Bd. of Trustees of Vill. of Ridgefield Park v. W. Shore R. Co.

EMERY, V. C.

Suits by the Board of Trustees of the Village of Ridgefield Park and by the West View Boat Club against the West Shore Railroad Company and others. On bills, answer, replication, and proofs. Continued until the establishment of complainant's right at law.

William J. Morrison and J. Edward Ashmead, for complainants.

Vredenburgh, Wall & Carey, for defendants.

EMERY, V. C. These two suits (which were tried together) are brought against the New York Central & Hudson River Railroad Company as lessee and the West Shore Railroad Company as owner for the purpose of removing the obstructions to a public street claimed to cross lands now occupied or in possession of the West Shore Railroad by its main tracks, a siding, and other structures.

The complainants in one suit, the board of trustees of the village of Ridgefield Park, seek further to compel the railroad companies to construct a good and sufficient crossing over, under, or across this public street, under the twenty-sixth section of the railroad act; the right to bring the suit in equity under this section being further claimed under section 29 of the act of April 14, 1903. They also claim the right to relief on the ground of the jurisdiction of the court over conflicting easements in highways. The complainant in the other suit is a private owner of land bounding on the alleged public street, and claiming under its deeds the easement of passage through the street over the railroad crossing. Complainants in both suits base their claims upon an alleged dedication of a street across these lands occupied by the crossing before the construction of the railroad and before defendant acquired title. The right to a crossing over the entirewidth (60 feet) of the street is claimed to have been dedicated is claimed. The defendants by their answer admit the occupation of the alleged street by their main tracks, siding, fences, and other structures, and the obstruction of passage across their road, but deny the existence of any public street across their road, or of the private easement. The same contention is made at the hearing upon the facts as proved, and it is contended that, the legal right on which the complainants' bills are based being the subject of a substantial dispute, no equitable relief by injunction or otherwise based on the right can be given to disturb defendants' possession of the lands until complainants' legal title is established at law. The general rule requiring the legal title to be first settled at law in such cases of substantial dispute is well settled. A late decision of the Court of Errors and Appeals has applied the rule to cases where public easements over railroads as highway crossings were claimed. South Amboy v. Penna. R. R. Co., 77 N. J. Eq. 242, 249, 76 Atl. 1038 (Err. & App., 1910). In this case there was a substantial dispute as to the width of the highway. In a later case, decided since the final hearing in the present case—Imperial Realty Co. v. West Jersey, etc., R. Co., 81 Atl. 837 (Nov. 20, 1911)—the same court declared that in case of a substantial dispute the extent of an alleged easement as well as its existence was a matter to be settled at law before a court of equity could aid its enforcement The decision of the Court of Chancery in this case (78 N. J. Eq. 110, 77 Atl. 1041) October 20, 1910, deciding the question of legal title and granting relief, made before the hearing in this suit, and relied on for sustaining the jurisdiction, was reversed by the appellate court, and controls the decision in this case.

