- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
People v. Jamison
JUSTICE HARRIS delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County No. 12 CR 22847 Honorable Kenneth J. Wadas, Judge Presiding. JUSTICE HARRIS delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Justices Cunningham and Connors concurred in the judgment and opinion.
¶ 1 Defendant-appellant, Ismaaeel Jamison, was arrested and convicted of three counts of aggravated battery. At trial, the State presented evidence that demonstrated defendant punched Hector Hernandez while he attempted to board a Chicago Transit Authority (CTA) bus. The evidence also showed that while on the bus, defendant made insulting or provoking contact with the bus driver, Thomas Hojnacki. After the jury convicted defendant, the trial court sentenced defendant to nine years' imprisonment. ¶ 2 Defendant timely appealed to this court. He raises several arguments before this court: (1) the State failed to prove he acted knowingly when he committed both aggravated batteries; (2) the State failed to prove he knew the victim, Thomas Hojnacki, was over 60 years old; (3) trial counsel provided ineffective assistance when he promised testimony from two witnesses but never called them during the trial; (4) the trial court violated Illinois Supreme Court Rule 431(b) (eff. July 1, 2012); and (5) he established a prima facie Batson claim so this case should be remanded for a second and third stage Batson proceeding. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). ¶ 3 After reviewing the record and for reasons stated more fully below, we affirm the defendant's convictions for aggravated battery. The State presented sufficient evidence from which the jury could infer defendant acted knowingly when he committed the batteries. Trial counsel did not provide ineffective assistance for failing to call two witnesses mentioned in opening statements. The evidence was not closely balanced so defendant is not entitled to remand on the Rule 431(b) violation nor is he entitled to remand for the alleged Batson violation.
¶ 4 JURISDICTION¶ 5 On September 4, 2015, a jury found defendant guilty of three counts of aggravated battery and not guilty on two other counts of aggravated battery. Defendant filed a motion for a new trial, which the court denied on October 2, 2015. On December 11, 2015, the trial court sentenced defendant to nine years' concurrent imprisonment on the two aggravated batteries. A notice of appeal was filed December 29, 2015. Accordingly, this court has jurisdiction pursuant to article VI, section 6, of the Illinois Constitution and Illinois Supreme Court Rules 603 and 606, governing appeals from a final judgment of conviction in a criminal case entered below. Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, § 6; Ill. S. Ct. Rs. 603, 606 (eff. Feb. 6, 2013).
¶ 6 BACKGROUND¶ 7 The State charged defendant with six counts of aggravated battery for his conduct on a CTA bus on November 22, 2012. The State proceeded to trial on five of the six counts: aggravated battery causing bodily harm to transit passenger Hector Hernandez (count II), aggravated battery causing bodily harm to transit employee Thomas Hojnacki (count III), aggravated battery caused by contact of an insulting or provoking nature with transit employee Thomas Hojnacki (count IV), aggravated battery causing bodily harm to an individual (Thomas Hojnacki) 60 years or older (count V), and aggravated battery caused by contact of an insulting or provoking nature to a victim (Thomas Hojnacki) 60 years or older (count VI). ¶ 8 Prior to the start of trial, defense counsel moved for a behavioral clinical examination of defendant "for physical incapacity to assist the defense" based on a claim defendant had no recollection of the events leading to his arrest. On November 2, 2014, the court held a fitness hearing in which forensic psychologist, Dr. Christopher Cooper, chief of psychology and clinic coordinator for Forensic Clinical Services, testified regarding the interview he conducted with defendant on August 22 and August 29, 2014. ¶ 9 Dr. Cooper testified that he examined defendant and found no signs of acute psychological symptoms. During the examination defendant indicated he understood the relevant aspects of his prosecution and the roles of all the various court personnel. Defendant informed Dr. Cooper that he had no memory of the incident that led to his arrest. Based on defendant's claim, Dr. Cooper administered two memory malingering tests to objectively assess cognitive malingering or memory impairment. Defendant's scores on both tests were "highly indicative of malingering current memory dysfunction or currently a malingering memory impairment." Dr. insulting or provoking contact against a transit employee), and count VI (aggravated battery based on insulting or provoking contact against an individual 60 years or older). Defendant was acquitted of counts III (aggravated battery causing bodily harm to a transit employee) and count V (aggravated battery causing bodily harm to a person 60 years or older). The trial court merged count VI into count IV and then sentenced defendant to nine years on both counts II and IV to run concurrently. ¶ 23 This timely appeal follows.
The record does not disclose Officer Lule's first name.
While the record contains a DVD purporting to contain the videos, defendant's brief indicates appellate counsel could not get the video to play. This court was also unable to view the video.
