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State v. Walker

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
Dec 19, 2018

Justice Laurie McKinnon delivered the Opinion of the Court.

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Twenty-First Judicial District, In and For the County of Ravalli, Cause No. DC-15-69 Honorable Jeffrey H. Langton, Presiding Judge COUNSEL OF RECORD: For Appellant: Quentin M. Rhoades (argued), Rhoades, Siefert & Erickson, P.L.L.C., Missoula, Montana For Appellee: Timothy C. Fox, Montana Attorney General, Micheal S. Wellenstein (argued), Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana William E. Fulbright, Ravalli County Attorney, Hamilton, Montana Filed: /s/_________
Clerk Justice Laurie McKinnon delivered the Opinion of the Court. ¶1 A jury found Randall Bryce Walker (Walker) guilty of two counts of incest and two counts of sexual assault. The Twenty-First Judicial District Court, Ravalli County, sentenced Walker to four, 100-year concurrent prison sentences, with no time suspended. Walker appeals, presenting three evidentiary issues for our review:

1. Did the District Court abuse its discretion in excluding the defendant's polygraph evidence?

2

. Did the District Court abuse its discretion in excluding a defense expert's testimony that the defendant's psychosexual profile revealed no sexual interest in children?

3

. Did the District Court correctly apply Montana's Rape Shield Law, § 45-5-511(2), MCA, to exclude evidence of a victim's alleged prior sexual conduct?

¶2 We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶3 Walker married A.W.'s mother, Kim, when A.W. was an infant. A.W. later disclosed that, when she lived with Walker, he subjected her to a series of sexual assaults, beginning when she was seven or eight years old and ending when she was twelve or thirteen years old. She testified at trial that Walker frequently and regularly sexually assaulted her. Walker and Kim divorced in 2007. The next year, Walker married Laura. Laura's two daughters, B.W. and R.W., lived with Walker and Laura. Walker and R.W. did not have a good relationship. R.W. testified that Walker constantly made her uncomfortable by doing things like smacking and grabbing her bottom and trying to kiss her on the lips. the parties' arguments and subsequently granted the State's motion to exclude Wood's testimony. ¶10 After five days of trial, the jury found Walker guilty on all four counts. The District Court sentenced Walker to four, 100-year concurrent prison sentences, with no time suspended. Walker appeals, arguing that the District Court improperly excluded Dr. Page's, Stotts's, and Wood's testimony.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶11 District courts have broad discretion in determining the relevance and admissibility of evidence. State v. Daffin, 2017 MT 76, ¶ 12, 387 Mont. 154, 392 P.3d 150. Thus, we review evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion. State v. Madplume, 2017 MT 40, ¶ 19, 386 Mont. 368, 390 P.3d 142. A court abuses its discretion if it acts arbitrarily without the employment of conscientious judgment or exceeds the bounds of reason, resulting in substantial injustice. State v. Spottedbear, 2016 MT 243, ¶ 9, 385 Mont. 68, 380 P.3d 810. In exercising its discretion, however, a district court is bound by the Rules of Evidence and applicable statutes. State v. Derbyshire, 2009 MT 27, ¶ 19, 349 Mont. 114, 201 P.3d 811. Consequently, to the extent the court's ruling is based on its interpretation of an evidentiary rule or statute, our review is de novo. Derbyshire, ¶ 19.

