving after revocation prohibited (a class 6 felony at the time of conviction): On December 23, 2004, police arrested Oldright for aggravated driving, driving under the influence (DUI), and careless driving. The DUI and a class 2 traffic offense (careless driving) were dismissed. The conviction date for aggravated driving was July 18, 2005. This offense was reclassified by the legislature and reduced to a misdemeanor in 2015. Ch. 262, sec. 4, § 42-2-206, 2015 Colo. Sess. Laws 996; see also § 42-2-206, C.R.S. 2016.
• Forgery (a class 5 felony): In September 1999, Oldright stole the personal checkbook of his former girlfriend and business partner and wrote five checks totaling $1337.52. His conviction date for that crime was August 22, 2001 (and his sentence was modified April 1, 2002).
• Fraud by check (a class 6 felony at the time of conviction): On December 29, 2000, Oldright wrote two checks to a computer store that were returned for insufficient funds. He wrote one check for $1075.50 and the second for $10.00. The conviction date was November 9, 2001. This
offense was reclassified by the legislature and reduced to a class 1 misdemeanor in 2007. Ch. 384, sec. 8, § 18-5-205(3)(c), 2007 Colo. Sess. Laws 1693-94; see also § 18-5-205(3)(c), C.R.S. 2016.
• Theft by receiving between $500 and $15,000 (a class 4 felony at the time of conviction): On November 27, 2000, Oldright received a loaner car that he knew was stolen in exchange for bonding a friend out of jail. The car contained stolen computer equipment. The owner valued the car at $17,000, and the court ordered Oldright to pay $1224.00 in restitution. Oldright was convicted on August 22, 2001. This offense was reclassified by the legislature and reduced to a class 5 felony in 2013. Ch. 373, sec. 1, § 18-4-401, 2013 Colo. Sess. Laws 2196; see also § 18-4-401(2)(g), C.R.S. 2016.
• Theft of between $500 and $15,000 (a class 4 felony at the time of conviction): On November 21, 2000, Oldright stole a computer from Micro Center. The court ordered $1579.00 in restitution. This offense was reclassified by the
legislature and reduced to a class 1 misdemeanor in 2013. Ch. 373, sec. 1, § 18-4-401, 2013 Colo. Sess. Laws 2196.
¶ 16 The trial court correctly recognized that Oldright's prior convictions "standing alone arguably [did not] rise to the level of grave and serious" offenses. However, it erred when it further concluded that each of the prior convictions was "serious" simply because each was a felony, without further considering relevant mitigating factors, including the legislature's current classification of those prior crimes. While Oldright is not entitled to be sentenced under any of the amended statutes, it is appropriate and necessary to consider these legislative changes in determining whether his sentence is grossly disproportionate. See Hargrove, ¶ 28 ("This [the legislature's 2011 amendment to the habitual criminal statute] calls into greater question the applicability to . . . felony possession convictions of case law finding narcotics-related crimes to be per se grave and serious. At the very least, we believe a court could factor in the amount of narcotics involved in a simple possession conviction . . . in evaluating the broader question of whether a defendant's triggering felony and underlying felonies 'in combination . . . are so lacking in gravity or seriousness so as to conduct in this case, we must conclude, on the basis of the record before us, that the particular facts of the triggering and prior offenses leads to an inference that Oldright's sixty-four-year sentence is grossly disproportionate to his offenses. Accordingly, we vacate Oldright's sentence and remand the case for the trial court to conduct an extended proportionality review.
Forgery, fraud by check, theft, and theft by receiving.
The parties did not include the presentence investigation report in the record on appeal. --------
III. Conclusion¶ 28 We vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing and an extended proportionality review. JUDGE ASHBY concurs. JUDGE HAWTHORNE concurs in part and dissents in part. JUDGE HAWTHORNE, concurring in part and dissenting in part. ¶ 29 I concur with the majority's conclusion that Oldright's triggering offense, first degree assault, is a grave or serious crime. And, I also reject his argument that the specific facts surrounding his triggering offense mitigate its gravity or seriousness. ¶ 30 But because, in my opinion, the majority does not apply Colorado's guiding principles for proportionality reviews in the manner prescribed by the supreme court in Rutter v. People, 2015 CO 71, I disagree with its conclusion that the trial court must determine the gravity of Oldright's prior offenses before it can reasonably determine the harshness of his penalty. For the same reason, I also disagree with the majority's disposition of vacating Oldright's sentence and remanding the case to the trial court to conduct an extended proportionality review. Accordingly, I would affirm the trial court's decision. I therefore respectfully dissent from the majority's disposition.
I. Facts and Procedural History¶ 31 A jury convicted Oldright of first degree assault. Oldright hit the victim in the head with a metal rod. The victim lost consciousness twice and suffered a fractured skull, a concussion, and two deep lacerations. ¶ 32 After trial, the court adjudicated Oldright a habitual criminal, and sentenced him to sixty-four years in prison. ¶ 33 The trial court conducted an abbreviated proportionality review. It concluded that Oldright's convictions were grave or serious and his sentence was not disproportionate. So, the court denied his request for an extended proportionality review.
II. Proportionality Review¶ 34 Oldright contends that the court erred by not conducting an extended proportionality review. I disagree.
A. Guiding Principles¶ 35 Whether a sentence is constitutionally proportionate is a legal question that we review de novo. People v. Gee, 2015 COA 151, ¶ 56. ¶ 36 The Eighth Amendment prohibits extreme sentences that are "grossly disproportionate" to the crime. Close v. People, 48 P.3d is involved results in a near-certain upholding of the sentence." Id. (quoting Close, 48 P.3d at 538). These guiding principles establish that, in abbreviated proportionality reviews, courts only scrutinize the penalty's harshness when the crime is grave or serious. Id. at ¶ 20. And, it is highly likely that the sentence will be proportionate. Id.
B. Application 1. Oldright's Triggering Offense Was Grave or Serious¶ 39 Oldright's triggering offense was first degree assault. Another division of this court has held that first degree assault is per se grave or serious, and I see no reason to disagree with that holding. See Gee, ¶ 60. ¶ 40 As the supreme court similarly noted in Rutter, I note here that, although it would not have been dispositive, the legislature did not reclassify Oldright's triggering offense of first degree assault. Thus, even in the legislature's view, the nature of first degree assault remains unchanged. So, Oldright's triggering offense was outside the purview of any legislative sentencing reforms.
2. Abbreviated Proportionality Review¶ 47 Finally, even assuming that Oldright's underlying offenses, standing alone, are not grave or serious, I conclude that, when combined with his serious first degree assault offense, they are grave or serious. So, no inference of gross disproportionality is raised by the court's imposing the statutorily mandated sentence. See People v. Deroulet, 48 P.3d 520, 527 (Colo. 2002) (concluding that court erred in reducing legislatively mandated sentence even though underlying crimes, "standing alone," were not grave or serious). ¶ 48 I conclude that Oldright's sentence was not grossly disproportionate. And, I reject his contention that the trial court erred in failing to conduct an extended proportionality review.
III. Conclusion¶ 49 I would affirm the sentence.
Alert