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Chamberlin v. Chamberlin
Billinson & Weinshenker (Elizabeth A. Burns of counsel), for respondent. Alan D. Scheer for petitioner. OPINION OF THE COURT
M. JOHN SHERMAN, J. Linda Chamberlin and Boyd Chamberlin are the parents of two children: David (age 22) and Christopher (age 17, born Feb. 8, 1983). The parties were divorced in 1985 under circumstances where the children lived primarily with the mother and the father paid child support to her. The parties entered into a stipulation in 1991 which provided for an increase in the amount of child support and a mechanism for adjusting support upon one of the children reaching age 21 or being otherwise emancipated. On June 4, 1999 the Tompkins County Support Collection Unit (SCU) filed with the Family Court a document entitled "Adjusted Order of Support." This document indicated that the agency had reviewed the status of the case and determined to increase the father's child support as a cost of living adjustment (COLA). Also on June 4, 1999 the agency filed objections to the proposed adjusted order. The parents appeared before Hearing Examiner Michael J. Costello in connection with the objections to the proposed adjusted order. The father moved to dismiss the objections, and by an order on motion of October 19, 1999 the motion was denied and a de novo hearing was held. A decision and order was issued bearing a notice of entry date of April 3, 2000. On April 14, 2000 written objections were filed with the Family Court by the respondent. On April 26, 2000 a rebuttal to the objections was filed by the petitioner. Family Court Act § 439 (e) provides the procedure for review by the Family Court of objections to a determination of the Hearing Examiner, and this decision and order is made to resolve the issues raised by the respondent's objections. Respondent made objections to rulings the Hearing Examiner made pretrial, as well as to both findings of fact and conclusions of law reached in the decision after trial. These issues are addressed separately below.
Objections to Pretrial RulingsIn respondent's pretrial motion he sought dismissal of SCU's objections. The Hearing Examiner denied that application and held a de novo hearing. In his objections to the ensuing decision and order, respondent's first objection is the contention that his motion to dismiss was improperly denied. There are essentially three arguments made in support of this contention: (1) the objections procedure used in this case deprived the respondent of due process of law, because SCU's objections to its proposed COLA did not identify any basis for the objections; (2) SCU was improperly attempting to modify the parties' stipulation using the adjustment procedure of Family Court Act § 413-a when modification could not be obtained under principles of substantive case law; and (3) SCU lacked standing in this case to file objections. All of these contentions involve analysis of Family Court Act § 413-a. This statute is relatively new (added by L 1997, ch 398, § 99, eff Jan. 1, 1998) and there is little decisional law to assist in interpreting the statute. The record indicates that the mother sought a COLA and that SCU computed the amount by which to adjust the old support order and filed an "Adjusted Order of Support" indicating an intention to increase the father's child support obligation by about $7 per week. Pursuant to statute, the proposed order contained various procedural safeguards and notices the net effect of which was to inform the parents that the order would go into effect in 35 days unless they objected. However, at approximately the same time as SCU filed the Adjusted Order of Support, it also filed objections to that order. The body of the objections was as follows: "THE SUPPORT COLLECTION UNIT OBJECTS TO THE ADJUSTED ORDER (COPY ATTACHED) RESULTING FROM APPLICATION OF A COST OF LIVING ADJUSTMENT BY THE SUPPORT COLLECTION UNIT. THE COURT WILL ADVISE THE PARTIES AND $57 per week pursuant to the parties' 1991 stipulation resulting in an overpayment that should either be applied as a credit to his continuing support obligation or treated as a basis for deviation from the CSSA standard under Family Court Act § 413 (1) (f). The Hearing Examiner found that the current level of support under the CSSA was $149.62 per week and that there was insufficient reason to deviate from that level of support based upon the alleged overpayments made when he was paying $100 per week. The effect of the Hearing Examiner's determination was to give no credit to the father for the alleged overpayments. While it is clear that respondent was paying $100 per week during the period in question and that he paid approximately $57 per week after his application to terminate his support obligation for David was granted, the record is insufficient to determine if $57 per week or some other figure was the appropriate level of support during that period. Application of the CSSA for support of only Christopher during that period would likely have resulted in a support obligation in excess of $100 per week. Consequently, it is unclear if there was any overpayment.
However, it was appropriate for the Hearing Examiner to consider the effect of that situation on the respondent's current level of support in the context of whether to deviate from the CSSA standard (either an increase or a decrease in support) (Family Ct Act § 413 [1] [f] [7], [10]). The record indicates no abuse of discretion in the Hearing Examiner's conclusion that application of the CSSA standard under these circumstances was not unjust or inappropriate. The court has considered the respondent's remaining arguments and finds them to be without merit. Conclusion The respondent has failed to establish that the Hearing Examiner committed error. Accordingly, his objections to the Hearing Examiner's determination are denied. [1] Apparently, SCU provides services to the mother and represented her at the hearing. The objections filed by SCU on June 4, 2000 were done in the name of the agency, rather than in the name of the mother as authorized by Family Court Act § 413-a (3) (a). Thereafter, it appears that SCU and the mother proceeded as essentially one litigant, the "petitioner." [2] The Office of the Attorney General was notified of litigation addressing the constitutionality of the statute and elected not to intervene. [3] Respondent re-alleges all of his pretrial contentions in his posttrial objections, and those contentions are denied for the same reasons. [4] The respondent offered no explanation for why he did not seek relief concerning the alleged overpayment for the period July 1995 to August 1997 until a hearing in January 2000 except that the record of the appellate process was convoluted.
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