DISCUSSION

¶12 1. Did the District Court abuse its discretion in excluding the defendant's polygraph evidence? ¶13 Walker included polygraph examiner Stotts on his list of potential trial witnesses and provided the State with a copy of Stotts's polygraph report. The State filed a pretrial motion, seeking to exclude Stotts as a trial witness and prohibit any reference to the polygraph examination by any attorney, party, or witness. The State based its motion on a line of precedent from this Court excluding polygraph evidence from all court proceedings. See, e.g., State v. Hameline, 2008 MT 241, ¶ 20, 344 Mont. 461, 188 P.3d 1052; State v. Anderson, 1999 MT 58, ¶ 12, 293 Mont. 472, 977 P.2d 315; State v. Staat, 248 Mont. 291, 293, 811 P.2d 1261, 1262 (1991). ¶14 Walker opposed the State's motion but did not mention Stotts's testimony or the precedent upon which the State relied. Instead, Walker asserted that his offer to take the polygraph examination was admissible. Walker stated, "If Walker testifies, he will seek to offer the fact he volunteered to take the polygraph test as evidence relevant to his state of mind - more specifically, evidence relevant to his consciousness of innocence." (Emphasis added.) Walker further argued that, because the jury would know that he offered to take the polygraph examination, it would also need to know the examination's results. He urged the District Court to consider the interaction of M. R. Evid. 403, 404, 608, and 702 in deciding whether the polygraph examination's results should be admitted. Walker asserted that each side should "present evidence concerning the general science of polygraph evidence" to assist the court in determining whether the results were admissible under concerning the admissibility of his offer to take a polygraph test, which would involve evidentiary considerations other than M. R. Evid. 702. ¶17 Walker urges us to depart from our precedent holding that polygraph test results are inadmissible and apply, instead, general standards for admitting expert opinion evidence. The analysis of whether to admit or exclude expert testimony begins with M. R. Evid. 702, which provides:

If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.

Our jurisprudence recognizes that expert evidence is admissible if the expert field is reliable, the expert is qualified, and the testimony will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or determine a fact in issue. McClue v. Safeco Ins. Co., 2015 MT 222, ¶¶ 21-23, 380 Mont. 204, 354 P.3d 604; M. R. Evid. 702. Walker asks us to reconsider the scientific reliability of polygraph testing. ¶18 This Court has long held that polygraph test results are inadmissible in all Montana court proceedings. See, e.g., Hameline, ¶ 20 ("We repeat yet again our blanket prohibition on the use of polygraph test results in any way in any Montana court proceeding."); State v. DuBray, 2003 MT 255, ¶ 105, 317 Mont. 377, 77 P.3d 247. The prohibition on polygraph test results extends to a defendant's sentencing. See, e.g., Anderson, ¶ 12; State v. Hensley, 250 Mont. 478, 482-83, 821 P.2d 1029, 1032 (1991). Even the indirect 188 Mont. at 414, 614 P.2d at 480 (quoting Alexander, 526 F.2d at 168). In Alexander, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals explained:
The most important function served by a jury is in bringing its accumulated experience to bear upon witnesses testifying before it, in order to distinguish truth from falsity. Such a process is of enormous complexity, and involves an almost infinite number of variable factors. It is the basic premise of the jury system that twelve men and women can harmonize those variables and decide, with the aid of examination and cross-examination, the truthfulness of a witness. But a [polygraph] machine cannot be examined or cross-examined; . . . [The court is] not prepared to rule that the jury system is as yet outmoded. [The court prefers] the collective judgment of twelve men and women who have sat through many weeks of a trial and heard all the evidence on the guilt or innocence of a defendant.

