People v. Todd

David E. Levine, New York City, for defendant. Charles J. Hynes, District Attorney of Kings County (Madelyn Sollecito of counsel), for plaintiff.

OPINION OF THE COURT

CHARLES A. POSNER, J. At what point does the People's failure to give notice of their In the instant case, the People filed a written statement of readiness along with a superceding information with the clerk of the court on March 2, 1999 but concede that they never mailed these documents to defense counsel. The People admit that they did not serve the statement of readiness for trial or the superceding information until the March 29, 1999 court appearance but argue that under Kendzia (supra) there is no strict requirement of immediate notice to defense counsel. This court finds however that a lapse of 27 days between the filing of the statement of readiness for trial and its service upon defense counsel is unacceptable. In People v Cenat (176 Misc 2d 39 [Crim Ct, Kings County 1997]), the People mailed but misaddressed a statement of readiness for trial to defense counsel immediately after it was filed off-calendar. Five days later, the People announced their readiness in open court. The court held that the People made an effective statement of readiness for trial on the day the statement was filed. In Cole (supra), the Third Department held effective a statement of readiness to the court, stenographically recorded in the County Court Judge's absence, which was followed three days later by a written notice sent to defendant. (See also, People v Diener, 153 Misc 2d 963 [Greene County Ct 1992].) While this court can find no cases on point regarding a delay of 27 days in serving notice on the defendant, I nonetheless hold that notice to the defendant is so integral to the progression towards trial that the failure to inform the defendant of the filing of the statement of readiness in a timely fashion in this case is a deprivation of the statutory right to a speedy trial (see, CPL 30.30). The two-prong requirement of Kendzia (supra) is clearly violated by the People's failure to even attempt to communicate their readiness in the interim between the off-calendar filing on March 2nd and the next court appearance on March 29th. Accordingly, the defendant's motion to dismiss the information pursuant to CPL 30.30 (1) (b) is granted.