The preliminary question, therefore, is as to whether there is a substantial dispute either as to the extent or existence of the public or private easement claimed. The Ridgefield Land & Building Company, a corporation under whom the parties defendant and complainant both claim, filed a map of building lots in Ridgefield Park, Hackensack township, in the Bergen county clerk's office, on September 8, 1867. Fourth street was a street which on this map ran nearly east and west and extended easterly from the Hackensack river to Overpeck avenue, another street on the map, about 2,400 feet from the river. Across Fourth street near the river, as delineated on the map, a railroad, called "Cherry Hill Railroad," was shown, and also a space marked "Depot," on the north side of Fourth street, adjoining the railroad A note on the map stated: "The trains of the Cherry Hill R. R. now in construction will stop at the depot on the property." The location of the road, according to the scale of the map, is about 200 feet easterly from the river. After filing this map, the company sold lots, referring to the map, and conveyances were made on November 9, 1867, of several lots fronting on or bounded by Fourth street, referring to the lots as so bounded or fronting. These lots were all on the portion of Fourth street east of the disputed crossing. On October 18, 1870, the land company conveyed to Richard A. Robertson the entire tract, excepting therefrom lots previously conveyed. Before this date another railroad company (the New Jersey Midland Company) had become entitled to a right of way GO feet in width across Fourth street, and had constructed a railroad across Fourth street, and this right of way was excepted from the grant in the Robertson deed as having been "a strip of land granted and conveyed to the New Jersey Midland Railway Company." Whether this conveyance included the land indicated on the dedication map as belonging to the Cherry Hill Railroad, within the lines of Fourth street, does not appear by any direct evidence. A mortgage given by Robertson to the Guardian Mutual Life Insurance Company, dated March 14, 1873, conveyed a part of the tract containing about 30 acres, described as lying north of the central line of Fourth street and between the river and the old Hackensack road, which was about 1,200 feet from the river. This mortgage expressly excepted the premises conveyed by the land company to the N. J. Midland Railway Company by deed dated October 18, 1870, the same date as Robertson's own deed. Defendant companies claim under the title derived from this mortgage by foreclosure and mesne conveyance, but the deed to their immediate predecessor in title, made by the Universal Life Insurance Company to the New York, West Shore & Buffalo Railroad Company, dated August 3, 1881, conveyed the right of way by special boundaries connected with the Midland Railway Company's lands, and not referring to Fourth street or to the previous deeds.

So far as the parties to this last deed are concerned, it may be fairly claimed that an intention to abandon or revoke the dedication of Fourth street west of the railroad may be inferred. Shortly after receiving this deed, the West Shore Railroad Company constructed its road alongside of and parallel with the Midland Railroad across Fourth street, excavating to a depth of about two feet below the grade. This excavation extended across Fourth street for the entire width (66 feet) of its right of way, and on the easterly side a wooden bulkhead was built across the end of Fourth street. On the right of way the company has constructed its two main tracks and also on the easterly side a siding which began some distance north of Fourth street and ended in or near the center of this street as laid down on the map. A large post or bumper was erected at the end of this siding, and within the lines of the allegedstreet. By this excavation and by this construction of the tracks below the level of the street, all use of Fourth street by wagons or vehicles at the crossing was obstructed, and to prevent or obstruct the use of the crossing on foot, the defendant companies later, and four or five years ago, also erected a fence across the southerly half of the crossing on its easterly side. The two railroads have a station used in common, located on lands of the Midland, now Susquehanna & Western, a short distance south of the crossing and between the tracks of the two roads. Access to the station from Fourth street east of the railroad on foot is afforded by a foot bridge erected by defendant companies over the West Shore Road, ending near the north end of the station, and by a driveway or parkway leading from Fourth street to the southern end of the station. This obstruction of Fourth street at the crossing continued from the time of the construction and operation of the railroad in 1881 up to the time of the acceptance by the complainant of the part of Fourth street lying east of the railroad as a public street. An ordinance passed June 26, 1892, recited the intention of the village trustees to accept formally streets which had been dedicated by implication by maps and conveyances, many of which streets had been used by the public for over 20 years, and further recited that it was the intention of the board of trustees of the village to improve all the "public streets" within the limits of the village as the funds for such purposes will permit, and that, therefore, they are desirous of having all such streets as aforesaid formally accepted and declared to be public streets. Then follows a declaration that the streets particularly described and laid down on a map attached to the ordinance were accepted as public streets, among others "Fourth street from Railroad avenue to Overpeck avenue being 60 feet in width." Railroad avenue on the map is an avenue north of the crossing at Fourth street and running along the easterly boundary of the defendant's railroad. It intersects Fourth street at an angle and ends at the easterly side of Fourth street, not crossing this street. On the map Fourth street appears to terminate and to be closed at the easterly boundary of the railroad company's lands, and one point of dispute as to the legal rights of the defendant companies is whether this acceptance and map did not operate to terminate the public right of highway in Fourth street west of the railroad company's lands. If the trustees, under their power to accept dedications, had the right to close any part of the dedicated streets, or had the right to accept part of a dedicated street, then the adoption of the map showing Fourth street closed where it reached the railroad crossing may be claimed to have released the public right.