Alexander
, 526 F.2d at 168-69
(quoting United States v. Stromberg, 179 F. Supp. 278, 280 (S.D.N.Y. 1959)); see also United States v. DeBetham, 348 F. Supp. 1377, 1390-91 (S.D. Cal.), aff'd, 470 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1972). In many ways, an "aura of infallibility" accompanies polygraph test results, which "can lead jurors to abandon their duty to assess credibility and guilt" and, instead, rely on the examiner's expert opinion. United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 314, 118 S. Ct. 1261, 1267 (1998). Consistent with this reasoning, "[t]he only acceptable lie detection methods in Montana court proceedings reside with the court in bench trials, the jury in jury trials, and the skill of counsel in cross-examination in all trials." Staat, 248 Mont. at 293, 811 P.2d at 1262. ¶20 There is a distinction between polygraph test results and most other types of admissible scientific evidence. Bashor, 188 Mont. at 414-16, 614 P.2d at 480-81. After the jury receives other types of scientific expert testimony, such as fingerprint comparisons or handwriting analyses, it "has the additional responsibility of reviewing other facts which tend to prove or disprove [a] defendant's connection with the crime and, if participation is polygraph test results addresses the truthfulness of a witness, a determination exclusively within the province of the fact finder at trial. Similarly, a clinical finding by Dr. Page that, in his professional opinion, "Walker's profile is that he is not sexually interested in school-age males or females, or preschool age males or females" is scientific evidence supporting the notion that because Walker does not fit a profile of a pedophile he must be innocent of the sexual assaults. Both are attempts to bolster the credibility of a witness; both speak directly to the guilt or innocence of the defendant; and both invade the exclusive province of the jury to judge credibility and the guilt or innocence of the accused. ¶31 Our precedent addressing the admissibility of profile evidence consists primarily of three cases: State v. Bailey, 2004 MT 87, 320 Mont. 501, 87 P.3d 1032; State v. Spencer, 2007 MT 245, 339 Mont. 227, 169 P.3d 384; and State v. Passmore, 2010 MT 34, 355 Mont. 187, 225 P.3d 1229. We address each, and examine them in the context of Dr. Page's proffered testimony. ¶32 In Bailey, the State charged Bailey with incest for sexually assaulting his step-daughters. Bailey, ¶ 9. Before his trial, Bailey underwent a psychosexual evaluation with Dr. Scolatti. Bailey, ¶ 35. Thereafter, Bailey sought to have Dr. Scolatti testify at his trial regarding the evaluation's results and Dr. Scolatti's opinion of the results. Bailey, ¶ 35. The district court excluded Dr. Scolatti's testimony and we affirmed on appeal, noting that Bailey offered Dr. Scolatti's testimony to bolster his own claim that he did not commit the alleged offenses. Bailey, ¶ 38. We reasoned:
Expert testimony offered to bolster the credibility of a party and his or her claims is improper because it invades the province of the jury by " placing a

stamp of scientific legitimacy
on a victim's allegations, or by dismissing the validity of the allegations."

Bailey
, ¶ 38 (quoting Benjamin v. Torgerson, 1999 MT 216, ¶ 40, 295 Mont. 528, 985 P.2d 734) (emphasis added). ¶33 In this case, the State urged the District Court to find that Bailey controlled, commenting that "[t]he only purpose to Dr. Page's testimony is to present the outcome of the testing and his opinion of [Walker's] potential to be a sex offender—in other words, to attempt to bolster [Walker's] credibility." The District Court agreed with the State, determining that Dr. Page's testimony in Walker's case was akin to Dr. Scolatti's testimony in Bailey. For that reason, the court excluded the profile evidence, remarking on "Walker's artful attempt to argue that he does not seek to offer such evidence to bolster his credibility, but rather to undermine the State's theory that he committed the crimes with which he [was] charged." ¶34 We agree with the District Court that, as in Bailey where Dr. Scolatti's testimony would have improperly bolstered Bailey's own claim that he did not commit the alleged offenses, Dr. Page's testimony would have improperly bolstered Walker's own claim that he did not commit the alleged offenses. See Bailey, ¶ 38. Bolstering a witness's testimony with profile evidence is inappropriate because it invades the province of the jury, as the jury alone is responsible for weighing the witnesses' credibility. See M. R. Evid. 608 (providing that a witness's credibility may be supported with evidence of his truthful character "only after the character of the witness for truthfulness has been attacked . . . ."). Admitting the profile evidence would have invaded the province of the jury by "placing a the evidence at issue and weighed the parties' competing interests, we conclude it did not mechanically apply the Rape Shield Law to exclude evidence of R.W.'s sexual conduct. ¶59 Further, we note that there was no clear evidence of the prior incident—Walker's proffered evidence of R.W.'s sexual conduct was speculative and unsupported. See Aguado, ¶ 34; Awbery, ¶ 22. He sought to present Wood's hearsay testimony of what the three-year-old told her happened and what the three-year-old said R.W. said. The probative value of Walker's proffered, unsupported evidence would not have been substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect. See Colburn, ¶ 25; M. R. Evid. 403 ("Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice . . . ."). District courts have the power and responsibility to manage the defendant's evidence to prevent "sordid probes into a victim's past sexual conduct." Colburn, ¶ 28 (quoting Anderson, 211 Mont. at 284, 686 P.2d at 200). The type of evidence Walker sought to admit is precisely the type of probe into R.W.'s past sexual conduct that the Rape Shield Law was designed to exclude, and Walker failed to demonstrate that his constitutional rights outweigh R.W.'s rights under the Rape Shield Law. The District Court correctly applied Montana's Rape Shield Law to exclude evidence regarding R.W.'s sexual conduct.