¶ 24 ANALYSIS¶ 25 Before this court, defendant raises two sufficiency of the evidence arguments. Defendant argues the State failed to present sufficient evidence from which the jury could infer that he acted knowingly when he committed the aggravated batteries against Hojnacki and Hernandez. Additionally, defendant argues the State failed to present sufficient evidence to demonstrate that he knew Hojnacki was 60 years or older. We analyze each argument in turn. ¶ 26 When a defendant argues the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction, the inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Collins, 214 Ill. 2d 206, 217 (2005). In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, the appellate court will not retry the defendant. People v. Smith, 185 Ill. 2d 532, 541 (1999). It is the trier of fact's function to assess witness credibility, weigh and resolve conflicts in the evidence, and draw reasonable inferences from the evidence. People v. Williams, 193 Ill. 2d 306, 338 (2000). While the trier of fact's findings regarding witness credibility are entitled to great weight, the determination is not conclusive. Smith, 185 Ill. 2d at 542. The fact finder's acceptance of testimony as true does not guarantee that it was reasonable to do so. People v. Cunningham, 212 Ill. 2d 274, 280 (2004). However, an appellate court will only reverse a conviction where no "rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Smith, 185 Ill. 2d at 541. ¶ 27 In his first sufficiency argument, defendant contends the State failed to prove he knowingly caused bodily harm to Hernandez or that he knowingly made physical contact of an insulting or provoking nature with Hojnacki. The aggravated battery statute requires the actions be committed "knowingly." See 720 ILCS 5/12-3.05 (West 2016) (requiring a person to knowingly commit one of the prohibited actions). The Criminal Code of 2012 further states,
"A person knows, or acts knowingly or with knowledge of:
(a) the nature or attendant circumstances of his or her conduct, described by the statute defining the offense, when he or she is consciously aware that his or her conduct is of that nature or that those circumstances exist. Knowledge of a material fact includes awareness of the substantial probability that the fact exists.
(b) The result of his or her conduct, described by the statute defining the offense, when he or she is consciously aware that that result is practically certain to be caused by his conduct." Id. § 4-5.
Since "knowingness" is a state of mind, it will rarely be proven by direct evidence. Rather, the State will often have to prove "knowingness" based on the surrounding circumstances of the event, "including the character of the assault and the nature and seriousness of the injury." People v. Williams, 165 Ill. 2d 51, 64 (1995). draw an inference that discrimination has occurred." Case law has provided seven factors to aid in determining whether a prima facie case exists:
"(1) racial identity between the defendant and the excluded venirepersons; (2) a pattern of strikes against African American venirepersons; (3) a disproportionate use of peremptory challenges against African American venirepersons; (4) the level of African American representation in the venire as compared to the jury; (5) the prosecutor's questions and statements during voir dire examination and while exercising peremptory challenges; (6) whether the excluded [black] venirepersons were a heterogeneous group sharing race as their only common characteristics; and (7) the race of the defendant, victim, and witnesses" People v. Williams, 173 Ill. 2d 48, 71 (1996).
See also Rivera, 221 Ill. 2d at 501. Our supreme court has also held comparative juror analysis from the Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 241 (2005), decision may be utilized "in determining whether a prima facie case exists in the first instance." People v. Davis, 231 Ill. 2d 349, 361-62 (2008). A trial judge's determination of whether a defendant has demonstrated a prima facie case of discriminatory jury selection will not be overturned unless it is against the manifest weight of evidence. People v. Heard, 187 Ill. 2d 36, 54 (1999); People v. Hudson, 157 Ill. 2d 401, 426 (1993). ¶ 52 During voir dire, the defendant's attorney raised a Batson objection at two different points and both times the trial court found that defendant had failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. The State used its first peremptory strike against Devenda Beals, an African American venireperson, but defense counsel did not immediately object. The State then used its second peremptory strike against William Rody, but the record does not disclose Rody's race. Immediately after dismissing Rody, the State used its third peremptory challenge against Robert Jones, an African American. This did draw a Batson objection from defense counsel. The following exchange then occurred:
"[DEFENSE ATTORNEY]: Can we approach?
[SECOND DEFENSE ATTORNEY]: May we approach, Judge, for a second.
THE COURT: With the court reporter.
[STATE'S ATTORNEY]: We need you.
[SECOND DEFENSE ATTORNEY]: No. One we have an obligation—we—previous to this there is a Batson obligation because Ms. Beals was also excused and my client is black. Ms. Beals is black, Ms. [sic] Jones is black so we'd ask the Court, was race a reason they have for excluding?
