People v. Hinkson

Legal Aid Society (Dennisa Torres of counsel), for defendant. Charles J. Hynes, District Attorney of Kings County (Pascale Charlot of counsel), for plaintiff.

OPINION OF THE COURT

THOMAS FARBER, J. Defendant Mark Hinkson, charged with obstructing governmental administration in the second degree, moves to dismiss his own safety, as well as the safety of the officers and others in the public, at risk, and consequently interfered with and obstructed law enforcement administration." (Supra, at 91.) Although the Court of Appeals noted that the Legislature intended that criminal responsibility should attach to "minimal interference set in motion to frustrate police activity" (supra, at 91), it also took pains to emphasize that its holding was not a departure from Case (supra), but, rather, "a relatively standard application of evidence under the statute that breaks no new interpretive ground." (Supra, at 92.) But whether viewed as a relaxation of the holding in Case or as a "standard application" of the Case rule, implicit in the holding of Davan L. (supra) is a recognition that where the police are involved in activities as potentially dangerous as an undercover buy-and-bust operation, even the utterance of "mere words" can jeopardize the safety of undercover officers and other persons in the vicinity. Where a defendant by his words and actions jeopardizes police operations and places lives in danger, it is appropriate that criminal sanctions be applied. While the facts of the instant case might at first blush seem similar to Davan L. (supra), the information is woefully insufficient. It fails to allege even the most minimal facts which would allow me to conclude that there was any interference with an official governmental act, much less one that was "in part at least" physical. (People v Case, 42 NY2d, supra, at 102.) The information is devoid of any fact that would suggest that there was a specific operation that was "confined and defined," that the defendant was put on notice of any specific operation; or that the defendant "directed his warnings toward a known criminal activity and assembly." (Matter of Davan L., 91 NY2d, at 91.) Nor is there any indication, as in Davan L., that the defendant's actions caused a "physical action or dispersal." Indeed, other than the bare, conclusory assertion that the officer was "on duty," there is no information that there was even an undercover operation in progress. In sum, the People have not alleged even the minimal activity which would be necessary for me to find that defendant's actions constituted "physical interference" within the meaning of Penal Law § 195.05. Since the People have had several opportunities to file a superseding information and have failed to do so, and the speedy trial time having elapsed, the motion to dismiss is granted. [*] The People aver that the defense challenged the information on the ground that it failed to allege that the undercover was engaged in official duties. The arraignment minutes were not attached to the moving papers or response and the court file does not indicate the reason the court found the instrument insufficient.