Montana is not alone in its complete prohibition of polygraph evidence. See State v. A.O., 965 A.2d 152, 161-62 (N.J. 2009) (citing cases from twenty-eight states barring the admission of polygraph evidence outright).

Our review of the District Court's decision to exclude the psychosexual evaluation is limited to a review of the information the District Court knew about the evaluation when it made its decision. Walker represented that he planned to use Dr. Page as an expert witness, stating, "[Dr. Page] has not yet supplied a written report, but states orally that upon his psycho-sexual evaluation of [Walker], [Walker] has no abnormal or other attraction for pubescent or prepubescent children." Based on that information, the State filed its pretrial motion to exclude Dr. Page's testimony. In response, Walker provided an offer of proof, stating:

Dr. Page has conducted an assessment of Walker and will testify that his findings are as follows: Walker's profile is that he is not sexually interested in school-age males or females, or preschool age males or females. Dr. Page wi[ll] further testify that Walker shows not [sic] no signs of psychopathology or personality pathology. And so Dr. Page, as he will testify, makes no therapeutic recommendations for Walker's case.

Based on the parties' arguments and Walker's proffer, the District Court excluded Dr. Page's testimony. The parties' arguments focused exclusively on the admissibility of Dr. Page's testimony that "Walker's profile" does not fit the class of offenders identified as pedophiles. The parties did not dispute Dr. Page's status as an expert witness and Walker shared no information with the District Court about the scientific methods by which Dr. Page performed the evaluation.


Although we do not rely upon it for our decision, we also observe that the literature discussing the many methods of psychological assessment used to evaluate sex offenders indicates that there is no psychological test or combination of tests that can determine whether a person has engaged or will engage in deviant sexual activity. State v. Parkinson, 909 P.2d 647, 651 n.1 (Idaho Ct. App. 1996) (citing Myers et al., Expert Testimony in Child Abuse Litigation, 68 Neb. L. Rev. 1, 139, 143-44 (1989); William D. Murphy and James M. Peters, Profiling Child Sexual Abusers, Psychological Considerations, 19 CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND BEHAVIOR 24 (1992)).

There are two narrowly-drawn exceptions to the general rule: parties may present evidence of "the victim's past sexual conduct with the offender" and "evidence of specific instances of the victim's sexual activity to show the origin of semen, pregnancy, or disease that is at issue in the prosecution." Section 45-5-511(2), MCA. Neither exception is at issue here.

CONCLUSION

¶60 The District Court did not abuse its discretion when it excluded Walker's polygraph evidence or when it excluded evidence pertaining to Walker's psychosexual profile. We further conclude that the District Court correctly balanced Walker's and the victim's competing interests when it applied Montana's Rape Shield Law, § 45-5-511(2), MCA, to exclude evidence of the victim's alleged prior sexual conduct. Walker's conviction is affirmed.

/S/ LAURIE McKINNON We concur: /S/ MIKE McGRATH
/S/ BETH BAKER
/S/ JIM RICE Justice Ingrid Gustafson, specially concurring. ¶61 Although I agree with the result the Majority has reached, I write separately because its rulings exceed the scope of what is necessary to resolve the issues in this case. ¶62 In the proceedings below, Walker filed a discovery notice in which he listed possible defense witnesses, including Dr. Page. The State moved to exclude Dr. Page's testimony because it alleged his testimony would impermissibly bolster Walker's credibility. Walker disagreed, arguing that M. R. Evid. 704 allows an expert witness to enter the province of the jury and testify to an ultimate issue of fact. Walker went on to explain how he believed Dr. Page's opinions constitute clinical findings and not opinions of law, and why these opinions would not impermissibly bolster Walker's testimony. The District Court found Walker's proposed expert testimony indistinguishable from the testimony found inadmissible in Bailey and granted the State's motion. Based on the evidence Walker offered and the arguments he raised at the time, the District Court ruled within its discretion. Thus, our analysis of the issue on appeal should end here. defendant. In so doing, we reviewed the testimony and questioned whether the testimony, if admitted, would have assisted the trier of fact. We explained:

Though Dr. Scolatti conducted a number of tests . . . much of his testimony focused on the Abel Assessment for Sexual Interest test (the Abel test). . . . Dr. Scolatti stated that the Abel test is controversial among researchers and that he thought the test could be "beaten." He also stated that, when applied to an existing offender group, the Abel test identified child molesters "with different levels of success."