[STATE'S ATTORNEY]: I don't believe the Defense has made a prima facie showing that there was any type of bias or any real reason for the excuse.
THE COURT: Have any African Americans been accepted on the jury?
[STATE'S ATTORNEY]: Yes, they have. I believe that Ms. Annette Brown, the juror number two, was accepted by the State.
THE COURT: All right. Okay. The Defense has [not] established a prima facie showing of a systematic exclusion of African Americans at this point in time, and accordingly to [sic] the Motion for Batson relief is denied."
Voir dire then continued and the second panel of four venirepersons was seated as jurors without issue. During voir dire for the final group of four jurors, the State exercised a peremptory challenge against Stacey Anaman, an African American venireperson. This drew an immediate objection from defense counsel. The following exchange then occurred:
"[DEFENSE ATTORNEY]: Your Honor, we have an objection if we can go in the back.
THE COURT: All right. Come to the back, court reporter. Defense objection.
[DEFENSE ATTORNEY]: It's the same objection Batson.
THE COURT: Renewing the Batson Motion, prosecution, the State is using a peremptory challenge on Ms. Anaman.
[STATE'S ATTORNEY]: I don't believe that this challenge was based on the basis of race.
THE COURT: Within this panel of four right now as far as—is the State accepting another African American juror or excusing one so once again I don't think the Defense has established a prima facie showing of systematic exclusion in light of the fact that they're accepting multiple African Americans so the Defense Motion for Batson relief is denied."
After this second Batson objection, the parties completed the final panel of four venirepersons and also seated the two alternates. ¶ 53 After reviewing the record and relevant case law, we cannot say that the trial court's determinations to deny the Batson challenges were against the manifest weight of the evidence. As the transcript demonstrates, when defense counsel raised both Batson objections, she only heterogeneous group sharing race as their only common characteristic. Defendant engages in an incomplete analysis because the above represent only part of the relevant factors a court should look at to determine whether a prima facie case has been established. Williams, 173 Ill. 2d at 71. ¶ 56 Several other facts that are germane to a first stage Batson inquiry are not present in the record. The record does not demonstrate the level of African American representation on the venire as compared to the jury nor does the record include the race of the victims or witnesses. The Illinois Supreme Court has held the "unchallenged presence of jurors of that race on the seated jury is a factor properly considered [citations] and tends to weaken the basis for a prima facie case of discrimination." Rivera, 221 Ill. 2d at 513. Moreover, "racial characteristics of a crime are important factors to be considered in determining whether a prima facie case has been established." People v. Andrews, 146 Ill. 2d 413, 433 (1992) (citing People v. Evans, 125 Ill. 2d 50, 66 (1988)). Defendant has the responsibility for "preserving the record and any ambiguities in the record will be construed against [defendant]." Davis, 231 Ill. 2d at 365 (citing Rivera, 221 Ill. 2d at 512). We will not speculate as to the race of witnesses, victims, the venire panel, or members of the jury. Defendant's failure to preserve a complete record prevents an analysis of all relevant first stage Batson factors. ¶ 57 It was defendant's obligation to present the trial court with all relevant facts from which a prima facie case of discrimination could be inferred. Defendant failed to make a complete presentation and failed to properly preserve the relevant facts to allow for an all-encompassing inquiry on appeal. Accordingly, defendant has failed to demonstrate the trial court's rulings on the Batson objections were against the manifest weight of the evidence.
A comparative jury analysis looks at "a prosecutor's proffered reason for striking a black panelist" to determine if it "applies just as well to an otherwise-similar nonblack who is permitted to serve." Miller-El II, 545 U.S. at 241. Comparative jury analysis cannot be used here because the State never proffered a reason for striking any of the African American venirepersons.
The record demonstrates that Annette D. Brown, an African American, was part of the first panel of four venirepersons accepted to be part of the jury.
In the last paragraph of his brief, defendant states "the trial court improperly applied a 'systematic exclusion' standard as its basis for summarily denying defense counsel's motion." We are aware that the trial court made passing reference to "systematic exclusion," which references pre-Batson case law. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965). Any argument that the trial court applied the wrong standard has been forfeited because defendant failed to object below (People v. Wiley, 156 Ill. 2d 464, 472-73 (1993)), and the mere passing reference means the issue has been forfeited for being insufficiently briefed (People v. Nere, 2018 IL 122566, ¶ 25 (citing Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. July 1, 2012))).
While Brown is identified as an African American, the record indicates one or two other individuals on the petit jury were African American, but they are not identified for the record. --------
¶ 58 CONCLUSION¶ 59 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm defendant's convictions. ¶ 60 Affirmed.
Alert