The claim is made upon the part of the defendant companies that it did have this effect, and that the subsequent acceptance in July, 1907, of Fourth street from Railroad avenue to the Hackensack river was of no validity. Whether it did or not is a question relating purely to the legal title to the lands now in the occupation and possession of the defendant companies, and, under the rule established by the cases above referred to, the defendants have the right to have the question of the existence of the street across their road determined at law before a court of equity interferes with their possession and occupation of the land for the purpose of enforcing a public easement over it. Whether the street does still legally exist across the railroad, and the extent of the easement, must be first determined by a suit at law, before this court can exercise the jurisdiction over crossings given by section 29 of the act of 1903. This was expressly decided in South Amboy v. Penna. R. R. Co., 77 N. J. Eq. 242, 76 Atl. 1038, and the establishment of the legal existence of the street is also necessary before the jurisdiction over conflicting easements can be invoked.

Another question is raised as a substantial dispute, viz., the effect of adverse possession of the crossing as against the village for over 20 years. Such objection, without doubt, raises a substantial dispute as to legal title, which must be tried at law, so far as relates to the suit of the West View Boat Club, but, under the rule claimed to be settled by our decisions, it is insisted that adverse possession cannot operate against the public right in highways asserted in the village trustees' suit. On the part of the defendants, the contention is that the defendants, being in possession and claiming adversely exclusive possession, are entitled to have the legal question of the effect of such possession settled at law before their possession is interfered with by a court of equity. So far as the effect of adverse possession alone is concerned, my present view is that adverse possession alone does not of itself under our cases raise such a question of substantial dispute that this court should decline to exercise jurisdiction over an admitted public street crossing, if such possession were the sole question in dispute. But the adverse possession as one fact in the case may have a bearing, in connection with the other facts of the case, upon the legal title involved, and defendants are entitled to present it to a court of law in connection with other evidence bearing on their claim of legal title.

Another matter should be referred to as showing the necessity of further proofs before ultimate relief can be given. Defendants' counsel claim that the New Jersey Midland Road is located as shown on the dedication map by the Cherry Hill Railroad. The matter is important for the reason that, if at the time of filing the dedication map theCherry Hill Railroad had the title to a strip across Fourth street, then the dedication of Fourth street by the map was probably ineffective to dedicate a continuous street, and operated only to dedicate Fourth street in two sections, one section east and the other west of the Midland Railroad, and the eastern section of Fourth street thus broken terminated on its western end at the easterly boundary of the N. J. Midland Railroad Company's lands. Now, this easterly boundary of the Midland Company's lands appears by the deeds in evidence to be the westerly boundary of the defendant companies' right of way across Fourth street, and unless Fourth street, by dedication or otherwise, is a public street across the Midland Railroad, then the street terminated on the right of way and railroad of the defendant companies, and, even if the validity of the second acceptance be not affected, the whole status of the case as to the character of the crossing to be finally directed after establishing the legal status of the street is materially affected. The entire rights of the public to the street over both the crossings should clearly appear and be definitely settled by proceedings at law, if necessary, before any decree as to the crossing of the defendant companies as owners of one of the roads should be made.

The answers in both cases denied the substantial facts stated in the bills, as to complainants' title, and thus put complainants upon proofs of their title, and on the answers defendants put in their own proofs of title. The objection that complainants' title should be first established at law was not made by the answers, and was first set up at the hearing.

The denials in the answer of right to equitable relief and their claim of the benefit of a demurrer (which would admit the existence of the street) are not equivalent to a denial of the jurisdiction of the court to grant relief before the establishment of the disputed title at law.

The bills therefore should not be dismissed, but should stand over until the establishment of the title at law. Todd v. Staats, 60 N. J. Eq. 512, 46 Atl. 645; Mason v. Todd, 77 N. J. Eq. 527, 77 Atl. 44.