Spencer
, ¶ 40. We further commented that Dr. Scolatti had partially based his conclusion Spencer did not have the diagnostic criteria of a pedophile on the fact Spencer told Dr. Scolatti he did not have a sexual interest in children. Spencer, ¶ 41. We found the evidence inadmissible under Rule 403—a theory not at issue in the present case. ¶68 The Majority finds the evidence Walker sought to admit via Dr. Page "bear[s] remarkable resemblance to the testimony by Dr. Scolatti that Spencer sought to introduce." Opinion, ¶ 37. Walker, however, offered no evidence of which tests Dr. Page conducted, the focus of his testimony, or whether the tests were controversial or able to be "beaten." Thus, the outcome of Spencer does not control the outcome here. However, Spencer should serve as an example for the kind and amount of information which a court needs to have in order to rule on admissibility under Rule 702, and consistent with McClue. ¶69 Under Walker, courts may no longer weigh the admissibility of such evidence as did the Spencer court. In Passmore, we held there is neither a per se rule requiring or not being, sexually interested in children does not prove that Walker is guilty or innocent of sexual assault and incest. ¶72 The applicable statutes elucidate the distinction between being a pedophile—someone sexually attracted to children—and committing sexual assault and/or incest. The crimes of sexual assault and incest both require "sexual contact." Section 45-2-101(67), MCA, defines "sexual contact." It states:
"Sexual contact" means touching of the sexual or other intimate parts of the person of another, directly or through clothing, in order to knowingly or purposely:
(a) cause bodily injury to or humiliate, harass, or degrade another; or
(b) arouse or gratify the sexual response or desire of either party.


¶73
Under these statutes, in order to commit either sexual assault or incest, the offender must touch the victim with the knowledge or purpose to accomplish one or more of the objectives enumerated in § 45-2-101(67)(a) and (b), MCA. Dr. Page would have offered no opinion on the credibility of Walker's denial, and whether or not Walker committed the offenses with which he was charged. Therefore, a jury could find Dr. Page credible and still conclude Walker had sexual contact with A.W. and/or R.W. for any of the other reasons enumerated in § 45-2-101(67), MCA, and is therefore guilty of the charged offenses even if he was not motivated by his own sexual gratification. ¶74 Although the majority maintains the exclusionary rule it has created is consistent with Bailey, Spencer, and Passmore, I do not see how a blanket prohibition against scientific evidence that indicates a defendant does not fit the profile of a pedophile would not in fact overrule these decisions as well as abrogate our holding in McClue. Rather than allowing courts to apply the Rules of Evidence, this Court has now identified an "inherent problem" in allowing juries to consider profile evidence. It broadly holds that, "evidence that a defendant does or does not fit within a class of offenders impermissibly bolsters the defendant's claim of innocence and improperly invades the province of the jury in determining the defendant's guilt or innocence." Opinion, ¶ 40. ¶75 However, we have safeguards to prevent expert testimony from invading the province of the jury. "Expert testimony cannot 'invade the province of the jury' unless the jury is instructed that it must agree with the expert's assessment." State v. Geyman, 224 Mont. 194, 199, 729 P.2d 475, 478 (1986) (citation omitted and emphasis in original) (holding expert testimony concerning the credibility of a child alleged to have been the victim of sexual assault admissible and did not impinge upon jury's obligation to decide credibility). "Our case law demonstrates that even though testimony on an ultimate issue of fact may implicate legal issues, an expert's testimony is admissible as long as it does not reach a legal conclusion or apply the law to the facts." Wittich, ¶ 41 (citation omitted). Our courts routinely instruct jurors they are not bound to believe the testimony of expert witnesses. In cases in which a party offers expert testimony regarding psychosexual evaluations, the court would properly instruct the jury to ensure jurors understand they are free to accept or reject, in whole or in part, the opinions offered by the expert. Montana Criminal Jury Instruction No. 1-113 (2009) states:
A witness who by education and experience has become expert in any art, science, profession or calling may be permitted to state an opinion as to a matter in which the witness is versed and which is material to the case, and

may also state the reasons for such opinion. You should consider each expert opinion received in evidence in this case and give it such weight as you think it deserves; and you may reject it entirely if you conclude the reasons given in support of the opinion are unsound.

