City of Rochester v. Torpey

John P. Lomenzo for appellant. Clarence J. Henry, District Attorney (John A. Mastrella of counsel), for respondent. that the so-called radar equipment is a mechanism that correctly and accurately records the speed of passing automobiles. The use of radar is comparatively new as a means of bringing about the arrest of violators of ordinances pertaining to the speed of automobiles and until such time as the courts recognize radar equipment as a method of accurately measuring the speed of automobiles in those cases in which the People rely solely upon the speed indicator of the radar equipment, it will be necessary to establish by expert testimony the accuracy of radar for the purpose of measuring speed. It is claimed on behalf of the defendant that the information charging the defendant with the violation in question is fatally defective in that it was sworn to before a commissioner of deeds. The claim is apparently predicated upon the fact that the only persons other than the magistrate authorized to take the oath of the person signing the information are the clerk or deputy clerk of the Criminal Branch of the City Court of Rochester. The Municipal Code of the City of Rochester gives such authority to the clerk and deputy clerk and such other subordinates as may be prescribed but it does not follow that because of such authorization a commissioner of deeds or a notary public is prohibited from taking the oath to an information. One of the powers vested in a commissioner of deeds by section 142 of the Executive Law is "To administer oaths" and the information in question is not defective due to the fact that the oath was administered by a commissioner of deeds. The only requirement of the law insofar as the execution of the information is concerned is that it be sworn to (People ex rel. Livingston v. Wyatt, 186 N.Y. 383). The Court of Appeals of this State has held that an information sworn to before a notary public is a good and sufficient information. (People v. Jacoby, 304 N.Y. 33.) The information in question was not used as the basis for the issuance of a warrant of arrest but solely as a pleading in connection with the trial of the defendant. It therefore follows that the provisions of section 148 of the Code of Criminal Procedure are not applicable to the questioned information. Judgment of conviction is affirmed. Submit order accordingly.