¶76 Finally, the Majority alleges the profile evidence here is distinguishable from another type of profile evidence—expert testimony on battered woman syndrome—because expert testimony on the latter is limited to "how women with the syndrome act and behave." Opinion, ¶ 42 (citing Hess, generally). In Hess, however, the State did not challenge—and the court did not rule upon—the admissibility of battered woman syndrome, nor was the admissibility challenged on appeal. Rather, although the defendant gave notice of her intent to rely on battered woman syndrome as an affirmative defense, she challenged the State's right to have her examined by their own experts. Hess, 252 Mont. at 209-10, 828 P.2d at 385-86. When this Court has ruled upon the admissibility of expert testimony on battered woman syndrome, it has explicitly declined "to set hard and fast foundational requirements, preferring instead, to leave those to the sound discretion of the trial court . . . ." State v. Stringer, 271 Mont. 367, 378, 897 P.2d 1063, 1070 (1995). This Court has found it within a trial court's discretion to admit evidence of battered woman syndrome where the alleged victim did not recant and the evidence was "indirectly supportive" of her credibility. State v. Bonamarte, 2009 MT 243, ¶ 26, 351 Mont. 419, 213 P.3d 457. It has upheld the trial court's discretion to exclude such evidence where a defendant, accused of deliberate homicide, sought to admit expert testimony that she suffered from battered woman syndrome and post-traumatic stress disorder where the trial court found she had failed to produce an adequate evidentiary foundation. State v. Lotter, 2013 MT 336, 372 Mont. 445, 313 P.3d 148. And it has affirmed the discretion of a trial court to admit expert testimony that domestic violence victims commonly recant. State v. Ankeny, 2010 MT 224, ¶ 49, 358 Mont. 32, 243 P.3d 391. ¶77 In Ankeny, the defendant's girlfriend initially informed law enforcement he had choked her. Ankeny, ¶ 7. She later recanted, and at trial denied he had choked her. Ankeny, ¶¶ 8-9. Over Ankeny's objection, the State presented expert testimony from a social worker who opined it was not unusual for domestic violence victims to initially cooperate and later recant. Ankeny, ¶ 14. On appeal, we rejected Ankeny's argument that the expert testimony impermissibly bolstered the victim's credibility, holding it "simply provided the jury with an explanation for the inconsistencies in [her] testimony." Ankeny, ¶ 45. Relying in part on Stringer, 271 Mont. at 377, 897 P.2d at 1069, which held such testimony "merely provided the jury with information to aid the jury in evaluating the evidence," we found no error in the District Court's admission of the expert testimony. However, in spite of McClue and Passmore, and although the arguments for and against admission of profile evidence are analogous, this Court has removed the discretion of the trial courts here. ¶78 I would hold that the admissibility of profile evidence should be left to the sound discretion of the trial court, as it has been until now. For the above reasons, while I would affirm the District Court's rulings, I cannot join in the Majority's Opinion.

The Majority alleges, "Dr. Page would have extrapolated data or information from psychological testing conducted on known sexual offenders and compared his extrapolation to Walker's test results." Opinion, ¶ 46. However, the District Court did not have the benefit of this information when it made its determination.

Moreover, while the Majority prohibits defendants from presenting scientific evidence that indicates they do not fit the profile of a pedophile, the same reasoning will bar prosecutors from presenting scientific evidence that a defendant fits the profile of a pedophile.

Pedophile, Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). --------

/S/ INGRID GUSTAFSON Justices Dirk Sandefur and James Jeremiah Shea join in the special concurrence Opinion of Justice Ingrid Gustafson.

/S/ JAMES JEREMIAH SHEA


/S/ DIRK M. SANDEFUR